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frBSTRACT 
Economically and educationally Bihar la on* of the 
most backward s tates la the Indian union* Thla backwardness 
la s direct bearing on the behaviour of I t s po l i t i co and 
p o l i t i c i a n s , caate and factions also play important roles 
in the s t a t e p o l i t i c s ana mould i t s nature* 
This work embodies a study of ministerial poll t i e s 
during 1967 - 1977. An analysis of the composition of the 
various councils of Ministers during the period has been 
made with a view to determining (1) the strength of the 
constituent parties; (11) the role of the parties and factions 
in the formation of the Ministries; ( i l l ) Their sola in 
the break-up of the Ministries* This indicates the behaviour 
of the constituent parties resulting in the return of the 
Congress as a dominant party a t the end of the period* 
Through the analyses of the Ministries from the point 
of view of (1) po l i t i ca l part ies; (11) Caste; ( i l l ) region; 
( l v i rural/urban bases; ( • ) age and socio-economic background 
of Ministers; (v l ) representation of women and of minorities* 
an attempt has been made to find out any trends* i f they are 
v is ib le* pertaining to these aspects of Ministry-making* 
The Immediate reasons and circumstances of the f a l l of the 
different governments at different t ines have also been 
studied* 
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Three d i s t inct phases emerge out of the analyse* of 
the Councils of Ministers, The f i r s t phase, namely the 
'Period of Non-Congressiem' from March, 1967 to June, 1968 
cons i s t s of the non-Congress coal i t ion governments only* 
During t h i s period of on*, year and four months, there were 
three ministerial change*. All ministerial collapses were 
brought about by large scale defections, the f i r s t two 
involving intra-party s p l i t s and the third involving the 
threat of defection of an entire party from the government. 
None of the three ministerial cr i ses could be attributed 
to the withdrawal of support by a party on a question of 
principle or the performance of the government: 
The second phase of 'Mixed Coalit ions' , extending 
from February, 1969 to December, 1971, corqprlses of coal i t ion 
governments including the Congress Party. There had been 
f ive ministerial changes, apart from a 227-day President's 
Rule during th i s period* The average l i f e of 5 months 9 days 
of these governments was suff ic ient indication of the deep 
malady of ins tab i l i ty that Bihar was suffering from, sine* 
no party commanded a majority in the Assembly, Independents, 
defectors and mini-parties found an excel lent opportunity 
to f i sh in troubled waters* Even some of the Ministers were 
c lose ly watching the situation* As soon as they found that 
the Ministry, of which they were members, was on the way out, 
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they quickly jumped the fence and got on to the bandwagon 
of the probable winner. Amidst a l l t h i s power p o l i t i c s , 
public Interests and the needs of administration were 
thrown to the winds* 
The third phase Is a period of 'one Party Governments. 
Extending from March* 1972 to April* 1977, t h i s period 
witnessed factional f ights within the ruling Congress 
leading to the collapses of two Mlnlstrie s and the estab-
lishment of a thltid one* That three Congress Ministries 
came to power In a period of three years was a clear 
testimony of the ol igarchic nature of governments In Bihar* 
The Congress promises - of stabi l i ty* prosperity and a 
better life-proved mere sound and fury signifying nothing % 
Congressmen* maintaining the ir old legacy* fought endlessly 
for a share In the ministerial cake* Dlssldence was bu i l t 
up over the Inclusion In or exclusion from the Ministry 
of some leaders of factional groups* 
An attempt to examine the performance of the 
governments has also been made* The governments have been 
c l a s s i f i e d Into two broad categories - the Csallt lon 
Governments and the Congress Governments* While most of 
the Coalition governments came to power on the bas is of 
an agreed common-minimum programme* the Congress governments 
had their party manifestoes subsequently modified by 
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different Chief Ministers la order to give pr ior i t i e s 
to particular items* However* ttoe performance of tha 
successive governments shows that tho Cpalltlon and the 
one party government* were two sides of tho suae coin* 
They were bas ica l ly similar in nature* character sad 
performance. They were not honestly dedicated to the 
causes of the poor and exploited masses* Thay had l i t t l e 
time to attend to the pressing problem* of the State as 
their main concern was either warding off threats to their 
governments or the expansion of the Ministries and 
distribution of portfolios* Their nonperformance la soae 
v i t a l f i e l d s , namely land ce l l ing , adminletratlve reform 
and educational re-orientation was sore glaring, what was 
agonising was that even the minimum of the security of 
l i f e and honour that a c i t i z en was ent i t led to could not 
he guaranteed to him* 
The 'Protest Movement'* which had i t s roots l a the 
ministerial ins tab i l i ty and the non-performance of the 
governments* has also been sought to be studied* However* 
corruption and high prices, which triggered off agitation* 
gave way to the po l i t i ca l demands* v i z . , resignation of 
the Ministry and the dissolution of the Assembly* Likewise* 
students* youth and Sarvodaya workers* who started the 
movement* were pushed back by the pragmatic* hardboiled 
and buslnessmlnded pol i t ic ians* for whom the movement was 
s 
a pure and simple power game. Though, the movement succeeded 
in Rethrowing what was ca l led the authoritarian rule at 
the centre and in the whole of North India, but fa i led to 
achieve i t s basic object ives . The pious hope of establish-
ing the control of 'Lok Shantl* (People's power) over the 
'Raj shaktl» ( s tate power) remainsd unfulfi l led* The people 
who came to power followed the same Congress pattern* which 
they had been c r i t i c i s i n g day in and day out* Above a l l , 
the change of government in 1977 did not succeed in helping 
to bring about s tab i l i ty to Bihar p o l i t i c s . However* i t 
served a useful purpose by exposing the weakness of the 
system that had fa i led to solve the basic problems of the 
people. 
on the whole* therefore, Bihar p o l i t i c s during th i s 
period can be said to represent a po l i t i ca l system suffering 
from the acute malady of malfunctioning in a l l spheres. The 
basic po l i t i ca l structure, however, did not break-up and 
the state could be said to be moving from a pre-democratlc 
to a democratic stage. 
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The politic* of Bihar frow the years 1967 to 1977, 
forms the aabjcct matter of this study* This pol i t ies 
could bo studied in a number of ways and at various levels , 
I t could be studied fro* a sociological, economic, adminis-
trative or other viewpoints. Likewise* the focus could 
f a l l sharply on the village or district level pol i t ics , 
the political party, factions, the caste* strata, class* 
the political leadership* the bureaucracy or any other 
aspect* ttlcro-level studies oould lead to broad generalisa-
tions about the identification and characteristics of Bihar 
pol i t i cs . A single general study attempting to embrace the 
subject in i t s total ity, however, could run the risk of 
being eupnemeral* 
Thus* this study selects, for i t s main focus* the 
Ministerial level* For necessary perspective* an outline 
of the geo-physical and demographic features of Bihar has 
been provided (Chapter I ) . This i s followed by a brief 
survey of Ministerial* largely Congress* and caste polit ics , 
prior to Independence and from there to 1967 (Chapter XX). 
with tine objective of gaining a better understanding 
of Bihar pol i t ics , therefore, the study seeks to analyse 
the composition of the various Councils of Ministers of 
iv 
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Bihar during the It67-1977 period (chapters XXX* XV and V), 
The analyses, in the ir turn, should help l a determining 
( i ) the strength of the constituent parties; (11) their 
role in the formation of the Ministries; ( i l l ) the ir cols 
in the break-up of the Ministries* This can be expected 
to indicate the behaviour of the constituent parties leading 
to the reassertlon of the Congress as the dominant party 
a t the end of the period* 
Another l i n e of enquiry constitutes finding out 
other aspects of the Ministries, namely* their composition 
from the points of view of (1) po l i t i ca l parties* (11) caste, 
( i l l ) region, ( lv ) rural/urban bases, (v) age, soc io-
economic background of Ministers, (v l ) representation of 
women and of minorities* wherever* such data liave been 
available* Effort has also been made to find any trends, 
i f they are v i s i b l e , pertaining to these aspects l a Ministry 
making* The study also seeks to unravel the immediate 
reasons and circumstances of the f a l l of the different 
Ministries at different times* 
Furthermore, most governments that came to power 
during t h i s period had certain declared minimum common 
programmes. Carrying the researches further, an attempt 
has been made to examine what measures, l e g i s l a t i v e or 
executive* were taken by them to implement the programmes 
and to see how far such measures came near the avowed 
*1 
promises (chapter VI)• 40 evaluation of the political 
impact of the composition of the Ministries end of the 
Mini atonal changee, aa well as tho general working of 
the governments* follows aa a corollary. 
another rather uouaual and in soma measure catalytic 
f motor that influenced the working of the govoinmauta, 
Mlnlatorlal compoaltlon and leadership* tho oloctlona of 
1977 and tho subsequent developments of Bihar polltlca has 
boon taken into consideration* This was tho proteat movement 
started by tho students la 1974 and taken ovor by Jaya 
Prakaah Narayaa and political partioo in tho Opposition* 
Tho essential featurea of thlo movement* Ite dirootloa and 
Its roaulto pertaining to Bihar politico novo boon ©ought 
to be examined (Chapter VII). 
Aa • rooult of tho anolyala of the Council of 
Mini a tor a iron different anaioa* an evaluation of tho 
perioramnee of tho govemmenta in the light of their promises 
and an examination of the protest movement* certain charac* 
terlaclca of tho Bihar Hinlstriea during thlo period emerge* 
Tho evaluation of the performance of the governments in 
the light of their promises end tho examination of tho 
proteat movement leada to certain oonoluolono obout tho 
main features of Bihar government and tho nature of polltlca 
in Bihar during the period* certain treads are also visible* 
These results are embodied as 'Conclusions' In the last 
chapter v m . 
*u 
significance) 
k party-wise* caste-wise analysis of the various 
Councils of Ministers i s a key to the understanding of the 
interplay of po l i t i ca l forces in Bihar po l i t i c s* Their 
composition re f l ec t s the balance of forces at a given time 
and the ir changes indicate po l i t i ca l trends* Age-vise, 
rural/urban and region-wise analysis and the representation 
of women and of minorities have been regarded as Important 
indicators of the soc io-pol i t ica l character of the Ministries* 
Chapters VX and vi I , described above, are expected to reveal 
the extent of fai lures or successes of various governments* 
t h e i r s t a b i l i t y and legitimacy* we also get analysed, data-
based results about what may be cal led outstanding t r a i t s 
of Bihar p o l i t i c s during the period* 
I t has not been possible, however* for want of time 
and space to include certain aspects of the problem within 
the scope of th i s study* Election-time promises of the 
p o l i t i c a l parties and the a c t i v i t i e s of the governments 
covered very wide economic* social* educational and cultural 
areas* k few* however* have been selected for examination 
in view of their importance* l i k e land ceiling* law and 
order, prices* educational* administrative and agricultural 
reforms* I t has not been possible e i ther to take stock of 
the actual effects* i f any* of the l e g i s l a t i v e or executive 
v t l t 
•taps taken by the various governments on the l i v e s of 
the poor/ nor to measure the extent of the r i s e or f a l l 
in the standard of l i v ing of the common man. 
A comprehensive questionnaire was presented to , and 
interviews were sought from many of the Bihar leaders. 
However* only a few* re lat ive ly speaking* could find time 
for personal interviews and fewer for written answers* 
&£Sfi&l£*£&2£ 
Following the f i r s t two background chapters* the 
analyses of the Councils of Ministers have been divided 
into three broad phases; each phase representing a category 
of governments in power* 
The f i r s t phase* devoted to the study of the non-
Con? ress coa l i t ion governments from March, 1967 to June*1968, 
Includes the formation of the f i r s t united Front non-
congress Government* the bargaining among the constituents 
and* f inally* the defeat of the government* This phase also 
includes two other governments* namely* tike Defectors* 
Government supported by the congress and the Second United 
Front Government* The period highlights the beginning of 
the p o l i t i c s of defection and threats of withdrawal from 
the Ministries* 
The second phase comprises the mlxex coal i t ion 
u 
governments including the congress Party. NO l e s s than 
f i v e different governments cams to power daring the period 
extending from February* 19*9 to December, 1971. of these* 
one government was led by the undivided Cong rasa and two 
other* were led by the Congress (ft). The other two govern-
ments were non-congress coal i t ions excluding the CPI and 
the PSP in one of them. The roles of the Congress/ Jan Sangh, 
8SP and other parties and spl inter and regional groups in the 
making and breaking of governments have been analysed. 
The third phase extending from March, 1972 to April, 
1977 deals with three Congress governments. This period 
witnessed the increased factional f ights within the ruling 
Congress leading to the ouster of the Pandey and the Ghafoor 
Ministries and the establishment of Jagannath Mlshra's 
which 
government/in i t s turn, was dismissed in April, 1977. 
The performance of the governments has also been 
examined in a chronological order. The governments have been 
broadly c l a s s i f i e d into two categories - the Coalition 
Governments and the Congress Governments* Host of the 
governments in the former category* excepting the minor ones* 
came to power on the basis of camion-minimum programmes* The 
Congress governments had their e lect ion manifesto* subse-
quently modified by different chief Ministers for giving 
pr ior i t i e s to particular programmes* The f i e ld of ac t i v i t i e s 
se lected for re-view l ike law and order* prices* employment, 
X 
and various reforms art common to different governments. 
This provide* a basis for a comparative assessment. 
The protest movement of 1974-75, without going Into 
the details, have been studied as far as it has relevance 
for Bihar politics. The emphasis is on the issues involved* 
the direction of the movement, and the nature of participants 
in the movement. 
conclusions regarding the councils of Ministers are 
followed by results relating to the performance of the 
governments and the impact of the protest movement. The 
concluding portion embodies explanatory observations as well 
as observations about the nature of leadership* the legitimacy 
of governments and the stability and character of Bihar 
politics. 
Methodology 
This thesis embodies an empirical study of the govern-
ments and politics of Bihar. Zt attempts * data-based 
quantitative analysis of the nature and main characteristics 
of the subject under study. Documentary information and 
minutes of the legislative debates have been supplemented by 
written answers from or personal interviews with leading 
figures who took part in the shaping of Bihar politics during 
the period. The questionnaire and interviews related to the 
most significant aspects of Bihar politics. 
A quantitative analysis to determine the characteris-
t i c s of the governments and their performance Is not enough* 
This analysis has been placed in the l i ght of the Bihar*s 
socio-economic perspectives and the evaluation has been made 
on the bas i s of the f inal cri terion for any po l i t i ca l organi-
zation, i . e . * the good of the common nan. 
Sources 
The sources of the study comprise time following*-
Bihar Government Publications. 
Legis lat ive assembly Debates 
e lec t ion Commission Reports 
Census of India 
publications of Po l i t i ca l Parties 
Memoirs of a Chief Minister and other leaders. 
Personal interviews with po l i t i ca l leaders 
Scholarly works on Bihar Po l i t i c s / coa l i t ion Governments 
Art ic les in learned journals* and 
Newspapers and periodicals . 
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tii) 
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( i v ) 
<v) 
(vt> 
(via 
(vlli) 
(lx) 
BUKV&Y OF LITgRATUHE 
The literature dealing with Bihar politic* of the 
period under study is but scanty. However* some literature 
that deals with certain aspects of polities la Bihar is 
available and makes valuable contribution toward an under-
standing of the subject. 
The Theory of Political Coalition by W.H, Riker and 
Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation by Abram De Swaan 
deal with various theories of coalition making. Coalition in 
Parliamentary Government by Lawrence c. Dodd deals with 
cabinet formation in multiparty legislatures and the stability 
and durability of such cabinets. 
Coalition Governments la India i Problems and Prospects 
edited by K.P. Karunakaran deals with theories and concepts 
of coalition making, the attitudes of different political 
parties to coalition and impact of coalition governments on 
Indian political system* 
Coalition Politics in India edited by N.c. sahnl deals 
with the functioning of some coalition governments in the 
Indian polity. 
Twilight or Dawn $ The Political Changs in India (It 67-
1971) by Iqbal Narain deals with the efficacy of the Indian 
political system, various 'forms of coalition* and the Impact 
of the functioning of coalition governments on political 
institutions. 
xiii 
s t a f P o l i t i c s In India (1967) edited by the M M 
author deals with the condition*, constraints and infra-
structures of p o l i t i c s in various s tates and the role of 
p o l i t i c a l part ies . 
State P o l i t i c s in India (1976)edited again by Iqbal 
Narain, perhaps the f i r s t complete book on Stats p o l i t i c s 
in India* covers the period 1967-1971 exhaustively. I t i s a 
praiseworthy attempt towards building a1theory of State 
p o n t i c s ' in India. This theory growing out of the study 
finds place toward the end of the volume* 
Reflections on Indian Po l i t i c s by J.C, Johari deals 
with the p o l i t i c s of Coalitions and defections during 1967-
1971* He also deals with what he c a l l s s in i s t er and pernicious 
trends of Naxalite movement and mil itant and protective 
regionalism* 
P o l i t i c s of infection by subhash C* Kashyap i s 
concerned with p o l i t i c s of defections in different s tates 
and i t s motivations particularly during the period 1967-1969* 
P o l i t i c s of Power by the same author i s devoted to 
the problem of defection. I t s motivations and i t s impact 
on the party position in the leg is latures and the s tab i l i ty 
of governments. Kashyap also describes th«% p o l i t i c s of 
power In some states including Bihar* 
xiv 
Language, i f XtaIon and Po l i t i c s In north India by 
Paul R. Brass deals with the p o l i t i e s of language*particularly 
Maithill and Urdu In Bihar* po l i t i c* of Urdu In uttar Pradesh 
and p o l i t i e s of re l ig ion in the Punjab* 
A Comparison of the BSP and the CPI Radical P o l i t i c s 
in South l a l a edited by Paul R. Brass and Marcus Franda 
deals with the nature of Left parties in India and the role 
of the CPI and the SSP during coal i t ion period in Bihar* 
'Were Bamsmaran' by Inugrah Narain Sinha deals with 
the factional p o l i t i c s in the Congress Party and Government 
i n Bihar* 
Cohesion in a Predominant Party i The Pradesh Congress 
and Party P o l i t i c s in Bihar by Mahendra P. Singh deals with 
the factional p o l i t i c s and i t s impact on the cohesion of 
the dominant party during 1937-1967. I t also brief ly discusses 
p o l i t i c s of coa l i t ions and defections in Bihar during 19*7-
1970. 
'Jab Main Mukhya Mantrl Tha'by Mahamaya Prasad Slnha 
describes the Manoeuvrings, bargainings and pressure tact ics 
by the partners of the f i r s t united Front Government of which 
he was the chief Minister. I t a lso discusses the conf l ic t s 
among the constituent parties and i t s impact on the function-
ing and s t a b i l i t y of the government. 
H v 
Po l i t i ca l E l i t es and Modernization! The Bihar Po l i t i c s 
by Ram Ahuja Pays attention to the type, commitment and 
inter-group relat ions of the pol i t ica l e l i t e s in economic 
growth and po l i t i ca l s tabi l i ty* 
Po l i t i ca l E l i t e in Bihar by Shashishskhar Jha deals 
with t h e social and po l i t i ca l structures from which pol i t ical 
e l i t e s including Muslims and Tribals emerge* I t also deals 
with the social background and Interest a f f i l i a t ion of the 
l eg i s la tors and their views regarding various developmental 
programmes. 
The HarlJan E l i t e by Sachchidananda, though does not 
re f lec ts the situation at the grass-root l e v e l , examines the 
status of educated e l i t e s / drawn from f ive scheduled castes , 
in their own community and i n the society, the ir mobility and 
the i r perception of social transformation and their role in 
providing leadership for social transformation In their own 
community, 
A detai led study of the governments in Biter during 
l t67-ltT7 - their £o mat ion, composition and their breaking 
up - and the performance of these governments in the perspective 
of the conditions in the State and the forces at work behind 
governmental Instabi l i ty has not been nade* Such a study with 
I t s focus on Bihar has hmen undertaken in t h i s work* 
CHAPTER I 
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE I THE ROOTS OF BACKWARDNESS 
Territory 
o 
The state of Bihar lies between latitudes 21.58' and 
o o o 
27.31* N and longitudes 93.20* and 58.32' E. The State is 
entirely landlocked and the nearest point from the sea (Bay 
of bengal) is 90 kms. To the north it shares an international 
frontier of approximately 482 kms. with the Independent 
kingdom of Nepal, to the east its boundary stretches with 
that of West Bengal for a distance of 482 km?., to the south 
it is bounded by Orissa for a distance of 421 kms. and to 
the south-west and west lie the states of Madhya Pradesh and 
uttar Pradesh with which it shares a border of 260 kms. and 
1 
540 kms. respectively. The State i s roughly quadrilateral in 
shape with a maximum distance from noth to south being 
approximately 605 kms. and the east-west distance at i t s 
widest point being about 483 kms. With a tota l area of 
approximately 1,74,000 sq. kms. (67,196 sq. miles)> Bihar 
covers 5.3 percent of India's land surface and i s the eighth 
2 
largest State in the Indian Union in terms of area. 
1 . Government of Bihar Revenue Department, Report on 
AgriculturalCensus, 1970-71 (Patnat Secretary to 
Government, Revenue and Land Reform Departments, and 
Commissioner, Agricultural Census, Bihar), p. 11. 
2 . Ibid. 
1 
2 
In 1912, the province of Bihar and Orissa was separated 
from Bengal and/again in 1937 Orissa was formed into a 
separate province. Since then Bihar has continued to function 
as a province by itself. With the achievement of Independence* 
the states of Saraikela and KhaYsawan lying geographically 
within Singhbhum district were integrated with Bihar. On the 
1st November, 1956/ as a result of the reorganization of 
States* 8,105 sq. kms. in Purnea and Manbhum districts were 
a 
transferred to west bengal State. 
Almost half of the total area of the State consists 
of hills and plateaus with an average altitude varying from 
305 to 610 metres above the sea level* alternating with the 
rivers* valleys and basins separating the hills. The remaining 
half is flat plain with an average altitude varying between 
31 to 61 metres from sea level* with the exception of a 
4 
small range of hills in the extreme north-west. 
Broadly speaking* the plains region is alluvial with 
gentle slope towards the east. The river Ganga* whose length 
in Bihar is about 550 kms.* divides the plains region into 
two unequal parts* viz.* the North Bihar Plains and the 
South Bihar Plains. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid.* p. 13. 
3 
The North blhar Plalne comprise* the area between Hepal 
border lit the north and the river Ganga In the eouth and has 
S 
an area of about 22,000 sq. a l i a s 153.8 thousand so . tas*)« 
Xt Includes the la d i s t r i c t s of East Chaaparan, Meat Chaaparan* 
Satan, Slwan, Qopalganj, Sltamarhi, Muzaffarpur, Valshall, 
Madhubanl, Darbhanga, Samastlpur, begusarai# Saharsa# Purnea, 
Katlhar and portions of Moaghyr* With the exception of Soaeshwar 
and Dun h i l l s in the extras* nortlv-weet, the plains la completely 
level, and a t no point does I t s elevation exceeds 76 astro* 
above seal level* 
lhe South Gangetlc Plains comprise a the area between 
the r iver Ganga and the southern hi l l - lands* I t Includes the 
d i s t r i c t s of Rohtas* bhojpur. Patna, Malanda* t*awadah, Gaya, 
Auraagabad* portions of Monghyr* ehagalpur and Santhal Paragnaa* 
This plains covers an area of approximately 13,000 sq .a l l e s 
(40.3 thousand sq* tans./. I t i s wide towards the west and the 
6 
middle,and extremely narrow towards the wast. The south 
plains d i f fers la manymspecta from the north Gangetic plains . 
Zt i s higher In the south and slopes towards the Ganga but 
the slope i s not so gradual as in the north plains* while the 
north i s l i a b l e to flood and change, the south Gangetic plains 
i s stable and not subject to flood except in dlara (low lying 
S. K.K* blwaxar, Bihar IterattflM Aflttl (Calcuttai Orifeht 
Longnans, 19S6), p. 51. 
»* Ibid*, p . 25* 
4 
area along with river which i s subject to f luvial act ions) . 
The Plateau region of Bihar i s the second of the great 
natural divisions in the s ta te and i s the north-easterly 
projection of s t i l l order plateau, v i z . , pensular India.Covering 
an area of 97.6 thousand sq, tans., comprising 46 percent of 
7 
Bihar, i t Includes the d i s t r i c t s of Ranch!, Hazarlbagh,Singhbhura, 
Dhanbad, Palarau, the greater part of Santhal Paragnas as well 
as portions of Rohtas, Aurangabad, Monghyr and Bhagalpur 
d i s t r i c t s . In contrast to the Bihar plains, the plateau region 
i s quite uneven and consists of a ser ies of plateaus each 
occurring at a height of different from the other. Whereas 
the plains part of the State, especial ly the northern part of 
i t , i s predominantly an agricultural area, the plateau part 
i s f u l l of mineral resources and i s often viewed as the Ruhr 
of India. Zt accounts for 40.47% of India's mineral production* 
comprising coal , iron, ore, limestone, mica, copper, kyanlte, 
china-clay, f ire-c lay and bauxiate. I t s coal production accounts 
for 434 of the total coal production of India, i t s Iron ore 
production for 40% of India's total ,and copper production 
8 
for 100 .^ of India's to ta l . 
Civ i l izat ion in Bihar grew along the river Ganga and 
7. Government of Bihar, op. c l t . , p. 16. 
a. finayat Ahmad, Bihar* A Physical, Economic and Regional 
Geography (Ranchl * Ranch! University, 1965;, pp.6-7. 
5 
spread towards north and south* In the south, i t was checked 
by the h i l l s and the plateaus of Chotanagpur. The barrier 
was so formidable that the culture and economic patterns of 
Chotanagpur remained completely d i s t inc t from those of the 
river val ley c i v i l i z a t i o n of the north. The people of Chota-
nagpur retained the ir tr ibal social patterns and methods 
9 
of production, 
T i l l 1st October* 1972* Bihar was divided into 17 
d i s t r i c t s within four divisions* Since then three new divisions 
and 14 new d i s t r i c t s have been created* of which two(Gopalganj 
and Katihar) were created as recently as October* 1973* The 
names of the new divis ions and d i s t r i c t s may be seen in the 
Table X* 
With 56.35 mill ion (56*353*369 inhabitants) a t sun 
r i s e on April 1* 1971* Bihar has 10.3 percent of the total 
Indian population and ranks second (next only to Uttar Pradesh) 
in the Indian union by the s ize of population* although i t 
covers only 5.3 percent of the country's land surface. I t s 
population density of 324 per sq* km. i s the third among the 
10 
States aftser Kerala (548 per sq.km) and West Bengal(507/sq.km). 
9 . Techo-Economlc Survey of Bihar* Vol. I , National Council 
of Applied Economic Research* New Delhi (Bombayi Asia 
Publishing House* 1959)* pp. 5-8. 
10. Government of India* Census of India* 1971 * Series 4, 
Hnar* £2£tIXA., general Popul atipn To^jH (Patnai 
Director of Census Operations* Bihar)* p. VII• 
TABLE I 
Showing old and new divisions and districts of Bihar 
DIVISIONS 
—r— -mar + •mar LIS1RICTS j "TOT "nnr 
Tlrhut Tlrhut 
(H.Q.Muzaffarpur> 
Bhagalpur , (H.Q.bhagaipur 
Patna 
(H.Q.Patna) 
Chotanagpur 
(H.G. Ranchl) 
Champaran 
Muzaffarpur 
Saran 
Darbhanga Darbhanga 
(H.Q .Darbhanga) 
bhagalpur 
Koshl 
(H.Q.Saharsa) 
Patna 
MonghyrlPartJ 
Bhagalpur 
MonghyriPart) 
Santhal Paragnas 
Purnea 
Saharaa 
Patna 
Gaya 
Shahabad 
North Chota- Hazabibagh 
nagpur 
(H.Q.Hazarlbagh) 
Dhanbad 
South Shota-
nagpur 
IH.Q.Ranch!) 
Palamu 
Ranchl 
Slnghbhua 
West Champaran 
East Champaran 
Sltamarhi 
Muzaffarpur 
Vaisha l l 
Saran 
Gopalganj 
Slvan 
Madhubani 
Darbhanga 
samastlpur 
Bsgusarai 
bhagalpur 
Monghyr 
i Santhal Paragnas 
Purnea 
Katihar 
Saharsa 
Patna 
Nalanda 
Gaya 
Nawadah 
Aurangabad 
Bhoj pur 
Rohtas 
Hazarlbagh 
fiirdlh 
Dhanbad 
Palamu 
Ranch! 
Singhbhum 
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The population of Bihar i s unevenly distributed* The 
North Bihar Plains* with an area of 53.8 thousand sq* kas. , 
has a population of 25.4 mil l ion, the South Bihar Plains with 
an area of 40.3 thousand sq. tans*, has a population of 
16*7 mill ion and the Chotanagpur plateau region covering 
79• 6 thousand sq. JOBS, has a population of 14.2 mi l l ion. 
The population in Bihar i s predominantly rural and 
agricultural* In 1961 census, the proportion of 'urban* 
population to total population in Bihar was 8*43 percent which 
went up to 10 percent in the 1971 census* As against th i s , 
the rat io of urban population to total population for a l l -
Indla was 17*91 percent in 1961 which went up to 19*91 percent 
in 1971* The s ta te i s thus only half as urbanised as the 
country as a whole* The regional variations in the proportion 
13 
of urban to total population in the State i s indicated below* 
North Bihar 5*2 
South Bihar 12.6 
Chotanagpur 16*0 
State of Bihar 10.o 
11. Government of Bihar, o p . c l t . , p. 28* 
12 . 'Urban* Is defined in 1971 census in terms of (1) a 
population not l e s s than 5,000;(2)density not l e s s than 
400 persons per sq.kmseO) at l ea s t three-fourth of the 
adult male population engaged in non-agricultural 
l ivelihoods Ibid*, p. 32. 
13. Xbld*« p. 32* 
a 
while the northern basin is by far the least urbanised, 
the relative hlyhor degro© of urbanisation in Chotanagpur 
area is also somewhat deceptive inasmuch as it is on account 
of a tew heavy and mineral basso Industrial complex forming 
see^^^vee^w^ ew WPW « e w^^*^^ ^P s^^evo* *™ w^ oe'^Mwewewsj^i^eMiy^y e> OJSSP •^e^ e^ ** ewe^^e/ei* eii^w^w years, 
however* the race of growth of urban population in the Stats 
has bean higher then that for the country as a whole* The 
actual rate of growth being 49*03 percent In the decaeto 1951HH, 
and 43.95 percent In 1&41-71 a* against 27*41 percent and 
14 
38*83 percent respectively of the country as a whole. 
Among 202 towns,only 9 of then could be categorised 
as c i t i e s with a population of 100,000 or wore, with 9 c i t i e s , 
bihar ranks seventh after uttar Pradesh {22), raaillnadtt and 
Maharashtra 117 eachv, west Bengal (15)* Andhra (l3),Madhya 
15 
Pradesh i l l ) mod Karaataka Uoj* in 1981, -ihar had 153 
towns out of which 7 were ci t ies* I t i s pertinent to note 
that towns with a population of one lakh and more have been 
growing at ouch faster rates than towns and while in 1981 
such towns haa only 13 percent of total population,* in 1971 
18 
they had as ouch as 46 percent of the urban population, thus, 
esMseeM*eeje«»OT*e»i***He*MMMMNMNMM^^ 
14* ££&&• 
*&• frijltfr ^hlWfo *1<a»*ff' *$??•?• 81. *ive of the nine 
c i t i e s - Vetaa* ^Iharsharlf # 3aya« Mongbyr* fchagalpur 
are in the south Bihar, two - Musaufarpur ana larbhanga 
are in the North uiharr and two - Jaashedpur and £*nchi 
are in the Chotanagpur belt* 
18* oovernment of bihar, ma. e l t . . p, 32. 
9 
there is a trend towards centralization of population In 
big towns and urban agglomeration. 
Literacy 
Zn the f i e l d of l i teracy , Bihar comes very close to 
the bottom. In 1961, Bihar had 18.40 percent l i t e r a t e s as 
against the a l l -India average of 24*08 percent. In 1971 while 
the a l l - India average of l i teracy has grown from 24.08 to 
29.34# that i s , a growth of 22.10 percent* Bihar registered 
a growth of just 7.52 percent with a r i se from 18.40 to 19.77 
percent and only two s tates - Raj as than and Jammu and Kashmir 
are lower in ranks than bihar in t h i s regard. During the same 
period, Kerala has taken a big leap from 46.85 to 60.16 percent, 
West bengal from 29.28 to 33.05 percent* Maharashtra from 
29.82 to 39.08 percent and Tamil Nadu from 31.41 to 39.39 
17 
percent. 
The Society 
Bihar i s a highly cleavaged society with multiple l ines 
of reinforcing l i n g u i s t i c , re l ig ious and caste divis ions . 
Hindus are by far the largest re l ig ious community accounting 
for 83.5 percent of the population of the State. Muslims come 
17. Government of India, Census of India, Paper I , 1971, 
Supplement Provisional Population Totals (Delhit 
Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India), 
p. 1? Bihar Through Figure^, pp. 62-63. 
10 
next In numerical strength comprising 13.5 percent* The 
State has a large Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
population* In 1971. the total population of the Scheduled 
Castes was 7*9 million and that of Scheduled Tribes 4*9 million* 
The two together constitute 22*9 percent of the total popula-
lB 
tlon of the state against 21.5 percent for all-India* The 
regional variation in Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
are as followst 
Portion to ^ RSGIGNS 
total J North J South « Chota- i State of 
population « Bihar • Bihar 0 nagpur $ Bihar 
« * tl I 
scheduled Castes 17*9 11*5 9*9 14*1 
Scheduled Tribes 0.8 0*9 32*1 8.8 
Scheduled Castes & lB*7 12*4 42.0 22*9 
Scheduled Tribes 
Combined 
The Hindus and the Muslims are divided Into several 
social stratifications* The Muslims are first divided Into 
two sects - the Shlyas and the Sunnls. Both these two sects 
are sub-divided traditionally Into various stratifications/ 
18. Government of Bihar* OP. clt., p* 32* 
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Including Syeds and Sheikhs and Mall Iks. Lowest in the s t r a t i -
f icat ion are the Julahas, the Lhunias, the Kujars and the 
Kabarls and d i s t inc t from them, the Momlns. Though the Muslims 
claim that the ir social relations are based on the Islamic 
principle of equality, in actual practice, they have followed 
c a s t e - l i n e s . The Sunnls and the Shiyas ranking above the rest 
have continued to be guided to some extent# i f not wholly, by 
the traditional social alienation and antagonism between the 
two sect ions . 
The Hindus of Bihar have continued to remain divided 
into three sub-strata - the High Castes or Upper Castgsthe 
Backward and the Scheduled castes (Harijans and others; . In 
terras of ritual status, the caste system forms a hierarchy with 
the Brahmins at the top and the Shudras at the bottom with 
Kshatrlyas and Valshyas in that order - in the middle. The 
f i r s t three vathnc jo in t ly constitute the e l i t e fttflja ("twice 
bom") category and can be conveniently referred to as the 
•Upper Castes*, whereas the Shudras or the 'Backward Castes' 
and the lower Shudras or the "Scheduled Castes" can be 
19 
characterised as the lower castes . The Brahmins, the Rajputs, 
the Bhumlhars and the Kayasthas constitute the Upper Caste 
stratum, the Yadavas, the Kuj-mia, the Koiris, the Ban las # the 
19. Mahendra P. Singh, Cohesion in a Predominant Party* 
The Pradesh Congress and Party Po l i t i c s in Bihar 
tNew Delhi: &. Chand & Co., 1975), p. 26. 
12 
Barbis, the Lhanuka, the Kahars, the Kanus, the Kumhars, the 
Lohars, the Mallahs, the Nal, the Tantwas and the Tells fall 
la the Backward stratum, the Dusadhs, the Chamars, the Mushars, 
the Tantis, the Lhobis, the Pasls and the Coma are regarded 
as the scheduled Caste stratum. 
The caste system Is the most salient feature of the 
Hindu social structure. It divides and stratifies the Hindu 
society Into a large number of sub-groups, separate yet 
Integrated. The separate Identities of the various castes are 
nourished by strict prohibitions on marrying outside the sub-
group and sanctions against mobility from one caste to other* 
Integration among the various castes is maintained by hierar-
chical gradation and functional inter-dependence among them 
In a complex system of exchange services and obligations known 
20 
as the 'Jajmani* system, 
Upper Caste? t A notable feature of the caste system In Bihar 
Is the predominant position of the Upper Castes in the life 
of the State lnspite of their numerical weakness. They 
constitute only 13 percent of the State population, but their 
numerical weakness is compensated to a considerable extent 
by their higher ritual status, social prestige, economic 
power and modern educatxou. The Table II shows percentage 
distribution of castes in various regions of Bihar. 
20. Oscar i»ewis, "caste and the Jajmani System" in his 
V H I age Life in Northern India (New York: Vintage Books, 
1958), pp. 55-84; quoted in Mahendra P. Singh, op.clt., 
p. 26. 
13 
21 
tkASHSmmmJdmm 
Showing percentage distribution of 
castes in various regions of Bihar 
castes w. RBBIQHS i North C South I Chota- rf s tate of 
ft Bihar 0 Bihar 0 nagpur 0 Bihar 
Upper castes 
Lower Castes or 
Backward Castes 
Scheduled Castes 
Scheduled Tribes 
Muslims 
13.8 
56.3 
14.0 
7.3 
15.3 
18.4 
55.6 
16.8 
1.2 
9.7 
7.7 
48.4 
11.9 
31.5 
8.0 
13,2 
52.2 
14.1 
9.1 
U.5 
The brahmins enjoy the f i r s t position in ritual 
matters though economically they are the poorest. The 
Kayasthas* although low on the scale of the r i tual status, 
have 'r ival led the Brahmins in everything connected with 
22 
the pen'. The Bhumihars and the Rajputs* constituting about 
7 percent of the population, are the land-owning gentry 
accounting for 78.6 percent of the land areas in Bihar and 
23 
thereby dominate the economic l i f e of the State . The economic 
21. Mahendra P. Singh* pp.c i t .* p. 29. 
22. B.B. Mishra* The Indian Middle Classt Their Growth, in 
Modern Times (Londont Oxford University Press 
p. 6 i . 
fW 
23. N.K. Singh, "Many iaces of Caste Politics"* Economic and 
P o l i t i c a l Weekly, VoU 7U5),Apri l 8*1972, p / 7 4 8 . 
14 
inequality had i t s e f f ec t s in other f i e l d s a l s o . In terras 
of modern s k i l l s and education, too, the Upper Castes happened 
to be the e a r l i e s t recipient of the modern Western education 
with the resul t that they predominate even in the high status 
24 
modern profession* The 1931 census for Bihar and Orlssa 
reveals that of the four Upper Castes, the Kayasthas have 
been the most l i t e r a t e caste (372 per 1,000), followed by the 
Brahmins (195 per 1,000), the Bhumihars (136 per 1,000) and 
Rajputs (120 per 1,000). Among the lower Castes, for the 
Kurrais and the Yadavas there were only 4 0 + 5 0 l i t e r a t e persons 
per thousand, and the Te l l s had only 52 l i t e r a t e persons per 
thousand. The census further shows that the Kayasthas are 
ahead of a l l other castes in respect of English education. 
They were followed by Brahmins, Bhumihars and the Hajputs.The 
gap between the Upper Castes and the Lower Castes i s again 
26 
very wide. 
Backward caster However, the situation has now changed to 
a considerable extent, especially after the 1967 elections 
when 'Backward caste dominated * politics began in Bihar. 
Their dominant role in state politics may be borne out by the 
24* R.C Prasad, "Educational Development in Bihar" .Seminar, 
July, 1968, pp. 26-29. 
25* Ramashray Hoy, "caste and Political Recruitment in 
Bihar", in Rajni Kothari (ed.), caste in Indian Politics, 
(New telhit Orient Longmans, 1970), p. 234. 
26. Ibid. 
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fact that of the fourteen Chief Ministers since 1967, f ive 
have been of Backward Castes, four of Scheduled Castes, one 
of the Muslim community and the remaining four have been of 
Upper c a s t e s . Accordingly the ir share in ministerial posts 
has a lso Increased considerably. Out of 350 ministers In the 
period concerned with this study, 103 belonged to the Backward 
Castes, I . e . 28.6% ministerial berths went to them. After 
22 percent reservation In government Jobs for them, the 
s i tuat ion has further Improved In the ir favour* Thus, the 
'cumulative Inequality' maintained so far by the Upper Castes 
has been removed to a very great extent. 
I t Is Important to note that among the Backward Castes, 
Yadavas, Kurmis, Kolrls and Banlas constitute a separate 
segment of 'advanced* cas tes . Indeed, members of these four 
castes are better-oft both economically and p o l i t i c a l l y than 
some of the Upper Castes in many areas. For Instance, the 
Brahmins in Hadhubani d i s t r i c t are desperately poor, while 
the former own most of the land In the d i s t r i c t . Similarly, 
the Yadavas and the Kurmis enjoy the status of dominant 
castes in some part of the State . The Yadavas, the Kolrls 
and the Kurmis make up 18.5 percent of the population in 
Bihar or more than three- f i f ths of the total population of 
the 128 Backward Castes. The Kurmis, the smallest among the 
three groups, were, even in 1931, regarded as the most 
27 
soc ia l ly conscious of the Backward Castes. The extent to 
27. Prem Shankar Jha, "Bihar's Dangerous Venture* Reserved 
Jobs for Backward Castes", Times of India (New Delhi) , 
p. 6:4, March 30, 1978. 
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which those four castes dominate the State in various spheres 
becomes clear iron the fact that of the 94 MLAs belonging 
to the Backward Castes after the 1977 elections, as many as 
91 belonged to them* £o was the case with the Cabinet 
Ministers and Ministers of State except the Chief Minister 
Karpoorl Thakur* Among the Parliamentary Secretaries, there 
was only one who belonged to a different caste* Of the 216 
gazetted officers belonging to the Backward Castes, only 7 
belonged to other castes* Only 1.4 percent of the stipends 
and scholarships to students of Backward Castes are enjoyed 
28 
by those who do not belong to the four castes. It Is, there-
fore, not surprising thai the four castes constituted the 
vanguard of the job reservation agitation. 
scheduled Caster . The 'Lower Castes' known as Scheduled 
Castes in government vocabulary, who account for \U 
percent of the total population include the untouchables ' 
or Harijans. They earn their livelihood as sweepers, agricul-
tural labourers and landless labourers* inspite of having 
two Chief Ministers, including the second Janata Chief 
Minister, Ram Sundar Las (the previous one had been the 
Chief Minister three times), besides their numerical strength, 
28. P.c. Gandhi, "Job Reservation in Bihar: Playing for 
High Stakes", Times of India, April 20, 1978, p. 6. 
It Is to be noted that figures about ministers^Mlnlsters 
of state and Parliamentary Secretaries are related 
with the Karpoorl Thakur Ministry after 1977 elections. 
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they have not yet been a po l i t i ca l force to reckon with* 
They are s t i l l oppressed not only by the Upper Castes but 
a lso by the neo-rich advanced section from among the Backward 
Castes* 
Scheduled Trlbef The Scheduled Tribes* accounting for 8.8 
percent of the total population continue to suffer on accoapt 
of the ir economic and educational backwardness* They are s t i l l 
exploited by the 'Detkus' (outsiders who have se t t l ed in 
Chotanagpur region). But their po l i t i ca l leaders have not 
been very honest to them* Mo doubt* they very often raise 
the banner of a separate Jharkhand State* but the moment they 
get po l i t i ca l pelf* they forget the ir exploited fellows* 
However* i t i s heartening that the sleepy tribal region i s 
witnessing the emergence of A diva s i power as a reaction to 
29 
the age-old exploitat ion of the tr ibal masses. 
Linguist ical ly , Bihar i s predominantly a Hindi-speaking 
State (64 percent) • Urdu i s the largest minority language 
29* The normally innocent and docile Adivasis have been 
roused to militancy by Shibu Soren, leader of the Jharkhand 
Mukti Morcha* who successfully contested the parliamentary 
seat in Jjuraka in 1980 e lec t ions with h i s cal l for unity 
against Delkus* Since 1974 movement* he has been holding 
Adlvasi r a l l i e s and meetings in the area in support of 
the demand for a separate s ta te . Enraged by the plight of 
h i s kinsmen* Soren t e l l s h i s fellows*"You have to wake 
up* Unless you agitate nobody in Patna and Delhi wil l 
look Into your problems". Times of India, December 31*1979. 
The l a s t such ra l ly was held at Ohanbad on February 4* 19*> 
in which Shibu Soren and A.K. Roy (both MPs) threatened 
to shed the ir blood for f u l f i l l i n g their demand of a 
•Jharkhand State'* Indian Nation* February 12* 1980. 
18 
(7 percent) followed by some very email linguistic minorities 
30 
(together constituting 19 percent). However* Grlerson 
considered Malthili, Magahi and Bhojpuri the three main 
dialects of the Blhari language though sometimes he divided 
the three dialects into two groups - an eastern group consisting 
of the closely related dialects of Mai thill and Magahi # and 
31 
a western group consisting of bhojpuri. Malthill and Magahi 
are both languages primarily of Bihar whereas the Bhojpuri 
speakers are divided between Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 
The politics of language in Bihar are complicated by 
the fact that the official language, Hindi, is not the mother 
tongue of any major population group* Zt becomes official 
language of the State because the predominant ethnic groups 
in Bihar, the Maga-hi and Bhojpuri peoples, lacking a standard 
literary language of their own, chose to adopt Hindi as the 
32 
medium of education, administration and political communication. 
However, among the Hindus in Bihar (leaving aside the question 
of Urdu), the language Issues Involve a competition between 
two litera-ry languages* one Hindi, which has had the advantage 
30. Government of Xndla, Report of the Commissioner for 
Linguistic Minorities Uew Delhit Government of India, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960), quoted in Mahendra 
P. Singh, op. clt., p. 25. 
31. Grlerson, Linguistic Survey, Vol. V, Part XX, p. 41; 
quoted in Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics 
in North India (Delhi* Vikas Publications, 1974), 
p. 68. 
32* Ibid,, p. 69. 
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of earlier standardization and official statue and Is the 
chosen language of a politically Important ethnic group; 
the other* Maithill, an Independent literary language and 
the mother tongue of the largest ethnic group In the State, 
but an unstandardlzed language, lacking official status, 
and spoken in the economically and socially less advanced 
33 
areas of the State. 
With regard to the position of Hindi vls-a-vis Urdu, 
It Is to be noted that in the post-Independence period, Hindi 
acquired the position of pre-eminence in U.P. and Ulnar 
which Urdu had In the nineteenth century* Hindi In Devnagari 
script was adopted as the official language of India in the 
Constitution and the official language of u.P. and Bihar In 
the Bihar Official language Act, 1950, and the Uttar Pradesh 
Official Language Act, 1951* However, the Urdu issue has 
been the most persistent and the most clearly and consistently 
articulated issue concerning the Muslims In North India 
during the past two decades. In recent years, the demand to 
declare Urdu as the second official language of the States 
of U.P. and Bihar has become a bitter and divisive issue in 
the politics of the two north Indian States. But the facilities 
provided to Urdu speakers in blhar have been proportionately 
greater than those provided in U.P. Furthermore, Government 
policy has been somewhat more favourable to Urdu in principle 
33. Ib^d» 
20 
than in U.P. 
The Economy 
Economically, Bihar Is one of the most backward States. 
The economy of Bihar has been predominantly agricultural* 
This is borne out by the fact that about 32 percent of the 
population of Bihar depends upon agriculture for their 
livelihood, but agriculture in Bihar is in a poor state, it 
largely depends for its agriculture on the vagaries of the 
monsoon* The Inadequacy of irrigation facilities and paucity 
of funds result in low fertilizer consumption and uncertain 
yields. Absence of advanced methods of farming and uneconomic 
size of land-holding further result in low productivity. 
As land availability is low with a density of 324 persons 
per sq. km. which is next only to Kerala and West Bengal 
and is more than twice that of Gujarat and Maharashtra, its 
excessive dependence on agriculture must depress the 
living standard of the people* 
With per capita income of Rs* 402 in 1969-70, Bihar 
stands frery close to the bottom. Only Orlssa with Rs.326 
35 
and Jaramu and Kashmir with Ks. 216 are below to Bihar. 
The economy of Bihar has been aptly described as "from 
34. tor detail, see iblc.. pp. 11-12. 
35. Sachchldanand Sinha, The Internal Colonyi A Case Study 
in Regional Exploitation (Hew JBelhli Sandhu 
Prakashan, 1973J, p. 89. 
zx 
36 
colonial status to colonial status"• Bihar does not 
produce even 5 percent of the cloth it needs and has to 
depend on outside sources for nearly every item of its 
consumption. As against this, before the penetration of 
British commerce/ bihari industrial production had been 
37 
impressive. Neither Swadeshi movement nor even Independence 
could significantly arrest this process of industrial decline 
in Bihar* The result of the disappearance of its various 
industries has been that more and more people have been 
falling back upon its already burdened agriculture as a 
last resort* This is proved by the comment in the Techno* 
Economic Survery of Bihar "the proportion of earning popula-
tion dependent on agriculture has actually increased from 
78.7 percent in 1931 to 7b.3 percent in 1951* while the 
proportion of earning population dependent on industry has 
decreased from 4*3 percent to 2.5 percent Indicating in a 
38 
sense increasing ruralization". Only 2*7 million or 6*7 
percent of the Bihar population were located in urban areas 
as against 17*3 percent for all India* 24 percent for 
39 
West Bengal and 13.6 percent for uttar Pradesh. Even by 
1961 # this situation had not changed much with urban 
36* Ibid.* p. 73* 
37. For d e t a i l , see i b i d . * pp. 73-101* 
38. Techno-Econosaic Survey of Bihar, o p . c i t . , p* 14* 
39* I b i d . 
22 
population accounting for only 17.37 percent* The following 
Table I I I gives a picture of the situation of faihar in the 
years 1961*71 and also i t s posit ion re lat ive to other states . 
40 
TABLE H I 
Statement showing percentage of urban 
t o t o t a l population In India and some 
S t a t e s 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Mysore 
Nagaland 
Orlssa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamilnadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
west bengal 
A l l India 
! Percentage of 
A— to t o t a l 
fl 
i 
4 0 . census of India , 1971, 
• • • frnrnnn 
1961 
17 .74 
7 .37 
8 .43 
25*37 
17 .23 
6.34 
16 .66 
15.11 
14.29 
28.22 
22.33 
5.19 
6.32 
23.06 
16.28 
26.69 
12.85 
24.45 
17 .98 
population 
other s t a t e s 
urban population 
population 
. Provis ional 
Statement ...a*_ja*__a« 
i 9 l l 
19 .35 
8.39 
10.04 
28 .13 
17.78 
7 .06 
18.26 
16.26 
16.26 
31.20 
24.31 
9 .91 
8.27 
23 .63 
17.61 
30.28 
14 .00 
24.59 
19.87 
Population Totals 
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From the above Table, I t becomes clear that while 
there has been a marginal change in Bihar towards urbanisation, 
the change has been slower than in India as a whole and i s 
s t i l l almost half of the a l l India average for the urban 
percentage of population* Further* Maharashtra's and Tamllnadu's 
percentages are three times that of Bihar; and West Bengali; 
Punjabi;and Gujarat!; around two and a half times that of Bihar. 
Even more striking i s the fact that while in the whole of 
India the percentage of those engaged in a c t i v i t i e s other than 
agriculture has grown s l ight ly from 30.51 in 1961 to 31.37 in 
1971 , in Bihar there has been a marked decline from 23.16 to 
19.80 during the corresponding year. An alarming e f fect of 
t h i s process of economic decay has been that between 1961 and 
1971 the, percentage of landless agricultural workers has 
swelled by more than 16 percent, from 24.37 to 40.84. Since 
agriculture has remained largely stagnant i t i s c lear that 
the entire addition to the number of landless workers consists 
of unemployed who are sharing the available work days with 
other agricultural workers and thereby increasing their 
miseries . 
The reason for this slow decay of Bihar i s that though 
the Brit ish rule ended in 1947, Bihar never knew a break in 
the intensity ot i t s colonial exploitat ion. As the role of 
the Brit ish capital declined, the Indian cap i ta l i s t s from 
outside Bihar jumped in the breach to continue the tradition 
of colonial l o o t . Even before the Bri t i sh , the Parsl* the 
34 
Marwari and the Qujarati businessman descended In large number 
to exploit its enormous resources and make quick profits. 
Besides, a large number of technicians, professional men, 
executives, educationalists and others from neighbouring Bengal 
and from other distant provinces, who had the benefit of 
English education, swarmed to Bihar with a view to making 
easy careers amidst a people* who had been left behind in the 
process of westernisation. These businessmen have not only 
influenced New tielhi to frustrate attempts by the State 
Government to put a curb on their prerogatives* but they have 
often tried to influence the party in power in the State in 
41 
the election of its leaders. As most industries come within 
the purview of the Centre, the. industrialists can very 
conveniently ignore the Interests of the local people. Thus, 
one set of colonial exploiters was silently replaced by another 
to continue the loot of the State wealth, /mother major factor 
contributing to the backwardness of Bihar is Its land tenure. 
Distribution of land is so unjust that a large majority of 
people are mere landless labourers; the land holding of many 
are too small and uneconomic while a few own huge areas of 
hundreds of acres. The land celling law remained a dead letter. 
There are still the Sahus of Parbatta, Kursela estate, the 
Mahants of Bodh Gaya and the Raja of Ramgarh who own thousands 
42 
of acres each. 
41. Sachchldanand Slnha, oo.clt., p. 76. 
42. Link, august 8, 1971, p.20; November 28, 1971, p. 21; 
April 23, 1972, p. 20; Times of India, January 1 and 
October 31, 1972. See also Chapter VI of this study. 
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This exploitation of the State becomes even more glaring 
In view of I t s potential wealth. Bihar i s the most Important 
mineral bearing State in India and accounts for 40*57 percent 
of i t s mineral production. Minerals with s ignif icant production 
are* coal, iron ore* lime stone, mica, copper, kyanite, china 
clay, f i re clay and bauxite. Chotanagpur Plateau which i s the 
richest mineral b e l t in India, contains 80 percent of India's 
43 
known deposits of coal and loo percent of i t s cooking coal . 
Even at i t s present leve l of development the mineral products 
of th is State account for between rupees hundred to hundred 
44 
and twenty crores annually. Just at the southern part of the 
State i s rich in i t s mineral resources* the central and the 
northern parts possess rich a l luvia l s o i l for agriculture. The 
ent ire land in t h i s rich gangetlc plains i s criss-crossed by 
a large number of r ivers , most of which have water a l l through 
the year. Every inch of Bihar's land can thus be eas i ly 
brought under one or other form of perennial Irrigation. There 
i s poverty In the land of plenty. This Is indicative of serious 
defects in the po l i t i ca l and economic organization of the State. 
This backwardness has direct bearing on the po l i t i ca l behaviour 
of i t s po l i t i c ians . 
43 . Techno-Economic Survey, op. c l t . , pp. 5-8. 
44. sachchldanand Slnha, o p . c l t . , p. 84. 
CHAPTER IX 
COMGRESS POLITICS UPTO 1967 t CASTE aASED FACTIONALISM 
*or twenty years following Independence Bihar's 
po l i t i ca l system was dominated by the Congress Party. I t was 
a system in which a single'party of consensus'( i .e . the 
Congress Party) occupied the dominant/ central posit ion, with 
the minor Opposition parties acting from the margin as 'parties 
1 
of pressure' without providing an alternation of power. A one-
party dominance system, however, does not mean the obsence 
of po l i t i ca l competition as minor national or regional parties 
2 
constantly pose a threat to the 'dominant party'. I t only 
3 
mates competition unequal. I t i s a system in which "other 
parties ex i s t l ega l ly but for reasons largely unrelated to 
legal questions of government coercion, find themselves unable 
to challenge e f fec t ive ly the dominant party's hold on public 
1 . Rajni Kotharl, "The Congress System in India" in h is 
Party System and Election Studies (Bombayt Allied 
Publishers, 1967), pp. 1-18. 
2. Here "dominant party" has been used in the sense Maurice 
Duverger has used in his book, Po l i t i ca l Parti est Tsjelr 
Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London* 
Methuen, 1963), pp. 307-312. 
3 . In the case of Bihar the dominance of the Congress Party 
was threatened by the Jharkhand and the Janata Party 
as regional parties and by the parties of l e f t Opposition, 
namely the Soc ia l i s t and Communist parties as national 
parties . 
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4 
power*. 
The Congress was* however, an open system - an 'open 
5 
umbrella', which in order to maintain its dominant position 
brought into its fold a variety of social and economic 
interests which were neither compatible nor homogenous* But 
dominance and accommodation cannot go together. "To dominate, 
the Congress must accommodate, yet accommodation encourages 
6 
in coherence which destroys the capacity to dominate". 
The Congress Party,established in 1908 in Bihar, 
functioned until 1947 as an integrative force by bringing 
together diverse elements from different geographical and 
cultural regions. It submerged local and regional loyalties 
in the overweening national identity with national freedom 
7 
as its primary objective. 
This is not to deny the existence of differences, 
tensions and divisions in the Congress of the pre-Independence 
days. Factional conflicts have always been a part of the 
4. B.I. Blanksten, quoted in Jerzy J. Wlatr and Adam 
Przowovski, "Control Without Opposition", tjovemment 
and Opposition, Vol. 1, No.2, 1966, p. 230. 
5. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and dissent: Their Inter* 
Relations in the Indian Party System", Government and 
Opposition, Vol. I, No. 4, 1966, p. 460. 
6 . I b j d . 
7. Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in tiie Bihar 
Congress", Asian Survey,Vol. 6, No. 12, December,1966, 
pp. 707-708. 
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Congress In pre as well as post-Independence period. It Is 
to be noted that even before Independence the Congress 
some times assumed dual roles. In addition to being a movement 
poised against alien rule, it at times acquired governmental 
powers at different levels in the State. In the nineteen-
twenties, the Congress first came to power at the municipal 
and district levels and in the thirties, at the State level. 
Thus, while In office, the party also represented a 'power 
8 
structure*, through which various interests could achieve 
their ends. This resulted in the emergence of factionalism, 
indiscipline and of parochial interests in the party. 
With the emergence of the Congress as a structure 
of power and with the prospect of political power becoming 
a reality, the aims of the organization or of larger group 
became secondary to sectional or personal goals. Thus, the 
Congress became of playground for sectional and personal 
Interests even before the objective of national freedom was 
achieved. The full Implications of this change became 
manifest, however, in the post-Independence period when the 
Congress was transformed into a ruling party. 
Since Independence the Congress as a political party 
has had to contend with such Interest groups trying to get 
8. Ramashray Roy, "Dynamics of One Party dominance in an 
Indian State", Aplan Survey, Vol. 8, No. 7, July, 1968, 
p. 559. 
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control of the organizational apparatus and the organs of 
the government. The compulsion to depend on votes as an 
essent ia l condition for remaining in power made i t a l l the 
more essential for the Congress to seek support from diverse 
socio-economic groups of the society* Further, the re lat ive ly 
weaker position of the Opposition unti l 1967, caused almost 
a l l the p o l i t i c a l l y s ignif icant groups and interes ts to he 
drawn to the Congress* This resulted into a s i tuation in 
which intra-factional competition and conf l ict become s ign i f i -
cant for the p o l i t i c a l process "making the Congress Party 
a highly competitive sub-system which must to lerate internal 
conf l ic t and acqulece to factional demands in order to prevent 
9 
them from col l id ing with the party's grand design for power"• 
Once personal ambitions and fulfilment of sectarian 
in teres t s were accepted as suitable goals* the formation of 
a l l iances and coal i t ions became the pattern of the Congress 
organization* Conflicting claims and counter-claims acted as 
catalysts* The process of fractionallzation of the party 
structure into fact ions and sub-coalItions began. "Regional 
loyal t ies* caste considerations, diverse economic interests 
and personal ambition a l l provided bases for formation of 
10 
alliances"* I t i s important that personal ambition was the 
guiding force which exploited diverse a f f i n i t i e s - of which 
9 . Ibid* 
10* Ramashray Roy, "Politics of *ragmentatloniThe Case of 
the Congress Party in alhar", in Iqbal Narain (ed*) 
State Politics in India (Meeruts Meenakshi Prakashan, 
1967J, p. 418. 
30 
caste was the most important * in making political alliances. 
Caste distinctions were the most Important factor 
for mobilising political support. Political rivalry among 
the Upper castes and, as a result, the gradual involvement 
of other caste groups in Congress politics is a characteristic 
feature of politics in Bihar. In the early years* the Congress 
leadership, apart from the Muslims* came from the Kayasthas* 
who had received English education earlier ami in larger 
11 
numbers as compared to other States. But their dominance 
came to be challenged by the Bhumihars* who were more numerous 
and economically more influential, The rising aspirations of 
the bhumihars brought home to the Kayasthas the fear of 
of 
dlslodgement from the position (power. They responded to this 
threat by entering Into an alliance with yet another emerging 
12 
caste* the Rajputs. Alliances led to counter alliances, 
the leading castes coopted men from politically inarticulate 
castes to positions of second rank leadership in an obvious 
bid to consolidate their own positions. This brought more 
and more castes into the vortex of politics. Thus the tensions 
and conflicts among the combined forces of Kayasthas* Rajputs 
and Bhumihars guided the course of Congress politics In 
11. Ibid., Ramashray Roy, "Dynamics of One Party Dominance 
in an Indian State", op.clt.* p. 563. 
12. Ramashray Roy* "Politics of Fragmentations The Case of 
the Congress Party in Bihar"* in Iqbal Narain (ed.)* 
op. cit.* p. 4l9i Chetkar Jha, "Caste in fcihar Politics** 
in Iqbal Narain (ed.)* op.clt.* pp. 575-587. 
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Bihar upt i l l 1947. 
In the course of the po l i t i ca l mobilisation of caste 
groups in the Congress p o l i t i c s , the process of selection of 
Congress candidates for e lect ions to the l eg i s la ture , local 
self-governing bodies and party hierarchy at different l eve l s 
oveated intense intra-party confl icts* "Many Congress workers 
• . • started assessing their services in terms of rewards in 
the form of membership of a l e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, municipal 
or d i s t r i c t board or at l e a s t a place of honour and power In 
13 
a Congress Committee"• claims of o f f ice were pressed and 
considered on grounds of caste, geographical, re l ig ious and 
14 
personal bases. 
t>y the time the f i r s t Congress ministry was formed In 
Bihar in 1937, the Congress leadership in the State had sp l i t 
into two fact ions, each composed of several caste groups. One 
was headed by Shrl Krishna Slnha, a Bhumlhar from Monghyr 
d i s t r i c t and the other by Anugrah Narayan Slnha, a Rajput from 
15 
Gaya d i s t r i c t . Attempts to capture Important positions and to 
favour one's own supporters in the selection of Congress 
candidates for contesting e lec t ions , appointments and nominations 
13. Rajendra Prasad, "Autobiography"(Bombayt Asia Publishing 
House, 1961), p. 431; Anugrah Narain Slnha, Mere Samsmaran 
(My Reminiscences), (Patna» Kusuna Prakashan, 1961),p.319. 
14. Rajendra Prasad, o p . c l t . , pp. 436-444. 
15. Chetkar Jha, o p . c i t . , p. 577. 
32 
created an atmosphere of envy and jealousy which gradually 
eroded mutual confidence, trust and sol idarity among top-
ranking leaders of the State Congress. The presence of 
suspcion and jealousy was mainly responsible for discontinuance 
of weekly meetings of the Council of Ministers. After the 
e l ec t ions to the d i s t inc t boards were over in 1939, the 
Ministry had s p l i t further on the question of government 
nominations to the d i s t r i c t boards. 
The f i r s t open division in the Congress leadership In 
the State appeared in December, 1939, when a bid for the 
unanimous e lect ion of the members of the Bihar Pradesh Congress 
Working Committee (aPCWC) f a i l e d . The next two years were 
marked by intense factional r ivalry. The Congress High Command 
had to take note of the situation and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad 
was sent to Patna by the High Command in February, 1942 in a 
18 
vain bid to patch up the differences between the two groups. 
The Intensity of group rivalry was further sharpened one 
month la ter at the time of the reconstruction of the Pradesh 
working Committee. The supporters of S.K. sinha - Ram Charitra 
Slnha, Sarangdhar Sinha, Shyama Prasad Singh, Sardar Harlhar 
Singh and Dewavarat Shastrl alleged that the Working Committee 
16. Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress" 
O P . c l t « , p . 708. 
17. Anugrah Narain Slnha, o p . c l t . , pp. 296-299. 
18. Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress" 
o p . c l t . , p. 708. 
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was packed by supporters of A.N. Sinha. In June, Ran Charitra 
Slnha and Shyama Prasad Singh resigned from the Working 
19 
Committee in protest . Thus the growing heterogeneity in the 
Congress ref lect ing the increasing po l i t i ca l mobilisation of 
cross sect ions of the society and their confl ict ing claims 
to posi t ions of power in the party hierarchy as well as in 
the government/ adversely affected the coheslveness of the 
top leadership, ay 1942 I t had s p l i t into two opposing camps. 
The two sub-coalit ions, dominated by the Rajputs and 
the Bhuraihars continued to function in the Bihar Congress 
t i l l 1946. But after the formation of the Congress Ministry 
in 1946/ alienation and defections from the ruling group 
started -^ nd got accelerated further in 1952. The formation of 
the new Ministry disappointed some of the non-Bhumihar 
supporters of S .K. slnha* who were expecting to be rewarded 
with the ministerial gadais in their support to the uhumlhar 
Chief Minister* Sarangdhar Singh* a Rajput, was particularly 
20 
confident of being picked up as a Minister* but was disappointed. 
The formation of the Congress Ministry in 1952 gave a 
further shock to the supporters of S.K. slnha and accelerated 
the process of defection, on* of the Important factors was 
the Inclusion of Mahesh Prasad. Slnha* a Bhumlhar and a dos i 
relation of S.K. Slnha* In the Ministry. M.P. Slnha'a r i se 
19 . Anugrah Narain Slnha* op .c l t .» p.374 and 382. 
20. £&&£.* p. 410. 
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to power made Krishna Ballabh Sahay, a Kayastha lieutenant 
of S.K. sinha* whom the latter had earlier weaned away from 
the Rajput - Kayaetha alliance and who aspired to be Chief 
21 
Minister, apprehensive of the intentions of the Chief Minister. 
It quickened the alienation of the Chief Minister's non-
ohumlhar lieutenants who had been passed over for ministerial 
positions in both 1946 and 1952* M.*>. Sinha soon started deni-
gradlng K.B. Sahay and the non-Bhumihar favourites of the 
Chlei Minister and replacing them with persons from his own 
22 
caste. M.r>. sinha and K.jb. Sahay rivalry intensified caste 
rivalry. 
The bit actional structure came to an end by 1953 when 
almost a l l the important non-Bhumihar supporters of the Chief 
Minister S.K. Sinha deserted h i s camp and formed a 'Centrist* 
group. This group got busy in discredit ing M.P. Sinha,holding 
23 
him responsible for their grievances. However, i t i s interesting 
21. Referring to the impact of his e f forts to push K.B.Sahay, 
S.K. Sinha says, "For nearly twenty years I gave Krishna 
Ballabh Babu a position la ahe government which Mahesh 
Babu could not even dream of. Some people thought that 
1 was doing a fool ish thing and now X real ize that i t 
was fool ish of me to have given him so much la t i tude . Some 
of my old friends got annoyed with me and deserted me 
only because X was giving so much encouragement to 
Krishna Ballabh Babu". "Jay Prakash Narayan - Shrl Krishna 
Sinha Correspondence", Indian Nation, August 8, 1959, 
quoted in Ramashray Roy• "Xntra-i'arty Conflict in the 
Bihar Congress", o p . c l t . , p. 711. 
22. Anugrah Narain Sinha, o p . c i t . , p. 437. 
23. Ramashray ftoy, "Polit ics of Fragmentationi The Case of 
the Congress Party in Bihar", in Iqbal Narain ( ed . ) , 
op. c l t . , p. 422. 
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to note that the Bhumlhar supporters of the Chief Minister* 
by and large* stuck to him even in cases where they failed 
to get rewarded by ministerial positions* Presumably the 
reason was the psychological satisfaction they derived from 
24 
belonging to the 'ruling caste*» The revolt of the Centrist 
group was directed mainly against the ruling Bhumlhar faction. 
This group, apart from impressing upon the Congress High 
Command the need for taking action against the Bhumlhar leaders. 
was busy in creating public opinion against them. The group 
further provided a forum for other disgruntled el«m«nts,both 
within and outside the party, for criticising the ruling 
25 
Congress leadership in the State. 
Zn the meantime the rivalry between M.P. slnha and 
K.B. Sahay affected the Congress Party's activities ranging 
from organizational elections to the general elections in 1957. 
"K.b. Sahay *s ambitions have been mounting so much that his 
mischief would push the Congress into the ditch and the 
26 
administration woulu become dlctatorlcal". M.P. Slnha also 
developed ambitions and the two engaged in bitter fratricidal 
warfare. They used each and every trick to outwit and 
24. Mahendxa P. Singh. Cohesion in a Predominant Partyt The 
Pradesh Conarecs and Party Politics la Bihar {Mew Del hi t 
S. Chand & Co.. 1975;, p. 62. 
25. Kanashray feoy. "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar 
Congress"« op.clt.. p. 711. 
26. Anugrah Naraln Slnha. OP. clt.» p. 490. 
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outmanoeuvre each other. In the selection of candidates for 
the General Elections in 1967, many members of the Centrist 
group were not recommended for the Congress tickets. They, 
therefore, left the Congress and formed the Jan Congress. 
The rivalry between M.p. Sinha and K.B. Sahay culminated in 
both 
their defeat in the 1967 elections mainly because^ of them, 
27 
as the Pataskar Report points out* worked against each other* 
For the first time in the history of the Bihar Congress, 
a Contest for leadership of the Congress Legislature Party 
took place between the old rivals - S.K* Sinha and A.N.Sinha. 
K.B. Sahay openly aligned with the Rajput group, along with 
28 
the remnants of the Centrist group. However, A.N. sinha 
29 
lost as supporters of Sahay deserted him. The death of 
.A.N. Sinha in July 1957 left his group without a recognised 
leader capable of winning support from other communities. 
Consequently* the Rajput group, under the stewardship of 
S.N. Sinha son of A.N. Sinha, was reduced simply to as a 
caste group. The other caste elements of the Rajput gromp 
were reorganized under the leadership of Blnoda Nand Jha, 
27. Ramashray Roy* "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in 
an Indian State", op.cit., p. 564. 
29. Anugrah Narain Sinha, op. clt., p. 439. 
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a Brahmin and a camp follower of A.N, Sinha. Thus,bifactional 
structure of the State Congress was changed to a multi-
fact ional structure* 
The death of S.K. Sinha in January/ 1961 again changed 
the balance of factional forces. The ruling Bhumlhar sub-
coalit ion* under the leadership of M.P. Sinha, l o s t to a new 
sub-coalit ion of Brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthae and a majority 
of Lower Castes. Scheduled Castes, Muslims and others under 
31 
the leadership of B . N . Jha. As the leader of the majority 
group, B.N. Jha became the second Chief Minister of Bihar. 
I t i s to be noted here that so long as the stalwarts 
l.khe S.K. sinha and A.N. sinha were in positions of po l i t i ca l 
predominance, the typical Congress p o l i t i c s of 'winning over' 
and 'patching up' paid devidends. But a f ter the ir death, 
alignments began to show new trends. An important factor 
affecting the group alignments was the increasing number 
of Backward Castes in the Congress as well as in the Legisla-
t ive Assembly. This numerical strength of the Backward) Castes 
compelled leaders from the Upper Castes to accede to their 
demand for a meaningful share in the formal inst i tut ional 
30. Ramashray, Roy, "Intra-Farty Conflict in the Bihar 
Congress", o p . c l t . . p.712; Shree Nagesh Jha, "caste 
in Bihar Po l i t i c s" , Economic and Po l i t i ca l Weekly, 
Vol. 5, No. 7, February* 1970, p. 343. 
31. Chetkar Jha, o p . c l t . , p. 579. 
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in 
se t up. The sudden rise/Lower Caste members In the Bihar 
Pradesh Committee resulted in the alow decline in dominance 
32 
of the Upper Castes. In the Legis lat ive Assembly also the 
Lower castes including the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes* emerged as the most crucial group - the ir percentage 
Increased froa 39.46 in 1967 to 49.53 in 1962. The representa-
t ion of Brahmins also increased. 4 Brahmin, Backward Caste 
coal i t ion was perhaps the resul t of th i s development. I t was 
due to th i s combination that Q.N. Jha succeeded in defeating 
M.P. Sinha. The following Table I shows the caste-wise composi-
t ion of Congress Party members in the Legislative Assembly 
in 1957 and l962t 
33 
TABLE I 
Caste-wise composition of the Congress members In 
Assembly la 1957 and 1962. 
Caste I 1957 \ Noumber j 1962 [ Number 
Brahmins 
Bhumihars 
Rajputs 
Kayasthas 
Scheduled Castes & 
Scheduled Tribes 
Backward Castes 
Muslims 
Not known and others 
Total 100.00 2lO 100.00 204 
32. Shree Naoesh Jha, o p . c l t . . P . 344/Ramashrav Rov,"Caste and 
P o l i t i c a l Recruitment In Bihar",in Rajni Kb thari (ed.),Casta 
In Indian P o l i t i c s (Mew Delhi»Orient Longmans, 1970), pp. 242-45. 
33 . Shree Maoesh Jha,op.c l t .«p.344ialso Chetkar Jha,op.c l t . .p .S83. 
9.54 
16.19 
14.28 
4.28 
17.62 
22.86 
11.43 
3.80 
20 
34 
30 
S 
37 
48 
24 
8 
12.74 
11.77 
11.23 
5.38 
27.46 
22.06 
7.35 
• 
26 
24 
27 
11 
56 
45 
15 
«. 
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Thus, the post-1957 factional rivalry included a 
new sub-coalition consisting of Brahmins, who were earl ier 
34 
camp followers of S.K. Sinha with the exception of B.N* Jha, 
and Lower Castes* Thus, the ' internal'struggle among Kayasthas, 
Bhumihars and Rajputs no longer contained the whole story* 
However, tension within the min i s ter ia l i s t sub-coalition 
developed from the very beginning as K.B* Sahay was not taken 
Into the Cabinet. He also became apprehensive of the growing 
Influence of S.N. Sinha in the Cabinet. As a result , K.B.Sab&y 
crossed over to M.p. Sinha group jus t four days before the 
Pradesh Election Committee Ipse) met to nominate Congress 
candidates for 1962 General Elect ions. This t i l t e d the balance 
in favour of M*P. Sinha* The PEC was divided into s ix to four 
3$ 
with the min i s t er ia l i s t in the minority. This defection had, 
however, l i t t l e immediate e f fect on the fortunes of the Jha 
group which continued to be Hi the dominant position unti l 
April* 1963 when Jha's nominees for some key posts in the 
Congress Legislature Party were defeated because^of the 
desertation of a number of h i s Rajput supporters. 
After B.N* Jha was 'Kamraged' out in October, 1963, a 
34. Chetkar Jha, OP. c l t . * p . 579. 
35. Ramashray Boy, "Factionalism and Stratarchy: The Experience 
of the Congress Party", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 12, 
December, 1967, p. 901. 
36* Ramashray Roy, Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress", 
OP* c i t* , p» 712. 
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new alignment of fact ions came into being. S.N. Sinha and 
hie followers deserted the Jha camp and joined the Sahay* 
M.P. Sinha sub-coalition* The sub-coalition of Bhumihars* 
Rajputs* Kayasthas and a majority of Backward Castes* 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes members defeated Blrchand Patel, 
a Backward (Kurml) Caste l ieutenant of Jha in the contest 
37 
for leadership of the Congress Legislature Party. Sahay* 
as the leader of the new sub-coalItIon, was thus able to 
f u l f i l his long-cherished ambition of becoming the Chief 
Minister of Bihar. An ear l i er attempt by Jha group to build 
up an ent ire ly new base of support through the merger of the 
Jhasrkhand Party with the Congress in the summer of 1963 did 
not fu l ly succeed. Finding himself out of of f ice immediately 
a f ter the merger* B.N. Jha fa i l ed to prevent a majority of 
h i s Jharkhand followers from defecting to the new Chief 
38 
Minister's faction, over wi l l ing to oblige them with patronage. 
In view of h i s l imitation as leader of the numerically 
smaller Kayastha Caste as compared to h i s Brahmin* Rajput 
and Bhumlhar rivals* K.B. Sahay* in a bid to create a viable 
support base in the party* began to woo the numerically 
stronger Backward communities by promising greater po l i t i ca l 
share for them in the party as well as In the government and 
37. Chetkar Jha* OP. c l t . , p. 580. 
38. Mahendra P. Singh* O P . c l t . . p. 64. 
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by promoting the ir members to position of leadership* He 
appointed Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav, an important Yadav Caste 
p o l i t i c i a n , a Cabinet Minister in h i s government and gave 
him the portfol io of Public work* Department!PWD). sahay 
a lso won over the influenclal Kurrai leader Deo Sharan Singh, 
the Chairman of the Vldhan Pari shad (the Upper House of 
Bihar Legislatures. This strategy of Sahay, which was aimed 
a t weakening the power position of other leaders accelerated 
internal f ighting within the sub-coalit ion. The coming 1967 
..General Elections sharpened i t* In the formation of the 
DEC in June, 1966, M.P. Sinha, one of the important members 
of the sub-coalition and the leader of the Bhumlhar group 
defected to Jha group, K.B. sahay, nonetheless, succeeded 
in capturing s i x e l ec t ive seats in the psc against four 
bagged by the dissidents* He did also succeed in keeping the 
m i n i s t e r i a l i s t in power by retaining the support of a section 
of the Bhumlhar group led by Shiva Shankar Sinha, son of 
40 
the former Chief Minister 6.K. Sinha. The select ion of 
candidates to contest the 1967 General Elections reflected 
intense factional f ights with each faction leader competing 
with others in snatching the largest number of party 
nominations for the ir own followers. In the process S.N.sinha 
39. Mahendra P. Singh, OP. c i t . , p. 65; Ramashray Roy, 
"One Party Dominance in an Indian State**, pp. c i t . , 
p. 565. 
40. Mahendra P. Singh, OP. c i t . , p.65. 
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deserted the ruling sub-coalition to join the dissidents in 
the M.P. sinha - B.N. Jha camp reducing the former to a 
41 
minority of 5 to 7 in the pEC. When attempts to prepare an 
agreed l i s t of candidates failed* the rival sub-coalitions 
submitted separate l i s t s of candidates to the Central Election 
Committee (CEO. The f inal se lect ion fai led to sat i s fy any 
group in the party* However, two groups f e l t more dissat i s f ied 
with the decision of the CBC because,in their view, their due 
share in the Congress nomination was denied by i t . These 
groups were: (1) Raja of Ramgarh-led erstwhile Janata Party 
42 
group and (11) the Jha faction* 
The group of Ramgarh Raja as well as Hahamaya Prasad 
Sinha, a former Congress President* l e f t the party and formed 
Jan Krantl Pal to f ight the e lect ions against the ir formal 
p o l i t i c a l partners. However, B.N. Jha did not desert the 
party though only 11 of h i s 48 supporters in the l a s t Vidhan 
43 
Sabha were renominated. 
Thus, proliferation of factions has been an important 
hallmark of the Congress Party in Bihar. In the course of 
twenty years the bipolarity of factionalism transformed into 
mult i -polarity, each faction getting exclusive or major 
41* Ib id . , p. 66. 
42. Ib id . 
43. I b i d . , p. 67. 
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support from one caste or group of castes* In t h i s way power 
In the Congress Party came to be distributed among several 
caste-based factions* The compulsions of the po l i t i ca l situation 
forced the bel l igerant factions to convert themselves into 
two sub-coalit ions to help them to compete for the control 
of power apparatus. But within each sub-coalition each 
constituent faction was a contender for power, and al l iances 
and alignments were made and broken on the basis of profitable 
bargaining and convenience* 
Proliferation of factions and the intra-factional 
struggle to control the dominant Congress Party, interest ingly , 
had not originated on the basis of any differences on ideology 
and programme* caste uni t ies and differences were the crucial 
driving force behind tact ions! p o l i t i c s in the Bihar Congress* 
Economic, regional ano geographical differences might have 
been there to divide Congressmen but they did not provide as 
sound a base as did the Caste differences in the organization 
of po l i t i ca l groups* 
However, i t i s important to note that these differences 
were fu l ly exploited by the professional po l i t i c ians for the 
fulfilment of their own po l i t i ca l ambitions* The lack of 
ideology in factional a l l iances and the frequency with which 
men jumped from one group to another was suf l lc lent proof 
that po l i t i c ians were gulaed more by personal interests than 
by group commitment* This i s borne out also by the fact that 
44 
out of a to ta l of 60 prominent Congress leaders In Bihar as 
much as 30 leaders changed sides twice during title period 
of twenty years. Of these 30, ten leaders changed sides 
44 
more than twice* The personal bas is of factions has been 
observed also by Ghanshyam Singh Gupta* special representative 
of the All-India Congress Committee(AICC)", there are tuo 
main groups in the I Bihar) State Congress Organization - one 
of Shrl Krishna Slnha and the other of Shrl Anugrah Naraln 
sinha. The differences between them do not l i e In any marked 
degree on their po l i t i ca l po l ic ies and programmes or even 
in the ir outlook or approach to them* I t i s personal* The 
virus i s more pronounced amongst those who claim to follow 
45 
them"• 
A notable feature of the Congress p o l i t i c s during 
1937-1967 had been the domination of bhumihars, Rajputs, 
Brahmins and Kayasthas despite the numerical superiority of 
the Lower Castes in the State* One reason responsible for 
t h i s was the ear l ier po l i t i ca l mobilization of the economically 
well off and educationally superior upper castes* However, 
44* Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar 
Congress*, OP* c l t . , p* 713. 
45* Report of Ghanshyam Singha Gupta on Bihar Congress 
Affairs to the A ICC, December 7, 1952; quoted in 
Ramashray Roy, "Polit ics of Fragmentations The Case 
of the Congress Party in Bihar", in Iqbal Naraln 
(«<*.), op* c l t . , p* 427* 
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the Upper Caste p o l i t i c a l e l i t e * were forced by increasing 
competition in their po l i t i ca l game to broaden the ir support. 
This they did by recruiting men from other Lower Castes and 
raising them to the e l i t e status who la t er on became leaders 
in their own r ight . This process* while i t widened the 
c i r c l e of po l i t i ca l participation, also worked to divide the 
emerging castes which functioned as reserviour. of support 
for the contending upper caste groups. 
The cumulative resul t of th i s factional balkanization 
was that the cohesion and the organizational v iab i l i ty were 
seriously threatened by the end of 1966* The accommodative 
and integrative capability of the Congress organization came 
to be exhausted and indisc ipl ine and personal ambitions of 
the factional leaders ran r i o t . All th i s led to the calamitous 
defeat of the dominant party in the 1967 General Elections. 
INTRA-fACTlCJUL COttfLJCT IN THE MIMISiRY-MAiOMG, 1937-1963 
Greed for power had been the most important factor 
responsible for the emergence of caste-oriented factional 
p o l i t i c s in the Bihar Congress. So, i t i s pertinent to analyse 
lntra-fact lonal conf l ic t In relation to the ministry making 
in Bihar. I t i s to be mentioned here that as prospects of 
acquiring power appeared f i r s t at the d i s t r i c t l eve l , 
factionalism also developed f i r s t in the Distr ict Congress 
Committees U . C C s ) following generally the caste divisions 
in the d i s t r i c t s . Later, when the Congress came into power 
46 
a t the S ta te l e v e l , pressures from below for the fu l f i lment 
of f a c t i o n a l goals a f f e c t e d the coheslveness of the State 
leadership* 
The top l eaders of the Congress Party in Bihar, for 
the f i r s t t ime, iastect the glory of power a t the State l e v e l 
in 1937, when a Congress M.nistry was foxmea under the 
Government of India Act* 1936* A contes t for Chief Minister-
ship between the two s u b - c o a l i t i o n l eaders S.k. Sinha and 
A.N. Sinha was averteo by Kajendra Prasad who was authorised 
by the Congress High Command to ascer ta in the consensus of 
the metayers. As A.&* Sinha expressed h i s d e s i r e not to be 
46 
considered, *>*K. Sinha was unanimously e l ec ted* The former 
wa» e l e c t e d the Deputy Leader unanimously* 
However, the formation of the Ministry proved a 
t i c k l i s h problem* Pressures f o r Inclus ion in the Ministry 
began to be appl ied on the leadership* Some Harijan leaders 
demanded a Harijan member in the Ministry* There was pressure 
from the l e g i s l a t o r s of the Chotanagpur b e l t f o r the inc lus ion 
of a Minis ter in the Cabinet from t h a t area* Apart from Syed 
Mahraud and warn bayalu Singh, who were in the f i e l d r i g h t from 
the e l e c t i o n of the party leader* Ham Charitra Singh, Abdul 
47 
Barl and baldeo Sahay were a l s o in the race for min i s t ersh ip . 
46* Rajendra Prasad* op .c i t . *p*438; Anugrah Narain Sinha* 
op*c i t* , pp. 217-218. 
47 . Bameshwar Singh* Xhe Control of 
Making of Congress Ministry in i frfo q 9t congress W t p t r y 
University* Ph.D. Thesis tun 
p . 131* 
47 
The se lect ion of Ministers became more d i f f i cu l t In view of 
the des i rab i l i ty of having only a four-member Cabinet. 
Raj end ra Prasad recounts in h i s Autobiography, "The selection 
of ministers was a knotty problem. The Governor's Executive 
Council had only four members, and I thought i f fo\Jir men 
could do the job their* , four ministers ought to be sufficient 
48 
to run the Congress Government now". In a clever move, as 
i t appears, the leadership decided, to avoid bickering In the 
party, to appoint some Important men as Parliamentary Secreta-
49 
r l e s , and some others to other high posi t ions . In the middle 
of July, 1937, four Important leaders of the Congress * 
Rajendra Prasad, S.K. sinha, A.N. Sinha and Abdul Bari - met 
at Chapra ac the residence of Cfcrndradeo Naraln, an advocate, 
and decided to have only four men in the Cabinet. Abdul Bari's 
proposal that S .K . Sinha, A.N. Sinha, Syed Mahmud and a 
Harijan be made Ministers and Ham Layalu Singh the Speaker, 
50 
was accepted. I t remained, however/ undecided as to which 
of the two Harijan leaders namely Jagjiwan Ram and Jaglal 
Chaudhary were to be made a Minister* Final ly , I t was decided 
to appoint Ja|jlal Chaudhary as a Minister and Jagjiwan Ram 
51 
as a Parliamentary Secretary. After a l o t of discussion,the 
48. Rajendra Prasad, o p . c l t . , p. 442. 
49. Ram Layalu Singh and Abdul Bar! were elected Speaker 
anu deputy Speaker. Laldeo Sahay was appointed Advocate 
General; bameshwar Singh, op. c l t . , p. 133. 
50. Anuyrah Narain Sinha, O P . c l t . , pp. 220-221. 
51. Rajendra Prasad, O P . c l t . , p. 443. 
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names of Parliamentary Secretaries was finally decided on 
July 16/ 1937. The following Table II shows the nana and 
castes of the Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries* 
TABLE II 
Showing names and castes of Ministers and 
Parliamentary secretaries of the first 
Congress Ministry before Independence. 
Names 
fllHl^ERj 
S . K . s inha 
A.N. s inha 
Syed Mahmud 
Jagal Chaudhary 
PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARIES 
K.B. Sahay 
Sharangdhar Singh 
Jimut Bahan 
Shlvanandan Prasad Mandal 
Jagjiwan Ram 
Binodanand Jha 
Sadiqul Hague 
Jagat N?.raln Lai 
52 . Bameshwar Singh» SB* <?.!£•' 
ft 1 
ft 
p. 132 
caste/Community 
Ehumihar 
Raj put 
Muslim 
Harljan 
Kayastha 
Rajput 
Bihari Bengali 
Yadav 
Harijan 
Brahmin 
Muslim 
Kayastha 
>. 
e* 
I t , thus* appears U»t although factionalism had Its 
role to play ia the Ministry-making, i t had not become very 
strong* The leadership shoved the spirit of accommodation 
and was able to adjust counter-claims while taking into 
consideration the data* of castas* regions and par soooli t i e s . 
Moat of the aspirants for high office* wmm accommodated as 
Ministers or Parllaaentary Secretaries or as the Speaker or 
Deputy speaker or Advocate General, 
Xa the making of the Coagrsas Minletry in 194*, again 
factionalism did not have an important say, following elections, 
conflicts over the leadership of the congress legislature 
Party between &•*• Slnha and A*w* Slnhe again developed. But 
Maulana Aba* Kalam Aaad* the then Congress ^resident, with 
the help of R ijecdra Prasad, the then btu. President,managed 
SI 
to get S.K* sinha elected unanimously, in the selection of 
the members to be sworn in as Ministers, factional claims had 
to be considered by the Congress leadership both at the 
national and the State level , ihe spirit of accommodation was 
compromised ia the claims and cottttsr-clalms of factions* As 
a result, most of the meabars selected as Ministers and 
Parliamentary Secretaries belonged to one or the other of 
the tactions* rhe labia Hi glvea below shows the factional 
position or the Ministry. I t would appear from the Table that 
ia the ifr-ema Ministry, s.iu sinha's taction war, in a dominant 
position* I t i s also clear that the taction leaders tried to 
accommodate, within their faction, as many second rank leaders 
&3.Maul ana Abul Kalam »xad,"hh1ifl frlfli fFlpmm* Aft ittttbiaojajh>» 
baaashwar siagh, oDjcJ&.t p, • 129-1 JO. 
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belonging to other castes as was possible. 
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TABLE i n 
Showing factional alignment of the Ministers and 
Parliamentary Secretaries along with their castes 
Factions 
S.K. Slnha 
i) cabinet Ministers and9 Parliamentary Secre-
0 their Caete/CommunttyO tarles and their 
J 0 caate/gojHWvaltY 
(1) K.B. Sahay 
(Kayastha) 
(I) Bhola Paswan Shastrl 
(Pusadh) 
(2) Abdul Quayum Ansarl (2) A•A.M. Nocr 
(Momln) 
(3) Jaglal Chaudhary 
(Pa#i) 
(Muslim) 
(3) Sah Mohammad Qmair 
(Muslim) 
(4) L.W. Samanta 
(Kurml) 
( 5 ; Nirapado Mukherji 
(Beharl Bengali) 
A.N, Slnha (1> Badrinath Verma 
(Kayastha) 
(2; Binodanand Jha 
(Maithil Brahmin) 
(1) Shivnandan Prasad 
. ^ . Mandal 
(2) Blrchand Patel 
(Kurml) 
(3J SuMhlal Singh 
(Rajput) 
i; actional (1) Syed Mahmud 
allegiance not (Muslim) 
clear 
(2; Rant Charltra Singh 
(Bhumlhar) 
(1) Boniface Lakra 
(Adlvasl) 
54. Bameshwar Singh* QD» dt». p. 139. 
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Fact ional p o l i t i c s assumed ser ious proportions In 
the 1952 and 1957 Ministry making. Fact ional a c t i v i t i e s were 
i n t e n s i f i e d t o such a degree in 1952 that the High Command 
had t o intervene by sending three Central Min i s ters from 
Bihar t o patch up d i f f e r e n c e s . They, however* f a i l e d and i t 
was the intervent ion of the Prime Minister and the AICC 
Pres ident , Jawaharlal Nehru, which l e d to the unanimous e l ec t i on 
55 
of S.K. Sinha as the leader of the Congress Leg i s la ture Party. 
However, the formation of Ministry presented a l o t of 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . Most of the major c a s t e groups in the CLP pressed 
t h e i r claims f o r t h e i r respect ive shares in the Ministry by 
holding meetings and by carrying on various kinds of convassing. 
Some important i n t e r e s t groups, such as Muslims, Harijans, 
Adivasts and the members of the f a i r sex became a c t i v e and 
pressed t h e i r claims a l s o . The quest ion of geographical 
56 
representat ion was a l s o raised* However, i t was the adjustment 
of f a c t i o n a l claimswhich created the real problem. The two 
main f a c t i o n a l l e a d e r s - S.K. Sinha and A.N. sinha - met as 
many a s e ight t imes without s u c c e s s . I t was t h e i r ninth meeting 
57 
which produced an agreed l i s t of Cabinet Min i s ters . An amusing 
way of advancing f a c t i o n a l claims and counter-claims was that 
55. Mahendra P. Singh, op. c l t . # P . 61r Chetkar Jha, o p . c l t . , 
p . 578. 
56 . Bameshwar Singh, o p . c i t . , pp. 244-246. 
57. I b i q . , pp. 247-249. 
52 
If the name of a particular person xrom a particular caste 
was proposed by one faction, the other faction too, proposed 
the name of some other person from the same caste* For example, 
when the name of Deo Sharan Singh, a Kurmi MDA, was proposed 
by S.K. Slnha, A.N. sinha put forward the name of Birchand 
56 
Patel, another MLA belonging to the same caste. The selection 
of Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries also led 
to serious factional conflicts. It was only after protracted 
discussions between the two faction leaders that list of 
Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries could be finalised* 
ihe difficulties in deciding the names of Deputy Ministers 
and Parliamentary Secretaries could be understood by the fact 
that the former took their oath of office about six months 
later than the Cabinet Ministers and the latter over a year 
thereafter* i'he following Table IV shows caste/community, 
region and the factions to which they belonged* 
It is clear from the Table that S.K* Slnha faction was 
in the majority in the Council of Ministers* It had five men 
in the Cabinet, two Deputy Ministers and two Parliamentary 
Secretaries, while A.N. sinha faction had four Cabinet Ministers, 
one Deputy Minister and one Parliamentary Secretary* 
The S,K. Sinha faction included two Bhuraihars, one 
Kayastha, one Brahmin, one Harijan (all Cabinet Ministers), 
58. Ibia., p. 248. 
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TABLE flf 
Showing Caste/Community, region and factional allegiance of 
the Ministers,Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries 
of the F irs t Congress Ministry formed after 1952 e lect ions . 
Region/Name 9 Oath takenI Faction 1 Constituency/ ft D i s t r i c t 
cjftpsy WKffiffft 
North Plains 
Harinath Mishra 18.4.1952 
(MLA.Maithil Brahmin) 
Bhola Paswam Shastri -do-
(MLA, DusadhC Hart J an) 
Mohammad Shaft -do-
(MLA, Muslim) 
Ram Charltra Singh -do-
(MLA, bhumihar) 
Deep Narain Singh -do-
(ML,A# Rajput) 
Mahesh Prasad Singh -do-
(MLA, Bhumihar) 
South Plains 
S.K. sinha -do-
<MLA» Bhumihar) 
A.N. Sinha -do-
(MLA, Rajput) 
badrinath Varma -do-
(MLA, Kayastha) 
Shivnandan Prasad Mandal -do-
(MLA, Yadav) 
Chotanaqpur 
K.E. Sahay 
(MLA, Kayastha) 
Sah Ozair Munimi 
(MLC, Muslim) 
-do-
•do~ 
S.K. Sinha 
-dd-
Not clear 
-do-
A.M. sinha 
S .K. sinha 
Factional 
Leader 
iact ional 
Leader 
A.N.sinha 
A.N.Sinha 
S.K. Sinha 
Not clear 
Madhubanl 
(Darbhanga) 
(Purnea) 
faenipatti wrest (Darbhanga) 
(Mo^^hyr) 
Mannar 
(Muzaffarpur) 
Muzaffarpui 
Sakra(Muzaf farpur) 
Kharagpur 
(Monghyr) 
Nabinayar 
(Gaya) 
Patna city-cum-
Naubatpur$Patna) 
Murllganj 
(Bhagalpur) 
Girldlh-cum-Dumri (Hazaribagh/ 
Region not known 
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D&PUTY MINISTERS 
North Plains 
A.A.M. NOCT 
(MLA, Muslim) 
Birchand Pate l 
(MLA, Kurmi) 
South P la ins 
4 .10 .1952 
- d o -
S.K. Sinha ba iS l 
(Purnea) 
A.N. s inha Mahua 
(Kusaffarpur 
Nlrpada Mukherjee - d o -
(MLA, Beharl Bengali) 
S.K. Sinha Monghyr Town 
(Monghyr) 
PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARIES 
North P la ins 
Chandrika Ram 9.11 .1953 
(MLA, ChamarCaarijanj 
Chotanagpur 
A.N. Sinha Katea-cun-Bhore 
(Saran) 
Bhaglrath Singh 
(MLA, Adlvas l ) - a o -
Devendranath Mahto 30.11.1953 
VMLA, Koir l ) 
S.K. Sinha 
• d o -
Latehar—cum-
Manatu 
(Palamu) 
Jhalda 
(Manbhum) 
5 9 . (a> Ihe name and date of oath-taking of Minis ters and 
Deputy Ministers* Bihar C i v i l L i s t (A h a l f - y e a r l y 
publ i ca t ion , Government of Bihar Publ icat ions ,Patna) , 
1953, p . 1; and of Parliamentary Secre tar i e s from 
Bihar C i v i l L i s t , 1955, p . 2 . 
(b) Caste and f a c t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e , Baraeshwar Singh, 
o o . c l t . , pp. 146-147. 
(c) The c o n s t i t u e n c i e s of the Min i s t er s , Deputy Ministers 
of Parliamentary S e c r e t a r i e s , F i r s t General E lec t ions , 
under the Const i tut ion of India in Bihar (Patna* 
Superintendent, Government P r i n t i n g , Gulzarbagh, 
1953) . 
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one Muslim* one Bengali (both Deputy Ministers), one Adlvasl 
and one KbIrl (both Parliamentary Secretaries), The A.N.Slnha 
group had nominated two Rajputs* one Kayastha* one Yadav 
(all Cabinet Ministers^ one Rural (Deputy Minister) and one 
Harljan (Parliamentary Secretary)• Among the three Ministers* 
whose factional loyalty was not dear* two were Muslins and 
one a Bhumihar. 
So far as geographical representation was concerned* 
Noth Bihar had as many as nine berths in the Council of 
Ministers; six of them were Cabinet Ministers* two Deputy 
Ministers and one Parliamentary Secretary. South Bihar had 
got five seats* four Cabinet Ministers and one Deputy Minister* 
Both S.K. sinha and A.N. Sinha belonged to this region. There 
were three men in the Council of Ministers (one Cabinet 
Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries) who belonged to 
Chotanagpur region. 
Following the 1957 General Elections* a direct contest 
between S.K. Sinha and A.N. Sinha for the Congress Legislature 
Party leadership could not be avoided. All efforts of the 
High command to settle the matter amicably were in vain* for 
neither was prepared to accept any compromise. In the first 
open contest A.N. Sinha lost and subsequently accepted 
Deputy Leadership. 
The formation of the Ministry again caused feverish 
activity on the part of the factional leaders. All ?clnds of 
56 
caste groups, interest groups and groups of se l f -seekers 
became active for ministerial spoils* Final ly , the choices 
of the Ministers were made at the intervention of the Congress 
60 
High Command. I t i s wofcth mentioning that the S*K* Slnha 
sub-coalition had to face several problems in the selection 
of Ministers. Caste groups, pressure groups and important 
individuals pressed their claim to ministerial posts* On the 
contrary, the A.N. Slnha faction had no such problem and the 
choices of Ministers to be included in the Ministry were l e f t 
61 
to i t s leader* I t i s also important that the S*K» Slnha 
faction, th i s time, negotiated from the point of strength, as 
i t was victorious, and succeeded in having a l i o n ' s share of 
ministerial posts. Among the nine cabinet members, only three, 
Including A.N. slnha, were from h i s group. Almost a l l Deputy 
Ministers belonged to the S.K. Slnha faction* The following 
Table V shows caste and factional allegiance of the members 
of the Ministry apart iron i t s geographical representation* 
irora the Table i t i s clear that being a victorious group, 
the S.K* Slnha faction successfully restr icted the entry of 
the A.M. s lnha's supporters Into the Ministry* A signif icant 
feature of th i s Ministry making was that more and more gromps 
and individuals started demanding rewards for the ir support 
to the Chief Minister. 
60. Bameshwar Singh, apjtSlt** pp.255-261. 
61. Ib id . , pp. 256-256* 
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Showing caste/community, region and factional allegiance 
of the members of the second S.K. Sinha Ministry, 1957* 
Region/teame 8 oath taken 6 Faction T 6 ft 
Cons tituency/ 
i t strict 
CABIMBT MXNIS1&RS 
North_£JLains _ 
Bhola Pa swan Shastr l 
(MLA, J3uaadh(sc)) 
Birchand Patel 
(MLA, Kurmi) 
S^uth P la ins 
S.K. Sinha 
(MLA, Bhumihar) 
A.N* Sinha 
(ML,A, Rajput) 
Binoda Nand Jha 
(MLA, Malthl l Brahmin) 
Jagat Narayan Lai 
(MLA, Kayastha) 
Maqbool Ahmad 
(MLA, Muslim) 
Sah Ozair Muniml 
(MLC, Muslim) 
Kumar Ganga Nand Singh 
(MLC, Brahmin) 
LEPUTY MINiSifiRS 
North P l a i n s 
A .A.M. Noor 
(MLA* Muslim) 
6,5.1957 
- d o -
-do— 
••do*" 
- d o -
- 6 b -
- d o -
- d o -
- d o -
- d o -
S.K. Sinha 
A.N.Sinha 
Fact ional 
Leader 
Fact ional 
Leader 
A.N. Sinha 
S.K. Sinha 
S.K. Sinha 
S.K. sinha 
S.K. s inha 
S.K. Sinha 
Ohamdaha 
(Purnea) 
Laigaiij South 
(Muzaffarpur) 
Sheikhpura 
(Monghyr) 
Nabinagar 
(Gay a) 
Rajmahal 
(Santhal Pacagnas) 
Danapur 
(Patna) 
Colgong 
(Bhagalpur) 
Region not known 
Region not known 
Bai s l 
(Purnea) 
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Kedar Pande 
(MLA, brahmin) 
6 .6 .1957 
Laliteshwar Prasad Sahi 
(MLA, Bhumlhar) - d o -
Hirdya Narain chaudhary 
(MLA, Maithl l Brahmin) - d o -
Sahcteo Mahto 
(MLA, Kolri') 
Krishna Kant Singh 
(MLA, Bhumihar) 
Chandrlka Ram 
(MLA, Chamar(SC)) 
Laroga Prasad Rai 
(MLA, Yadav; 
Deo Naratn Yadav 
(MLA, Yadav) 
South P l a i n s 
- o o -
- d o -
—do— 
22,9.1959 
- d o -
S.K. Slnha 
S.K. Slnha 
S.K. Sinha 
S.K. Slnha 
S.K. Sinha 
Not c l e a r 
Bagaha 
(champaran) 
Lalganj North 
(Muzaffarpur 
Larbhanga North 
(Darbhanga) 
Samastipur East 
(Darbhanga) 
Baaantpur west 
(Saran} 
Bhore (Saran) 
A.N. Slnha Pamsa 
(Saran) 
S*K* Sinha Jalnayar 
(Larbhanga) 
Amblka Saran Singh 6 .5 .1957 
(MLA, Rajput) 
Rani Jyotirmayee - d o -
(MLA, Bihar! Bengal i ) 
Syed Mohamoad ftqull • d o -
(MLA, Muslim) 
Cto^anagpur, 
Hiss Rajeshwar Saroj Las 
(MLA, Adlvasi) 22.9.1959 
Radha Govind Prasad 6.5.1957 
(MLC, Kayastha) 
Not 
S.K. 
S.K. 
S.K. 
S^K. 
c l e a r 
Slnha 
Sinha 
Sinha 
Slnha 
Arrah Muffasil 
(Shahabad) 
fcakur 
(Santhal Paragnas) 
Bihar North 
(Patna) 
Garhva 
(Palamu) 
Region not known 
62 . Name and date of swearing-in o f Minis ters and Deputy 
Minis ters ,Bihar C i v i l L i s t , September, 195tt,pp. 1-2,and 
March, I960,p .21 Caste and fac t iona l allegiance,Baiaeshwar 
S i n g h , o p . c i t . , P P . 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 ? Constituency/ Report on the Secon< 
General E l e c t i o n s , i n Bihar,1956-57(Patna:Secretariat Press 
Sih&r,l957),€fc>ver£tment of Bihar, L i s t of Members of the 
Bihar L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, 1958 (Patna: Secre tar ia t Preas 
Bihar, 1957 and 1958) . 
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The A.N. Sinha fact ion had nominated one Rajput, one 
brahmin and one Kurral as Cabinet Minis ters and a Yadav as 
Deputy Minis te r . After the death of A.N. Sinha., h i s group 
Included another Rajput, Deep Naraln Singh, in h i s p lace . 
Among the two Deputy Minis te r s , whoee fac t ional al legiance 
was not c l ea r , one was a Rajput and the o ther a HartJan. Thus, 
the second 23-man S.K. Sinha Minis try was dominated by the 
forward casteroen. There were eleven forward cas te amen - four 
Brawn ins , th ree Bhumihars, two Rajputs and two Kayasthas, 
four backward castemen, two Yadavas, one Ku.nni and one Kolr i , 
two Scheduled castemen, one scheduled tribeman and four Muslins 
in h i s Minis t ry . The remaining one was a Bihari Bengali . 
As regards regional representa t ion , the North Plains 
had eleven represen ta t ives - two Cabinet and nine Deputy 
Minis te rs - in the Council of Min i s t e r s . I t was followed by 
the South Pla ins which had e ight members - f ive Cabinet and 
th ree Deputy Minis ters - in the Minis t ry . The Chotanagpur b e l t 
had only one represen ta t ion . 
After S.K. Sinha*s death and following .'=.&. J h a ' s e lec t ion 
as the l eade r of t he Congress Leg i s l a tu re ^a r ty , fact ional 
claims for the allotment of min i s t e r i a l be r th s were pressed 
again . x>th t h e fact ional leaders - B.N. Jha and M . P . Sinha 
requested the High Command a maximum number of the i r supporters 
63 
should be accommodated in the Minis t ry . This time, the leader 
63 . Indian Nation (Patna) , February 13,14,15, 1961. 
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of the Legislature Party, B.u. Jha asserted h i s right to choose 
h i s colleagues* He told the Congress President Milam Sanjiva 
Reddy, who was keen to have a composite Ministry, that i f any 
choice was forced upon him, i t would be d i f f i cu l t for him 
64 
to carry on. However, he met M.P. Sinha on February 15, 1961 
in Mew Xelhi and asked hira to suggest two names o£ his choice 
65 
for the Cabinet* Earlier on February 13, the Congress High 
Command decided to have a nine-man Cabinet - seven from 
66 
£„&• Jha camp and two from M.P* Sinha faction. They again 
met on February 16 but did not reach any agreement. M.P.Sinha 
was ins i s tent on having three Cabinet posts and retaining a l l 
67 
the f ive Leputy Ministers of h i s faction* B.N. Jha submitted 
a l i s t of seven Cabinet Ministers (a l l from h i s group) and 
nine i«puty Ministers (including two from M*P* Sinha faction) 
to the Governor* All of them, barring Sinha's supporters, took 
68 
their oath on February l e , 1961. 
The situation turned serious. Abdul Qayum Ansari, the 
bPCc President and Deep Naraln Singh, Irrigation Minister, 
separately tr ied to mediate between the two factions but they 
£4. Bameshwar Singh, OP* c i t* , p. 268* 
65. Indian Nation, February 16, 1961. 
66* Ib id . , February 15, 1961. 
67. Search Light (Patna), February 17, 1961. 
68. Bihar Civil L i s t , September, 1961, pp* 1-2. 
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did not succeed. The High Command was also anxious to settle 
the matter. When on March 10, B.N. Jha and his two colleagues 
went to Delhi for discussions on Cabinet expansion, he was 
advised to broadbase his Ministry by Including members from 
the M.P. Slnha faction. It was decided that two Cabinet 
Ministers and five leputy Ministers would be taken from the 
69 
Slnha faction. B.N. Jha expanded his Ministry on April 3,1961 
when only Zawar Hussatn (Cabinet Minister) took oath. Members 
70 
from the M.P. slnha faction did not take their oath again. 
Ultimately, they had to join the Ministry on April 19, 1961 
71 
after receiving serious warning from the High Commano. 
Thus, the Ministry formation was completed in three 
months' time as a result of the hardening of the attitude of 
the High Command. Both the factions aggressively pressed their 
claims upto the last moment. More than anything else, factional 
consideration was taken into account in the rormatlon of the 
Ministry. b.N. Jha, having a majority of his men in the Ministry, 
did not include any member from the opposite camp while 
appointing ten Parliamentary Secretaries on April 4, 1961. The 
following Table VI shows the dominant position of the Jha 
faction in the Ministry. 
69. bameshwar Singh, pp. clt., p. 272. 
70
» Search Light, April 4, 1961. 
71. Xblo., April 20, 1961. 
•1 
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TABLE VI 
Showing caste/comrouuity,region and f a c t i o n a l l o y a l t y 
of the members of the B.N. Jha Ministry , 1961, 
V. Caste / 
J community 
T y 
0 Faction 0. Constituency 
i tf 
Region/Name 
i 
CABINET MINISTERS 
North P l a i n s 
Bhola Paswan Shast 
(MLA) 
Birchand Pate l 
(MLA) 
Deep Naraln Singh 
(MLA) 
Zawar Hussain 
(MLA) 
Janaki Raman Mishra bhumlhar 
(MLA) 
Dusadh( 
Kurrai 
Rajput 
Muslim 
SC) B.N, Jha 
B . N . Jha 
B.N. Jha 
M . P . Slnha 
Dhamdaha 
(purnea) 
Lalganj South 
(Muzaffarp*r) 
Haj ipur 
(Muzaffarpur) 
Zeradie 
(Saran) 
Binoda Hand Jha 
(MLA) 
Kaithil 
Brahmin 
Satyendra Narain Slnha Rajput 
(MP 
Jafar Imam 
(MLC) 
Ram Prakash Lai 
(MLC) 
D1PUTY MINISTERS 
North P l a i n s 
A .A.M. Noor 
(MLA) 
Kedar Pandey 
(MLA) 
Muslim 
Kayastha 
Muslim 
Brahmin 
M.P.Slnha Darbhanga South 
IDarbhanga) 
factional Rajmahal 
Leader (Santhai Paragnas) 
B.N. Jha Aurangabad 
(Gaya) 
B.N. Jha Region not known 
B.N. Jha Region not known 
B.N. Jha Balsl 
(Purnea) 
B.N. Jha bagaha 
(Champaran) 
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Chandrika Ran 
(MLA) 
Laroga Prasad Rat 
(MLA) 
Beonarain Yadav 
(MLA) 
Abdul Ghafoor 
(MLA) 
Chamar( SC) 
Yadav 
Yadav 
Muslim 
Kamaldeo Narain Singh Kayastha 
(MLA) 
Laliteshwar Prasad Sahi Bhumihar 
(MLA) 
Sahdeo Mahto 
(MLA) 
Koiri 
Nawal KiShore Pa.Slnha bhumihar 
(MLA) 
South P l a i n s 
Ambika shaxan Singh Rajput 
(MLA) 
B . N . Jha 
B.N. Jha 
B.N. Jha 
B.N. Jha 
'j.N. Jha 
M.P.Slnha 
M.p.sinha 
M.P.Slnha 
B.N. Jha 
Bhore 
(saran) 
Parasa 
(Saran) 
Jainagar 
(Darbhanga) 
Barauli 
(Saran) 
Purnea 
Lalganj North 
(Muzaf farpuc ) 
Santas t ipur East 
(Darbhanga) 
Daro 
(Muzaf farpur 
Arrah Muffasll 
(Shahabad) 
SfcafcaaaSEur. 
Samu Charan Tubid 
(MLC) 
Lokesh Nath Jha 
(MLc) 
Adivasi(ST) B.N. Jha Region not known 
Maithi l 
Brahmin 
Dusadh(SC) Mungeri Lai 
(MLC) 
PAULJAMgJTAKY SECRETARIES 
North P l a i n s 
PraMKawati Gupta (MLA J Bania 
South P la ins 
Mrs. Sumitra £ievl(Mi>A) Koiri 
Mrs.Manorama Pandey(MLA)Brahmin 
Lai Singh Tyagi(MLA) Kuxmi 
Chandra Shekhar Singh(MLA)Rajput 
B.N. Jha 
M.P.Slnha 
Region not known 
Region not known 
B.N. Jha Kesarla(Champaran) 
B.N.Jha Prio (Shahabad) 
B.N.Jha B1kraraganJ(Shahabad) 
B.N.Jha Hi l sa (Patna) 
B.N .Jha Jhajha(Monghyr) 
7 2 . Caste and fac t iona l allegiance,Bameshwar S i n g h , q p . c i t . , """** 
pp.152-154; Constituency,Vide Supra,Cahpter I I , f o o t n o t e 63(c ) ; 
Name and Membership of the Leg i s la ture of the Min i s ters , 
Bihar C i v i l L i s t , September, 1961, p p . 1 - 2 . 
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The dominant position of B.N. Jha group was natural in 
the sense that K.B. Sahay and S.N. Stnha faction were with 
him ia the game of power. 
Caste-wise Break-up 
The B.N. Jha Ministry was also dominated by the forward 
castemen. ..here were fourteen men belonging to these castes -
f ive Cabinet Mini seers # s ix Ministers of State and three 
Parliamentary secretar ies . There were eight Ministers belonging 
to the backward Castes - one Cabinet Minister, three Ministers 
of ^tate and four Parliamentary secretar ies . The Scheduled 
castes had s ix men - one cabinet Minister* two Ministers of 
State and three Parliamentary Secretaries in the Ministry. The 
Muslim community had four men - two Cabinet and two Ministers 
of State in the Jha Ministry. However, the Scheduled Tribes had 
only one man. The above Taoie shows that the four Forward and 
four Backward castes were represented, while there wsjre three 
Scheduled Castes* There was one schedule Tribe. 
Region-wise Break-up 
The North Bihar plains had the highest number of represen-
ta t ives in the Ministry* i . e . , twenty. Among them, f ive were 
Cabinet Ministers, ten Ministers of state and four Parliamentary 
Secretaries . The South Bihar plains had two Cabinet Ministers* 
one Minister of State and five Parliamentary Secretaries. The 
tr iba l be l t of Chotanagpur had one representative as a Minister 
of State . 
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The Second B.N. Jha Ministry, 1962 
After the 1962 General Elect ions , a t r i a l o £ Strength 
between the m i n i s t e r i a l l a t e and the d i s s iden t s took place over 
the CLP l eade r sh ip . The d i s s iden t s put up K.B. Sahay agains t 
B.N, Jha but l o s t once more desp i t e the K.B. Sahay - M.p.sinha 
combination* 
Ministry-making, t h i s t ime, was not a long drawn b a t t l e 
i n sp i t e of fact ional claims and counter claims for min i s t e r i a l 
b e r t h s . One of the reasons perhaps was tha t the dominant faction 
was not So dominant a f t e r the defection of K.B. Sahay. secondly, 
the fact ional l eaders were more pragmatic and accommodative. 
B.N. Jha himself wanted the Ministry to be broad-based and he 
publ ic ly expressed the view tha t he had no prejudice against 
73 
anybody who had voted against him. The d i s s iden t s a lso were 
not taking any of tensive ac t ion , perhaps, because of t h e i r two 
consecutive de fea t s . H.P. s l n h a ' s statement tha t "B.N. Jha i s 
the undisputed leader of the Bihar Congress Legis la ture Par ty . 
74 
He i s alone to decide the s t rength and nature of the Cabinet* was 
a c l e a r proof of t h i s . When B.N. Jha held discussions with 
the r i v a l fact ion l eade r s with regard to Ministry-making and 
sought t h e i r approval in joining the Minis t ry , t h e l a t t e r 
reciprocated by deciding to jo in along with a l l those whose 
73» Indian Nation, March 10 and 11, 1961. 
74. I b i d . , March 10, 1962. 
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co-operat ion was being sought by the former. The th ird and 
one of the roost Important reasons was the a t t i t u d e of the 
Congress High Command which wanted a homogeneous Ministry 
represented by a i l s ec t ions* In I t s meeting on March 9, 1962 
the Central Parliamentary Board (CPBj decided that wherever 
there were f a c t i o n s , the leader of the CLP should form a broad-
base cabinet and s t r i v e for bringing unity In the party. 
B.N. Jha was to ld t h i s when he discussed Ministry formation 
76 
with the members of the High Command. 
However, the fac t iona l l eaders did t h e i r bes t to secure 
as many m i n i s t e r i a l posts as was poss ib le in order to reward 
t h e i r supporters . In the process some d i f f erences remained 
unresolved upto the l a s t moment. The K.B. Sahay - M.P. Sinha 
t a c t i o n wanted to have four berths in the Cabinet but the 
77 
B . N . Jha fac t ion was not ready to concede t h i s demand. B.N .Jha 
had succeeded in rewar-ding most of h i s supporters by taking 
them in the Minis try . Even then, in an obvious b id to meet 
the ambitions of some more of them, he appointed s i x P a r l i a -
mentary Secre tar i e s from h i s f a c t i o n . The Table v i l shows 
the fac t iona l p o s i t i o n of the Min i s try . 
7 5 . Search Llcftt, March 13 , 1962; Indian Nat ion, March 14,1962. 
7 6 . Search Light , March 10 and i l , 1962. 
77 . I b i d . , March 12, 1962. 
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TABLE VII 
Showing castpcommunlty* region and factional allegiance 
of the members of the second B.N. Jha Ministry* 1962 • 
1 Caste/ 9 T 
0 coraannlty I Faction 6 
J I L 
Region/Name Constituency 
CASUIST mMlSHiunb 
North Plains 
Dee* Naraln Singh (MLA) Rajput B.N. Jha Hajlpur (Muzaf farpur) 
Bhola Paswan Shastrl Dusadh(SC) B.N. Jha Banmakhi 
(MLA.) (Pumea) 
B lr Chand Pate l Kurrot 
(MLA) 
Mahesh Prasad Slnha Bhumlhar 
(MLA) 
Harlnath Mishra Malthll 
(MLA) Brahmin 
South Plains 
B.N .Jha Brahmin 
(MLA) 
Satyendra Naraln Slnha Rajput 
(MLA) 
Badrlnath Verraa(MLA) Kayaatha 
Muslim 
B.N. Jha Lalganj South 
(Muzaffarpur) 
K.B.-M.P. Sakra (Muzaffarpur) 
B.N. Jha Bahera 
(Darbhanga) 
Factional 
Leader 
B.N. Jha 
B.N. Jha 
K.B.-M.P. 
K.B .*•M.P. 
Abdul Qayum Anearl 
(MLA) 
K.£. Sahay(MLA) Kayastha 
Ciioyanagpur, 
Shayama Charan Tubld Adlvasl(ST) B.N. Jha 
(MLC) 
Jalpal Singh Yadav 
(MP) 
Adlvasl(ST) B . N . Jha 
MINISTERS OP STATE 
caroga Prasad Ral(MLA) Yadav 
Rajmahal 
(Santhal Paragnas) 
Nablnagar 
(Gaya) 
Patna SouthIPatna) 
Dehrl-on-Sone 
(Shahabad) 
Patna West( Patna) 
Local bodies 
(Chotanagpur 
Ranchl west 
(Chotanagpur) 
B.N. Jha Parasa (saran) 
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Rirlah Tiwari 
(MLA) 
South P l a ^ s 
Hand Wtanar Singh 
(MLA) 
A.A.M. Noor(MLC) 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Muslim 
B.N. Jha 
B . N . Jha 
B . N . Jha 
Manjhi 
(Saran) 
Kharagpur 
(Monghyr) 
Region not 
DEVU1Y HIMS&ukiS 
North P l a i n s 
Abdul Ghafoor(MLA) Muslim 
Kamal Deo Narain Sinha 
(MLA) 
Sahdeo Mahto(MLA) 
South P la ins 
Amblka Sbaran Singh 
(MLA) 
Lokesh Nath Jha 
Mungeri Lal(MLC) 
Kayaatha 
Koiri 
Raj put 
B.N. Jha 
K.B.—M.P. 
K.B.-M.P. 
B.N. Jha 
B.N. Jha 
Dusadh(sc) K . B . - M . P . 
MaithlA 
Brahmin 
PARLIAMENTAKY SECRETARIES 
Berth P l a i n s 
Baleshwar Ram 
(MLA) 
Baidya Nath Mehta 
(MLA) 
Dumar Lai Baltha 
(MLA) 
fqulfr P l a i n s 
Sural t ra £evi$MLA) 
Manorma Pande (MLA) 
Hardeo Singh JMLA; 
DusadMsc) 
Koiri 
Dhobi(sc) 
Koiri 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
B.N. Jha 
B.N. Jha 
B.N. Jha 
B . N . Jha 
B . N . Jha 
B . N . Jha 
Gopalgao j (Saran) 
Purnea 
Somasttpur East 
(Darbhanga) 
Arrah Muffaell 
(Shahabad) 
Region not known 
Region not known 
Balsinghearai 
(Larbhanga) 
Kishanpur 
(saharsa) 
Narpatganj 
(Purnea) 
Arrah(Shahabad) 
B ikramganj (Shahabad) 
Gaya Muf faa 11 (Gay a) 
7 8 . Name of the M i n i s t e r s , Bihar C i v i l L i s t . March, 1963,pp.1-2; 
Caste and f a c t i o n a l l o y a l t y , Baraeshwar Singh, o p . c i t . . 
pp. 156-157; Const i tuenc ies of the Members of the Ministry, 
Reports on the Third General E lec t ions in Bihar, 1962 
trie " VPatnai S e c r e t a i a t P r e s s , Bihar, 1963; . 
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Fact ional Pos i t ion 
The d i s s iden t s were given three be r th s in the Cabinet 
and three of t h e i r supporters were appointed as Deputy Ministers* 
None of t h e i r camp followers were taken as Parliamentary 
S e c r e t a r i e s . K.s . Sahay, one of the two important l eaae rs of 
the r i v a l fact ion, was appointed as a member of the Cabinet 
about 
on June 29, 1962 along with Shyama Sharan rubid( three and a 
79 
half months a f t e r the formation of the Ministry* B.&. Jha 
fu r the r expanded h i s cabinet and appointed Ja ipa l Singh on 
September 3 , 1962 a f t e r the merger of the Jharkhand Party with 
80 
the Congress. He did t h i s to consol idate h i s posi t ion in the 
Congress Leg is la tu re pa r ty . 
Cftifre-Wlfe pgfiiUon 
'Ihough B.N. Jha had forged an a l l i ance with the Backward 
Castes , h i s Ministry was again packed with Forward cas t e s men. 
There were fourteen Minis ters belonging to the Forward and five 
to the backward c a s t e s . The Scheduled Castes had four aien in 
the Jha Ministry (one Cabinet, one Deputy Minis ter and two 
Pari 1 anientary S e c r e t a r i e s ) . The Scheduled Tribes haa two men 
[both cabine t Minis ters) in the Council of Min i s t e r s , while the 
Muslims had three b e r t h s . 
79 . Bihar Civ i l feist. March, 1963, pp. 1-2. 
80. i b id . 
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Among the Forward Castes there were five Brahmins, five 
Rajputs* three Kayasthas and one Bhumlhar. This was the first 
occasion After s.K. Sinha's death that Bhumihars were reduced 
to such a miserable minority/ while B.N, Jha had raised the 
strength of his own Castemen irom four to five and that of 
Kayasthas from two to three. Among the backward Castes, Kurmls 
were given a place of importance by being included in the Cabinet. 
One Yadav was made a Minister of State. There were three Kolria 
(one Deputy Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries) • Among 
the Scheduled Castes, Dusadhs were given thre posts (one Cabinet/ 
one Deputy Minister and one Parliamentary Secretary) and Dhobis 
one (Parliamentary Secretary). 
RegIon-wise Analysis 
For the first time in the history of the Congress Ministries, 
members from the Chotanagpur region were included in the Cabinet. 
Its two representatives were made Cabinet Ministers. The North 
Plains were again given the highest number of seats in the 
Ministry. There were thirteen Ministers (five Cabinet Minister* 
two Ministers of State, three xeputy Ministers ana three 
Parliamentary Secretaries) belonging to this region. The South 
Plains got ten berths (five Cabinet, one Minister of State, one 
Deputy Minister and three Parliamentary Secretaries). 
The K.B. Sahav Ministry 
Readership Contest. 
Following B.N. Jha*s resignation in 1963 under the Kamraj 
70 
Plan, a fresh Contest for Chief Ministership occurred between 
K.B, Sahay - M.P. slnha - S.N. slnha combine and B.N. Jha 
faction. Bir Chand Pa^el, a Backward Caste (Kurmi) lieutenant 
of Jha, lost the contest to K.B. Sahay, who became the third 
Chief Minister of Bihar since India became a Republic. There 
were some striking features of this contest* For the first 
time in the tactions! history of the Bihar Congress, Kayasthas, 
Bhuraihars and Rajputs came together to defeat B.N. Jha faction* 
In the contest, members of the Backward Castes/Scheduled Tribes 
and Scheduled Castes were sharply divided* R.L.. Singh Yadav, 
Leaoer of Yadavas, and 5.K. Bage, Leader of Scheduled Tribe, 
were with Kayasthe - Bhumihar - Kajput alliance* The B.N. Jha 
faction was further isolated by the desertatlon of Bhola 
Paswan Shastri, an influenclal Harijan leader of Bihar, who 
conveyed his support to Sahay through A.A.M. Noar, an influenclal 
81 
Muslim supporter of B.N* Jha. 
Min^stry^k&no, 
i actional warfare started over the formation of the 
Ministry, but the firm handling by the Congress High Command 
saved the situation* In view of the past activities of the 
factional leaders of the Bihar Congress* the High Command was 
seizea of the problem from the very beginning. It invited 
both group leaders for a discussion on the formation of the 
81. Bameshwar Singh, op. clt*. pp. 238-241; Chetkar Jha, 
OP. clt., p. 580. 
n 
Ministry and warned them that if they fai led to agree, the 
82 
CPB would prepare the l i s t . In spite of K„B. Sahay's Insistence 
on 27, the High Command decided to have a 20-raenber Ministry 
83 
consisting only of Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of State, 
Keeping in mind the High Command's att i tude, K.B. Sahay and 
Bir Chand Patel met twice on October 1# 1963, f i r s t at the 
residence of K.K. shah*the l i c e General Secretary, and then 
at the residence of i»al Bahadur Shastri, and prepared an 
34 85 
agreed l i s t . The Ministers took their oath on October 2,1963. 
irom Table VIII, given below, i t i s clear that only 
two Ministers were taken from the B.N. Jha faction* Mo Minister 
of s tate was included from his faction, though Bir Chand Patel 
had put forwaro the claim of three Ministers of State and 
86 
one Deputy Minister. The rest of ministerial berths was 
shared by three leaders of the Kayastha - fihurolhar - Rajput 
combine. However, K.B. Sahay took away s ix cabinet and three 
Minister of State posts, th i s being the highest number of 
berths taken by any of the group leaders. 
82. Indian Natl can, September 29, 30 and October 1, 1963. 
83. Bameshwar Singh, OP. c l t . , pp. 284-285. 
84. I b i d . , p. 284. 
85. Bihar Civil List, September, 1964, pp. 1-2. 
86. Search Lluht, October 1, 1963. 
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TABLE VIII 
Showing caste/community, region and factional allegiance 
of the members o£ the K.B. Sahay Mini*try, 1963. 
Caste/ 5 1 
community 0 Faction it Constituency 
I S !_ 
Reg ion/ft ame 
CABINS! MINISi'&fiS 
North Plains 
M#P. Sinha (MLA) 
Blr Chand Patel 
(MLA) 
Harinath Mlshra 
(MLA) 
South Plains 
K.B, Sahay 
(MLA) 
S.N. Sinha 
(ML A) 
Mrs. Suroitra Devi 
(MLA) 
Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav 
(MLA) 
Abdul Qayum Ansari (MLA) 
Chotanaqpur 
Shushil Kumar Bage 
(MLA) 
Mungeri Lal(MLC) 
Jafar Imam (MLC) 
Bhumihar factional leader sakra 
of Kayastha-Bhumihar-^Muzaf far-
Rajput al l iance pur) 
Kurrai i actional leader Lalganj South 
of o.N. Jha (Muzaffarpur) 
group 
Mattnil -do* Bahera West 
Brahmin (Darbhanga) 
Kayastha Factional leader Patna West 
of Kayastha-Bhumihar-(Pacna) 
Rajput al l iance 
Rajput -do- Nabinagar 
(Gaya) 
Kolri K.B. Sahay Arrah 
(Shahabad) 
Yadav K.B. Sahay Paliganj 
(Patna) 
Muslim K.B. sahay Dehri-on-Sone 
(Shahabad) 
Adivaal 
( ST ) 
Dusadh(sc) 
Muslim 
K.B. Sahay Kolibera 
(Ranchi) 
M.P .Sinha Region not known 
K.B. Sahay Region not known 
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MINISlERS OF STATS 
North P la ins 
Eymarlal ba l tha 
(MLA) 
Nawal Kishor Prasad 
(MLA) 
Sahdeo Mahto 
(MLA) 
Baleshwar Ram 
(MLA) 
Glriah Tlwarl (MLA) 
S ^ t h - P l a l n s 
Arabika Sharan Singh 
(MLA) 
Dhobi (SC) 
Stnha 
Bhumihar 
Kolri 
Dusadh(SC) 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
S.N. 
M.P. 
M.P. 
M.P. 
K.B. 
S.N. 
Sin ha 
Slnha 
Slnha 
Slnha 
Sahay 
Slnha 
Narpatganj 
(Pumea) 
Sahebganj 
(Muzaffarpur) 
Samastlpur East 
iLartohanga) 
Dalslngh Saral 
(Darbhanga) 
Manjhi 
(saran) 
Arrah Muffasil 
(shahabad) 
Raghvendra Naraln Singh 
(MLA) Rajput 
Bar tar Hembrum 
(MLA) 
S.N. Slnha 
Adlvasi(ST) K . B . Sahay 
Shiva Shankar Singh bhumihar K.b. sahay 
(MLA) 
Balhar 
(Bhogalpur) 
Shikaripara 
(santhal 
Paragnas) 
Sheikhpura 
(Monghyr) 
87 . (a) Name and membership of the Leg i s la ture of the 
Ministers* Bihar C i v i l L i s t , September, 1964* pp .1 -2 . 
(b) Caste and fac t iona l a l l eg iance* Bameshwar Singh* 
OP, a l t . * p. 159. 
( c ) Const i tuencies* Vide Supra* Chapter II* footnote 
7fi ( c ) . 
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caste-wise Analysis 
This Ministry, unlike the past, was not dominated by 
the Forward Casteraen. on the contrary* the Backward Castes 
had increased their strength considerably in the Cabinet, 
which rose to three, one short of the Forward Caste's strength. 
One of their men was included as a Minister of State. There 
were nine Forward Castes men ( four Cabinet and f ive Ministers 
of State) in the K.b. sahay Ministry* Among them, thmte came 
each from Bhumihars and Raj puts, two from Brahmins and one 
from Kayasthas. Among the Backward Castes* one came each from 
Yaaavas and Kolrie and two from Kurmis. There were three 
Scheduled Caste men Cone Dhobi and two Lusads) in the l a s t 
undivided Congress Ministry. The Scheduled Tribes and the 
Muslims each had two members in the Ministry. 
Region-wise Analysis 
As regards regional representation in the Sahay Ministry, 
the South Plains had nine representatives, while the North 
Plains had eight men. The Chotanagpur bel t had only one 
representative. 
Observations 
Thus, po l i t i ca l expediency, guided by personal Interests 
and ambitions was the main reason of the factional conf l i c t s . 
This i s Indicated by the foregoing analysis of Ministry forma-
t ion . Jbroro the above account, i t seems clear that Upper Castes 
7S 
did not form a single cohesive and coherent group. Bach unit 
of the Upper Castes was serious contender for political power. 
Despite all this* there seems to have been an unwritten 
agreement among them to keep political power in their hands. 
The Upper caste leaders of the main factions within Congress, 
who used to group and re-group among themselves, managed to 
keep real power away from the Backward Castes* It is among the 
Upper Castes that a major portion of political rewards in 
terms of political leadership was distributed. All Chief 
Ministers during the period belonged to Upper Castes. Though, 
B.N. Jha, to keep himself in power* had forged an alliance 
with the backward Caste men in the Legislature* it was K.B. 
Sahay, who brought them to the centre of power. While the 
former hao included one man from these Castes in each of his 
two Cabinets* the latter had taken three of their men in the 
Cabinet and allotted a very important portfolio* PWI, to one 
of them. The Scheduled castes and the Muslims continued to be 
in a better position. The Scheduled Tribes were given a place 
of honour as late as in 1962* when B.N. Jha formed his second 
Ministry. There was* thus* a shift in the direction of greater 
participation by the Backward Caste elites in the Crame of 
politics in Bihar. 
Most of the members of the Ministries formed during 
this period came from the North Plains. But all the Chief 
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Ministers belonged to the South Plains* The latter continued 
to receive a fairly good number of ministerial berths* Zt 
is only the tribal belt of Chotanagpur, which continued to 
get the lowest number of berths in all the Ministries. 
CHAPTER III 
MULTI-PARTY COALITION GQV&RMMBNTga THE PHASE OF NON-COMGRESSIOI 
The Year 1967 
The fourth General Elections* held In February 1967,proved to 
be a momentous year from the point of view of Indian po l i t i ca l 
development. The resul t s clearly showed that the hold of the monoli-
t h i c congress in a large number of states was greatly diminished. The 
defeat of the Congress Party and the emergence of a number of other 
po l i t i ca l parties on the post-elect ion scene, thus* provides a 
watershed in the post-independence Indian p o l i t i c s . 
The congress Party fa i led e i ther to secure "the. requisite 
majority in Assemblies in various s tates or subsequently wembers 
e lected tm congress t i cke t s l e f t the fold of the congress to form 
spl inter groups, what many observers had predicted for the f ir th 
General Elections in 1972 happened in 1967. one party dominant system 
was not succeeded by two-party or three-party or multi-party system, 
2 
but rather by a cross-party system of dubious value. Thus«after the 
1967 General Elections,Indian p o l i t i c s centered a •second s t a g e s 
1. i n 7 out of the 17 s ta te s - £ihar# west Bengal* orlssa* Madras (Now Tamil Nadu), Punjab* Raj as than, Kerala (and l a t e r in 
Haryana, uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh for a short period) 
the congress l o s t absolute majority. 
2 . Norman £»• Palmer* "India's Fourth General Elections'** Asian 
survey, v o l . VH# No. 5 (May, 1967), p. 275. 
3 . Paul R. Brsss, "coalition Po l i t i c s in north*India", The American 
Po l i t i ca l science Review, Vol. 62* NO* 4 (December* 1*968)* 
p. i*74. Braes considers 1964 as st f i r s t stage when the National 
Congress leadership handled smoothly f o r the f i r s t time the 
process of legit imizing democratic po l i t i ca l authority* that is* 
transferring power from a charisma t i c leader to his successor 
within the dominant party*, ;»T v )^ ---, 
N 
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concerned with the problems of transferring power from the 
previously dominant Congress Party to diverse parties and 
party coalitions in more than half of the Indian states. The 
Congress dominated party system was replaced, particularly 
in North India, by a highly complex system in which 'parties/ 
factions and individuals all played important roles according 
\ 
to the logic inherent in particular situations • The monopoly 
5 
was broken and the 'market' was thrown open. As a result/ the 
Opposition party managers entered the political market 
effectively for the first time and negotiated deals among 
themselves* 
There were some other features of this competiti 
market. First* Coalition governments, which came into being 
in the aftermath of the fourth General Elections, were them-
selves small markets in which negotiations and bargaining 
continued unabated for ministerial and other profitable positions. 
Some Chief Ministers took the course of unending expansions 
of their Ministries. It is important to note that Congress 
4. Ibid. 
5. W.H. Morris-Jones, "From Monopoly to Competition In India's 
Po l i t i c s" , Asian Survey, Vol. I , Mo. 1 INovember, 1967), 
P. 2; The Government and P o l ^ l c s ifl India (Londoni 
Hutchinson University Library, 1964), p. H9# Morris-Jones 
l ikens India's po l i t i ca l evolution as a market policy -
a system in which decisions are highly multiple and 
widely dispersed, arrived at by a process of bargaining 
in which partnership and terms of trade change continuously. 
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leaders In the s ta tes were also often preoccupied with similar 
adjustments within the Party. Secondly, the new tug of war 
between the Congress and the non-Congress s ides introduced 
6 
a pretty regular and continuous 'defectors' market. Thirdly, 
the market of p o l i t i c s was further expanded by the participa-
tion of new groups in the governments* Thus* i t may be said 
that those who were gambling outside the market now shifted 
7 
their s t a l l s ins ide . Fourthly, by being in of f ice these parties 
were confronted with new tensions and found new areas for 
negotiations. One of the areas of tensions existed between 
party's representatives in the government and another between 
the central and State leaders, f i f t h l y , the po l i t i ca l parties, 
placed in such a market, could do business only through 
manipulation, underhand t a c t i c s and high handed salesmanship, 
8 
and gave party competition an unseemly form. Both the parties 
in off ice and chose out of i t played the toppling game by 
trading the l e g i s l a t o r s , who were open to easy inducements. 
This became instrumental in making a mockery of the electoral 
verdict as well as of the constitutional procedures for the 
establishment of governments. 
Congress Debacle In Bihar 
In Bihar the Congress was reduced, after the 1967 
6. w.H. Morris-Jones,"From Monopoly to Competition in India's 
politics'*, o p . c i t . , p. 9. 
7
* lt>lQ«* p . 1 0 . 
6. Shushil Kumar, "The Problem", Seminar* December, 1969,p.11. 
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Elections, to a minority in the State Assembly. At the same 
time it emerged as the largest single party in the Legislature* 
Table X shows the percentage of total votes and seats won by 
different political parties in the 1967 Elections for the 
Legislative Assembly in Bihar* 
Bihar was the traditional stronghold of the Congress 
Party and as the Elections of 1967 approached* a few observers 
could suspect the Congress to lose* In spite of the continuing 
decline in organizational cohesion and an Intensification of 
internal factional strife, the Congress Party appeared to 
have strengthened its hold in Bihar after the 1962 Elections. 
It did so by the merger with the Congress Party of the 
Jharkhand Party of Adlvasl and Christians in 1963 and of the 
Janata Party of the Raja of Ramgarh in May, 1966. Both these 
parties had strong support in the Chotanagpur region where the 
Congress following was thin. 
However, on the eve of the Elections political trends 
in Bihar appeared to be hostile to the Congress Party. The 
Congress after nearly two decades as the dominant party with 
a virtual monopoly of governmental power had become soft, a 
house divided against itself, open to the charge of moving 
away from the people, of weak leadership (after Nehru), of 
corrup tion and of incompetence. The key factor responsible 
for the rout of the <-ongresa Party is to be found in the 
'breakdown of the Congress organization itself and the 
81 
Shoving nunber of seats woo and percentage of votes 
pollec by different parties In 1967 General E l e c t i o n 
I Percentage) I Nuaber of 
Parties « of votes ft 
n , i i i t PflJUtfl , I 
Congrasa Party 
SanyuktSL Social l e t Party(SSP) 
Praja Soc ia l i s t Party (PSP) 
Jan Sangn U s ) 
Conmunlst Party of India(CPU 
coastunlst Party of XnolaiMarxiatv 1.28 
(CPZ-M) 
Swatantra 
Jan Xranti Dal 
Republican Party of IndlatRPI) 
Independents 
Total 99*99 316 
33»0« 
17.62 
6,92 
10.42 
6.91 
*
2*33 
3.33 
0.18 
17.88 
128 
68 
18 
26 
24 
4 
3 
13 
1 
33 
9* Inula. Election Commissioner,, Report of) the, f w f f j 
General Elections In India. 1967, Vol* 1 1 , S t a t i s t i c a l ) . 
Thirteen Indepenaenta were actually associated with 
the JKi. so* the real strength of the JKD ianedlatcly 
af ter the Eioetlons was 26§ Indian nation* February 27, 
1967* 
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consequent breach in the 'concensus* represented by the 
JLO 
Congress, 
There had already taken place a considerable ' loss of 
touch* with the people' . 'firead and butter' i ssues of daily 
importance were allowed to accumulate as the Congress rank 
and f i l e was no longer performing i t s traditional role of 
carrying the grievances of the people at the lower l e v e l s into 
the Councils of the Government and the party* Lack of planning 
as regards ava i lab i l i ty of essent ial commodities* ineff ic ient 
distribution of the same and the increasing greed of the 
middlemen were allowed to accumulate without a s ignif icant 
11 
voice of protest from the Congressmen. 
The consensus on which the party had built its foundations 
became weak and hesitant and its common idiom disappeared* 
The party hac always lacked cohesion but what failed by 1967 
12 
was the working of its internal 'thermostat' by which the 
various forces at work were contained and overall balance 
maintained* With the passing away of skilled balancers at the 
top and with the High Command itself considerably divided* 
the factional structure of the Congress Party developed into 
an endless struggle for power* This resulted in one of the 
10* Rajni Kotharl* "Congress and Consensus"* Seminar* 
June, 1967* p* 24* 
11
• ibid. 
*
2
* Sbld. 
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greatest fa i lures of the Congress Party* namely i t s inabi l i ty 
to build a viable mass organization, consisting of an effect ive 
hierarchy of party cadres and active channels of communication 
with the various strata of the population* The party appeared 
to be too preoccupied with internal p o l i t i c s at a l l l eve l s 
to give any attention to a purposive organization tor i t s 
mass campaigns. 
One of the most important manifestations of the Congress 
Party's organizational fai lure was to be found in the break 
up of the party i t s e l f . The old process of forming 'dissident 
groups' within the party or of organizational versus ministerial 
'wings' was replaced by breakaway of large numbers of Congress-
men from the party and their active association with new 
part ies . The formation of the Jan Krantl LBX in Bihar was a 
major step in the alow disintegration of the Congress Party's 
all-encompassing character* 
Caste-based and personality oriented factions and 
infighting had been the highlight of the Congress pol i t ics* 
but i t became worse and took an ugly shape a t the time of the 
Elections* The main factions within the Congress Party before 
the e lect ions were those led by (1) the Chief Minister 
K.B. Sahay, (11) the former Chief Minister B.N. Jha, ( i l l ) the 
Irrigation Minister M*P* Sinha and ( iv) the Education Minister 
S.N. Sinha. I t was the internal 'competition and bargaining 
13 
between groups in semi-institutionalized form'* which was 
13. Morris-Jones* "From Monopoly to Competition in India's 
Politics"« op .c l t . * ?• 8 . 
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responsible to a very great extent of the 1967 CHIHIJU'BB debacle 
of the Congress Party In Bihar* These four leaders/ who vers 
aspiring to become Chief Minister after the elections*contrived 
to get defeated as many as possible of the Congress candidates 
14 
supporting their r ivals* I t appeared that each leader was 
more concerned with reducing the strength of h i s rival than 
with the defeat of those who were opposing Congress candidates. 
Even S*N* slnha had to concede that I t was not "so much the 
Opposition forces which have defeated the Congress but factions 
inslae the Congress I t s e l f * I t was also alleged that Congress 
group leaders gave financial assistance to Opposition candidates 
in the constituencies where Congress candidates were not to 
the i r liking* According to B.N. Jha, "the party e lect ion fund 
has been used to sabotage the e lect ion of the Congress candidates" • 
The bitterness of factional p o l i t i c s increased to such 
an extent that the PEC could not recommend an agreed l i s t of 
prospective candidates to the central Election Committee (CEC). 
The manner in which the CEC selected the candidates only made 
the situation worse* A l i t t l e before the e l ec t ions , on December 
31/ 1966 the group led by Mahamaya Prasad Slnha and the Raja 
14. Paul R. Bras, OP. c l t . , p . 1176. 
15. Haridwar Ral and Jawaharial Pandey, "Pol i t ics of Coalition 
Governments* The Experience of the f i r s t U.F* Government 
In Bihar", Journal of the Constitutional and Parliamentary 
Studies, Vol* VI, No. 2 (New Oelhi, April-June, 1972) , 
p. 53. 
16. M l f " Nation, March 4, 1967. 
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of Ramgarh rebelled against the dominant K.B. Sahay group, 
left the Congress and formed a new party named Jan Krantl £al. 
The situation in the Congress Party on the eve of the elections 
was aptly described by the Editor of Indian Nation}" And 
where was the Congress in Bihar on the eve of the General 
Elections? There were the majority and minority groups with 
16 
a number of sub-groups..." Dissident Congressmen also played 
an important part in the weakening of the party at the polls* 
The Congressmen, who were denied tickets, had no Interest in 
the electoral victory of their party. On the contrary, they did 
everything to defeat the official candidates* Thus, weakened 
by the pre-election dissertations by about 3,000 disgruntled 
applicants and aspirants for Congress tickets, the Congress 
Party found its capacity to organize its election campaign in 
a coordinated and effective manner greatly diminished* 
The Congress Party betrayed a wide gap between its 
profession and practice* "While professing to be dedicated to 
the building of a Socialist society, it has provided refuge 
to scoundrels and agents of Big Business and foreign interests 
Inimical to the common people of this country, and today these 
17. Mahamaya Prasad Slnha, Jab Main Mukhva Mantrl Tha (Arrah* 
Pustak Sadan, 1974)# pp. 3-4. 
l8
» Indian Nation, February 26, 1967. 
19. Navneeth, "Congress debacle in Bihar* Voting Pattern in 
1967", Economic and Political weekly. Vol. Ill, No. 34, 
August 24, 1968* p. 1311. 
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1
 elements who have nothing In common with the kind of Congress, 
which in the public mind was associated with Gandhijl and 
Nehru, are the dominant factors in the higher echelons of 
20 
the organization*. This was also confessed by the Congress 
President, K. Kamraj, who said in 1966 that, "we have been 
talking of Socialism without doing anything substantial about 
21 
it". 
The unhealthy reliance on the 'po l i t i c s of patronage* 
ior too long a time has led to fixed centres of power in the 
form of Ministers, party managers and regional 'bosses* 
against whom popular resentment found expression in the e lect ions . 
Alienation of public opinion from the Congress Party and the 
tendency to take the people for granted were themselves a 
resul t of lack of a direct mass base for the party and i t s 
excessive reliance on informal networks of patronage. The party 
fa i led to maintain i t s traditional linkages with strategic 
sectors of the population such as the minority communities, 
labour, the youth and the students, the economically deprived 
castes in the v i l l a g e s and the lower middle c lasses in urban 
areas - a l l these jus t at a time when the logic of economic 
development was leading to increasing hardships and an 
20. "Congress, What Next", Mainstream (Editorial) , March 26, 
1967, p . 5. 
21. Harldwar Hal and Jawharlal Pandey, op. c l t . , p. 58. 
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22 
Increasing sense of frustration. Thus, the tarnished image 
of the Congress Party resulting from i t s continuing dependence 
on mere patronage relationships on the one hand and the lo s s 
of unity and wi l l on the part of the Central leadership on 
the other, contributed considerably to the fragmentation of 
the party at the time of the e lec t ions . 
Insplte of a l l i t s cr i s e s and div is ions , the Congress 
would not have fared so badly had the Opposition groups and 
parties not been successful in 1967 in forming anti-Congress 
coa l i t ions , tor the f i r s t time, some important Opposition 
parties showed resistance and the ab i l i t y to forge a United 
Front against the Congress. The father of the new strategy of 
non-Congress ism was the SSP leader Ram Manahar Lohla, who in 
an obvious bid to match the 'catch-al l ' character of the 
Congress Party put forward the thes is of a 'catch-al l ' Opposition 
irrespective of Ideologies and po l i c i es for the purpose of 
23 
dislodging the Congress trom power. In pursuance of th i s 
strategy, the SSP, the CPI, the CPI(M), the RSP, the Jharkhand 
Party and the Soc ia l i s t Unity centre (sue) formed a United 
Opposition Front to make adjustments to avoid electoral contact 
among themselves. Consequently the multi-cornered 'contests, 
23 . Rajni Kotharl, OP. c i t . , p. 16. 
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which had greatly benefitted the Congress Party in the previous 
elections by dividing Opposition votes, were in 1967 greatly 
reduced* 
Apart from these general factors, there were also 
certain immediate reasons which brought about the rout of 
the Congress P*rty* The economic situations in the country had 
worsened after the wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 
1965. It was further aggravated in Bihar by a wide-spread 
famine In 1966-67 causing misery and starvation to the people. 
The prices of food grains and other essential commodities 
soared high* The Government employees* particularly the non-
gazettea ones, launched an agitation for an increase in their 
dearness allowances* The newly formed United Opposition Front 
organized 'Bihar Bund* on August 9, 1966, and staged successful 
demonstrations throughout the State to express their public 
support to the employees* The demonstration in Patna, in 
particular, was So successful that it unnerved the Government* 
As a result three prominent Opposition leaders, who were later 
to become Ministers in the First United Front Government -
Karpoorl Thakur, Ramanand Tiwari (both SSP) and Chandra Shekhar 
Singh (CPU were deliberately and mercilessly lathi charged at 
a public meeting at the Patna Gandhi Maldan* 
The police firings upon students at Muzaffarpur, Patna, 
Samastipur and some other places in Lecember, 1966 and January 
1967 and the arrogant attitude adopted by the Chief Minister 
69 
K.b. Sahay* played an important part in the humiliation of 
the Government at the polls. The students launched a State-
wide agitation to expose further the alleged 'cruelty'* high-
handedness' and 'misdeeds' of the Government, with the univer-
sities* colleges and schools throughout the State closed 
'Indefinitely' on account of 'disturbances'* the stuoents 
fanned out of the educational institutions and turned themselves 
into the vanguard of the 'Defeat the Congress and Save Democracy' 
24 
movement. On January 8* 1967* a largely attended convention 
of University teachers and students held at Muzaffarpur resolved 
to mobilize the students and teachers against the Congress in 
the ensuing elections. The Secondary School Teachers Association, 
which had already been unoer the influence of the CPI, joined 
25 
hands with the forces opposed to the Congress. 
Thus* just on the eve of the elections* feeling of 
dissatisfaction against the Congress was fast spreading, for 
the common people the Congress Party had become*as pointed 
out earlier* a symbol of corruption* caste!sm* favouratlsm, 
26 
inefficiency and repression. Monopoly of power had lulled them 
2
*» I*>13** P» 7 2 . 
25 . Chetkar Jha* "Election Panoxma in Bihar", P o l i t i c a l Science 
Review* Vol . VI* Nos. 3 and 4 (July - September and 
October - December* 1967)* and V o l . VIZ* No* 1 and 2 
(January - March and April - June* 1968)(Combined)* 
p . 142. 
2 6
« fcink* March 12* 1967* p . 12 . 
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i n t o a f a l s e sense of s ecur i ty while in t r igue and incompetence 
wi th in the Cabinet had s er ious ly cr ippled the administrat ive 
27 
machinery* lhus , the l o s s of fervour among Congressmen, l t tst 
for power and the sordid game of power p o l i t i c s * the non-too-
s a t i s f a c t o r y showing of the success ive Congress Governments, 
the gradual a l i e n a t i o n of Congressmen from the people, 
corruption among qu i t e a few Congressmen ( inc luding ex-Ministers) 
28 
were the l a c t o r s that went against the Congress. 
Bttttrafflco 9* *** n y » t unlj»d Froaf Government 
I t i s i n t h i s background t h a t the formation of the new 
uni ted Front (UJU Government can be s tudied , in the e l e c t i o n s , 
the Congress Party suffered major reverses and could secure 
on ly 128 out of **8 Assembly s e a t s . The Congress had been 
l o s i n g 30 s e a t s per General E l e c t i o n s , but t h i s time i t l o s t 
29 
about 60. In terms of s e a t s secured, the most spectacular 
performance had been that of the SSP which increased i t s 
s trength nearly t en t imes from seven in the outgoing Assembly 
t o 68 s e a t s in the new one. The Jan Sangh which had only 3 seats 
in the o l d House could now boast o f 26 , The Communists had 
27. Eastern Economist, March 17, 1967, p . 437. 
28 . L.P. Sinha, "Bihar* cas te -based P o l i t i c s of Opportunism", 
Link, August 15, 1969, p . 6 2 . 
2 9 . The strength of the Congress Party in the Assembly was 
f a l l i n g s t e a d i l y from 240 s e a t s in the F i r s t General 
E l e c t i o n s t o 21o in the second, 185 in the Third and 
f i n a l l y 128 In the Fourth General E l e c t i o n s , Link, 
March 5, 1967, p . 24. 
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doubled their strength from 12 to 28 - CPI 24 and the CPI(M) 4* 
The rebel Congressmen (JKD) had bagged 26. The PSP had not 
fared well. Its leaders Basavan Singh and Suraj Narain Singh 
lost, while its strength came down from 29 to 16. But this was 
due to the merger of a big chunk of the former PSP workers 
30 
under the leadership of Ramanand Tiwari and Karpoori Thakur. 
The strength of the Swatantra Party was also reduced from 60 
to 3, but this was again because its founder in the State, the 
Raja of Ramgarh Kamakhya Narain Singh had already reduced its 
positive strength a great deal by joining the Congress. However* 
31 
the independents had increased their strength from 12 to 20. 
The results of the elections were, thus, indecisive. The 
Congress was defeated but not decisively beaten. While losing 
the majority of seats in the Assembly it managed to win them 
in the l»ok Sabha. Further, no party opposed to the Congress was 
in a position to form a government on its own. Moreover,neither 
a combination of the Left parties nor a combination of Right 
parties were in a position to do so. Thus, the elections "have 
produced a mixed bag altogether. Xt is amply clear that the 
electorate does not want the Congress. Xt is not very clear 
32 
what it does want". The people seemed to have worked under 
30. G Irish Ml shra, "What Elections Have Revealed", Main stream, 
Vol. V, No. 28, March U , 1967, p. 28. 
31. Previous strength of political parties in the Assembly, 
Navneeth, pp. clt., p. 1312; Chetakar Jha,op.clt., p.145. 
32. Sunday Standard (New Delhi), March 12, 1967. 
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the naive understanding that once they defeated the Congress 
everything will , be alright* Hence* they did not bother to 
decide the question as to which party or combination of parties 
should replace the Congress* 
Inspite of being the largest single party* the Congress 
was unable to form a government due to internal bickering* 
which continued unabated. The Governor had f i r s t cal led upon 
M.P* Sinha, leader of the CLP* to form a Ministry* Although 
M.P. Sinha was eager to form a Ministry* he could not do so* 
since B.N* Jha* who was defeated by one vote by M.P. sinha in 
the contest for CLP* along with 34 other Congress l eg i s la tors . 
made i t clear in a jo in t statement to the press that i f M.P. 
Sinha had any idea of forming a government* they would not 
33 
support him. S.N. Sinha had also written to the Governor in 
a similar vein. This was revealed by the Governor* Ananth 
Sayanam Ayyangar, himself in h i s farewell speech at the Gandhi 
34 
Maidan, patna* on November 30* 1967. This provided an opportune 
moment to the parties opposed to the Congress to coalesce and 
provide an alternative popular non-Congress Government* The 
SSP* as the largest single non-Congress party in the Assembly 
and also the most vocal exponent of non-Congressism took the 
35 
i n i t i a t i v e in forming a non-Congress coa l i t ion . Bhupesh Gupta 
33. Indian Nation* March 5, 1967. 
34. MA Governor Takes Leave*«Commerce * December 9*1967 ,p. l370. 
35* Haridwar Rai and Jawaharlal Pandey, op. d t . « p. 62. 
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and Atal Behari BaJpayee, leaaars of the CPI and the Jan Sangh 
respectively also contributed to the efforts of making coalition 
36 
Ministry, ultimately, a United Front - Samyukta vidhayak Dal 
(SVD) - with all the nine parties of the erstwhile opposition 
and of some Independents was formed on the basis of ^33-point 
37 
common minimum programme. Mahamaya Prasad slnha, Chairman of 
the JKD, and Karpoorl Thakur of the SSP were choosen leader 
38 
and Deputy leader, respectively* 
However, the matter of the formation of a coalition 
Government consisting of such political parties which had till 
yesterday refused to cooperate against the Congress for ideolo-
gical reasons, got into rough weather* This was caused by the 
uncompromising attitude of the Jan Sangh and of the CPI and 
hesitation on the part of the PSP. subsequently, however, they 
changea their stand. In addition to the 'desire of office', 
36. statesman (Calcutta;* lebruary 28, 1967. 
37. Mahamaya Prasaa Slnha was a proven giant-killer. In 1957, 
he took up the challenge of the powerful Minister Mahesh 
Prasad sinha and humbled him in his home town, Muzaffarpur. 
in 1967, he opposed K.B. Sahay in Patna west constituency 
and defeated him by almost the same margin - 20,000 votes -
by which K.B. Sahay was elected to the Assembly in 1962 
from the same constituency. In 1972,Assembly elections, he 
defeated another giant. Krishna Kant Singh, a prominent 
leader of the Congress(o) in his own den, Goreakothl Assembly 
constituency in Saran district. In 1977 Parliamentary 
Elections he humbled another giant, Ramavatar Shastrl of 
the CPI in Patna Parliamentary constituency. 
38. Indian Nation, March 1, 1967. 
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there were four main considerations which Influenced the 
decisions of the parties to coalesce - Popular demand for such 
coalition, the abilities of the parties to formulate minimum 
common programme, pragmatic and accommocatic tendencies in 
the parties and the recognition of the necessity for adjustment 
39 
to local conditions. 
bargainings In the Formation of the Coalition 
The formation of the Coalition Government was not an easy 
task. Zt entailed hard political bargainings and hectic behind 
the scene activities. The SSP, the CPZ and the JKD, no doubt, 
had formed a loose front to fight the elections, but they had 
never visualized that their representatives would share govern-
mental power. The Jan Sangh and the Communist Party, which had 
fought each other In the elections, could not be thought of as 
comrades in a Coalition. But they realised that if they did 
anything to jeopardize the chances of the formation of a non-
Congress government, they would be dubbed as dlsruptors by 
their electoral allies. They would also be accused by the people, 
who had voted for them and against the Congress. 
samvukta Socialist Party 
It was only the SSP, which under the leadership of Ram 
Hanohar Lohla, had persistently called for such an alliance 
39. Paul R. Brass, OP. cit., p. 1178. 
95 
before and after the e lect ions to defeat and remove the Congress 
from power. I t , therefore, needed no jus t i f i cat ion la joining 
the proposed Coal i t ion. The party was ent i t led as the largest 
constituent to the leadership of the Front/ hut I t sacrificed 
even t h i s to ensure the rormatlon of the Coalition Government. 
Communist Party of India 
The CPI was also anxious to overcome any d i f f i cu l ty that 
might come in tile way of a Coalit ion. I t was ready even to 
stay out of the Government i f I t would accommodate the Jan Sangh 
in the Ministry provided the l a t t e r agreed to join I t on the 
40 
basis oM an agreed minimum programme. Bhupesh Gupta, who was 
summoned by h i s comrades to Patna, also accepted the force of 
the argument that any party, that stood in the way of anti -
Congress Coalition,would be repudiated by a large section of 
41 
I t s supporters. Ram Manohar £*ohla, the most prominent and 
act ive exponent of a purely non-Congress Front, was reported to 
have said that 'those who do not posit ively join the Coalition, 
when the of fer i s made, might be described as narrow-minded 
42 
and sectarian lot. 
40. Indradeep sinha, "The Bihar Experience", Link* January 26, 
1966; Search Light. February 26* 1967. 
•
x
« kin*' March 5, 1967, p. 24. 
42. Ib id . 
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The Jan Sangh leaders were also not far behind in 
realizing that slightest gesture of non-cooperation would be 
unpopular not only among the political parties, but also among 
the masses o± the people* respite the contrary view of Thakur 
Prasad, President of the State Party* Atal Behari Bajpayee 
was of the view that keeping out of Coalition Government would 
amount to applying brakes to what he called "democratic revolu-
tion brewing out in the country". The party had another reason 
also for joining the Coalition Government,for if it did not 
do so, the SSP in u.p., where the Jan Sangh was the largest 
4 
Opposition party, would not extend its support to the Coalition, 
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
The CPI(M) was also favourably disposed to a Coalition 
making. It signed the programme and pledged all support to the 
new government but dia not join it because of the inclusion 
45 
of the Jan Sangh as a full partner. As a matter of fact, the 
leaaers of the Bihar Unit of the CBI(M) were, as reported the 
New Age, ready to join the Ministry but at the last moment the 
General Secretary of their party* P. Sundarayya asked them to 
4S 
stay out of the Government. 
43« Indian Nation, April 24, 1967. 
44. Hartdwar Rai and Jawaharlal Pandey, op.cit., p. 63. 
45. Indian Nation* March 5, 1967. 
*
6
• New Age* March 12, 1967, p. 5. 
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Swatantra 
The Swatantra was ready to join any non-Cong res* Govern-
ment, but having fared badly In the e lect ions had no significant 
say in the formation of the Government* I t was rather gratif ied 
47 
that i t s cooperation was being sought* 
Jan Krantl i-al 
The JKi. was not only ready to Join the Coalition Govern-
ment/ but also played an important role in the making of the 
Ministry* Cue largely to the shrewdness of the Raja of Ramgarh 
and the personality of Mahamaya Prasad Slnha, i t succeeded in 
snatching the leadership of the United Front from the SSP. 
Praja Socj.alist Party 
The PSP, in i t s turn, showed considerable ambivalence 
before deciding to join the UF Government* However, they 
f inal ly joined on the ground that by keeping out of the 
Government i t would simply cut off from the people and be 
46 
charged with helping the Congress to come to power* An SSp 
Minister commented that "they (PSP leaders) thought that they 
would be nowhere i f they went against the wishes of the people, 
49 
who wanted a non-Congress Government* However, the ir attitude 
41* Harldwar Ral and Jawaharlal Pandey, o p . c i t , . p. 64* 
48. Search Light, March 7, 1967* 
49* Paul R. Brass, OP. c l t« , p* 1179* 
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50 
caused considerable delay in t h e i r j o in ing the Minis try . 
Thus, the non-Congress p a r t i e s came together t o form 
the f i r s t non-Congress SVC Government in Bihar under the 
pressure of public opin ion . This was re f l e c t ed in the reply of 
a Jan &angh Minister* who on being asked how long he thought 
the non-Congress Government would l a s t , sa id , *I think i t w i l l 
l a s t because we a l l are a fra id of t h i s publ ic opinion • • • No 
51 
party w i l l aare to take the blame of desert ing the Government". 
Moreover, the party l eaders a s ser t ed that no compromise on 
bas ic p r i n c i p l e s was Involved in the formation o f the non-
Congress Coal i t ion Government, because a l l p a r t i e s had agreed 
upon a minimum common programme, which did not go against t h e i r 
ideo log i e s* Ram Manohar Lohla a l s o be l i eved that the non-Congress 
Coa l i t ion Government need not have a common p o l i t i c a l ideology 
52 
and llkemindedness but rather a few common p o l i c i e s * This f a c t 
was c l e a r from the comments of the two most sharply opposed 
partners in the Coa l i t ion - the Jan Sangh and the Communists* 
"People wanted an a l t e r n a t i v e to Congress* we prepared an agreed 
programme* Keeping our re spec t ive Ideo log ie s apart , we decided 
53 
to implement the programme". 
50 . The PSP jo ined the Ministry on March 15, 1967, while the 
members belonging to other p a r t i e s were sworn-in on 
March 5, 1967. 
51* Paul R. Brass , OP* c l t . , p . 1179. 
52 . Haridwar Rai and Jawaharlai P a n d e v , o p . c l t . , p . 62 . 
5 3 . Paul R. Brass , pp. c l t . , p . 1179. 
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With the exception of one point* no substantial disagree-
ments arose initially on any of the points in the 33-point 
minimum programme. Recognition of Urdu as the second official 
language of Bihar was the only issue on which there was 
disagreement among the Coalition partners* Several partners 
in the Coalition Government felt themselves committed by their 
previous statements to including this point in the common 
54 
programme. But the Jan Sangh refused to commit Itself to this 
point and submitted a note of dissent at the meeting of the 
Coordination Committee of the Ux which finalised the 33-point 
55 
common programme on March 3, 1967. The Jan Sangh leaders were 
prepared to make some concessions toward the encouragement of 
the Urdu language, but they were unwilling to provide symbolic 
Satisfaction to Muslim minority of having Urdu declared as 
56 
the second official language. However* the inclusion of this 
point in the common programme did not prevent the Jan Sangh 
from joining the Coalition, nor did it prevent other parties 
from joining hands with the Jan Sangh. Thus, the party leaders 
adopted superficially a "pragmatic and accommodative attitudes* 
as they claimed, in the formation of the Coalition Government. 
A Jan Sangh Minister voiced this attitude: "So, all the Eight 
and the left have come together, we are neither Right nor Left. 
54. Iblo., p. 1160. 
55. Inalan Nation, March 4, 1967. 
56. Paul R. Erase, OP. cit., p. 1180. 
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57 
we approach the problems straightway". 
Bickerings In the Congress Party 
I t i s worth mentioning that the continuous bickerings 
within the Congress also negatively helped the formation of 
the non-Congress Coalition* A new alignment of groups had taken 
place In the Congress* The K . B . Sahay faction joined hands 
58 
with M.P. Slnha while S.N. Sinha joined B . J . Jha camp. The 
e lect ion of M.P* Sinha as the leader of the CLP by defeating 
59 
B.N. Jha by one vote (97 to 96) also strengthened the 'internal 
cohesion' of the non-Congress Coalit ion. If Jha hact won the 
leadership, he would have been in a stronger position because 
60 
of h i s close l inks with some of the leaders of the JKD. 
According to Maharaaya Prasad Sinha, B.N. Jha was to resign from 
the Congress a few days after the former's resignation, but 
subsequently he changed h is mind. He had ear l ier counselled 
61 
Maharaaya Prasad Slnha to resign from the Congress. I t was, 
perhaps, because of h i s close l inks with the JKD leaders that 
62 
B.N. Jha had given h i s blessings to the Mahamaya Ministry* 
57. Ibid. 
5b. Link, March 12, 1967, p. 13. 
59. Indian Nation, March 4, 1967. 
60. Link, March 12, 1967, p. 13. 
61. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, op.clt., pp. 2*3. 
62. subhas c. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhii National 
Publishing, 1974), p. 317. 
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This became clear when f ive Congress defectors* who t i l l the 
other day had been ardent supporters of B . N . Jha, were made 
Ministers In the Maharaaya Ministry In the f i r s t week of 
September/ 1967. Zt might be that because of h i s sympathetic 
att i tude, the UF Government did not constitute a Commission of 
Inquiry against B.N. Jha and his group* 
Composition of the Ministry 
On March 5, 1967, Bihar p o l i t i c s entered the second phase -
the phase of Coalition p o l i t i c s - when a non-Congress Ministry 
63 
headed by Mahamaya Prasad Sinha was sworn*In. I t consisted of 
fourteen Ministers * eleven Cabinet Ministers and three Ministers 
ot State - to begin with. Subsequently* on March 16, 1967, four 
Ministers of Cabinet rank and three Ministers of State were 
64 
sworn-in, thus raising the strength of the Ministry to twenty-one. 
The following Table ZI shows the party-wise position of the 
UF Ministry as on March 5 and after I t s expansion on March 16,1967. 
From the Table i t i s c lear that no nominee of the PSP was 
sworn-in on March 5, 1967, because the party by then had not 
taken a final decision about joining the Ministry. Similarly, 
the SSP could not decide on a l l of i t s nominees to be represented 
in the Ministry* However, the se lect ion of Ministers proved to 
be a hard task. The individual constituents had to take into 
6 3
» Zndlan Nation, March 6, 1967. 
§4. Ib id . , March 17, 1967. 
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TABLE I I 
Showing Party-wise Break-up Of the Coalition Ministry 
as on March 5, 1967 
8 II 5 
Party 0 Ministers i Ministers of State • Total 
j s t 
JKD 3 1 4 
SSP 4 - 4 
CPI 2 1 3 
Jan sangh 2 1 3 
Total 11 3 14 
Party-wise Break-up a f t e r Expansion on March 16,1967 
JKD 3 1 4 
SSP 6 2 8 
CPI 2 1 3 
Jan sangh 2 1 3 
PSP 2 1 3 
Total 15 6 21 
Sources- Indian nat ion , March 6 and 17, 1967. 
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account such conflicting claims as those of 'seniority, caste, 
65 
region and political expediency* before taking final decisions. 
This was particularly the case with the SSP, because it was 
keen on appointing a woman, a Harijan, and an Adlvasl as 
Ministers besides giving weightage to Backward communities in 
pursuance of its policy. It was, however, not averse to accommo-
dating members of the upper Castes lest it should alienate 
politically conscious and economically advanced section of the 
society. Consequently, the selection of the names proved 
difficult. There was disagreement between Raman and Tlwari, the 
Chairman of the State party, and Karpoor Thakur, Deputy Chief 
66 
Minister. Madhu Limaye had to intervene to break the deadlock 
on the question of nominating candidates for Speakership and 
67 
the Ministry. However, Ramanand Tlwari was not happy with the 
decision because he was pressing for the name of Ramakant Jha 
68 
for inclusion in the Ministry. Lohia also criticised the 
selection of the Ministers in the SSP quota on the ground that 
it did not conform to the accepted policy of the party. In his 
opinion, the party should have given first preference to the 
weaker sections of the society, namely women, Harijans and 
69 
Adivasis. The JKD had no such problems. It was a 'one-man-show' 
65. Harldwar Rai and Jawaharlal Pandey.op.clt., p. 66. 
66. Indian Nation, March 16, 1967. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid., June 3, 1967. 
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and even Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, the Chairman of the party, had** 
play the second fiddle. The selection of the nominee* of 
the Jan Sangh, the CPI and the PSP appeared to be smooth as 
they were comparatively disciplined parties. The PSP, however* 
had some initial difficulty in the selection of its nominees, 
but it succeeded in overcoming it because of the successful 
70 
efforts made by the national leaders of the party. 
In the context of the Ministry formation, it is significant 
that the Leader of the Front had to leave the selection of his 
colleagues to the Individual partners of the Coalition. This 
was because the selection of the Leader itself was the result 
of hard political bargainings. It was mainly owing to the insis-
tence of the Jan Sangh, JXD and PSP and the positive role played 
by Ram Manohar Lohla that Mahamaya Prasad Sinha was preferred 
71 
to Karpoori Thakur. Initially some sort of ratio was fixed for 
the selection of Ministers, though it was not strictly followed 
in practice. After some months, the ratio was completely ignored 
in view of constant threats to the stability of the Government. 
The expansion of the Ministry then became a convenient means 
to keep the Front in power by giving ministerial berths to the 
defectors. Again, in order to appease the unwilling and hesitant 
partners, like the PSP, some welghtage had to be given to them. 
70. Harldwar Rai and Jawaharlal Pandey, op.clt., p* 67. 
71. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, op. clt., p. 6; Statesman 
(Calcutta), March 4, 1967. 
1#5 
From Table II, it Is evident that the SSP could get 
8 seats in the Government - 6 cabinet rank and 2 Ministers of 
State. The JKL had 3 Ministers of Cabinet rank Including the 
Chief Minister, and 1 Minister of State. The Jan Sangh, the CPX 
and the PSP had 2 Ministers each of Cabinet rank and 1 Minister 
each of State rank. The PSP got a weightage as a result of 
protracted bargaining. It secured as many ministerial berths 
as the Jan Sangh and the CPI, while it had the strength of 18 
only in the Assembly as compared to 26 of the Jan Sangh and 
24 of the CPI. Ihe PSP got further weightage when one more of 
its nominees was taken as a Minister of State on November 19,1967. 
It is also interesting to note that the first United 
Front Government o£ Bihar was expanded five times during its 
spell of 10 months and 20 days on March 6, March 16, August 11, 
72 
September 9 ana November 19, 1967. Consequently, allocation 
of portfolios was also made six times - on March 8 and 22, 
73 74 75 
April 4 and 10, November 5, 1967 and on January 3, 1968. 
As in the selection of Ministers, the Chief Minister 
had no say at all in the allocation of portfolios. He had to 
72. Indian Nation * March 6, 17, August 12, September 10, and 
November 20, 1967• 
73. Bihar Gazette, March 13, 30, April 11, 1967. 
74. Indian Nation, April li, 1967. 
75. Bihar Gazette, November 27, 1967, and January 31, 1968. 
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agree to the demands of almost all Ministers in the Cabinet. 
He had to yield finance and Education to Karpoori Thakur. 
Chandra Shekhar Singh was not prepared to have portfolios other 
than Electricity and Irrigation, the departments held by his 
late father Ram Charltra Singh. He wanted Education too, but 
Karpoori Thakur w&» n o t ready to part with this department. 
Indradeep sinha wanted Revenue and the Chief Minister had to 
agree. He had to allocate Agriculture and Cooperative to Jan 
Sangh Ministers. Karpoori Thakur, along with some other SSP 
leaders, tried hardest that Police (General) Department should 
be given to Ramanand Tlwari* The chief Minister resisted for 
sometime on the plea that he was directly responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order in the state. But, ultimately, 
he had to yield to the pressure. Bhola Prasad Singh was the 
only Minister, who was not given Justice Department because of 
the strong opposition of Thakur Prasad of the Jan Sangh.Thakur 
Prasad was present along with Indradeep sinha and Chandra 
Shekhar Singh (both CPZ), Karpoori Thakur and Bhola Prasad 
Singh of the SSP at the time of allocation of portfolios. The 
Ministry had to face a mini crisis caused by the distribution 
of portfolios. The above mentioned Ministers urged the Chief 
Minister that the Raja of Ramgarh should not be allotted the 
department of Mines and Minerals. But the Raja threatened 
that he woulc resign from the Ministry and withdraw support 
unless he was given those same departments and his younger 
brother, Basant Narain Singh, the Lepartment of Forests. The 
76. Mahamaya Prasad sinha, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
107 
crisis was averted when he and his younger brother were given 
the said departments. 
It woula be Instructive to analyse the UF Ministry from 
the caste and urban/rural points of view* The analysis Is 
presented in Table III, 
From the Table it is evident that out of 21 Ministers/ 
only 3 were the members of the Upper House, Legislative Council 
of the Bihar Legislature. They all were members of the Cabinet. 
However* they were Ministers not because they were members of 
the Legislative Council (MLCs) and that the Council should 
also be represented in the Ministry* but because they held 
Important positions in their respective parties. Two members 
of the Cabinet were members of the Parliament, bindeshwari 
Prasad Mandal (SSP) was a member of the Lok sabha from Madhepura 
in Sahrasa district. He had come to Patna to finalise the 
names of the SSP nominees but managed to include his own name 
in the list and preferred to stay on in the State politics 
as a Minister inspite of the opposition of the SSP central 
77 
leaders, in general* and Lohla in particular. Later on* he 
became one of the major factors in the downfall of the UF 
Ministry. Basant Narain Singh was also a member of the Lok Sabha 
but resigned his seat in the Parliament to become a Minister 
in the state. For continuing in the Cabinet beyond a period 
77. Subhash C Kashyap, OP. clt., p. 313; Mahendra P. Singh, 
OP. clt., p. 80. 
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mABSmfi in urn 
Showing caste/community, membership, constituency (region ) 
and urban/rural base of the members of the Hi Ministry/1967. 
1 5 
ft Caste t Rural/Urban 
i L 
Region/toame, e t c . 
1 
$ Constituency 
J 
CABINET MINISTERS 
H f t h P l a i n s 
Karpoorl Thakur 
(MLA.. SSP) 
Kaiaakhya Narin Singh 
(MLA, JKD) 
Chandra Shelkhar Singh 
(MLA, CPI) 
Nayee 
Rajput 
Bhumlhar 
Bindeshwari Prasad Manaal Yadav 
(MP, SSP) 
Hasibur Rahman 
(MLA, PSP) 
jgou^ P*flMff 
Mahamaya Prasad Slnha 
(MLA, JKL) 
Ramanand Tiwari 
(MLA, SSP) 
Muslim 
Kayastha 
Brahmin 
Vi jay Kumar Mltra Behari-Bengali 
(MLA, JS) (Kayastha) 
Ram Deo Mahto 
(MLA, JS) 
KapUdeo Singh 
(MLA, SSP) 
Shri Krishna Singh 
(MLA, SSP) 
Basant Narain Singh 
U4P, JKD) 
Kolrl 
Bhumlhar 
Rajput 
Rajput 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
urban 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Taj pur 
(Larbhanga) 
Jalafpar (Saran) 
Baraunt 
(Honghyr) 
Madhepura 
(Sahrasa) 
Amour 
(Purnea) 
Patna West 
(Patna) 
Shahpur 
(Shahabad) 
Bhagalpur 
(B ha gal pur) 
Patna East 
Cpatna) 
Barahla 
(Monghyr) 
Chakai 
(Monghyr) 
Hazarlbagh 
(Hazarlbagh) 
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Regions Wot Know 
Indradeep stnha Bhumlhar 
(MLC, CPZ) 
Basawan Singh Bhumihar 
(MLC, PSP) 
Bhola Prasad Sigh Kurrai 
(MLC, SSP) 
HliilSTSRS OF STATE 
North P la ins 
Maithll Brahmin Rural 
Raj put Rural 
Rajput Rural 
Tej Narain Jha 
(MLA, CPZ) 
Sabhapati Singh 
(MLA, SSP) 
Ramapatl Singh 
(MLA, PSP) 
South P l a i n s 
Mahablr Pa swan 
(MLA, JKL; 
upendra Hath Varma 
(MLA, SSP) 
Cho^anagpujr 
Rudra Pratap Sarangl Oriya Brahmin Rural 
(MLA, JS) 
scheduled Caste 
(i-usadh) 
Kolri 
Rural 
Rural 
Benipatti 
(Larbhanga) 
BalJcunthpur 
(saran) 
Patahl 
(Champaran) 
Punpun 
Konch 
(Gaya) 
Saralkala 
(Singhbhum) 
78.(a)Name and membership of the Ministers,Indian NatioM, 
March 6 and 17,1967; (b) Ironically enough,information regarding 
the castes of the Ministers and legislators is not available 
anywhere in print. I could collect the information from the 
sources* (i)Nagina Rai, Congress(I) MLA and a former Minister 
of State; elected from Gopalganj to the Lok Sabha in 1980 
elections, (11) Janardan Tiwari, a former Jan Sangh MLA from 
1962 to 1967 and again from 1969 to 1972 from Siwan(Saran 
district), (ill) Badri Singh,SEP MLA from 1952 to 1962 and 
again front 1969 to 1972: from Mohan la and secondly from 
Chaincur in Shahabad (now Rohtas) district;(iv) Ram Dayal 
Singh, a Janata MLA from Sandesh (Bhojpur district); died 
in August, 1978; was formerly associated with the Socialist 
Party; (cj Constituencies of the Ministers, India Election 
Commission, Report on the Fourth General Election in India, 
Vol. 11 (Statistical), 1967. 
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of s i x months/ he got himself elected from Bagodar Assembly 
constituency (Hazarlbagh) in a bye-election, caused by the 
resignation of Shrimatl Lalita RfWY» Lakshmi, wife of Kamakhya 
Naraln Singh, who opted for i»ok Sabha seat from Lhanbad. 
Caste/Communlty-wlse Analysis 
With regard to the caste composition of the United Front 
Ministry, i t i s important to note that .Forward castes were in 
a majority. Out of 15 Cabinet Ministers, their number was 9 -
Bhumihars four, Rajputs three, Kayasthas and Brahmins one each. 
Of the remaining 6 Ministers, 4 were from Backward castes -
one Yadav, one Kurrni, one Koiri and one Nayee, one was a Muslim 
and another one a Bihari-Bengali. Among the 6 Ministers of 
State, 3 were from the forward Castes - Rajputs two, and 
Brahmin one, one was a Scheduled Caste (ijusadh), one was from 
the backward Caste (Kurmi) and another one belonged to the 
family of Orlya Brahmins* So, i f we count Oriya Brahmin as a 
Forward Caste, the rat io between Forward and Backward castes 
among the Ministers of State was 4 i 2 . Thus, taken together 
out of 21-member Ministry, the number of Forward Castes was 
14, including a Bengali Kayastha and an Oriya Brahmin. 
Among the Forward Castes the break-up was as follows* 
Rajputs f ive , Bhumihars four. Brahmins three and Kayasthas one. 
Of the s ix Ministers belonging to the Backward Castes, there 
were two Kurmis, one Yadav, one Koiri and one Nayee. Mahabir 
in 
Paswan was the sole member belonging to the Scheduled Caste. 
Similarly/ Hasibur Rahman was the lone Muslim in the Council 
of Ministers* 
I t i s surprising/ however, that no representation was 
given to the Scheduled Tribes* Equally surprising was the 
non-representation of women* S t i l l more surprising was the 
fact that these weaker sections of the society were not given 
prior i ty or preference either by the SSP, which was, a l l the 
while, clamouring for the upliftment of these sections and 
demanding reservations for them in government jobs or by the 
CPI, the self-claimed messlah of the exploited and down-trodden. 
The SSP also fa i led to give representation to the Muslims, 
though i t tr ied to appease them by championing the cause of 
the Urdu language. Similarly, the party fa i l ed to include a 
member of the Scheduled Castes inspite of the fact that I t 
had the largest number of Scheduled Caste members among al l 
the constituents of the Front in the Assembly. On the contrary, 
i t provided four berths each to the Forward and the Backward 
c a s t e s . Table XV shows the number of the Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Muslims and Women ML As in each party of the 
United Front. 
The CPI fa i led to give representation to the Backward 
Castes, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women and the 
Muslim minority. I t gave representation to the forward castes 
only* Both of i t s cabinet Ministers came from the same land-
112 
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TABLE IV 
Showing number of SC ST, Muslims and Women MLAs 
in each constituent of the United Front Government 
——•———" I scheduled 9 Scheduled 9 5 
Party S Castes 9 Tribes 9 Muslims 9 Women 
9 8 0 0 
SSP 8 
PSP 
CPI 
JKD 
Jan Sangh 
CPIlM) 
2 
2 
5 
2 
Swatantra 
Total 20 e 9 
79. India, Election Commission, Report on the Fourth General 
Election in Indfraf Vol. 11 (S ta t i s t i ca l ) 7 Ubl. " f 
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owning Bhuraihar caste . However* I t Is to be noted that Chandra 
Shekhar Singh and Indradeep Slnha came to the Ministry because 
of their standing In the party. They were prominent leaders 
and did guards of the party. The CPI's lone Minister of State 
belonged to the family of Malthll Brahmins. 
The PS?/ though gave representation to the Muslims by 
having one cabinet Minister, fai led to $ive representation 
to the Backward castes , Harljans and Adtvasls and women. 
However* the party had no Scheduled Tribes and women member In 
the Assembly, but i t had one Harijan member* I t s remaining 
each 
two Ministers came out^frora the Bhumihar and the Rajput. The 
JKD being a party of a landlord gave representation to the 
Scheduled Caste. I t s Minister of State came from th is community. 
The party had two women and one Muslim members In the Assembly 
but gave no preference to them. I t had no member belonging to 
Scheduled Tribes. Out of I t s three Cabinet Ministers* two were 
Rajputs and one was a Kayastha. 
The Jan Songh did not include a member from the trading 
and merchant c lass Inspite of being allegedly a party of 
trading and Bania c l a s s . Nor did I t include any one from the 
Borward cas te s . Interestingly* two of I t s three Ministers 
belonged to the minority communities but not the Muslims. One 
belonged to the Bengali community and the other was an Oriya 
Brahmin, ihe remaining one was a Backward Koiri. But the party 
fa i l ed to give preference to Scheduled Castes* Scheduled Tribes 
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and women. However, it may be noted that the Jan Sangh had 
no Muslim and women members in the Assembly* But it had no 
justification in not including the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Iribes members as the party had 10 members I 5 
Scheduled Castes and 5 Scheduled Tribes) belonging to these 
Castes out of its total strength of 26. This strength was next 
only to the Congress Party which had about 37 members belonging 
to these castes* 
Thus, almost all the parties of the UF Government- whether 
of the Right, Left or Centre - favoured Forward Castes in 
giving ministerial berths. Therefore, parties and Governments 
die not seem to represent different classes in the sense that 
the leaders in different political parties belonged to the same 
Forward, land-owning and influenclal castes. None of them 
gave prexeras.ee to Harijans, Adlvasis, Muslims and women, the 
weaker sections of the society. All but one IPSPJ failed to 
give representation to the Muslim minority. Similarly, none 
cut one UKD; gave representation to the Scheduled Castes. The 
CPX inspite of having the largest number of Muslim members 
among the partners of the uB did not give any preference to 
them. The SSP gave equal representation both to the Forward 
and Backward Castes. 
It is signilicr Jit in the context of the composition of 
the first hi. Government that there was,at one time, the proposal 
to elevate Mahaolr Paswan to Cabinet Rank. The Cabinet, too, 
U S 
80 
had endorsed I t . But the proposal had to ne shelved because 
of the determined opposition by the Jan Sangh Minister V.K* 
Mitra, who threatened to create a c r i s i s i f Paswan were to be 
81 
elevated to the Cabinet rank. 
Social status 
So far as the social status of the members of the non-
Cong re es Ministry was concerned, roost of them came from Middle 
c la s s famil ies . Two Ministers, namely Kamakhya Naraln Singh 
and feasant Narain Singh came from the former Zamlndar family 
of Ramgarh. The Cabinet Ministers of the CPI came from the 
wel l -of t land-owning c l a s s . Most of the Ministers of the SSP 
and che PSP belonged to the land-owning famil ies . Some of them, 
l i k e Ramapati Singh, were big landlords* Even the Ministers 
belonging to the Backward Castes came trom land-owning strata 
of the society . Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal and Bhola Prasad 
Singh were examples of th i s type* 
Regional and Rural/Urban bases of the Ministry 
Out of 21 Ministers, 8 came from the North Plains of 
the State . The South Plains also got 8 berths (6 Cabin** tank 
and 2 Ministers of State) in the Ministry* However* the Chota-
nagpur bel t could get only 2 posts - one Cabinet and one 
were 
Minister of State . Of the 8 North Plains Ministers, three/from 
the SSP, two each were from the CPI and the PSP and one was 
from the JKD* Among the 8 South Plains Ministers, four were 
80. Indian Nation, November 11, 1967* """" 
81* Ibid*, November 30, 1967. 
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from the SSP and two each from the Jan Sangh and the JKL. of 
the two Ministers from the Chotanagpur region, one each 
belonged to the JKL and the Jan Sangh. 
As regards the rural/urban bases of the Ministers* 
most of them had rural bases. Only 5 (all of Cabinet) Ministers 
represented urban population. Of them two each were from the 
JKI and the Jan Sangh and the remaining one was from the CPI. 
Later on, when Ministry expansion became an expedient 
means of keeping the ur Government in the saddle, no rational* 
was followed in giving representation to the different 
constituents of u*. The only purpose seeaed to be to check 
unfavourable defections and encourage favourable defections. 
An exception to this was a Minister of Cabinet rank, Khalil 
Ahmad* a former Judge of the Patna High Court and a retired 
Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, who was sworn-ln to 
82 
join the Ministry on August 11, 1967. The announcement of 
Khalil Ahmad's name in the papers before his joining the 
Ministry was a subject of prolonged discussion in the Co-ordina-
tion Committee of the Ui on August 10, 1967 to iron out 
83 
differences on the question of his Inclusion. Leaders of 
some of the constituents had been quoted in the press as 
saying that the Chief Minister had not consulted his colleagues 
82. Ibid., August 12, 1967. 
83. Ibid. 
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before dec id ing to include J u s t i c e Ahmad. I t was the manner 
of appointment that came in f o r sharp c r i t i c i s m a t the Committee 
meeting, but not the appointment of Khalll Ahmad i t s e l f . The 
SSP members did not j o i n the fray as v igorous ly as did the 
84 
CPI members. However* i t appeared that there had been some 
understanding i n the matter* I t was c l e a r from the statement 
of the chiU; Minis ter , when he sa id that , "He had not only 
consulted Karpoorl Thakur aa had been agreed upon at the time 
of the formation of the present government/ but a l s o some other 
85 
c o l l e a g u e s . Khalil Ahmad's appointment, however, was of no 
p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . He became the seconc Muslim Minister 
tn che Cabinet, the strength of which had increased to 16. 
He was a l so the th ird man a f t e r bindeshwexi Prasad Mandal and 
Basant Nan*in Singh to be appointed a Minis ter without being 
a rrerober of the State L e g i s l a t u r e . 
On September 7, 1967, one Cabinet Minis ter and ten 
Mini s ters of S ta te were adued t o the Mahemaya Ministry , thus, 
66 
ra i s ing I t s strength t o 34 . The only Cabinet Minis ter sworn-in 
was Mrs. Premlata Rai CSSF). Of the ten Minis ters of S t a t e , 
four were Congress d e f e c t o r s . This gave the Congress a set-back 
in t h e i r bid to topple the Ufc Government. The other s i x 
Mini s ters of State belonged to the CPI, Jan Sangh, Jharkhand, 
84 . I b i d . 
85. Xblo. 
86. l b l a . , September 8, 1967. 
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Republican Party, JKD and an Independent, The JKX nominee wan 
87 
also a Congress defector, who left the party on July 25, 1967. 
Thus, five Congress defectors were rewarded with ministerial 
gaddls. Table V shows the names and the respective parties 
of the Ministers. 
TAbLE V 
Names and parties of the Ministers 
T 
JL 
T 
0 
± 
Nans Rank Party 
Mrs, Premlata Rai 
&•*>• Jawahar 
Simon Tigga 
Pramod Kumar Mishra 
Mohanlal Gupta 
Shyam Sundar Gupta 
Shatrughan Besra 
Topna Oraon 
Blshnudhari Lai 
Philoraon Toppo 
Mohammad Azimudaln 
Cabinet Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
State Minister 
SSP 
Congress defector 
Congress defector 
Congress defector 
Congress defector 
JKD 
CPZ 
Jan Sangh 
Republican 
Jharkhand 
Independent 
88 
However, the Jan Sangh was not happy with this expansion. 
87. Subhash C Kashyap, OP. clt., p. 313. 
88. Indian Nation, September 9, 1967. 
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PSP was the only constituent which was left unrepresented In 
this expansion. The party was, however, given representation 
subsequently when Its nominee, Ram Naresh Singh, was taken 
89 
as a Minister of State on November 16, 1967. This raised 
the strength ot the United Front Ministry to 34. 
Of these Ministers, five, namely, Mrs. Premlata Rai 
lYadav), C P . JawaharlKurmi), Mohanlal Gupta (Bania), Bishnu-
dhari Lai and Shyam Sundar Gupta (Kurmts) belonged to the 
Backward Castes. Simon Tigga, Shatrughan Besra, Topna Ovaon 
and Philomon ioppo came fr^m the Scheduled Tribes. Pramod 
Kumar Mishra (Brahmin) and Ram Naresh Singh (Rajput; belonged 
to the Forward Castes. Mohammad Azimuddin belonged to the 
Muslim community. These expansions of the Ministry were part 
o*. the processes of bargaining between the constituents of 
the Ul, on the one hand, and between the UP and legislators 
in the Congress, on the other. However, members ot the Scheduled 
Tribes were included in the Council of Ministers for the 
first time after six months of the installation of the Coalition 
Government. Similarly, for the first time, a woman was added 
to the Ministry. 
Thus, out of 34 UF Ministers 16 belonged to the Forward 
Castes, 10 to the Backward castes, 4 to the Scheduled Tribes 
and 1 to the Scheduled caste. The remaining 3 were Muslims. 
69. Ibid., November 17, 1967. 
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Among the uni ts of the Ur, the SSP got 9 seats . The JKD, 
the Jan Sangh, the CPI and the PSP got four seats each. The 
R PI and the Jharkhand got one seat each. One was an Independent 
while another one was a non-party roan. 
causes of the Fall of the Mi Ministry 
The f i r s t non-Congress UF Government* which came to 
power with a l o t of fanfare, could not remain In power even 
for a year. After remaining In o f f i ce for ten months and 
twenty days* i t was voted out of power on January 25, 1966 
by a no-confldence motion moved by the Congress Shoshlt Lai 
al l iance* I t was carried In the Vldhan Sabha by 163 to 150 
90 
votes , iour floor-crossings were witnessed on the day the 
ui was voted out of power* The members, who joined the Congress-
Shoshlt Lai al l iance were Nathmal Dokania, Shohan Lai Jain 
(both Swatantra), Suraj Naraln Sharma (Independent; and Keshav 
91 
Prasad SlngiUtfKLj. Defections, lntra-party divis ions , dlssen-
tlons and clash of Interests among the constituents of the 
ui and, above a l l , the cynical designs and a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Congress Party brought down the f irs t -ever non-Congress Govern-
ment. Bihar was thrown into a state of uncertainty and 
Ins tab i l i ty after the fa l l of the Ul Government, which had a 
bad ef fect on the development of the State. 
90. Ib id . , January 26, 1968. 
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Defectlong 
The game of defections and redefeetIons came to be 
played in the state politics just four and a half months 
after the Ui came to power. Three Adivasi legislators, namely 
Paul Hansda, Munsht H&nsda and Bhagat Murmu, were the first 
to defect irom the UJt on July 16, 1967 and pledged their 
92 
support to the Congress in toppling the Coalition Government. 
Shyam Suncar Prasad of the Congress was the first to defect 
to the United Front. Then it became the normal feature of 
Bihar politics. However, two cases of defections are worth 
mentioning in details. One was the case of Bindeshwarl Prasad 
Mandal IB.P. Mandal;, Health Minister of the Coalition Govern-
ment, who, along with 25 supporters, defected from the UF 
93 
and formed a defectors* party, the Shoshlt Dal (the party of 
the exploited people). Another Important case of defection 
was that of &.P. Jawahar, a Congress legislator. B.P. Mandal 
had been subjected to pressure by the Central leadership of 
his party to give up his ministerial post and go to the 
parliament. As he was not a member of the state Legislature, 
his term of oftice would have constitutionally ended on 
September 4, 1967, after the completion of six months. When 
it became dear that the SSP was not prepared to accommodate 
him in the State Legislature and prolong his tenure as a 
92. Subhash C. Kashyap, OP. clt., p. 310. 
93
« Iblo., p. 314; Link, September 3, 1967, p. 14. 
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Minister, B.P. Mandal and his supporters formed a new group 
94 
without resigning from the Ministry* The next day B.P. Mandal 
was asked by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister 
95 
to resign and his resignation was accepted. Mandal's Shoshlt 
Lai formed an alliance with the Congress Party to topple the 
UF Government. The United Front leaders, on their part, were 
promising ministership to Congress legislators to defect to 
96 
the UF. On September 5, 1967, B.P. Jawahar along with his XI 
other Congress MLAs defected from the Congress Party and formed 
a 'Second Shoshlt ^al ' under his leadership to support the 
97 
Coalition Ministry. He and some of his colleagues were rewarded 
with ministerial posts on September 7, 1967. on the same day, 
however, one JKL and two Jharkhand Party MLAs defected to the 
98 
Congress - Shoshlt lal alliance. Next, two of the UF Ministers, 
Simon Tigga and o.p. Jawahar submitted their resignations and 
99 
defected to the Congress - Shoshlt Dal alliance on January 17,1968. 
They resigned because they saw that the Ui boat was about to 
sink, besides, seven more Ministers had also decided to defect 
100 
to the Congress - Shoshlt Lal alliance. Even the Jharkhand Party 
9 4 . Indian Nation, August 27, 1967. 
95 . I b l c August 28, 1967. 
96 . Subhash C. Kashyap, OP. c l t . , p . 317. 
9 7
• I b i d . ; Link, September 24, 1967, p . 15 . 
9 8 . Indian Nation, September 8, 1967. 
9 9 . Subhash C Kashyap, pp. c l t . , p . 321. 
lOO. I b i d . , p . 320. 
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Legislature group of s ix members under the leadership of 
N . E . Horo defected en bloc from the UJ and pledged support to 
101 
the Shoshlt Lai. Thus, defections, counter-defections and 
re-defections made the pol i t ica l atmosphere of the State highly 
unpredictable. The unpredictable elements had been hopping 
from one side to the other and sometimes squatting in the 
middle after a high jump, making the situation completely 
confused. I t was in such confusion that the UF remained in 
power for about eleven months. This situation could have been 
checked, at l e a s t , to some extent, had the right to recall 
the representatives been provided in the constitution* But in 
the absence of any such safeguard* the so-called people's 
representatives had been playing their se l f i sh game of power 
unashamedly, by throwing the democratic norms to the winds. 
The people, having l o s t their right by elect ing these people, 
a t l e a s t for f ive years, were the helpless spectators of th is 
sordid drama* 
Role of the ConareBS Party 
The congress Party in Bihar was very largely responsible 
for the fa l l of the Uf Government. Cynical disregard for 
principles in the search for power was not a new development 
in the s tate Congress, which had never reconciled i t s e l f to 
i t s new role of the Opposition, after twenty yeara of 
101. Ibid. 
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uninter rupted r u l e . " I t muse bear r e spons ib i l i t y for not 
Having given the Government any peace o r chance to s e t t l e 
102 
down to a const ruct ive r o l e " . Evegr since they were routed 
a t the p o l l s , the s t a t e Congress l eade r s had been t ry ing 
t h e i r hardest to bring down the UF Government. Although 
M.P. Sinha, the leader of the Opposition in the Bihar Assembly, 
a s se r t ed t h a t he wanted the Government to remain in power so 
tha t people ge t an "opportunity t o judge i t and compare i t 
109 
with the Congress Government". But events showed tha t the 
Congress l eader s were ge t t i ng impatient and wanted to return 
to power as soon as possible with the help of defectors* In 
July 1967, they made a successful attempt to win over three 
Aaivasi Independent MLAs of the ru l ing Coali t ion* On July 18, 
1967, the top l eade r s of the Bihar Congress decided a t a 
104 
meeting to make an a l l - o u t attempt to topple the UF Government 
and thus created an atmosphere of i n s t a b i l i t y and uncer ta in ty 
in the s t a t e . They made a concerted attempt to mar shal l the 
forces and defeat the Government on the Appropriations B i l l 
on Ju ly 25, 1967, bu t nothing came out of i t * Soon afterwards, 
they pursuaded one of t h e i r ML As to move a b i l l in the Assembly 
c a l l i n g for recognit ion of Urdu as the second o f f i c i a l 
language, while another Congress MLA led a demonstration 
102. Subhash C. Kashyap, The P o l i t i c s of Lefectlon ( i e l h i i 
National Publishing House, 1970J, p . 100. 
1 0 3
• faiofr* September 24* 1967, p . 20. 
104* Subhash C.Kashyap»The P o l i t i c s of Fower,op*clt , . ,p .3U. 
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against the b i l l . The purpose was to intensify the conf l ict 
between the Jan Sangh and other partners of the Coalit ion. 
Apart from their greed for power, the Congress leaders 
were making desperate ef forts to topple the Coalition Govern* 
rnent in order to foresta l l the inquiry into the charges of 
corruption against the previous Congress Ministers. The new 
Government had announced the appointment of an Enquiry Commission 
headed by Just ice venktararaan Iyer, a retired Judge of the 
Supreme Court, to probe into the charges of corruption and 
misuse of power by the former Chief Minister K.B. sahay, and 
f ive of h i s colleagues. They were the former Education, Local 
self-Government and Agriculture Minister S.N. Slnha, the former 
Power and Irrigation Minister M . P . slnha (now the leader of 
the Opposition), the former PWP Minister Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav, 
106 
and the former Minister for Transport Raghvendra Narain Singh. 
The arrest of B.K. Slnha, the Plant Protection Officer, and the 
sensational disclosures following i t added fuel to f ire and 
became an immediate cause of the Congress leaders' bid to 
topple the UP Government* B.K. Slnha was reported to have 
confessed to the involvement of some former Ministers and top 
o f f i c i a l s in connection with misappropriation of croses of 
107 
rupees. The former Ministers concerned were, thus, confronted 
105. Indradeep slnha, "The Bihar Experience", Link, 
January - 6 , 1968, p. 37. 
106. Search Light, September 14, 1967. 
107. LloJt, September 3, 1967, p. 16. 
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with the danger of los ing face and the possible ruin of their 
p o l i t i c a l careers. 
In their bid to topple the UF Government* the Congress 
leaders found in B.P. Mandal a God-sent opportunity. The 
Congress Party Immediately formed an al l iance with h i s Shoshit 
Dal and intensif ied their e f forts to topple the ruling Coalition. 
The Executive Committee of the Congress Legislature Party 
accepted an offer from B.P. Mandal to form a Coalition Ministry 
108 
under h i s leadership. This decision was announced by a 
spokesman of the party at the dead of night at a hurriedly 
109 
ca l led Press Conference to show the intensi ty of their efforts 
to topple the ui- Government. However/ there were sharp differen-
ces in the Bihar Congress over the issue of joining hands with 
the Shoshit kal for the formation of a Coalition Government. 
A powerful section,headed by b.N. Jha, made i t clear to the 
Central leadership that t h i s move was opportunistic and again t 
110 
the in teres t s of the party. Dwarika Hath Tiwari, a senior 
Congress M.P., termed the Congress - Shoshit l a l a l l iance as 
'highly inopportune and impracticable' and hoped that the 
Congress High Command would condemn i t . The High Command* on 
108. Indian MatIon, August 27, 1967. 
109. Ibid . ; Commerce, September 30, 1967, p. 38. 
110. Indian Nation, August 30, 1967/ Link, September 3, 1967, 
p. *5 . 
111. Subhash C. Kashyap, The P o l i t i c s of Power, opjfcCi^.,p.3l6. 
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the contrary/ endorsed the Bihar Congress l e a d e r s ' des i re 
112 
t o topple the ui Government with a .P . Mandal's he ld . They 
u l t i m a t e l y did so on January 25, 1968. Not only t h i s , the 
Congress l eadership in Delhi t r i e d , a s reported by Xndradeep 
Sinha in Link, to d i s c r e d i t the Coa l i t ion Government by 
c u r t a i l i n g the al lotment and dispatches of foodgrains . The 
r e l i e f budget was sought to be whi t t l ed down, plan a l l oca t ions 
were c h a s t i c a l l y pruned and acce lerated a s s i s t a n c e on certa in 
non-plan schemes was severe ly s lashed . I n s p i t e of the declara-
t i o n of the f inance Minis ter in the Parliament t o the contrary, 
a c e i l i n g for r e l i e f operat ions was imposed a f t e r the State 
Government had already spent over Rs. 50 crores on famine 
113 
r e l i e f . 
The b i g bus iness a l s o haa t h e i r ro le in the f a l l of the 
non-Congress C o a l i t i o n , a s reported by K. Gopalan in the New 
Aae. Liberal contr ibut ions given by the l a t a s and B i r l a s and 
other b ig indus tr ia l houses made i t pos s ib l e for the Congress 
bosses to bear the heavy c o s t of "purchasing the l e g i s l a t o r s " , 
114 
and maintaining the Shoshit Lai . s i x UE Minis ters produced 
evidence that the former Chief Minis ter K.B. Sahay, who spear-
headed the conspiracy, had rece ived lakhs of rupees from big 
112 . Link, September 3 , 1967, p . 15 . 
113 . Xndradeep Sinha, OP. c i t . , p . 37. 
114 . K. Gopalan, "Bihar Ministry ? a l l v ict im t o Conspiracy", 
New Age, February 4, 1968, p . 4 . 
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business houses to purchase l e g i s l a t o r s . They produced cheque 
numbers to prove that the Tatas alone had contributed Rs.4.85 
lakhs through four cheques and an amount of Rs. 49,9225 through 
another cheque to K.B. Sahay. These Ministers produced a long 
l i s t of payments made through cheques by K.B. Sahay to prove 
115 
that not l e s s than 3.75 lakhs were spent in purchasing l eg i s la tors . 
K.B. Sahay, though strongly denied the charge of bribing the 
l e g i s l a t o r s / admitted paying Rs. 2,000 to the Independent MLA 
Harihar Singh to enable him "to meet h i s expenses in fighting 
116 
the e lect ion pe t i t ion . This showed the role of money in 
toppling the ruling Coalition. 
Nature of the Coalition 
The UF Government was by i t s very nature transi t ional . 
I t was a post-e lect ion governmental Coalit ion. The part ies , 
constituting the Ufe, had not fought the e lect ion unitedly and 
had not on any occasion expressed wil l ingness to work out a 
Coalition i f voted to power. After the e lec t ions , they made a 
hurried and hotch-potch front to ward off the Congress chances 
to come to power. I t was not a two-party governmental Coalition 
l i k e the Congress (K) - BKD Coalition in u .P , , Swatantra - Jan 
congress Coalition in Orissa, A kali - Jan Congress Coalition in 
the Punjab but a many-party governmental Coalit ion, similarly, 
115. Ib id . 
116. Subhash C Kashyap, The Politics of Power, OP. clt., 
p. 323. 
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i t was not a major-party dominant governmental Coal i t ion such 
as the Congress (R) - BKL Coal i t ion tn u . P . and Swatantra -
Jan Congress Coal i t ion in Orlssa , but many minor p a r t i e s l i k e 
RPI, C P I ( K ; and swatantra* and regional p a r t i e s l i k e the 
Jharfchand, had t h e i r say in the Government. Above a l l , i t was 
not an Ideological ly homogenous governmental Coal i t ion l i k e 
the Swatantra - Jen Congress Coal i t ion in Orlssa but an 
117 
ideo log ica l ly heterogenous one, and i t s cons t i tuen t un i t s 
stood poles apart* Zt was composed of p a r t i e s l i k e CPi, CPX(M) 
and SSP on the one hand and Jan Sangh and Swatantra on the 
o the r . Not only t h i s , the feudal elements represented by the 
Raja of Ramgarh had important say in the Government. In such 
a Coal i t ion , the p a r t i e s could not forget t h e i r past legacy 
of suspicion and antagonism and quar re l led over almost a l l 
minor or major i s s u e s . Almost a l l pa r tne r s of the Coal i t ion , 
a t one time or another, threatened to walk out of the Coali t ion 
in order to compel other par tners to accede t h e i r demands. 
Even the Chief Minis te r had t o r e s o r t to t h i s course a t l e a s t 
118 
in the appointment of Khalil Ahmad. Thus, the inherent contra-
d i c t i o n s in the na ture of the Coal i t ion helped in the ear ly 
f a l l of the uni ted Front . 
Role of the Const i tuents of the United Front 
The cons t i tuen t s o i the U* were themselves to blame for 
117* Forms of Coal i t ion have been borrowed from Xqbal Narain, 
ywfrliflhfr o r Lmmi The FpUt ic? i . Change in XndjfiC 1967-71), 
(Agra* Shivalal Agarwal, 1972), pp. 138-139. 
118. Maharaaya Prasad Singh, OP. c l t . , p . 39. 
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i t s downfal l . The non-Congress Ministry in Bihar was i n s t a l l e d 
under strong anti-Congress pressure. Therefore,, the main 
motive of such Coa l i t i on of the former Opposition p a r t i e s was 
not to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e government with a p o s i t i v e 
programme d i f f e r e n t from that of the Congress, but somehow or 
119 
the o ther , to o u s t the Congress from power. But b l ind a n t i -
Congressism did not prove to have a cohesive e f f e c t for long* 
When the p o s i t i v e quest ion of speed i ly implementing a t ime-
bound programme that could redress peoples ' grievances arose/ 
they f a l t e r e d . While the s i t u a t i o n demanded p o s i t i v e united 
approach^ the SVL displayed l u s t for power as was evidenced 
by the refusal of the Chief Minis ter t o convene the Assembly 
120 
to prove h i s s trength . In fact* no group was prepared t o 
share power wi th o thers because each of them considered i t s e l f 
121 
to be the succecsor of the Congress. The Coa l i t ion Government 
was supposedly formed on the b a s i s of the 33-point common 
minimum programme/ but the programme i t s e l f was hurriedly 
drafted and glossed over t h e i r d i f f erences which surfaced 
122 
l a t e r . Even t h i s programme had not been genuinely accepted 
119 , £>.C. Pavate, "Coal i t ion Governments:Their Problems and 
Prospects", In N.C. Sahni (Ed , ; , Coa l i t i on P o l i t i c s in 
Ino la (Jullundert New Academic/ 1971;/ P . 126; Ramashray 
Roy* "Bihar*/ Seminar/ Ju ly , 1967, p. 4 1 . 
120 , L.P. Sinha, "Bihar; Kaleidoscopic Change", Link, 
August 15, 1970, p . 59, 
1 2 1 . Kamashray Roy, OP. c i t . , p , 4 1 . 
122. K.L. Kama! and Ralph C. Meyer, democratic P o l i t i c s in 
India (New l e l h i i VlJcas Publishing* 1977) , p, 122. 
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by some of the constituents of the Coalition* Therefore, one 
of the main reasons for Its failure were the differences that 
arose among the constituent parties over the Implementation 
of the agreed programme. 
Jan Sough 
The Jan Sangh agreed to the 32-po lnts of the programme 
without any h e s i t a t i o n , but expressed reservat ion and even 
124 
submitted a note of d i s s e n t on the quest ion of Urdu. This sowed 
the seed of c o n f l i c t Ins ide the front* The f i r s t shot was* 
however, f i r e d by the Bihar Congress. The Congress leadership , 
I t s e l f unwi l l ing and unable t o support whole-heartedly the 
demand for Urdu permitted a Muslim MLA of the party to Introduce 
a Pr ivate Members' b i l l In the Assembly to declare Urdu as 
the second o f f i c i a l language of Bihar* The Introduction of the 
B i l l forced the members of the Government to stand up for 
commitments on t h e i r disagreements over Urdu. The President of 
the Bihar Jan Sangh, a t a press conference on July 17, 1967, 
announced that h i s party would v igorously oppose the B i l l which 
he reportedly viewed as an Instrument of communal elements of 
125 
Bihar, on the same day, however, the SSP Deputy Chief Minister 
of the rul ing Coa l i t i on announced In the s t a t e Assembly that 
123. S.M. Josh i , "A New Direct ion t o S o c i a l i s t Party", In 
N . c . Sahnl (Ed . ) , op. c i t . , p . 5 3 . 
124. See Supra, Chapter I I I , p.99 
125 . Paul « . Brass , Language, a e l l g I o n sftd P o l i t i c s In Horth 
India <Delhlt Vikas Publ ishing, 1975) , p. 262. 
132 
the Government was inclined to give Urdu the status of the 
second official language and that orders to that effect would 
126 
soon be passed* However* the Government oecided to oppose 
the Congress members' bill, but prepared a memorandum about 
the facilities being offered to the Urdu speaking students 
and the public in general in order to assuage their feelings. 
The Cabinet, including the two Jan &angh Cabinet Ministers, 
unanimously approved the memorandum on July 13, 1967. The 
Deputy Chief Minister hao already Issued orders before the 
controversy broke out in July for implementing decisions reached 
by the Bihar cabinet to make arrangements for the teaching of 
Urdu in schools* for government offices to give reply in Urdu 
to applications presented in Urdu, and for printing government 
123 
publications in Urdu also. When the controversy intensified 
in July, the Jan 5 tngh demanded the deferment of this decision 
and began threatening to resign from the Government if its 
views were not respected. Consequently, the Cabinet at a 
meeting on July 27, 1967 agreed to defer any action in respect 
129 
of Urdu. 
In the meanwhile, the Bihar branch of the Hindi Sahitya 
127. Link, September 3, 1967, p. 15. 
128. Kahamaya Prasad Slnha, OP. clfc., p. 27; Paul R. Brass, 
pp. cit., p. 263. 
129. I'aul 'V. Brass, op. cit., p. 263. 
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Parlshad joined hand* with the Jan Sangh in opposing Urdu and 
staged a demonstration in f ront of the Assembly on July 28,1967. 
The Bihar Jan Sangh Chief announced t h a t i t was the beginning 
of a s ta te-wide ag i t a t i on and warned t h a t the Coal i t ion would 
come to gr ief i f i t d id not amend i t s programme in respect of 
130 ^ 
Urdu. Jan sangh Minis ters in the Government began to declare 
openly in public meetings t h e i r opposit ion to any move to give 
131 
Urdu the place of a second o f f i c i a l language* Been Dayal 
Upadhya, the then General Secretary of the All Ind ia Jan Sangh, 
declared t h a t i f "the Muslim s e p a r a t i s t tendency" was encouraged, 
132 
h i s party would pul l out of the UF. On the o ther hand,Karpoorl 
Thakur announced on August 2, 1967 tha t he would d e s i s t from 
at tending the Coordination Committee meeting unless the Jan 
Sangh gave up i t s anti-Urdu stand. 
i e s p i t e the Cabinet uecision to defer any fur ther act ion, 
the anti-Urdu forces gathered s t reng th . These forces now 
included the KSS and the Jan sangh, the Bihar Hindi Sahitya 
Sammelan, a group of Congressmen l ed by the former Speaker 
Lakshml Narayan Sudhanshu, the spokesman for Ms1thi l l Ind iv i -
dual MLAs and members from o ther p a r t i e s in the Government, 
130, Link, September 3 , 1967, p . 15, 
131• Paul K. Brass, op . c l t . , p . 262. 
132. S.N, sadaslvan, Party and xemocracy in India (New Delhi: 
Tata McGraw, 1977;, p . 36. 
133. I b i o . 
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particularly the PSP and BKD and students* At a meeting on 
July 27, in the Hindi Sahltya Sanmelan building in Patna* 
comprising some of these elements, i t was decided to launch 
a two-week state-wide ant1-second language agi tat ion, beginning 
135 
from August 12/ 1967. Subsequently, anti-Urdu demonstrations 
and agitations resulted In a ser ies of communal r i o t s , which 
ended in the catastrophe of a week of violence, blood-shed and 
murder in the c i t y and suburbs of Ranch!. This l e f t , according 
to the o f f i c i a l figure a minimum of 184 people dead and 173 
136 
injured. 
The events, leading to the r io t s and the couarse of the 
r io t i t s e l f were direct ly linked to the complex manoeuvrlngs 
by the Congress and disafiected elements within the non-Congress 
Government to bring the Government down* I t was also linked 
to the a c t i v i t i e s of the parties in the Coalition Government to 
137 
embarrass and discredit each other. 
The Jan sangh also started opposing land reforms and food 
policy and clashed with the SSP and the CPI on these i ssues . 
The conf l ic t s over these issues stemmed from the CPI Revenue 
Minister's attempt to amend the Bihar Tenancy Act to give more 
134. Paul R. Brass, OP. c l t . , p. 264f Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, 
9P- clfe., p. 28. 
135. Paul R. Brass, OP. c l t . . p. 264. 
136. Raghubar Laval Commission Report, pp. 46-48, quoted in 
Paul K. Brass, OP. cit«, p. 261. 
*37. |bld., p. 265. 
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legal protection to the 'Bataldars' (Share-croppers) and from 
the SSP Food and Supply Minister's proposal for a compulsory 
foodgrain levy obliging the farmers to s e l l a certain quota of 
their produce to the Government/ usually at a price lower 
than in the open market, to help meet scarc i t i es caused by 
famine and to control black-marketing in foodgrains. On both 
these issues the Jan Sangh with the help of BKL and the 
Swatantra Party started rallying landlords and succeeded in 
136 
i t s attempts to some extent* I t a lso started a State-wide 
agitat ion to scut t le the o f f i c ia l flood policy. The Bihar state 
Grain Lealers Association was organized with Ram Lakhan Gupta, 
the then President of the Monghyr d i s t r i c t Jan Sangh as the 
President and the Swatantra MLA Nathmal cokania as the Chairman. 
This Association demanded a change in the food policy and 
agitated against the proposal of punitive measures against 
139 
the defaulting traders. 
Samyukta Soc ia l i s t Party 
The intra-party divis ions in the SSP were also responsible 
for the downfall of the front Government. The SSP in Bihar was 
more a conglomeration of individuals than a wel l -knit party. 
The select ion of i t s nominees for the Ministry proved a very 
138. S.M. Joshi, pp. c l t .« p. 15; Mahendra P. Singh, o p . c l t . , 
p. 79; Girish Mishra and Bra J Kumar Pandey, "United 
Front Balance Sheet", Mainstream, February 10, 1968,p. 10. 
139. Link, October 22, 1967, p. 20, 
136 
difficult task, and yet It could not satisfy many party leaders. 
Those SSP men, who were cherishing the dream of becoming 
Ministers and were left out, became antagonised and worked 
tirelessly for the fall of the Government* Jagdeo Prasad, an 
ML A, started planning against the SSP leaders and the United 
Front. Later he becamo the convenor of the Shosalt Lai and 
became a Cabinet Minister in the Congress - Shoshlt Lai Govern-
ment* Some of the leaders pitchforked into power did not know 
how to behave. Following the Congress pattern, the ambitious 
among them, including Ministers, formed their own factions 
140 
inside the party at the cost of their colleagues* The conflict 
between personal interests of B.P. Mandal and party interests 
increased in which personal ambition and caste sentiments 
prevailed over party interests. The Government policy of 
unearthing hoarded foodgralns had resulted in raids on the 
houses of a number of MLAs belonging to the SSP and the JKD. 
141 
They left their parties and joined the Shoshlt Dal. On the 
question of land reforms also, the SSP was divided and its 
leaders did not attend a meeting on the issue convened by Jaya 
142 
Prakash Narayan. This showed the sharp division in the party 
on major policy issues. In iact, the party had many ML As who 
w«re big landlords and they would not favour a decision which 
140. Girish Mlshra and Braj Kumar Pandey, pp. clt., p. 9. 
141* Ibid.. p. 10. 
142. Ibid. 
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reduced their landed property, 
Thus* the non-Congress Coalition, which came to power 
with new promises* soon started disappointing people. Its 
constituents started pulling in different directions. The 
constituents of the Coalition looked at it as an opportunity 
rather than a responsibility and tried to use it to strengthen 
143 
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l b a s e . T h i s l e d them t o t a k e possess ion of key 
Departments through which v a s t r e s o u i c e s and pa t ronage could 
be commanded. Some of the M i n i s t e r s * p a r t i c u l a r l y Karaakhya 
Nara in Singh and h i s younger b r o t h e r i n s i s t e d on having p a r t i -
c u l a r p o r t f o l i o s because they had t h e i r pe rsona l i n t e r e s t s 
i nvo lved in them. Some of the M i n i s t e r s , b e l o n g i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y * 
t o t h e SSP and t h e Jan Sangh* s t a r t e d indu lg ing in cheap 
144 
propaganda to b u i l d up t h e i r personal images among t h e peop l e . 
Some of t h e M i n i s t e r s were accused of i ndu lg ing in c o r r u p t 
p r a c t i c e s and of s h i e l d i n g t h e b l a c k - m a r k e t e e r s . The Mudholkar 
Commission of I n q u i r y was subsequen t ly i n s t i t u t e d t o probe i n t o 
t h e cha rges a g a i n s t t h a n . Thus, t h e UF i t s e l f was not in good 
shape , i he re had been d e f e c t i o n s from t h e SSP* t h e PSP, t h e 
Jan sangh and t h e Swatant ra t o t h e Shosh i t L a i . A CPI MLk, 
S.M. Abdullah* was e x p e l l e a from t h e p a r t y , bu t he had a l ready 
c e f e c t e d t o the S h o s h i t L a i . 
Another f a c t o r which to some e x t e n t has tened t h e f a l l of 
1 4 3 . K.L.Kamal and Ralph C.Meyer, O P . c l t . * p . 1 2 3 . 
144 . G I r i s h Mlshra and Braj Kuner Pandey, o p . c l t . , p . 10 . 
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the UF Government was the inexperience of i t s leaders . No 
doubt/ they were in p o l i t i c s for a pretty long time, but they 
wore not ful ly acquainted with the fact and s k i l l needed to 
run the administration. Furthermore/ in the absence of a serious-
ness of purpose in implementing the 33-point minimum programme, 
they coula not decide on the pr ior i t i e s nor did they act with 
object iv i ty and patience. 
The se l ec tor ' s Government 
After the f a l l of the f i r s t Ui Government* Satish Prasad 
Singh/ a nominee of the Shoahit l a l , was sworn-in as an 'interim1 
145 
Chief Minister of Bihar in the evening of January 28, 1968. Two 
more Ministers, namely Shatrumardan Shahl and N.E. Horo (both 
146 
Shoshit Lal) were sworn-in in the afternoon of January 30, 1968. 
i h i s Government was a purely stop-gap arrangement/ because 
the man, who was instrumental in the fa l l of the Mahamaya 
Ministry and was also the real leader of the Shoshit Lal, which 
was in a real sense a get-together of a l l defectors, was not 
a member of the Bihar Legislature. As B.P. Mandal had almost 
completed a period of s ix months as a Minister in the UF Govern-
ment/ the Governor was not prepared to invi te him to form the 
new government in view of the serious doubts raised about h i s 
becoming the Chief Miniseer without being a member of the 
145. Indian Nation, January 29, 1968. 
146. Ib id . , January 31, 1968. 
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Legislature* After many manoeuvres and deliberations, the 
name of sat lsh Prasad Singh was submitted to the Governor by 
148 
M.P. slnha and B.P. Mandal at 5*00 P.M. on January 28, 1968. 
He w*s swom-ln the same day. i t would not be out of context 
to mention here that after the defeat of the Mahamaya Government, 
the Governor invited M.P. Slnha to form a new government, but 
he expressed the support of h i s party to B.P. Mandal In forming 
149 
the new government. 
However, the congress-shoshit Dal al l iance evolved a 
formula according to which the chief Minister sat l sh Prasad Singh, 
would nominate Mandal to the vidhan Parlshad, the upper House 
of the Legislature, to circumvent the constitutional bar against 
h i s becoming the chief Minister. To clear the way for Mandal1 s 
entry into the vidhan Parlshad, Parmanand, a nominated member 
150 
and close re lat ive of K. B. sahay, resigned h i s seat . Accordingly, 
the Interim chief Minister recommended to the Governor the name 
of Mandal for nomination to the vidhan Parlshad on January 29, 
151 
1968. The next day Mandal was nominated to the Parlshad and the 
way was cllear for the formation of the f i r s t congress-backed 
Shoshlt Lai Ministry, headed by B.P. Mandal. sat l sh Prasad Singh 
147. subhash C. Kashyap, o p . c l t . , p* 326. 
148. Indian nation, January 29, 1968. 
149. subhash C. Kashyp.p, op. c l t . , p. 326. 
150. Indian Nation, January 29, 1968. 
151. Ibid., January 30 and 31, 1968. 
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resigned h i s o f f i ce on February 1, 1968 and h is resignation was 
152 
accepted In the afternoon of the same day* 
The shoshit Dal Ministry was sworn-tn on February 1, 1968* 
Besides, B . P . Mandal the four Ministers* who took oath of secrecy 
we re« sat l sh Prasad Singh, shatru mardhan shahi, N.E. Horo and 
153 
jagdeo Prasad* Except N.E. Horo, a l l the three Ministers were 
from the shoshit Dal. Horo belonged to one faction of the 
jharkhand Party headed by him. He and h i s s ix supporters had 
e a r l i e r walked off the UF to join the Dai.satish Prasad Singh 
had the privilege of being a chief Minister for three days. 
B.P. Mandal1s shoshit Dal Ministry was further expanded 
on Fehruary 5, 1968 with the addition of twenty-nine more Ministers 
Of them thirteen were cabinet Ministers, thirteen Ministers of 
154 
State and three Depmty Ministers. With this expansion, the 
strength of the Mandal Ministry went upto 34. The Ministers 
sworn-in on February 5 Included 8 EX-JKD men, 7 SSP men, 2 Rx-
Jan sangh members, 2 Ex~swatantra, 1 EX-PSP, 1 Ex-CPI and 4 
independents, of the remaining 4, 2 were Ex-congress members and 
2 jharkhand members. The new Ministers included three •sadhus', 
two of them - Mahanth sukdeo Girl and Mahanth Ram Klshore Das were 
sworn-in as fu l l fledged Ministers, swaiai vlvekanand was taken 
as a Deputy Minister. 
152. Bihar Government gazette , February 7, 1968. 
153. Indian Nation, February 2, 1968. 
154. search Light, February 6, 1968. 
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One interest ing aspect of t h i s expansion was that two 
Ministers of s ta te and three Deputy Ministers, who were to be 
aworn-in on that day, did not turn up. They were DeJbilaljt and 
sanat Raut (both state Ministers) and Bagun sumbrui, Munshi 
Hansda and suraj Narain sharma (Deputy Ministers) , of them Debi-
l a l j l was sworn-iiii. on February 7, 1966 as the 14th Minister of 
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State raising the strength of Ministry to 35. Even on that day 
the other four prospective Ministers did not turn up for their 
swearing-in, because they refused to accept the posts to which they 
were appointed* sanat Raut, in particular, was understood to 
have told the shoshit Lai leaders that he was not interested in 
154 
joining the Ministry as a Minister of s ta t e , on February 10,1968 
the shoshit Dal Ministry was further expanded/ raising i t s 
strength to 36, with the addition of one cabinet Minister. He 
157 
was shambhu Nath jha, the Assistant Editor of the search Light. 
re fec tor ' s Ministry 
The B . P . Mandal Ministry was a •Defectors* paradise, 
because h i s was a hundred percent defectors' Ministry. Every one, 
who defected to the Lai, was rewarded with a ministerial berth. 
Among these defector Ministers, the largest number were from 
the former SSP members, out of 36 Ministers, their strength was 
eleven including the chief Minister. Then came the number of JKD 
men who were nine. They were followed by independents (four) and 
155. Indian Mat ion, February 8, 1968. 
156. i b i d . 
157. i b i d . , February 11, 1968. 
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the jharkhand group. There were two congress defectors, two 
jan sangh defectors, two swatantra and one each from the CPZ and 
the PSP. Table vi shows the shoshlt Dal Minister's former 
parties, their castes, region and their rural/urban base. It is 
important to mention that the shoshlt Dal Ministry Included 
Paul Hansda (cabinet rank), and Bhagat Murmu (Deputy Minister), 
who along with Munshi Hansda, were the first since 1967, to 
start the game of "Aya Ram and oaya Ram" in Bihar politics. 
Munshi Hansda was also offered Deputy Ministerial gaddt, but 
be refused/ because he wanted a better position* 
composition 
With regard to the composition of the shoshlt Dal Ministry, 
it is to be noted that all, but two Ministers, were members of the 
Assembly. The chief Minister was a nominated member of the 
vidhan Partshad, sambhu Nath jha was not a member of either House 
of the Legislature nor did he belong to any political party. 
caste/community composition 
As for the caste composition of the Mandal Ministry, it 
is significant that, as ayainst the first UF Government, this 
Ministry was dominated by Backward castes. There were twelve 
Backward caste Ministers as against nine in the Mahamaya Ministry. 
Among them Yadavas were in the majority having secured six berths, 
including the chief Minister's. Then cams the number of Kolrls 
whose strength was four. Kurmls and Tells got one berth each. The 
Scheduled castes and the scheduled Tribes got more berths in the 
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Showing caste/coomuntty, region , rural/urban bases 
and former parties of the shoahit cal Ministers/1968 
Region/Mane/ 
Parties and 
Membership 
1 cas te / 
0 Community 
J! 
9 Rural/ 9 
0 urban 4 
J L 
constituency 
CABINET Huasrms 
North Plains 
B.P. Mandal Vadav 
(SSP, MLC) 
Shatrumardan shahl Rajput 
(JKD/ ML A) 
satya Naraln sharma Bhumihar 
(PSP, MLA) 
Ahmad Kartm Muslim 
(independent, MLA) 
Mahanth Ram Kishore Das Bhumihar 
(JKD, MLA) 
Mahanth sukdeo Glri Rajput 
(JKD/ MLA) 
South plains 
Jagdeo Prasad 
(PSP, MLA) 
s a t i s h Prasad Singh 
(SSP, MLA) 
sardar Harlhar s ingh 
(independent* MLA) 
Ram Chandra Yadav 
(SSP, MLA) 
Tarni Prasad 
(JKD* MLA) 
Ram Magina Singh 
(SSP, MLA) 
S»M. Hashim 
(SSP, ML?) 
Paul Honeda 
(jharkhand, MLA) 
Koiri 
Kolri 
R& j put 
Yadav 
Kolri 
Yadav 
Muslim 
scheduled 
Tribe 
Nominated 
Rural Laurlya (champaran) 
Rural Dhaka (Champaran) 
Rural Adapur (champaran) 
Rural Mlnapur (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural Baruraj (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural Kurtha (Gaya) 
Rural Parbatta (Monghyr) 
Rural Dumraon (shahabad) 
Rural Gay a MU£ fasll 
urban Barh (Patna) 
Rural Maner (Patna) 
Urban Monghyr (Monghyr) 
Rural Maheshpur (S*) 
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Chotanaqpur 
N.F.. Horo 
(Jharkhand, ML A) 
p.c. Eirua 
(independent, ML A) 
shiburanjan Khan 
(independent, ML A) 
Brlndawan swansi 
(JKD, ML A) 
MINISTERS OF STATS 
scheduled Rural 
Tribe 
Scheduled Rural 
Tribe 
Tell Rural 
scheduled Rural 
Caste 
North P l a i n s 
Mahabir Prasad Yadav 
(SSP. MLA) 
Mahabir Prasad 
(SSP, MLA) 
Hargun shahi 
(JKD, ML A) 
S*M. Abdullah 
(CPI, MLA) 
D e b i l a l j i 
(SSP, MLA) 
south p l a i n s 
B*P* Jawahar 
(congress , ML A) 
Ran Chandra Prasad 
(Jan sangh, MLA) 
Ramashish singh 
(SSP, MLA) 
Nathmal Dokanta 
(swatantra, MLA) 
Mushtaq Al l Khan 
(JKD, MLA) 
Yadav Rural 
Yadav Rural 
Bhuraihar urban 
Muslim Rural 
Yadav Rural 
Kuxml Rural 
Scheduled Rural 
Caste 
Kolri Rural 
Marwari Rural 
Muslim Rural 
Kol ibira (Ranchi) 
Mojhgaon (Ranchi) 
Bahragaon (Ranchi) 
S i l l i (Ranch!) 
Madhepura (saharasa) 
Dlraul (carbhanga) 
Bet t iah (champaran) 
Harsldih (champaran) 
Mahraura (saran) 
Asthawan (patna) 
Fatwa (patna) 
Dlnara (shahabad) 
Raj Mahal (sP) 
Sherghatti (Gaya) 
Chotanaqpur 
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Simon Tlgga 
(Congress/ MLA) 
Balwant Nath s lngh 
(JKD, ML A) 
Majhie, Majhi 
(jan Sangh, MLA) 
KeahaV Prasad Singh 
(JKD# MLA) 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Raj put 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Rajput 
Rural chainpur (Ranchl) 
Rural Mandu (Hazartbagh) 
Rural chakradharpur 
(Singhbhun) 
Rural chatra 
(Hazartbagh) 
DEPUTY M1MISTERS 
North p la ins 
Shohan Lai Jain 
( s m t a n t r a * MLA) 
Marwarl Rural Bar sot (purnea) 
South Plains 
Swaral vlvekanand 
(SSPi MLA) 
Bhagat Murmu 
iJharkhand, MLA) 
Scheduled 
Caste 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Rural 
Rural 
Stkandara 
(Monghyr) 
Littpara ( S P ) 
158. caste and constituency* supra chapter I I I , Footnote 
7t(b) and ( c ) , p. 109. 
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Shoshit Dal Ministry than in the f i r s t UF Government. There 
were mix scheduled Tribes (ST) Ministers as against four in the 
MaMaaaya Ministry* The strength of the scheduled castes (sc) 
was three as against one in the f i r s t non-congress coa l i t ion . 
The strength of the ST could have gone to eight had Bagun suabrul 
and Mttnshi Hansda accepted the ministerial posts . The Muslins 
got fovr men as against three in the UF Ministry, in spite of 
a l l this* the Forward castes were not in a hopeless posit ion. 
They had nine men in the Ministry. This was not a mean achievement 
in view of the tirade launched against them by some of Mandal's 
supporters, what was more, Bhumihars and Rajputs had suff icient 
representation in the Ministry, while the former had three men 
in the Government, the l a t t e r got f ive seats , ka a natter of 
fac t , the shoshit Dal Ministry I t se l f was a brainchild of the 
Forward caste leaders, particularly Bhumlhar and Kayastha leaders. 
Mandal and h i s supporters owed the ir elevation in the manoeuvrlngs 
of M . P . slnha and K.B. sahay who wanted to topple the UF Ministry 
with Mandal's help. The remaining one Forward caste Minister 
was a Maithil Brahmin. The Marwari community had two representa-
t i v e s in the Dal Ministry. 
Region-wise Analysis 
As regards the representation to the three main regions 
of the s ta te , i t i s to be noted that they got almost even share 
of ministerial seats keeping in view tota l number of representatives 
coming from these areas. The south plains had the highest number 
of f i f teen members in the shoshit Dal Government. The North plains 
147 
had eleven representatives* excluding the chief Minister, while 
the chotanagpur region had eight representatives in the Govern-
ment. out of 36 Ministers of the Mandal Government* only three 
represented urban areas* They were Tarni Prasad and s*M* Hashira 
(both cabinet) and Hargun shahl (Minister of s t a t e ) . 
However* with regard to the composition of the shoshit 
Lai Ministry* i t i s worth mentioning that i t s composition was 
neither based on caste/coremunity nor on region-wise representa-
t i o n . i t s only consideration was to give ministerial seats to 
a l l defectors coming from UF. i t so happened that sone of the 
defectors themselves refused to jo in the shoshit Dal Government 
as they were not sa t i s f i ed with the posts* they were offered* 
The irony of the situation was that even the 'shoshit1 (exploited) 
people of Bihar were not given enough representation in the 
Ministry though the Dal claimed i t s e l f to be the ir vanguard* 
No representation was given to women because none of the women 
l e g i s l a t o r s defected to the Dal* 
The misleading 'shoshit* character of the congress-backed 
Mandal Ministry i s proved by the inclusion of two "Mahanths" 
and some well known landlords and feudal elements l i k e snatruraardan 
shahl in the cabinet* The appointment of two ex-swatantra 
Marwarls as Ministers exposed the hypocrisy of the se l f - s ty led 
Lenlns of Bihar* The chief Minister* himself a big landlord of 
saharasa dis tr ic t* exploited the backward people of the Backward 
159 
Castes to f u l f i l h i s own ambition* 
159* Link* September 3* 1967* p. 14* 
148 
Cauaes of the Fal l of the shoshlt pal Ministry 
However, the hypocratlc mask of the Mandal Ministry 
fa i l ed to keep him in power for a long period* If defections 
engineered by the congress had inducted B.P. Mandal into the 
Chief Minister's o f f i c e , defections from the congress led him 
out of I t just after 47 days. The 47-day-old Ministry f e l l on 
March 18, 1968, when, defying the party whip, sixteen Congress 
ML As voted with the opposition on the no-confidence motion, which 
160 
was carried out by 165 to 148 votes* in a House of 319, two 
seats were vacant and the speaker and a nominated member did 
not vote, suraj Naraln sharma, who was appointed a Deputy Minister 
but was yet to take oath, remained absent. Laliteshwar Prasad 
161 
Shahl (congress) remained neutral. 
The shoshlt Dal Ministry was the second Government in 
Bihar within a year to have been pushed out of of f ice as a result 
162 
of'naked pursuit of power through change of party l o y a l t i e s ' . 
Thus, "born in Ignopiny", th i s minority Ministry of "polit ical 
163 
non-descripts" met an ignomlnous end". 
Defection from the congress 
The most important factor responsible for the f a l l of the 
Shoshlt Lai Government was the congress Party in Bihar with whose 
160. Indian Nation, March 19, 1968, 
161. search Light, March 20, 1968. 
162. subhash c . Kashyap, op. c i t . , p . 331. 
163. Indian Express (New Delhi) , March 20, 1968. 
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support the Dal had COB* to power* Eversinos the congress-
Shoshlt Dal al l iance was formed, d issat i s fact ion was brewing 
in the congress party* An Influenclal group of the CLD, headed 
by B*N* Jha, was opposed to t h i s a l l iance from the very 
beginning* i t was never reconciled to the congress supporting 
Handal Government* Pandit Harinath Mishra, a former cooperative 
Minister and an Influenclal leader of th i s group strongly 
opposed the 'unprincipled and opportunistic a l l iance ' with the 
Shoshlt oal just for toppling the UF Ministry. He threatened 
164 
to lead a revolt i s the party i f t h i s strategy was not changed* 
subsequently, th i s group decided to topple the Mandal Ministry 
by supporting the no-confidence motion moved by the united Front* 
Five congress leaders of t h i s group, namely, L.N. surjthanshu, 
a former Speaker, Harinath Mishra, Deep Narain Singh, Bhola 
Paswan shastrl and Krishna Kant Singh, declared during the night 
of March 17, 1968, a few hours before the voting on the no-
confidence motion that they and their friends would defy the 
165 
party whip and vote against the Ministry* Accordingly, they 
voted with the opposition and brought down the shoshlt Dal 
Ministry* 
Besides the factional in-fighting within the Congress 
Party, lure of off ice was another factor responsible for 
defections from the congress party, i t was d i f f i c u l t for a 
164* Link, September 24, 1967, p. 24* 
165* Indian Nation, March 18, 1968. 
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group of Congressmen to re s i s t the temptation to defect when 
there was alluring reward for what was then a minor pol i t ica l 
v i c e . I t was particularly so In Bihar, when no holds were 
barred In po l i t i ca l machinations* Thus, "personal ambitions and 
antagonists, factional f ights and jea lous ies , caste r iva lr ies 
and conflicts" seemed to have played a much greater part In the 
defect ions from the congress tn»m any question of principle 
167 
or policy"» 
Role of the shoshlt Dal 
Apart from the congress Party* the shoshlt Dal was I t se l f 
responsible for the f a l l of the Mandal Ministry* The party had 
no programme o organization* i t was merely an amorphous group 
of a few self-seeking Individuals* L.N. sudhanshu termed the 
Dal Ministry as "a group of power-hungry persons reared on the 
168 
i l l - g o t t e n money of 111-famed and power-hungry pol it ic ians"• 
Most of Dal*s members had hundred of blghas of land. They were 
claiming to be exploited because their houses were raided for 
hoarded food grains and their interest was going to be affected 
169 
by the alleged actions of the UF Government. The party was made 
up of ^independable elements* These elements pushed Bihar Into a 
s tate of uncertainty and Instabi l i ty by bringing down tlie 
166. Times of India Uew Delhi) , March 20, 1968. 
i t > 7
» Statesman (L^alhi;, March 20, 1966. 
i b a
*
 N e w Aqe
» March 3, 1966, p. 9* 
169* Cirtsh Mishra and Braj Kumar Pandey, o p . c l t . , p* 11* 
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Mahamaya Ministry* There was no guarantee that they would not 
repeat their game* Dissatisfaction and quarrels had already 
started In the ranks of the Lai when four of them refused to 
jo in the Ministry. These were bound to result in fresh defections 
from the Lai. That th i s time they were l e f t behind by some of 
the top congressmen of Bihar was another matter. The chief 
Minister and the father of the Shoshit Lai had been an unstable 
p o l i t i c a l factor for the l a s t four years, when his ambition 
for ministerial off ice was not f u l f i l l e d by the then chief 
Minister K.B. sahay after the third General Elect ions , he turned 
a c r i t i c of h i s own party and got himself expelled f rom the 
170 
Congress Party and joined the sue in IS65. As the SSP leadership 
blocked his designs for f u l f i l l i n g h is ministerial ambition, 
L.p. Manual founded h is shoshit Dal and joined hands with the 
congressmen. Being a po l i t i ca l chameleon, ever ready to change 
M s loyalty to sui t h i s personal ambitions, Mandal could neither 
Inspire h i s team nor provide an e f f i c i ent administration. 
k minority Ministry had no worthwhile programme of action 
and was without the necessary ta lent to run the administration. 
The Lai was interested only in keeping I tse l f in power, and the 
Congress supported i t because I t wanted to keep the UF out. 
The Mandal Ministry lacked inherent strength and ideological 
freshness, and from the very beginning i t betrayed a l l the 
weakness ana nervousness of a puppet regime. The e lse of the 
170. Link, September 3, 1967, p. 14; subhash c . Kashyap, 
op. c l t . , p. 313. 
w 
Ministry i t s e l f was the g rea tes t c r i t i q u e of the Mandai Ministry* 
A race for Minis tership and por t fo l ios had begun in the shoshit 
Dal . All the 39 ML As Joined the Dal with a view to becoming 
M i n i s t e r s . An important MLA of the Dal said, H l have defected 
171 
from ray party to become a Minister of cabinet rank". Everybody 
wanted to be a cabinet Minis ter . 
i n the race for portfol ios* a shoshit Lai MLA not only 
wanted to be a cabinet Minis ter , but he l iked to have a l l 
po r t fo l i o s of Karaakhya Narain Singh. Another MLA wanted the 
p o r t f o l i o s of feasant Narain Singh. There was yet another MLA 
172 
who l i k e d to have the por t fo l ios of Kapildeo Singh. There 
was, thus , ser ious demands for por t fo l ios of Mines, Fores t , 
PWL and Food and Supply. 
The second UF Ministry 
Soon a f t e r the f a l l of the shoshi t Dal Ministry, l eaaers 
of the cons t i tuent u n i t s of the UF met a t the residence of 
B.N. Jha and formally e lec ted Bholp. Paswan shns t r i as t h e i r 
l e a d e r , on the same day, the rebel congressmen, vho votec* In 
favour of the no-confldence motion against the B . P , Hondol 
Government, formed a new party, the Loktantr lk congress r a l 
173 
(Let) of Eihar, with L.N. sudhanshu as its chairman. It is 
171. search Light (Editorial), February 3, 1968. 
172. Ibid. 
173. Indian Nation, March 19, 1966. 
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important to not* that some understanding had been reached 
between the dissident Congress leaders and the UF about an 
alternative to the Mandal Government with a dissident congress 
leader as the chief Minister* Further, all the parties oonsts-
174 
tuting the UF were to participate in the new Ministry. 
Accordingly, on March 22, 1968, Bhola paswan shastri 
175 
was sworn-in as the chief Minister of Bihar. He became the 
fourth chief Minister since the 1967 elections and the first" 
ever Harijan chief Minister of the state* Along with Paswan, 
the other two Ministers sworn-in were Krishna Kant Singh 
(K.K. slngh), a former xeputy Minister of Education and 
Rameshwar Prasad Sinha, both members of the new born Loktantrik 
Congress Dal. 
Bargainings 
The formation of the second UF Government, however, was 
not devoid of bargaining and behind-the-scene drama. First 
Mahamaya Prasad sinha, the UF leader in the Assembly and the 
former UF chief Minister, was obliged to resign from the 
leadership, in the evening of March 17, 1968 some of the top 
leaders of the UF came to him and urged him to resign to make 
room for shastr i . Mahamaya Prasad sinha resisted the pressure 
174. Mahamaya Prasad sinha, pp. c l t . , p. 59. 
175. Indian Nation, March 23, 1968. 
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for sometime on one ground or the other* but ultimately he 
176 
had to y ie ld and resign the sane night* 
congress Party 
M.P. sinha, the leader of the congress Legislature Party, 
a l so tr ied to form a government with the help of the shoshit 
Lai and the Raja of Ramgarh. But he fa i led to get a green 
signal from the central leadership* Moreover* the CLP was i t s e l f 
divided on the question of forming a government with the 
177 
support of defectors and the Raja of Ramgarh. Having fai led 
to f orra a government on their own* the Congress and the shoshit 
haX leaders pressurised Maharaaya Prasad sinha* who had by then 
developed strained relat ions with the UF to form a government 
with the support of the congress and the shoshit ral* but he 
178 
refused to oblige them. 
The Governor's Role 
The Governor* too* had h i s role to play, when approached 
by Bhola Paswan shastri (B.P. shastri) to allow him to form a 
government* the Governor asked for the l i s t of h i s supporters 
and their signatures, k l i s t of Bharatiya Krantl Dal (BKD), 
formerly JKD* members was submitted by Basant Narayan Singh* 
the General secretary of the party in the s t a t e . But the Governor* 
176. Mahamaya Prasad sinha* op.c l t .*p .59; Indian Nation* 
March 19* 1968. 
177. Girish Mlshra anci sraj Kumar Pandey,MBihar's second united 
Front Government"* Mainstream* June 23* 1968* p. 29. 
178. Mahamaya Prasad sinha* op .c l t .* p . 61. 
M 
aware of the etraiaed relatione between Mahaaeya Praead alalia 
and the yf leaders* inelatad on the aignature of Mahanaye 
m 
praead sinha also being prefaced* when sinha gave to the 
Governor* la writing his deeleloa to support Pnetmn* the letter 
had to accept the now situation, he then asked for a ooneaa 
agreed program r* of the Front though barely a month and a half 
back when hes^bre-in the shoehit imX Ministry lie had never 
180 
thought of any programme* TO nee* th is , the constituents of 
the yr prepared a 17-polnt tentative programme. Having been 
•atlailed on a l l counts, the Governor, on March 21, I960,invited 
&•?• Shaatrl to fora the new government* 
consti^uapfrs
 i o*. toe yBi.teo y **>*>» 
Aaony the partners of the uv, only the est and the jan 
saagh were ahle to f inalise their l l a ta of aoalaaaa for the 
council at Hint a tore without, ouch delay* The SCP, the mp end 
the bw. had apparently decided to Join the Ministry after getting 
clearance iron their aatlonal gxecutlvee* But, la fact* tact tonal 
ln-iiyhting wee preventing then tram Joining the Mlalatry* 
when the paewan Mlalatry was f oraed* the ss- gave the 
assumace that It would soon Join the Mlalatry without delay* 
180* o Irish Miahra and uraj Kumar paaooy,Bihar*e second united 
front Government, op ,c i t . , p* IS* Jagaaaath sarkar, 
"Problems and Prospects of Bihar s \ i Government*«jewige-jane t , 19**, p. »• 
**** fndlaa nation, March 32« ItelU 
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But In-fighting within the party on the question of allocation 
of ministerial seats prevented i t from taking a prompt decision 
about joining the Ministry. The central leadership was also 
not so prompt in resolving the controversy* in such a situation, 
as a face-saving device* the SSP refused to join the Ministry, 
unless two of i t s major demands, (1) the abolit ion of land 
revenue on uneconomic holdings* and (2) a complete ban on the 
182 
use of English for o f f i c i a l purposes, were accepted* There 
were other conditions also including sixty percent representation 
for the Harljans, Adivasts, women and Backward community in the 
Ministry, on April 28, 1968, the coordination committee of the 
UF decided to revise i t s 17-point common programme and to add 
to i t another 14-points including those of abolishing of land 
revenue on uneconomic holdings, ban on o f f i c i a l use of English 
and completion of Inquiry into charges of corruption against 
183 
highly placed persons, on June 9, 1968, the SSP permitted Its 
Bihar unit to join the Paswan Ministry, provided the chief 
Minister agreed immediately to suspend the collection of land 
revenue and give an assurance that within ten days of the 
prorogation
 0£ the Assembly an ordinance would be issued exempting 
184 
land revenue on hol£ln98 upto 6.5 acres. Thus, the SSP, the 
major partner In the coalition, continued to refuse to join the 
Ministry on one pretext or the other* 
182. subhash c. Kashyap, op. clt., p. 337. 
183. Ibid., p. 335. 
184. Ibid., p. 336. 
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praja s o c i a l i s t party 
The PSP was divided into two groups headed by Basawan 
Singh and Suraj Naraln Singh respectively. The former was in 
tavour of joining the Paswan Government, while the l a t t e r was 
opposed to i t . Final ly , i t was due to the e f forts of H.V.Kamath 
that differences were ironed out and the PSP decided to join 
185 
the Ministry* 
Bharatiya Krantl pal 
The chairman of the All India BKL, Mahamaya Prasad sinha, 
was sjgalnst h is party's joining the Government. But the s tate 
unit was not ready to follow hira. Kamakhya Naraln Singh, along 
with h i s 17 supporters severed h i s connection with the BUS and 
revived h i s old party - Janata Party - and pledged h i s party's 
186 
support to the Paswan Ministry. 
Expansion 
The strength of the paswan Ministry rose to eight with 
the swearing-in of f ive more Ministers ( a l l of cabinet rank) on 
187 
May 1, 1968. These Ministers weret zndradeep Singh and Chandra 
Shekhar Singh (CPI), vl joy Kumar Mltra and Raradeo Mahto (jan 
Saagh) and Ma J hi Rasraj Tuddu (LCD). The CPI and the Jan Sangh 
165. Link, May 12, 1968, p. 11. 
1»6. Indian nation. May 2, 1968. 
187. ibid. 
158 
retained the team which represented them la the f i r s t UF Ministry. 
Majht RasraJ Tuddu became the fourth Loktantrik congress 
Minister in the 8-member cabinet. 
Karaakhya Naraln Singh and h i s younger brother Basant 
Narain Singh were sworn-in on May 3, 1968, raising the strength 
188 
of the cabinet to iO, The Pasvan Ministry was further expanded 
on May 12, 1968 with the addition of Hasibur Rahman and Ramapatl 
189 
Singh (PSP) and Deep Naraln Singh (LCD) as members of the cabinet. 
This raised the strength of the second united Front Ministry to 
13 . 
With the exception of the SSP# a l l major partners of the 
UF joined the Ministry. The SSP f inal ly decided to join the 
Ministry and on June 22, 1968 f inal ised the l i s t of ten members 
to be included in the council of Ministers. But then i t became 
too l a t e . The pa swan Ministry went out of o f f i ce after three 
days and the party remained unrepresented in the Ministry. 
Table VII gives the party-wise break-up of tha Paswan Ministry 
along with the caste and region of the Ministers. 
Party-wise Break-up 
$11 the thirteen members of the second UF Ministry were 
Ministers of cabinet rank. There were no state and Deputy 
188. i b i d . , May 4, 1968. 
189. Ib id . , May 13, 1968. 
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TABLE VII 
Showing caste / community, region, rural/urban 
bases and party of the second UF Ministry*1968 
Region/Name 
Party 
T caste/ 4 
0Community 0 
J t 
Rura l / i 
urban 0 
WMHMIMMMMMkWi 
Constituency 
CABINET MINISTERS 
Nocth p l a i n s 
Bhola Pasv»an s h a s t r i 
(LCD, MLA) 
Krishna Kant Singh 
(LCD, MLA) 
Rameshwar Prasad sinha 
(LCD, MLA) 
Chandra shekhar Singh 
(CPI, MLA) 
Kaioakhya Narain Singh 
(Janata* MLA) 
Haslbur Rahman 
(*>SP* MLA) 
Ramapati Singh 
(PS?, MLA) 
Deep Narain s ingh 
(LCD* MLA) 
south p l a i n s 
Vijoy Kumar Mitra 
(JS* MLA) 
Raaadeo Mahto 
(JS/ MLA) 
Chotanagpur 
Majhi Rasraj Tuddu 
(LCD* MLA) 
Basant Narain singh 
Dusadh 
(SC) 
Bhumlhar 
Kurmi 
Bhumlhar 
Raj put 
Muslim 
Raj put 
Rajput 
Bengali 
Kolrl 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Raj put 
(Janata* MLA) 
indradeep singh 
(CPlqa MLC) 
Rural Korha (Pumea) 
Rural Goreakothi (saran) 
urban Darbhs,nga(D?rbhanga) 
Urban Baraunl (Monghyr) 
Rural j a l a p u r (saran) 
Rural Amour (pumea) 
Rural Patahi (champaran) 
Rural Lalganj (Muzaffarpur) 
Urban Bhagalpur (Bhagalpur) 
Urban Patna East (Patna) 
Rural j ugsa l a i (singhbhum) 
Rural Bagodar (Hazaribagh) 
190. c a s t e and const i tuency, supra chapter i n * Footnote 
78 (b) and ( c ) , p . 109. 
l«ft 
Ministers, because Paswan did not get the opportunity to 
Include them in h i s Ministry, out of thirteen Ministers, only 
one was a member of the vldhan parishad. All constituents of 
the UF retained their old teams. Only Ramapati Singh was elevated 
to the cabinet rank in place of Basawan Singh* who ceased to 
be a member of the Legislature. Among the constituents, the 
Loktantrlk congress Dal had as many as f ive members in the 
Council of Ministers. The other partners of the UF, namely the 
CVlt the PSP/ the jan sangh and the Janata Party of Raja 
Ramgarh had two members each in the Paswan Ministry. 
Caste-wise Analysis 
Although the chief Minister himself was a Scheduled 
cas te , h i s Ministry was dominated by men from the Forward castes . 
There were seven Forward caste Ministers in the Paswan Govern-
ment. Among them Rajputs were four and Bhumlhars three, wayasthas 
and Brahmins, among the Forward c a s t e s , remained unrepresented,. 
The Backward castes had three men in the coal i t ion Ministry. 
Two of them were Koiris and one was a Kurml, Yadavas, a 
dominant caste among the Backward cas tes , f or the f i r s t time, 
had no member in the second UF Ministry. The scheduled Tribes 
had one member in the Ministry. Heutibur Rahman was the sole 
member belonging to the Muslim minority. The remaining one 
Minister belonged to the Bengali community, women were not 
represented in the Paswan Ministry. 
Region-wise Analysis 
out of thirteen Ministers of the second VF Ministry,eight 
161 
belonged to the Nosth plains* I t was the f i r s t time that a 
Chief Minister came front th i s region. Though B . P * Mandal also 
belonged to th i s region but when he became chief Minister* he 
was a nominated member of the vidhan parishad* The south Plains 
and the tribal bel t of chotanagpur had two members each in 
the council of Ministers, 
Resignation of the Ministry 
However* the second UF Ministry could not l a s t long* 
Threats of resignation of Ministers* pressure of the constituent 
un i t s and the unacceptable demands of the Raja of Ramgarh made 
the paswan' Ministry to crumble* The chief Minister tendered 
h i s resignation on June 25, 1968 to the Governor and recommended 
191 
President's Rule followed by Mid-term elect ions in the state* 
The 95-day-old Ministry, third since the fourth General Elections, 
went out of o f f i ce without passing the s tate Budget. Finance 
Minister, K.K* Singh, announced the resignation of the Govern-
a>.ent in the Assembly, when the House was discussing the 
Appropriations Bi l l* 
Bhola Paswan in his resignation l e t t e r said that , "in 
the present s i tuation when none of the po l i t i ca l parties i s in 
an absolute majority in the vldhan sabha, and Kamakhya Narain 
Singh, PWD Minister* i s placing before me, directly or indirectly, 
such demands as could not be accepted in the interests of the 
1 9 1
• Indian Nation, June 26* 1968. 
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people or the s t a t e , i t wi l l not be possible for ne to run a 
192 
democratic government". Later, explaining the reasons for 
h i s resignation at a press conference at h i s residence/ the 
Chief Minister indirectly indicted the congress for "conspiring 
to topple h i s government" with a view to scutt l ing the judicial 
probe ordered by the f i r s t UF Government into the: charges of 
corruption against the former chief Minister • He directly 
accused the Raja ox Ramgarh for "pressurising" him to do certain 
things l i k e making "special arrangements' for conducting his 
court cases and engagement of a lawyer of h i s choice for the 
purpose", transfers and postings of o f f i c i a l s to suit h i s l ikes 
and d i s l ike s , allotment of portfol ios of Mines and Minerals to 
193 
h i s nominees or h i s elevation to the Deputy chief Ministership* 
Role of the Raja of Ramgarh 
Of course, the Raja of Ramgarh played a key role in 
the f a l l of the paewan Ministry. Eversince, he broke away from 
the BKD along with h i s supporters, he started creating troubles 
for Pa swan expecting that he would y ie ld to h i s pressure. 
Allotment of Mines and Minerals and Forest portfol ios to him 
or to h i s nominees was h i s declared condition before joining 
the f i r s t UF Govemnent. This time he claimed Deputy chief 
Ministership a l so , because of the ' sacr i f i ce ' he made by severing 
192. Ib id . 
193. i b i d . 
1*3 
h i s re lat ions with the BKD, foregoing chief Ministership and 
Chairmanship of the coordination Committee and saving Bihar 
194 
from President's Rule, when the chief Minister showed no 
sign of yie lding, the Raja resigned fron the cabinet on June 
195 
12, 1968 on grounds of health. But the real reason for h i s 
resignation was h is inabi l i ty to get the Mines and Mineral 
Departments, the Deputy chief Ministership and non-wlthdrawl 
of the cases pending against him. However* ta lks were held and 
e f f o r t s were made to reconcile Karaakhya Narain Singh, but he 
continued with h i s threats of toppling the Pa swan Ministry, on 
June 24* 1968, he himself told newsmen that he had written to 
the Governor conveying the withdrawl of h i s party «s support 
196 
to the UF« But only a couple of hours l a t e r , he surprised 
everybody by h is announcement that after h i s discussions with 
the chief Minister* he had decided to withdraw the l e t t e r of 
resignation written to the Governor, "what induced him to do 
so and what happened subsequently to change the position dras-
t l e a l l y has not been explained and may never be known fully", 
Even after this* the Raja went on bargaining with both sides ~ 
the ruling UF and the congress opposition, on the one hand, he 
194. i b i d . . May 2, 1968. 
195. search Light* June 13, 1968. 
196. Asian Recorder (New Delhi), July 15-21* 1968, p. 8420; 
Subhash c. Kashyap, op, cit., p, 337. 
197. statesman (Editorial)* June 26* 1968. 
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worked for someone else to be the chief Minister and asked for 
the transfers of certain officers, on the other hand/ he was 
also in constant touch with the congress eventually to bring 
down the Paswan Ministry and to form a new government with 
198 
the support of the congress and the shoshit Dal. But he was 
outwitted by Bhola Paswan who resigned at a time when the 
ministerial crises appeared to have blown over. He surprised 
the Raja and exposed his game. 
Role of the congress party 
The congress Party in Bihar again cannot be absolved 
of the blame for the fall of the Paswan Ministry* The leader-
ship of the party was not prepared to reconcile to the Paswan 
Ministry and was in a hurry to return to power by continuing 
the toppling drama. M.P. Sinha, on March 27, 1966, said that 
the Congress would continue its efforts to explore the possibility 
of making a common cause with like-minded democratic parties 
199 
so that the state might not have political instability, when 
the Raja of Ramgarh resigned on June 12, 1968, there were 
hectic political activities in the congress camp for trying to 
evolve a strategy for toppling the UF Government with the help 
200 
of the shoshit Dal and the Janata Party. But the party failed 
to form the Ministry. Thus, the machinations of the congressmen 
emboldened the Raja but they failed to dictate their terms 
198. indradeep siaha, "Raja's Blackmail Bout Failst Bihar SVD 
Victory", New Age, July 7, 1968, p. 10; Girish Mlshra and 
Braj Kumar pandsy,'Bihar's second united Front Government," 
op. clt., p. 32. 
199. subhash c. Kaahyap, op* clt., p. 334* 
200. Ib id . 
Bhmmmmm 
l i S 
la Bihar po l i t i es* 
Role of the constituents 
Apart from the machinations of the Raja and the congress 
Party/ the constituent units of the uf, purdcularly the SSP 
and the BKD* also had their share in the f a l l of the Ministry* 
samyujcta s o c i a l i s t party 
The SSP had played an important part in bringing down 
the 'Defectors' Government1 and again sacrificed i t s claim of 
the chief Ministership on account of being the largest partner 
of the Front. But then the Party did not join the Ministry 
Immediately and a long period elapsed before i t s decision to 
201 
join the Ministry on June 22, 1968, The party gave a l l support 
to the Government* but giving support from outside and joining 
the Ministry were quite different things* i t made the position 
of the Ministry more shaky because conditions, one after another* 
were placed before the chief Minister as a price for joining 
the Government, with regard to i t s condition of giving sixty 
percent representation to Harijans, Adivasls, women and Backward 
cas te s in the Ministry, i t i s to be noted that the Party I t se l f 
did not follow th is formula, while f ina l i s ing i t s own l i s t of 
nominees* I t i s evident from I t s l i s t of nominees in the f i r s t 
UF Ministry* idshen patnalk, a prominent youth leader of the 
party, admitted that the SSP leaders in Bihar never seriously 
201* Indian Nation, June 23, 1968* 
1*6 
thought of implementing reservation formula. Further* for 
them the Backward castes meant,firstly,only Kurrais, Yadavas 
202 
and KDlrls and, secondly, educated sections of these castes* 
A spokesman of the UF said that, " i t was the internal c r i s i s 
of the SSP which wrecked the Sirst SVD Ministry and one should 
not be surprised i f the SSP antics th i s time scutt le the new 
SVD Ministry too . Last time the SPP, in addition to having the 
posts of Deputy chief Ministership and the speakership of the 
Assembly, had the largest share in the Ministry. Even then, 
i t did not Include a single Harijan in i t s quota in the Ministry. 
But when things se t t led down, after many months, i t started 
pressing the chief Minister Mahamaya Prasad sinha to broadbase 
h i s Ministry by including these elements in accordance with 
203 
the SSP theory of caste revolution" • Thus, the SSP had the 
greatest share after the Raja of Raragarh, in bring about the 
f a l l of the paswan Ministry. Had the party promptly joined the 
Ministry, the situation might have changed for better . 
Bharatiya Kranti pal 
The BKD, though badly weakened by the desertatlon of 
the Raja and h i s followers, also played i t s role in the fa l l 
of the paswan Ministry. I t s All-India chairman,Mahamaya Prasad 
Sinha, could not reconcile himself to the UF Ministry, because 
he had to leave the leadership ot the Front in favour of Bhola 
202. GIrish Mishra and Braj Kumar Pandsy, "Bihar's second 
united Front Government? op. c i t . , p . IS . 
203. Link, April 14, 1966, p. 15. 
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Paswan. He accused the UF of having "devoid of moral values 
204 
and sense of service*. The party did no t Join the Ministry 
and gave only qualif ied support to the Government. But after 
sometime, the party withdrew even t h i s qualified support from 
20$ 
the Ministry. The CPI(M). a smaller partner of the Front, 
a l so did not join the Ministry and withdrew i t s support from 
206 
the Government on June 22, 1968 along with the BKD. 
With the ex i t of the 4-aeraber CPI(M) and 3-member BKD, 
the Front was placed in a precarious posi t ion. The attitude of 
the Front partners# thus, emboldened the Raja to bargain from 
the position of strength. The Front leaders fai led to take 
stock of the situation in the state and to f o i l the game of 
the Raja of Ramgarh. 
conclusions; March 1967 - June 1968 
With the f a l l of the second SVD Government and the 
disso lut ion of the s tate Assembly, the f i r s t phase of "non-
CongresslsmN came to an end in Bihar, i t was a phase characterised 
by a vague desire of the masses to get rid of the congress 
'somehow1 and to form 'any other* government in i t s place. I t 
was also a phase characterised by the formation of amorphous 
non-congress governments consisting of po l i t i ca l parties ranging 
204. Anjani K. Sinha, "Have united Front Governments Failed in 
Bihar", Mainstream, July 13, 1968, p. 31. 
205. Indian Nation, June 23, 1968. 
£06. Ibid. 
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from the jan sangh to s o c i a l i s t s and Communists and disparate 
p o l i t i c a l elements l ike the Raja of Ramgarh and B.P. Mandal. 
During th i s period of one year and four months, there 
were three ministerial changes in Bihar, i t i s interest ing, 
however, that a l l the three ministerial collapses were brought 
by large-scale defections, the f i r s t two involving tntra-party 
s p l i t s and the third involving the threat of defection by an 
ent ire party from the Government. The ways in which three 
governments f e l l indicate that there were three factors affecting 
the s tab i l i t y of the ministries) "The personal ambitions of 
the frustrated ministers, internal party divis ions and cross-
party or single-party l e g i s l a t i v e interes t s , such as those of 
the Middle castes or those of a great landlord - industrial is t 
207 
and his personal dependents. I t i s also important to note 
that none of the three ministerial cr i ses could be attributed 
to the withdrawl of support by a party on a question of 
principle . 
During the period of 16 months, over 200 acts of defec-
t ion took place in the s t a t e , some 85 l e g i s l a t o r s changed sides, 
a t l e a s t twice, while a few of them did so as many as four 
208 
times, NO major party oz group was free from erosion, some of 
the party leaders had changed the ir views and posit ions more 
than once. For example, the Raja of pamgarh expressed divergent 
207. paul R. Brass, "coalition p o l i t i c s In North India", 
op. c t t . , p. 12C4, 
208. Indian Nation, June 30, 1968. 
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views on the formation of a successor Minister to that of 
209 
Bhola Paswan thrice within 24 hours. 
in such a short period, Bihar had four chief Ministers 
and a l l of them were defectors excepting Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, 
who l e f t the congress on the eve of the fourth General Elections. 
sa t i sh prasad Singh and Blndeshwarl Prasad Mandal had defected 
from the SSP and the UF. Bhola paswan had defected from the 
Congress. Table VIII shows party-position in the s tate as after 
the e lec t ions in 1967 and as at the time of the dissolution of 
the Assembly in the l a s t week of June, 1968. 
I t i s clear from this Table that a l l major parties , 
with the exception of the communist3, were losers in the process 
of defect ions . However, the congress Party suffered heavily 
followed by the SSP among the non-congress part ies . I t i s worth 
mentioning that defectors, by and large, did noti leave one party 
to jo in another* but to form a new party or group of the ir own 
with a view to holding the balance between the old parties for 
the purpose of bargaining for power. As a resul t , three new 
groups of defectors were born la the Assembly. They were the 
Shoshit i>ai, the LoktantrlJc Congress Dal and the Janata Party. 
They a l l had a fa i r share of ministerial of f ices during th i s 
period. Table i x shows defectors' share in ministerial of f ices 
during t h i s period. 
As i s evident from Table ix defectors* sfrnre in minis-
209
•
 I b l d
* (Continued p. 171} 
170 
210 
TABLE VIII 
party position In the Bihar Assembly as after the 1967 e l e c -
t ions and as at the tine of i t s dissolution in June, 1968. 
1 Alter the 19*71 At the time of k mi gala 
party V e lec t ions I dissolution J or lo s s 
Congress 
SSP 
j a n sangh 
CPI 
PSP 
CPI(M) 
Swatantra 
RPI 
RSFI 
jharkhand 
JKD 
LCD 
Janata Party 
Shoshi t pa l 
independents 
128 
66 
26 
24 
18 
4 
3 
1 
1 
9 
26 
-
"* » 
-
10 
105 
57 
24 
24 
16 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
22 
*S 
38 
3 
- 23 
- 11 
- 2 
-
- 2 
-
- 2 
«•• 
-
- 7 
- 24 
22 
18 
38 
- 7 
Total 318 318 
2 l c , ibid *, one CPI merabsr defected from the party and one 
jo ined i t * 
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TABLE IX 
Defectors' share In ministerial o f f ices 
March 1967-june 1968 
' '"
n
 "J Governments ""'" " 
Ministers ffFlrst UF Govt, ¥ shoshlt Dal 0 second UF GOvfT 
ft ft G o v t , 0 
34 36 13 
19 7 
5 14 
3 
Total 5 36 7 
percfcUitayte of 
defectors 14.7 100 53.8 
t e r i a l o f f i ces during th i s period was as high as 5 7 . $ u As many 
as 46 defectors were rewarded with ministerial berths though 
the total number o± ministers was only 83* Thus, i t was a period 
in which unprincipled defector* reaped rich harvest at the cost 
of po l i t i ca l s t a b i l i t y . 
fee-' 
tors' 
Number of Ministers 
Cabinet Ministers 
Ministers of state 
Deputy Ministers 
CHAPTER IV 
TUB HMD CQAhlTim OOVERMMEWTS 
(A) THE CONGRESS-LED COALITION GQVBRNMEHT 
Mid-Terra Election 
Bihar was placed under President's Rule for some eight 
months from june, 1968 to February* 1 9 6 9 a f ter the resignation 
of the pa swan Government. The raid-tens poll held in February, 1969» 
however, fa i led to provide a stable majority government and 
end po l i t i ca l ins tab i l i ty and uncertainty* The Bihar electorate, 
ca l l ed upon to choose from among part ies , which had disgraced 
themselves in every conceivable way* refused to give a d e a r 
mandate to a party or group of like-minded parties to run the 
State for the rest of f i ve years* in fact, the raid-term e lec -
t ion unleashed fresh forces of po l i t i ca l chaos, whose ramifica-
t ions unfolded only gradually* Despite the mult ipl ic i ty of 
part ies and a refurbished image by the exclusion of the contro-
1 
vers la l leaders, not only did the congress sustain further 
l o s s e s , but no other party succeeded in getting a workable 
majority in the Assembly* 
Table I shows the electoral performances of the pol i t ica l 
part ies in the mid-term election* 
1 . Five controversial leaders, namely K .B . sahay, M»P. Sinha, 
S.N* sinha. Ram Lakhan singh Yadav and Amblka saran singh, 
were not given congress t i cket s to contest in the mid-term 
poll* 
172 
173 
2 
TABLE I 
p o l i t i c a l parties in the raid-term e lect ion (February/ 1969) 
5 
Part ies ft seats won 
t 
congress 
Samyukta s o c i a l i s t party (SSP) 
Jan sangh 
communist party of India (CPI) 
Communist party of lndla(Marxi8t)(cPZ(M) 
Praja s o c i a l i s t party (PSP) 
Janata Party 
Loktantrik congress Dal (LCD) 
Hul jharkhand 
Bharatiya Krantl Dal (BM>) 
so ah i t pal 
Swatantra 
Independents 
118 
52 
34 
25 
3 
17 
14 
9 
7 
6 
6 
3 
23* 
Total 317 
2 #
 Indian Mation (patna), February 15, 1969, one seat in the 
318-member vidhan sabha-Maarakh - was vacant* 
* independents included those who had been elected on the 
tickets of jharkhand, Forward Bloc and Republican parties, 
who were allotted free symbols* Among them 15 belonged to 
different factions of the old jharkhand Party* 1 each to 
the Forward Bloc and RPI and 6 independents. Link, 
February 23, 1969. 
m 
while the Congress share was reduced from 128 in 1967 
to H 8 in 1969/ i t s l o s s of seats had not meant a gain for 
any other party. As i s evident from Table n , i f the congress 
l o s t 81 seats to different parties , i t gained 71 seats from 
them. The congress was able to retain a l i t t l e over 30 percent 
of the seats , that i s , 47 out of 128, won in 1967,a. performance 
matched only by the SSP and surpassed only by the CPI (which 
retained 40 percent of the seats won in 1967). The jan sangh 
and the PSP, on the other hand, could retain only about a third 
(33<\) of the seats won in 1967. I t i s also to be noted that only 
the jan sangh gave a better performance in 1969 than in 1967. 
The congress had gained most from the SSP, capturing 30 seats 
loosing 20 seats to i t . m the case of the Jan sangh, the 
congress wrestled 10 seats and l o s t 15 seats to i t . s imilarly, 
in the cases of the CPI and the PSP, Congress wrestled 8 seats 
each from them and l o s t 10 to the CPI and H to the PSP. Thus* 
the decline in the congress dominance in Bihar had not benefitted 
any s ing le party. Not only had the opposition parties to contend 
the superior organizational strength of the Congress, they 
a lso squandered their strength by fighting among themselves. 
A notable feature of the mid-term elect ion was that while 
the two parties of defectors - shoshit Pal and Loktantric 
Congress - suffered hervy l o s s e s , the third one, Janata Party 
of Raja Ramgarh, retained i t s hold over the e lectorate in the 
Chotanagpur region of the s t a t e . The LCD, which contested 96 
seats expecting spectacular success, could secure only 9 seats 
IT* 
3 
TABLE H 
Losses and gains by parties in Bihar 
( 1967 - 1969 ) 
A ' ' ' frftHSIft*' "' 
Gains 196* { Cong.ft aSF t J8 U M t MPI CPtUJftgWA ft|n4.& ft
 TOt<a 
I 0 0 • 0 0 t tethers! 
Congress 47 20 i s 10 11 1 - 24 128 
SSP 30 26 2 l 1 - l 7 68 
Jan sangn 10 1 8 1 - - - 6 26 
CPI 8 2 3 lO - - - 1 24 
PSP 8 1 1 1 6 - - 1 1 8 
CPI(M) 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 4 
svatsjntra - - 1 - - - 1 1 3 
independents 14 2 3 2 1 1 24 47 
and others 
Total 118 52 34 25 18* 3 3 65** 318 
3* Raaashray Roy, "The patterns In India's Mid-term Elections", 
Asian survey, v o l . 2, No. 4 (July, 1969), p. 295. 
* Masrakh seat was l a t e r won by the SSP* 
** i t includes Janata 14/ Forward Bloc 1, BKD 6 and other parties 25. 
v?$ 
l a she new Assembly. out of 22 s i t t i n g l e g i s l a t o r s , 1? had bees 
unseated. However, most of i t s leaders, including B.P. Shastrl, 
Hariaath Mishra, K.K. Singh, Deep Narain Singh and Lallteshwar 
4 
Prasad shahi ( L . P . shahi) had returned victorious . The strength 
of the shoshit Dal in the new House was only • • only three to 
four, out of over two dosjsn former shoshit Dal Ministers, who 
5 
had contested the po l l s , had won. The Janata Party had won 14 
seats , including two won by i t s leader Karaakhya Narain slagh. 
The Bharatiya Kranti x>al chairman, Mahamaya Prasad sinha, was 
returned from Maharajganj constituency in saran dis tr ic t* 
Ministry waking 
Thus, the pattern of party strength emerging out of the 
mid-term e lec t ion was more or l e s s similar to that after 1967. 
The only difference was that the non-congress parties, after 
the General Elections, were in a mood to coalesce to keep the 
Congress out . This time, at l eas t some of them, were more choosy 
about the ir coa l i t ion partners. 
samyukta yidhayak pal (gyp) Formation 
No doubt, attemps were made to form another SVD# but the 
mutual antipathy of the Jan sangh and the CDI stood la the way. 
immediately after the announcement of the poll result , the sSP 
started Intense ac t iv i ty for the establishment of a non-congress 
6 
c o a l i t i o n . The trlpple a l l iance ( S S P , PSP and the LCD), which 
had fought elect ion unitedly* elected B.P. shastri as i t s leader 
amftlnk, February 23, 1969,?.^. 
6 . lEIa\ , March 2, 1969, p. 1 4 . 
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and Karppori Thakur as Deputy Leader. But the CPI declared 
that i t would support from outside any non-congress government, 
which did not Include the jan sangh and the Janata Party of 
the Raja of Ramgarh. The Jan sangh also declared i t s decision 
not to s i t In a coa l i t ion with the CPI. Thus, these two parties 
f o i l e d the move of a non-congress coa l i t ion government because 
without their support such a government could not be thought of• 
I t one stage, when the jan sangh, changing i t s stand, even 
offered to s i t with the communists, the CPI refused to recipro-
8 
cate . Thus, mere non-congresslam did not succeed th i s time, 
and so despite continuing e f forts of the t r ip le a l l iance , the 
prospect of a non-congress coal i t ion had receded* 
in contrast to 1967, the i n i t i a t i v e now lay with the 
Congress, which was able to forge an al l iance and form a 
Ministry. But the e lect ion of the CLP leader involved hard 
bargaining. There were three or four serious contenders for 
the post . The BPCC President Jinant Prasad sharma,despite his 
des ire , could not muster enough support and quietly withdrew 
9 
from the f i e l d . The diss idents and younger party elements 
s e t up Daroga Prasad Hal ( D . P . Rai), a former Minister of s t a t e . 
The f ive s tate congress bosses, who were kept out of the pol l , 
7. ibid. 
8. ibid, 
9. ibid., March 2, 1969, p. 14. 
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r a i s e d t h e i r heads again and t r i e d to play the r o l e of King-
10 
makers and sponsored the name of sardar Harlhar Singh, on 
February 19, 1969, sardar Harlhar s lngh was e l e c t e d the Leader 
of the Bihar CLP by defeat ing D.P. Rat by 140 v o t e s to 33 . 
He was i n v i t e d , o n February 21, 1969 by the Governor, Nityanand 
Kanungo, t o form a government, but Harlhar s lngh nought f i v e 
12 
days t ine t o ' f u l f i l cer ta in f o r m a l i t i e s ' . I t now appears 
t h s t he sought time only to forge an a l l i a n c e with the smaller 
and s p l i n t e r groups to muster the majority necessary t o Sosm 
a government* He succeeded in securing the support of the 
Janata Party, the BXD, the Jharkhand Party, the shosh l t Dal , 
t h e swatantra Party and 6 independents a f t e r a very exact ing 
and prolonged bargaining, claiming absolute majority in the 
318-raeraber Assembly, he submitted to the Governor a l i s t of 
162 supporters* The l i s t Included : Congress 118, Janata 13, 
jharkhand 12/ shosh l t Dal 6, swatantra 3 , BKD 4 and independents 
13 
6. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the six-member BKD 
Leg i s la ture Party was s p l i t Into two r i v a l groups, one l e d by 
the former ch ie f Min i s ter , Mahamaya Prasad s lnha , and the other 
10* su&hash c* Kashyap, The p o l i t i c s of Power (New D e l h i ) , 
National Publ ishing, 1974), P* 346* 
11* Link, March 2 , 1969, p*15; Indian Nation,January 20,1969. 
1 2 . Times o± I n d i a , February 22, 1969. 
1 3 . Link, March 2 , 1969, p . It*. 
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by Khaderan Singh, 'i'he l a t t e r included four of the s ix BKD 
members and stood for supporting the congress-led Coalition 
of Harihar Singh. This group passed a vote of non-confidence 
against the leadership of Mahamaya Prasad Singh and elected 
Khaderan singh as i t s leader* The former, in h i s capacity as 
the BKD chairman/ expelled a l l the four members on grounds of 
indisc ip l ine and defection. 
Ministry Formation 
15 
sardar Harihar singh was sworn-in as the chief Minister 
of the f i rs t -ever congress-led coal i t ion government in Bihar 
16 
on February 26/ 1969. with the insta l la t ion of Harihar*s 
Government/ the 242-day-old President's Rule in Bihar proclaimed 
on June 29/ 1968 came to an end. However* a sizeable section 
of the dissident congressmen/ l ed by L.P. Rat/ was cr i t i ca l of 
the hurry in which the Congress bosses had gone ahead wlUh the 
with the formation of the Congress-led Coalition. I t was, 
14. subhash c« Kashyap, o p . c l t . , p. 347. 
15. Harihar Singh/ on being denied the t i cket , l e f t the congress 
in 1957/ and l o s t the second General Elections on a Jan-
Congress t i cke t , in 1960/ he joined the swatantra, then led 
by the Raja of Ramgarh, and was elected to the Legislative 
Council, in 1962/ Harihar singh contested as a swatantra 
candidate but l o s t , in 1965/ along with the Raja of Ramgarh/ 
he l e f t the swatantra Party and was returned to the Assembly 
as an indepenuent in 1967 General Elect ions. Later, he was 
among those who toppled the f i r s t UF Government by walking 
out and joining the shoshlt Dal • He was Minister of Agricul-
ture and Irrigation in the Mandal Government, on the eve of 
the Mid-term pol l , he rejoined the Congress and returned to 
the Assembly on the congress t i c k e t . Link/ March 2, 1969;f>*\; 
Subhash c . Kashyap* op. c l t . , p. 347. 
16. Indian Nation/ February 27, 1969. 
17. Times of India/ February 27/ 1969. 
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perhaps , because of t h i s controversy tha t no o ther Minis ters 
could be sworn-In rdong with the chief Minis ter . The swearing-
in of the f i r s t batch of Minis ters scheduled for March 5, 1969 
had t o be put of t following a controversy over the inclusion 
of the Raja of Raragarh, against whom the Calcut ta High Court 
hao passed some s t r i c t u r e s * However, the f i r s t batch of twelve 
Minis ters* including the Raja and h i s younger b ro the r (both 
J a n a t a ) , one nominee each of the jharkhand and shoshit Dal and 
e igh t congressmen, was sworn-in on March 7, 1969 by the 
Governor Nityanand Kanungo. Mochi Rai Munda (congress) and puran 
Cfcand Birua (jharkhand), whose names were included in the l i s t , 
could not take oath as they were out of s ta t ion* The d i ss iden ts 
were not s a t i s f i e d and t h e i r leader* D . P . Rai refused to jo in 
t he cabinet a s a p r o t e s t against "breach of f a i t h by the chief 
19 
Minister"* I t was understood t h a t the group l ed by Rai was 
opposed to the inc lus ion of the Raja in the cab ine t . He a lso 
expected the chief Minis ter to give, a t l e a s t , 4 of the 12 
Cabinet sea t s t o the d i s s iden t s and s imi lar representa t ion in 
o the r t i e r s of the Minis t ry , in the l i s t of ten congress 
Min i s te r s prepared in the l a s t minute by the chief Minister , 
the d i s s iden t s were given only two pos t s , of them only Kedar 
20 
pandey took oath , 
18. ibid., March 8, 1969. 
19. Ibid. 
20. ibid. 
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Actually, the congress dissidents, who ware not reconciled 
to Harihar Singh*s chief Ministership, found in the inclusion 
of the Raja of Ramgarh in the cabinet a handy issue to 
embarrass Harihar Singh, The inclusion of the Raja and the 
reiusal of L.P. Rai roused strong feelings and differences in 
the congress working committee (cwc). C subramanim supported 
by Kamraj and Jagjivan Ram attacked, while s«K. patil and Y.B-
Chavan defended the Parliamentary Board's decision to permit 
the party to enter into a coalition without prior agreement on 
principles and programmes* s* Nljalingappa, the then congress 
president, took full responsibility for permitting Harihar Singh 
to include the controversial Raja in the cabinet and offered 
21 
to resign from the presidentship on this issue, on March 8,1969, 
subramanlam resigned f rout the cwc and did not agree to withdraw 
his resignation despite the unanimous request or the cwc to 
this effect, on the contrary, he insisted that Harihar Singh 
should be asked to resign and reconstitute his Government 
after excluding the Raja. He was strongly opposed to •unprinci-
pled coalitions solely for the purpose of getting into power* 
22 
a s these led to 'unprincipled d e f e c t i o n s ' , seeing the contro-
versy ge t t ing out o i cont ro l , an emergency meeting of the cwc 
on March 12, was reported to have asked the Bihar cnief Minister 
2 1 . s^bhash c . Kasnyap, op. c i t . , p . 349. 
22. ib id . 
18?. 
t o persuade the Raja of Raaiyarh t o res ign in favour of h i s son 
and any other noraiuee from h i s Janata Party* I f the Raja 
refused to agree, the ch i e f Minis ter was to submit the r e s i g -
23 
n a t i o n of h i s Ministry and r e c o n s t i t u t e i t without the R**ja. 
A i t e r a great deal of Dargainlng and behind-the-scene drama* 
the Raja res igned xrom the cab ine t on March 28, 1969 on grounds 
of the "unbecoming controversy" that had been unleashed against 
24 
him by "certain responsible parsons of the High command"• His 
26 
r e s i g n a t i o n was accepted by the Governor on April 2, 1969• 
The Harihar Ministry was expanded on April 17, 1969 when 
Shriraati shashank Manjari Levi , mother of the Raja of Ramgarh 
and p.c» biFua of the jharkhand Pa^ty were sworn-in as cabinet 
M i n i s t e r s and Mahablr Prasad o i the shosh i t Dal as Minis ter 
26 
of s t a t e , with t h i s addi t ion , the s trength of Uie Ministry 
rose t o 15 . axact ly a f t e r a month on May 18, the Ministry was 
further expanded with i.he addi t ion of l i cab inet Minis ters and 
27 
7 Mini s ters of s t a t e , r a i s i n g the strength of the Ministry to 33 . 
Al l cab inet M i n i s t e r s , with exception of s e th Herobrum of the 
Hull jharkhand, belonged to the congress Party, of the Ministers 
2 3 . i b i d . , p . 350. 
24 . Indian Nation, March 29, 1969. 
25• Bihar Government Gazet te , May 4, 1969. 
26 . Indian na t ion , April 18, 1969, 
2 7
* search Light (patna) , May 19, 1969. 
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of S t a t e , four were from the Janata Par ty and two from the 
jharkhend pa r ty . Tlvs remaining one was an independent. Th«? 
Chief Minis ter had said tha t the team was not ye t complete and 
28 
that some more appointments would be made. A. notable feature 
of t h i s addi t ion was tha t the d i s s iden t s lender P . P . Rai had/ 
u l t ima te ly , agreed to jo in the Hnrihar Governinent. A o ther 
no tab le feature was tha t H~rihar sinyh haa succeeded daring the 
i n t e r v a l since the previous expansion to rope in the 7-metnber 
Hul jharkhand group in to the rul ing c o a l i t i o n . After the 1969 
mid-term pol l t h i s group had so far been in the opposition* I t 
i s a l so to be noted tha t with t h i s expansion the Janata Party 
got s ix sea t s in the 33-raember council of Min i s t e r s . The party 
had a l so succeeded in including an inaependent member in the 
Min i s t ry , This representat ion was ce r ta in ly disproport ionate 
t o the p a r t y ' s s t rength in the Assembly* i t seems tha t t h i s 
was done to assuage the fee l ings of the Raja, who had to resign 
from the cabinet a f t e r t he controversy. 
Party-wise Break-up 
Out of 33 Minis ters in the congress-led c o a l i t i o n Ministry/ 
a l l but three were members of the Assembly. All these three 
Min i s t e r s belonged to the congress Par ty , As i s c lear from 
Table i n , the Congress haa 19 members in council of Ministers* 
including the chief Minis ter , i t was followed by the Janata 
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ffwTWIffffi ii iTIft 
Showing casta/cororauntty, const i tuency, region and rural /urban 
bases of t he members of the Harihar Singh Ministry/ 1969 
0 Cas te / 5 Rura l / 9 
Nane/kegion i cotru&unity 3 urban G Constituency 
CABIBOET MINISTERS 
Horth P la ins 
Kamaldeo Narain sinha Kayastha 
(Congress, MLA) 
Kedar Pandey Brahmin 
(Congress, ML A) 
Zawar Hussain Muslim 
(Congress, MLA) 
ounar Lai Baltha Dhobl(sc) 
(Congress, MLA) 
Mohammad Hussain Azad Muslim 
(congress, MLA) 
Sftfedeo Mahto Koirl 
(Congress, MLA) 
Ram j a i p c l single Yadav Yadav 
(Congress, MLA) 
Daroga Prasad Rai Yadav 
(Congress, MLA) 
Lahtan chaudhary Bania 
(Congress, ULA) 
Nagendra Jha Ka i th i l Brahmin 
(Congress, MLA) 
Rajendra Prat&p sinyh Rajput (Congress, MLA) 
Baleshwar Ram Dusadh, sc 
(Congress, MLA) 
sar ju Prasad singh Bhumihar (Congress. MLA) 
urban purnea (purnea) 
Rural Kautan (Chaasparan) 
kural z l raue i (saran) 
Rural Raniganj I purnea) 
Kural Thakurganj (purnaa) 
urban Rosera (Darbhanga) 
Rural sonepur (saran) 
Rural pa rasa (saran) 
Rural Mahlshi (saharasa) 
Rural Manigachhi (Darbhanga) 
Rural Ghora ahan(champaran) 
Rural hayaghat (parbhanga) 
urban Begusarai(rtonghyr) 
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South p la ina 
sardar Harihar Singh Rajput 
(Congress, MLA) 
jagdeo Prasad KOirl 
(Shoshl t , MLA) 
Shatrughan sharari singh Ehurolhar 
(Congress ,MLA) 
s e th Hembrum ST 
(Hul jharkhand ,MLA ) 
Chotanagpur 
Basant Naraln Singh Rajput 
( janata , HLA) 
Neelam &• Horo ST 
(jharkhand,MLA) 
srat.shashank Manjarl Rajput 
VJanata, MLA) 
T. Mochirai rtunda ST 
(Congress, MLA) 
puran chand Blrua ST 
(Jharkhand, ML A) 
MEMBERS Of LEGia^AlXVE COUNCIL 
Mungerilal Dusadh ( s c ) 
(Congress, MLC) 
jagannath Prasad Singh Rajput 
(Congress, MLC) 
pam E l l a s s lngh Bhumihar 
(congress , MLC) 
MINISTERS (tf STA'iE 
North p l a i n s 
Mahabir ^rasaa Yadav Rural Blraul (Darbhanga) 
( S h o s h i t , ML A) 
Rural Duraraon (shahabad) 
Rural Kurtha (Gs»ye) 
Rural Kloua (caya) 
Rural Borio (sp) 
Rural Bagodar (Hazarlbagh) 
Rural Torpo (Karachi) 
Rural j a l r i d i h (Hazarlbagh) 
Rural Khunti ( R ^ c h i ) 
Rural Maghgaon(sfcnghbhun) 
186 
Nagina R&i Bhunilhar 
(Janata* MLA) 
A z trauadln Musi im 
(independent/ MLA.) 
Kailashp^+rl Singh Rajput 
( Janata , ML/* J 
purnandu N.Singh Rajput 
( j ana t r , ML A.) 
Raghunandan Prasad Koirt 
( j ana ta , MLA.) 
Ratnakar Naik ST 
(jharkhand, MLA) 
Ban Behari wahto Koirl 
(jharkhand, MLA) 
Rural Kuchalkot (saran) 
Rural Palasi(purnea) 
Rural Dumri (F"-\i?aribagh) 
R\iral ropchandi (Dhanbad) 
Urban Ha2arib:^Jh(iia^artbagh) 
^ural Manoharpur(slngbbhum) 
Urban saraikela(singhbhUBt) 
29. (a) Names and Party ox. the Minis te rs , Indian Mat ion., 
February 27, 1969; Time* of incla* March 8, 1969; 
ina ian na t ion , Apri l i t i , 1969; search Light , May 19,1969. 
(b) c a s t e , vide Footnote ,Supra 78(b) , chapter I I I , p . 109. 
(c) const i tuency: i na i a , Election commission, Report on the 
Mtd-tcrm General E lec t ions in India , l968-iy«>!l. Vol. f l 
( S t a t i s t i c a l ) , 1970. 
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Par ty which had 6 members in the Minis t ry . All the 19 member* 
of the Congress were Minis ters of cabinet rank, of the s ix 
J ana ta Party Min is te r s , two were cabine t Minis ters and the 
remaining four Minis ters of s t a t e . The Jharkhand ^ar ty had got 
four sea t s - two Cabinet and two Minis ters of s t a t e , ihe Hul 
jharkhand had only one member in the Minis t ry . The sheshi t 
Dal was given two be r th s in the ru l ing coa l i t i on Government. 
The remaining one Minister of s t a t e was a Jana ta Par ty supported 
independent member. 
casce-wlse Analysis 
KB f a r as the cas te of the Ministers was concerned* the 
Har ihar Singh Ministry was dominated by the upper cas te men. 
Out of 33 Minis te rs , fourteen came from these c a s t e s . Among 
these fourteen - seven, including the chief Minister/ were Rajputs, 
four Bhurr.lhars, tvo Brahmins, including a M^-ithil Brahmin, and 
one Kayastha. ihe kajpufes bagged half of the t o t a l share of the 
upper c a s t e s . J-he Backward ca s t e s e igh t ber ths In the congress-
l e d ru l ing c o a l i t i o n , of these* four were Koir l s , three Yadavas 
and one was a Banla. There were f ive (four cabinet and one 
Min i s t e r of s t a t e ) scheduled Tribes Min i s te r s . Three members 
of the Harihar Ministry were scheduled castes* 1'hey a l l were 
Cabinet Min i s te r s . The Muslims had three be r th s (two cabinet 
and one Minister of s t a t e ) In the Government. 
Out o£ the 19 c>nyre3S Minis ters , nine were upper cas tes 
a*en, four belonged: to che backward c a s t e s , three to the scheduled 
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Castes, two to the Muslim minority and one to the scheduled 
Tribes . Thus, the Congress, though gave weightage to the upper 
c a s t e s , included in i c s quota of Ministers almost a l l important 
and powerful caste - segments in the s ta t e . However, the party 
lagged behind in giving a place to women in the Government. 
of the s ix Ministers coming from the Janata, f ive were forward 
cas t e s (four Rajputs ana one Bhuailhar) and one a Kolri Backward 
c a s t e , i t i s interest ing to know that two of the Janata 
Mini seers were family members of the Raja of Ramgarh, one his 
mother and the other h is younger brother (both cabinet Ministers). 
Out of the four Jharkhand Ministers, three were scheduled 
Tribes and one a Kolri Backward. The lone member of the Hul 
jnarkhand also belonged to the scheduled Tribes. Both shoshit 
Dal Ministers belonged to the Backward castes; one a yadav 
and another one a Koiri. The lone woman Minister came from the 
Janata farty. shrimati shashank Manjari replaced her son, 
Kamakhya Narain slngh, after h i s forced resignation from the 
Cabinet as described ear l i er , so , i t was a mere chance that 
a woman was included in the Harihar Singh Ministry. 
Regional Representation 
so far as the regional representation in the congress-
l ed coa l i t ion was concerned, the North plains had the highest 
number of Ministers. There were 16 Ministers (13 of cabinet 
rank and 3 Ministers of s tate) belonging to th is regioa. Next 
came the chotanagpur region, which had 10 Ministers - 5 cabinet 
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and 5 Ministers of s ta te - In the Ministry. There were four 
Ministers* including the chief Ministers, belonging to the 
south p la ins , of the 16 Ministers hail ing from the north plains, 
13, a l l of cabinet rank, belonged to the Congress party, one 
each to the shoshit Dal and the Janata Party and one was an 
independent, out of ten Ministers coming from the ehotanagpur 
region, f ive belonged to the Janata party and four to the 
Jharkhand Party. The remaining one cabinet Minister came from 
the Congress Party, of the four Ministers belong to the south 
pla ins two belonged to the congress and one each to the shoshit 
Dal and the iiul jharkhand* Thus, i t was the Congress Party 
which selected Ministers from a l l the three regions of the s t a t e . 
Rural/urban Bases of the Ministers 
Most of the Ministers of the Harihar Singh Ministry cans 
from the rural areas of the s t a t e , only f ive Ministers represen-
ted the urban people in the Government, of the 19 congress 
Ministers, 13 came from the rural areas and only three came from 
the urban areas, of the s ix Janata Ministers only one Minister 
of s ta te represented the urban people. Both nominees of the 
Shoshit Dal represented rural areas. All Ministers of the 
jharkhand and the null jharkhand, excepting one, came from rural 
areas. 
I t i s interesting to note that not a l l Ministers of the 
congress-led coa l i t ion Government could be al lotted portfol ios. 
only 12 out of 33 Ministers were able to get portfol ios on 
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April 2, 1969. The Ministers who took oath on April 17 and 
May 18, 1969 remained without any work t i l l the f a l l of the 
Ministry. 
Fa l l of the Harlhar Singh Ministry 
Shaky since the day of i t s formation, the 115-day-old 
Harihar Singh Ministry suffered a defeat in the Assembly on 
a snap vote on the budget demands of the Animal Husbandry 
Department on June 20, 1969. Harlhar Singh submitted the reslg-
31 
nation of h is Ministry that very evening. The demand was 
rejected by 164 votes to 143. jcarpoori Thakur* the SSP leader, 
gave the following break-up of the ML As who voted with the 
Opposition: SSP 53, Jan sangh 33, CPI 25, PSP 17, LCD 9, Hul 
32 
Jharkhand 7, shoshit Dal 6, BKD 5, CPI(M) 3 and jharkhand 4. 
While the Assembly was debating the demand, Jagdeo Prasad, the 
River val ley project and planning Minister and Mahablr Prasad, 
a Minister of s ta te , belonging to the shoshit Dal, along with 
other four members crossed the f loor and voted against the 
Government, s imilarly, seth Hembrura of the Hul jharkhand led 
33 
h i s group from the Treasury benches to the opposition benches. 
The only consolation for Harlhar slngh was that the jharkhand 
30. Bihar Government Gazette, April 15, 1969. 
3 1 . Times oi India, June 21, 1969. 
32. I b i d . , June 22, 1969. 
3 3 #
 Search Light, June 21 # 1969. 
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Minister, N.E. Horo and Jharkhand leader Baguzi sumbrui stood 
34 
by i t* s ix Congress members were absent at the t ine of voting. 
The mala reason behind the collapse of the f irs t -ever 
Congress-led coa l i t ion Government was b i t t er wrangling among 
the coal i t ion partners and rival factions within the Congress 
over the distribution of ministerial o f f i ce s and allocation of 
por t fo l i o s . Every party boss and every faction leader was 
35 
anxious to bag for h i s men as many ministerial seats as possible. 
Choice of Harlhar Singh 
Harihar slngh himself was not a happy choice for the 
36 
Chief Ministership, but having e lected him as leader, Congress-
men in Bihar could have offered him unstinted cooperation. But 
Congressmen were not united* and dissidents seemed to be as 
eager as the opposition parties to bring about the f a l l of the 
Harlhar Singh Government, in f ierce rivalry, i t was not clear 
who was cutting off whose nose to spi te whom, i n i t i a l l y , Harlhar 
Singh was elected leader of the CLP with the support of the 
leaders of the f ive groups in the s tate Congress. Most of these 
leaders were under eclipse* but the thought that by combining 
37 
they would manage the puppet show. The chief Minister openly 
34. Times of India/ June 21, 1969. 
35. subhash c . Kaahyap, o p . c l t . , p. 353. 
36. National Herald (New Delhi) , June 1969; Free press Journal VBomnay;, June 23, 1969. - . - - - — - — _ _ . 
37. Free Press Journal, June 30, 1969. 
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and repeatedly declared his subservience to K.B. sahay, M.P . 
38 
Slnha and S.N. slnha* But t h i s proved to be a short honeymoon 
and they soon f e l l apart over the distribution of ministerial 
s ea t s and portfol ios and started wooing the diss idents to 
' 39 
oust the Ministry* 
Harihar Singh, too, had not played h i s part wel l . He did 
not prove to be a good gambler. He depended too much on the 
big bosses of the congress and the Janata Party, particularly 
the Raja of Ramgarh* This lowered h is and h i s Government's 
image in public* He could not even complete h i s team of Ministers-
All the time Harihar Singh was In o f f i ce , he was busy shift ing 
the claims and counter-claims of Congress l eg i s la tors for being 
included In the cabinet* His Ministry was insta l led with the 
swearing-in of a lone Minister, I . e . , himself* The expansion 
in instalments re f lec ts the d i f f i c u l t i e s Harihar Singh was 
facing in selecting his colleagues* He had not only to satisfy 
the rival claims of the various constituents of the i l l -assorted 
c o a l i t i o n , but to contend against the confl ict ing pulls within 
his own party, in addition to the 33 Ministers in h i s Ministry, 
over a dozen more Ministers of s tate and a few Deputy Ministers 
were to be added, mostly trora his own party. But t h i s was put 
3 8
* search Light, June 22, 1969. 
39 . iLiarlt Bazar Patrlka (Calcutta), June 22, 1969* 
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off because of sharp differences among the state congress 
40 
bosses over certain names. Harlhar Singh created history by 
not a l lot lng portfo l ios to 21 out of 33 Ministers. A poor and 
he lp le s s Chief Minister, he was as rely postponing the day of 
h i s f a l l because he was unable to reconcile the confl icting 
claims of h i s angry and ambitious colleagues. As most of the 
Ministers happened to be the nominees of the s tate congress 
bosses , the chief had to keep them sa t i s f i ed . Besides, he was 
committed to the dissident leaders to a l l o t them some Important 
41 
port fo l ios . Ministers belonging to the jharkhand Party were 
pressing their claim f o r the portfol ios of Tribal welfare, 
Mines, Forest and Revenue, In which, they said, Adlvasls were 
v i t a l l y Interested, shoshlt Dal Ministers jagdeo Prasad staked 
h i s claim for power and irr igat ion portfol ios , and the claims 
of non-congress Ministers could not be ignored. But the irony 
of the situation was that the Ministers sworn-ln ear l ier were 
not prepared to part with any of their port fo l ios . Many Ministers 
including the Finance Minister, zawar Hussain,and Education 
Minister. N.£. Horo, had threatened to quit the cabinet i f their 
' 42 
port fo l ios were changed. The chief Minister, who had to get 
approval of the s ta te congress bosses on almost a l l such Issues, 
f e l t helpless because of sharp differences among them* The 
4 0
• Patriot (New Delhi ) , June 23, 1969. 
41. Ibid . 
42 . Ibid. 
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Chief Minister'8 s t y l e of functioning also annoyed some of 
the partners of the coa l i t i on . His action in withdrawing an 
appeal, pending in the supreme court for managing a l l proper-
t i e s involved in the long-drawn l i t i g a t i o n s between the Raja 
of Ramgarh and the s ta te Government>without taking the cabinet 
into confidence or consulting the department concerned* made 
the jharkhand Party and the shoshit Dal extremely unhappy, in 
the cabinet meeting, several Ministers, including jagdeo 
Prasad, N . E . Horo and Mungerllal expressed resentment on the 
43 
issue. 
Role of the spl inter and Regional groups 
The inception of the Ministry was somewhat abortive. 
The coa l i t ion with the Janata Party was an ignominy. The 
Coalit ion with the shoshit Dal, Jharkhand and Hul Jharkhand, 
l ikewise , proved disastrous. The Ministry became virtual ly 
an abomination. There was the curious anomaly of some of 
the jharkhand and Hul jharkhand members becoming Ministers 
44 
and some of them s i t t i n g with the opposition. The chief 
Minister, no doubt, succeeded in getting the support of the 
7-member Hul jharkhand, but i t s leaders were not happy over 
the •inadequate* representation given to the ir group in the 
43 . Link, May 25, 1969, p. 14. 
44 . Free press journal, May 25, 1969. 
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Ministry. There was also a Reeling of resentment among these 
various groups at. the seemingly large representation secured 
by the 13-member Janata Party, which had six of its members 
46 
in the Ministry. There was again, deep resentment among the 
ruling coalition partners over the postponement of the 
swearing-in of Ministers ot state and the failure on the part 
of the chief Minister to allocate portfolios to the jobless 
47 
Ministers, 
Role of the congress Party 
However, the greater difficulty that the coalition faced 
came from the wranglings within the congress party, its major 
partner* The congress Party was as divided as it was before 
the Mid-term poll, ^ he controversy over the inclusion of the 
Raja apart, the formation of the Ministry and the allocation 
of portfolios should have been completed long ago, but for 
the prolonged fight for ministerial plums among the warring 
factions in the Congress ?arty. Thus, the big bosses, who 
Installed Harihar Singh as chief Minister, were responsible 
for digging his grave. They never allowed Harihar Singh to 
work independently. 
45. Indian Express (Mew Delhi), May 20, 1969, 
46. I b i d . 
47. P a t r i o t , June 3 , 1969. 
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The congress centra l l eaders were a l s o responsible 
f o r Harlhar Singh*a f a i l . They should have given c l e a r 
g u i d e l i n e s to Bihar congress l eaders with regard t o Ministry-
making. But they were themselves divided and created a 
controversy over the inc lus ion of the Raja of Ramgarh. They 
a l s o f a i l e d miserably to prevent the f i v e b i g bos se s of the 
S t a t e congress from c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t e congress a f f a i r s from 
behind the scene* 
The d i s s i d e n t s had t h e i r share in bringing down t h e i r 
'own government'• once defeated In the leadership contes t , 
they could have taken t h e i r d e f e a t In a democratic s p i r i t 
and g iven whole-hearted support t o the ch ie f Minis ter , a t 
l e a s t , for sometime, to see h i s performance, i n s t e a d , they 
s t a r t e d press ing the i r c laims over m i n i s t e r i a l s e a t s and 
p o r t f o l i o s . A l l t h i s brought about the downfall of the 
Harlhar Singh Minis try . 
(B) THE THIRJU UNITED FRPMT GOVERNMENT 
The f a l l of the Harlhar s lngh Ministry brought the 
u n i t e d Front to power for the third time. Bhola Paswan ghas tr i , 
the l eader of the oppos i t ion in the Assembly, on June 21,1969, 
was formally Invi ted by the Governor, Nltyanand Kanungo, to 
48 
form a new government. Next day, Paswan took oath as the 
48 . Asian Recorder (a weekly D i g e s t o£ Asian Events, New 
D e l h i ) , August. 6 - 12 , 1969, p . 9064. 
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Chief Minister for the second time along with two other cabinet 
Min i s t e r s , They were sush i l Kumar Bage (jharkhand) and shankar 
Layal Singh (BKD)# a member of the Leg i s la t ive counc i l . The 
former haa, along with Haricharan soy, voted agains t the 
Congress-led c o a l i t i o n government- E a r l i e r , the S S P , PSP# CPX* 
Jan sangh, Loktant r ik congress Dal, sohshi t Dai and some other 
smal ler and s p l i n t e r groups within the Assembly accepted Paswan 
50 
as t h e i r leader in the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
on June 24, 1969 e ight more cabinet Minis ters and six 
Min i s t e r s of s t a t e were added to the three-day-old UF Ministry 
51 
br inging the t o t a l s t rength of the new Ministry to 17. Those 
sworn-in included four nominees of the Loktantr ik Congress, 
four of the shoshi t c a l , one each of the BKD, Jharkhand and 
the Forward a loe and three independents* of the cabinet Ministers , 
Deep Narain Singh was a Cabinet Minis ter in the second UP 
Ministry headed by the same chief Minister .Krishna Kant Singh 
was a lso a cabinet Minis ter In the UP Ministry before the mid-
term p o l l . Abdul Ghafoor and L . P . shahi were Deputy Ministers 
during the congress regime some years ago. sheo shanlcar Singh, 
son of l a t e s.K. s inha, was a Minis ter of s t a t e during the 
Congress r u l e . Mahabir Prasad was a Minis ter of s t a t e not only 
49. Times of Ind ia , June 23, 1969. 
50. subhash c . Kashyap, op. c i t . , p . 354. 
5 1 . Times of India , June 25, 1969. 
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during the congress-backed shoshi t Dal Ministry, but also a 
member of the Karihar Ministry* 
The s t rength of the Paswan Ministry was further ra ised 
t o 19 on June 30, 1969 with the swearing-in of two cabinet 
52 
M i n i s t e r s , These two* e lec ted on Congress t ickets* had defected 
t o the SVD only f ive days e a r l i e r along with another Congress 
MLA Madan s e s r a . The l a t t e r wa^ not given any min i s t e r i a l be r ths . 
These two Minis ters remained without po r t fo l ios t i l l the 
res igna t ion ox the paswan Minis t ry . The por t fo l ios of Ms other 
col leagues in the Ministry was announced by the chief Minister 
53 
in the Assembly on June 27, 1969, 
Par ty-wise Breafr~up 
Out of the 19 Minis ters - t h i r t e e n Minis ters and s ix 
Min i s t e r s of s t a t e , the LCD bagged f ive s e a t s , including the 
Chief Minis te rsh ip . Apart from Paswan, a l l o the r nominees of 
the LCD were Minis te rs of cab ine t rank. As i s c l ea r from the 
following Table rv , next to the LCD came the number of the 
Shoshl t Dal, which had secured four m i n i s t e r i a l pos t s , though 
the group had only s i x l e g i s l a t o r s in the Assembly* The BKD 
had two Minis ters (both cabinet ) in the council of Ministers* 
The jharkhand also bagged two sea t s in the Paswan Ministry* 
52, Hindustan Times (New Delh i ) , Ju ly 1, 1969, 
5 3 . Bihar Government Gazet te , Ju ly 16, 1969? Asian Recorder* 
August 6 * 12, 1969, p . 9064. 
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Showing caste/community, const i tuency, region and r u r a l / 
urban bases of the members of the SVD Minis try , 1969 
Name/Region 
"5 c a s t e / IT 
0 community 9 
i L 
Rural/8 
urban 6 
L 
Constituency 
CA5IMET MINISTERS 
North p l a i n s 
Bhola Paswan s h a s t r i Dusadh,SC 
(LCD, MLA) 
Deep Narain Singh 
(LCD/ MLA) 
Krisihna Kant s lngh 
(LCD* MLA) 
Rajput 
Bhumihar 
Lallteshwar Prasad shahi Bhumihar 
(LCD, «LA} 
Mahablr Prasad Y&dav 
(Shosh i t , MLA) 
Mot i la l s lngh Kanan Yaaav 
(Shoshit,MLA) 
Jamaluddin Ahmad Muslim 
(Congress Defector,MLA) 
south p l a i n s 
Sheo shankar Singh Bhumihar 
(independent# MLA) 
Khaderan s ingh Bhumihar 
(BKD, MLA) 
syed Mohammad zafar A l l Muslim 
(Congress j^fector,MLA) 
Chotanagpur 
Sushi1 Kumar bag© 
(jharkhand, MLA) 
scheduled 
Tribe 
Rural Korka ( purnea) 
Rural Lalganj (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural Goreakothi (saran) 
Rural v a i shal i (Muzaf farpur) 
Rural Biraut (Darbhanga) 
urban Hajlpur (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural B a l l a (Monghyr) 
Rural Barbigha (Monghyr) 
Rural Bikram (patna) 
Rural pakpura (SP) 
Rural Kollbera (Ranch!) 
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Shankai Dayai s lngh 
(BXD« MLC) 
Abdul Ghafoor 
(LCD* MLC) 
MINISXEaS OF STAB* 
South p l a i n s 
Ram Ballabh Singh 
( independent/ MLA) 
H a r i l a l Prasad slngh 
( S h o s h l t , MLA) 
s a t y a Narain Singh 
(independent/ ML A) 
Chotanagpur 
Haricharan soy 
(Jharkhand, ML A) 
Brindawan swansl 
(Shosh i t , MLA) 
kajput 
Muslim 
Kurmi 
Yadav 
Yadav 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Scheduled 
c a s t e 
Ghan shyam Mahto 
(Forward BIOCMLA) 
Rural Konch (Gaya) 
Urban jahanabad (oaya) 
Rural jagdishpur(shahabad) 
Koiri 
Urban chakradnarpur 
(Singhbhum) 
Rural s t l l i (Rauchi) 
Rural ichanagar (singhbhum) 
54* (a) The narass and party of the Ministers* Times of India, 
June 23, 25, 1969; Hindustan Tl«a« July 1, 1^69. 
(b) caste , viae supra* Footnote 78(b), chapter III ,p .109. 
(c) constituency, vioe supra. Footnote 29(c) , Chapter IV, 
p« 186. 
201 
There were three independent* in the Ministry* one of them 
was a cabinet Minister* The Forward Bloc's lone member in the 
Assembly was a Minister of s t a t e , in the third SVD Government, 
The remaining two Ministers were congress defectors. Thus, 
a l l mini-partners of the uf Government were given representation 
in the Ministry highly disproportionate to their strength in 
the Legislature, one of i t s reasons might be the decision of 
the major partners of the Front to remain out of the Government. 
Caste-wise Analysis 
Of the 19 Ministers of the paswan Ministry, s ix Ministers 
belonged each to the Forward castes and the Backward castes . 
Among the s ix upper castes Ministers, four were Bhumihars (a l l 
cabinet Ministers) and the remaining two were Rajputs also of 
Cabinet rank. Thus, a l l upper caste members of the paswan 
Ministry were the members of the cabinet. Of the s ix Backward 
Castes Ministers, four were Yadavas, one each belonged to the 
Kurmi and Kolrl cas tes . There were three Muslims in the third 
united Front Ministry. Two were scheduled castes Ministers. 
one was paswan himself and the other was a Minister of s ta t e . 
The remaining two Ministers came from the scheduled Tribes. 
Of the parties constituting the UF, the Loktantrik 
Congress Included two Bbumlhars, one Rajput, one Muslim and 
one scheduled cas te . The BKD included one Rajput and one 
Bhumihar. Among the four nominees of the shoshlt Dal, three were 
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Ya<iavas and the remaining one a scheduled cas te . Both nominees 
of the jharkhand Party were scheduled Tribes. The lone nominee 
of the Forward Bloc was a Koiri. However, no woman was 
included in the Ministry* 
Region-wise Analysis 
Sight members of the Paswan Ministry, including paswan 
himself, came from the North p la ins . The south Plains had got 
f i v e berths in the paswan Ministry. Four Ministers belonged to 
the chotanagpur b e l t of the stace . The LCD had selected a l l 
I t s nominees from the North pla ins , of the four shoshlt Dal 
Ministers, two were from the North plains and one each from the 
South Plains and the chotanagpur b e l t .The BKD had selected I t s 
nominees from the south pla ins . The nominees of the Jharkhand 
party and the Forward Bloc belonged to the chotanagpur region. 
while a l l independent Ministers came from the south plains , both 
Congress defectors belonged to the North p la ins . 
Rural/urban Analysis 
Most of the members of the SVD Government represented 
rural areas 01 the s ta t e , only three Ministers came from the 
urban areas. Of the Ministers representing urban population, 
two belonged to the shoshit Dal and one to the Jharkhand Part 
With the exception of two, a l l Ministers were MLAs. of the 
two MLCs one belonged each to the LCD and the BKD. 
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Resignation of the SVP Government 
However, the pa swan Ministry proved to be the shortest-
ever government in Bihar. Nine days after I t s Instal lat ion, 
the third SVD Ministry resigned on July 1, 1969 following the 
withdrawl of support by the 34-meraber Jan sangh group in the 
55 
Vidhan sabha. The chief Minister announced in the vidhan 
sabha the decision of his Ministry to resign* The Governor, 
Nityanand Kanungo, accepted the resignation and requested 
Paswan to continue in off ice unti l an alternative arrangement 
was made* 
The immediate provocation for the jan sangh1 s action 
was the inclusion in the cabinet of two defectors from the 
Congress and the Front's scheme for redressing the grievances 
of the Tribal people to get the support of the HUI jharkhand 
56 
party. The jan sangh put forward the view that no defector 
57 
should* as a matter of principle, be appointed Minister. 
Paswan read out a l e t t e r he had received from the 
secretary to the Governor saying that the Jan sangh group in 
the Assembly haa withdrawn i t s support to the Government. As 
such, he could not, in the circumstances, continue as chief 
55. Times of India, July 2, 1969. 
56. ib id . 
57. subhash c Kashyap, op. c l t . , p. 355. 
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Minister* After question hour. Ravish Chandra verma, leader 
of the jan sangh in the Assembly, handed over a similar letter 
58 
to the chief Minister. Ravish Chandra versa, in his letter 
of withdrawl, charged the chief Minister with 'lust for power'. 
He took strong objection to the inclusion of two congress 
u electors in the cabinet. He alleged that Pa swan had offered 
similar inducements to the members of the Hul jharkhand led 
by Justin Richard, MLC# He also criticised the Inclusion of 
59 
five of the nine Assembly members of the LCD in the cabinet. 
Role of the SSP, CPI and the PSP 
Although the immediate reason for Paswan resignation was 
the withdrawl of support by the jan sangh, the paswan Ministry 
had never been in a confortable position necessary to provide 
a stable government* Its stability was questionable from the 
day the four major partners of the SVD viz* the SSP, the CPI, 
the PSP and the Jan Sangh had refused to join the Ministry* 
Moreover, there were differences of opinion, from the very 
beginning, between the Jan sangh, on the one hand, and the 
60 
SSP, CPI, PSP and the LCD on the other, on Ministry making. 
Thus, a greater share of responsibility for the fall of the 
5«. Asian Recorder, August 6*12, 1969, p. 9064* 
59* Times of India, July 2, 1969* 
60, subhash c. Kashyap, op. cit*, p. 355, 
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pa swan Ministry f a l l s on these major constituents of the SVD 
Government* Had they actively participated In the Ministry* 
the l a t t e r might have survived, at l e a s t , for some t ine . But 
they did not join i t on the plea that they would function 
as a watch-dog to ensure the implementation of a time-bound 
programme in the interests of the people. This explanation 
seemed to be untenable because a government comprising of 
Shoshit i a l , Hul jharkhand and Jharkhand party could not provide 
even a superficial s tab i l i ty to the Government* 
Role of the Jan sangh * 
However* the Jan sangh was mainly to blame for the quick 
f a l l of the Pa swan Ministry* The party had accepted paswan as 
the leader of the svx> almost immediately after the mid-term 
pol l and reiterated i t s choice soon after the f a l l of the 
Harihar Singh Ministry* But within a week or so, Paswan became 
an incarnation of ev i l In the eyes of the Jan s^ngh and i t s 
leader, Ravish Chandra venna, charged him, among other things, 
with immoral conduct* However, even i f paswan did not come up 
to their expectations, nothing would have been l o s t i f the 
party had communicated i t s wlthdrawl of support to Paswan 
Instead of writing direct ly to the Governor* Thus, the party 
had set up a new precedent by writing to the Governor behind 
61* Indian Nation, July 2, 1969* 
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the back of the person* whom i t had accepted as the leader. 
in a l l fairness* the Jan sangh leaders should have told 
Pa swan f i r s t that he had l o s t their confidence. Had pa swan 
s t i l l clung to office* the Jan sangh would have been just i f i ed 
in
 w r l t lng to the Governor. 
Role of Bhofra paswan 
However* the lapses in the conduct of the Jan sangh did 
not absolve Bhola Paswan of his own unprincipled conduct. He 
should never have accepted the chief Ministership i f i t had 
to be sustained by defectors from other part ies . All the four 
defectors were appointed Ministers, similarly* both defectors 
from the jharkhand were made Ministers, out of the defectors 
from the Congress* two were made Ministers and the third was 
to have been sworn-in soon. Evidently* Paswan was in search 
of more and more defectors from the jharkhand* the Congress 
62 
and the Janata party. Even the arrangement among the consti-
tuents of the UF that 50 per cent of the defectors should be 
63 
made Ministers, was unscrupulous. But Paswan went a step further 
and increased the percentage on h is own. The reason that he 
advanced for adopting this course was far from convincing. He 
asserted that those l eg i s la tors who had voluntarily decided 
62. search Light* July 3 , 1969. 
6 3 . Ib id . 
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t o support the SVD Government to make i t more stable "did 
64 
deserve adequate representation on the Ministry"• i t was a 
confession of po l i t i ca l expediency which dictated h i s decision, 
smaller Parties and spl inter Groups 
The six-member s ho shi t Dal and the seven-member HUI 
Jharkhand, both constituents of the ruling Coalition, as was 
usual with them, created serious trouble over the question of 
t h e i r nominees in the Ministry* The conduct of the members of 
these parties had been so reprehensible that Bhola paswan 
should have displayed considerable discretion in selecting his 
Ministers from amongst them, Justin Richard, leader of the 
Hul jharkhand, had announced on July X, 1969 that he was ready 
to support the congress i f he got certain assurances from the 
65 
Congress High Command. But on June 20, 1969, a l l seven ML As of 
h i s party had voted against the Congress-led coa l i t i on , NOW he 
was again wil l ing to support the congress, NO coal i t ion govern-
ment could hope to run smoothly with the support of a party 
l i k e the Hul Jharkhand, Although, in a l l fa irness , i t should 
be said that bigger parties, l ike the Jan sangh, acted in the 
same way, 
64 , Asian Recorder, August 6-12, 1969, p. 9064, 
65 . search Light, July 3 , 1969, 
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The shoshit Dal also was s p l i t into two on June 24/ 1969. 
one group was led by rami Prasad, General secretary of the 
and 
Dal,/Jagdeo Prasad, who was removed on June 22, from the 
leadership of the Dai's leg is lature wing. The other group was 
66 
l e d by Ram Hagina Singh and sat l sh Prasad Singh. At the same 
time* the leader of the jharkhand group in the Assembly* Bagun 
sumbrui, declared that h i s party would no t support the Paswan 
Ministry. The leg is lature wing of the party also expelled 
Sushll Kumar Bage and Hart char an soy from the party for s ix 
years on June 24* 1969, for supporting the non-congress Coali-
67 
t lon without the party's permission. 
in the circumstances* the paswan Ministry was bound to 
collapse* The objection raised by the Jan sangh leaders and 
the ir subsequent decision to withdraw i t s support to the paswan 
Ministry might have been unwise. Had they not adopted such 
course* this government might have continued for a few days 
more. But the adjustment by which a small group* commanding 
not even 20 votes* in al l* in the Bihar Legislature* was 
expected to carry on the government on the uncertain support 
of the three major parties was by i t s very nature so shaky 
and ^independable that such arrangement* however* bonaf ids 
could not have lasted for more than a few weeks. 
66. Asian Recorder* August 6-12, 1969* p. 9064. 
6 1 . Ibid . 
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The second spel l of President's Rule, declared la Bihar 
on July 4/ 1969 after the fa l l of the third UF Govemaent, case 
to an end on February 16* 1970 when a six-party Congress(R)-
l e d coalition,headed by Daroga Prasad Rai U>.P* Rai),waa insta l led 
68 
l a the s t a t e , jcsdar pandey (congress-R) aad Bagun suabrui 
(jharkhaad) were swora-ln as cabinet Ministers on the ssne date* 
The congress ( R ) , the PSP* the CPX* the BKD, the shoshit nal 
and the jharkhand Party wars the partners of the six-party 
Coalition* 
The period between July 4* 1969 and February 16, 1970 saw 
sons Important events taking place in Bihar po l i t i cs* The findings 
of the two cowolssioasof enquiry that looked Ineo the charges 
of corruption against the former Bihar Ministers cane to l ight* 
The Mudholkar Commission of enquiry* appointed by the shoshit 
Dai Ministry* submitted I t s reports to the Governor on Roveaber 
19/ 1969, and held thirteen out of fourteen Ministers* against 
whom invest igat ions were made, gui l ty of abusing their o f f i c i a l 
69 
position* The Aiyar cosnission* se t up by the f i r s t UF Government 
to probe into the charges of corruption against the forner Chief 
Minister K*B* sahay and f ive of h i s cabinet colleagues* submitted 
•
8
- Search Light/ February 17* 1970. 
69* ftubhash C. JCashyap* op* c i t . , p« 3S8* 
aK> 
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i t * reports to tha Governor on February 7, WO. Tho awsaias-
loa lndl C-Ud al l the aim Ministers and found than guilty 
of favouritism and abuse of power. 
Another algal f leant development was that tha congress 
had • p l i t not only at tha contra but also la Bihar* with too 
exception of Ra« Lakhen Singh Yadav, the other five congress 
leaders stayed with the congress (o)# while the now dissidents 
l a tha Bihar Congreee aligned themselves with tha Prim* Minister 
in the congress ( R ) . on pec—bar e# 1»69, 60 congress MLAs, 
In a latter to the Governor, daelared that "we no laager 
reoognlse Harlhar Singh as our leader/ and elected D . P . Ral 
n 
aa tha leader In his place on January U , 1970, By the time, 
tha congress (R) had eaarged aa tha largest alagle party la 
the Assembly and i t s leader D . P , Ral d a t e d * and the Governor 
agreed, that ha had the support of 173 members, including a 
large number of independents, in a House of Hi* Tha opposition 
parties* including tha congress (o)# did try tofosa anothar 
SVD Government, hut with tha reaignations of Raaanand Tlwarl# 
leader of tha SVD, on February 7, 1970 and of Karpoori Thekur 
aa the chairman of tha SSP on February 10, 1970, a l l hoped 
73 
regarding another united Front Government ware shattered. 
70, Asian Recorder, March 2d - April 2, 1970, p« »4*9« 
71* aiibnaah c* Kaehyap, oo» d t . , p* 361* 
72% Ibid. , p. 3*2. 
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The third event of far reaching political importance 
was that following th« congress spl i t and the report of the 
Alyar commission, new alignment did taks place among the 
erstwhile partners of the SVD. The CPI and the PSP l e f t their 
old partners and formed an alliance with the Congress (R), in 
accordance with their national policy* 
The three-man coalition Ministry, backed by the six-party 
alliance, swelled to 21 with the swearing-in of 11 cabinet 
Ministers/ 6 Ministers of State and one parliamentary secretary 
on February 27, 1970, with the exception of one BKD nominee, 
who happened to be the chairman of the BKD, al l other entrants 
belonged to the congress (R)* Among the cabinet Ministers, 
nine were former Ministers* The two new comers were Chandra 
Shefchar Singh and Rameshwar Paswan* none of the Ministers of 
State had held ministerial posts so fax* The man taken as a 
Parliamentary secretary was also a fresher. 
However* two nominees failed to torn up for the swearing* 
in because, according to the chief Minister, they had gone 
out of station* They were palka Murmu (Minister of state) and 
Mahanth vlvekanand Girl (Parliamentary secretary)* The former 
was a Congress (R) nominee while the latter was an independent. 
Of the six-party ruling alliance, PAP, CPI and shoshlt 
Dal decided not to join the Government 'for the time beings 
?4* Indian Express* February 28, 1970* 
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Besides the congress ( R ) , the other two parties that Joined 
the Government were the Jharkhaad Party and the BMD, each 
having one cabinet post* 
The fourth round of Cabinet expansion was completed on 
April 23, 1970 with the swearlng-ln of s*th Henbrum, leader 
7S 
of the Hul jharkhand, The HUI jharkhand was the seventh 
* 
partner in the ruling a l l iance , b .p . Ral expanded h i s Ministry 
further by including L.p. Shahl* leader of the LCD in the 
Assembly as a cabinet Minister on jane 6, 1970, This raised 
the total strength of h i s Ministry to 2S* i t i s interesting 
to note that the nine Member LCD group in the Assembly had 
been sharply divided on the question of extending support to 
the Ral Ministry* The group was faimally dissolved on May 26, 
1970 after a l i f e of 18 months, and I t s members were l e f t free 
to jo in any party or function as independent in tiie House* 
jugal Prasad Yadav ML A, however* elaiaed that f ive of the 
nine ML As were in favour of maintaining separate identity of 
the party and had e lected I,.P. shahl as their new leader In 
77 
place of Bhola paswan* 
D.P. Ral, in the s ixth sound of expansion on September 
7, 1970, included s i x new Ministers - two of cabinet ranks 
75. Hindustan Times, April 24, 1970* 
76. I b i d . , June 9, 1970* 
7 7
 • 4»ian Recorder, July l e -22 , 1970, p* 9652. 
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and four Ministers of s t a t e in h i s council of Ministers, 
78 
rais ing i t s strength to 31. of the two new cabinet Mini ate ra, 
one was a shoshit Dal nominee and the other was a jharkhand 
Party member* The shoahit Dai nominee, Jagdeo Prasad* waa a 
former SSP man, who defected along with &.p* Mandal to topple 
the F irs t uF Government and l a t e r defected while s t i l l a 
Minister in the Harihar Singh Ministry. Backing a LCD nominee, 
a l l other Ministers of s ta te were congress (R) members* Of 
them Bhlshma Prasad Yadav was former M.P. and a brother-in-law 
of the chief Minister* 
Party-wise Break-up 
Thus, there were 31 members in the D.p. Rai Ministry* 
of them 18 were cabinet Ministers* H Ministers of s ta te and 
2 parliamentary secretaries . Table v shows the detai ls of the 
Congress (F)- led Rai Ministry, with the exception of the CPI 
and the PSP, a l l other s ix partners of the coal i t ion were 
represented i n the Ministry* The Congreas (R) had bagged 
twenty-three ministerial posts* including the post of a 
Parliamentary secretary* Of them twelve were cabinet Mlniate\ 
including the chief Minister and ten Ministers of state* The 
jharkhand **arty got two ministerial berths* both in the cabinet 
The EKD* the shoahit nal and the HUI Jharkhand had one Minister 
7 8
• search frisfet, September 8, 1970; I*ink* September 13,1970* 
3*4 
?• 
Showing party, caaWcowuni ty , constituency, ragloa, 
rural/urban &&••• ©f the mowfrnar* of tha congraa»(R)-
lad coa l i t ion Ministry, 1970, 
Maa»/Region 
I cnata/ f Rural/^ 
t coMMUnltv 4 Urban 6 CftMiafe i «*»*MMII» 
J L___J 
Daroga praaad Rai 
(Congre«*~R), ML*. 
Kedar pande 
lCoagrees-R), MLA 
yadav 
Brahmin 
Ran JalpaX Singh yadav Yadav 
(Congr*»s-R), M^A 
zawar Huaaaln 
(Congre»«-R), MLA 
Baleahwar RSM 
(Cong»»»-R), MLA 
Lain tan chaudhary 
(Congreau-R), MLA 
Nagendra Jha 
(CongreS8-H, MLA 
Muslim 
Duaadh 
(SC) 
Eania 
Maithll Brahmin 
MoheHwad Husoaia Azad Muslim 
(Congr«aa-R)#MLA 
Lalttaatwar Prasad shahi Bhuaihar 
(W»# MLA) 
south p la ins 
Shatrughan sharan singli Ehuraihar 
(Congrasa-R)»MLA 
Chantira sheknar slngh Rajput 
lCongr«»9-R),MLA 
sath Heabrus scheduled 
(Hul Jnarkhand.MLA) Trtba 
jagdso Prasad Koiri 
(Shoshlt, MLA) 
Ras»*hvar Paavan Duaadh(sc) (Congraa»-R),MLA 
Rural paraaa (saraa) 
Rural Nautan (champaran) 
aural son*pur (saraa) 
Rural zeradei (saraa) 
Rural Hayeghat (Darbhanga) 
Rural Mahishi (Sahara sa) 
Rural Manlgochhi (mrbhangs,) 
Rural Ti-iaJoirganj (purueaj 
Rural vaishal l (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural Hisua (caya) 
Rural Jhajha(Monghyr) 
Rural sanla ( s ) 
Rural Kurtha (Gaya) 
Rural slkandara (Honghyr) 
21$ 
chotanagpur 
Begun suabrui (jrharkhand, ML A.) 
T. Mocht Rat tfunda 
(eoagra»a-a)#MLA 
Ratnakar Nayak (jbarkhand, ML A) 
Shankar Dayal slngh 
(BKD/ HLC) 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Rnjput 
Urban chaibaaa (Singhbhua) 
Rural Khuati(Rancbi) 
Rural MaiK>barpur( singhbhua) 
aasaarffTiffi iff ff*waJi 
north plains 
Harstagh Battha 
(congress-R), HLA 
Hathuni Rasa chamar (Congree»-R), MLA 
Preachaad 
(Congre»s-R), ML* 
Objpbi 
Chasaar(se) 
Banla 
Hitianwar Prasad Singh Rajput (Congreae-R), MLA. 
Bhisfcna Prasad yadar 
(Coagreas-R), MLA 
Shttal Prasad Gupta 
(Coagsmea^R), MLA 
South Plains 
patka Hurwu 
(Coagrese-R), MLA 
Dharamvir cingh 
(coagresa~R), MLA 
yadav 
eaala 
scheduled 
Tribe 
Kurml 
vagal Kiehore singa yadav 
(LCD/ MLA) Yadav 
Rural Bagaha (Champaran) 
Rural Katea (saraiO 
Rural A3apur (Champaran) 
Rural Galghatti 
(Muaaffarpur) 
Rural Marhaura (saran) 
Rural Araria (purnea) 
Urban swnka ( S P ) 
Rural Bakhtiarpur (Patna) 
Rural Gobindpur (Gaya) 
aa.« 
Sadaaaad Prasad Kur»i Rural jamna (Haaarlbagh) 
(Congresa-R), MLA 
Ghanshyam Mahto Kolrl Rural patamda (slnghbhua) 
(Congr*ss-R), KLA 
Hadan Prasad siagfa Rural Gopalpur (Bhsgalpur) 
(Congr*s»-R), MLA 
Mahanth vivekanand Girl Rajput Rural Barahara (shahabad) 
(independent, MLA) 
79. (a) Minister's name and the ir party, search Light, February 
" ' f j ^ Express , February 28, Hindustani toe s, 
April 24 and June 9; ama search Light* September 8,197Q« 
(b) caste of the Ministers, vide Supra Footnote 78(b), 
Chapter m , p„ 109» * — " 
(c) constituency ot the Ministers, "vide supra Footnote 29(c) , 
Chapter IV, P»($6 
ait 
(Cabinet) each la the Rai Ministry* The LCD had two men l a 
the Mint*tryi one of them was a cabinet Minister and other 
a Minister of state* i t la to be noted that barrlof a LCD 
member, a l l Ministers of s ta te belonged to the Congress(R;. 
further* excepting a BKD nominee* a l l members of the congress 
(R)-led coa l i t ion Government were MLAs. The BKD nosilnee was 
a member of the vidhan pari shad. 
castfe-wlse Analysis 
The i>*p. Rai Ministry was dominated by the Backward 
cas te s wen,. There were twelve Htnisters belonging to the 
Backward castes* Of then, four were ?adavas# three Banies, 
two Kolris* two Kurmis and one Mallah. As l a clear from the 
Table v among the eight upper caste Ministers* four were Rajputs* 
two Bhunlhars and two Brahmins* including a Maithil Brahmin* 
There were four scheduled caste Ministers in the Rai Ministry* 
Of them,«wo were cabinet Ministers and another two were 
Ministers of state* The scheduled Tribes had f ive Ministers* 
four cabinet and one Minister of state* in the congress (R)-lmtf 
c o a l i t i o n Government* There were two Muslims (both cabinet 
Ministers) la the Ministry* 
out of 23 congress ( R ) Ministers* f ive belonged to the 
upper castes* of them,two were Brahmins* two Rajputs and one 
Bbuiaihar. The congress {*) had given ten berths to the Backward 
Castes. Among them* three were Ysdavas* three Banlas* two 
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Kurmis, one KOiri and one Mall ah. All the four scheduled 
caste Ministers belonged co the Congress tR>. TWO Ministers 
from the scheduled Tribes also represented the Congress (B). 
Both Muslim Ministers in the Rai Ministry CSSJS **o» the 
congress ( H ) . Thus, with the exception of woman the Cohgress(R) 
had included in the Ministry »•» f*om almost a l l important 
castas . Both representatives of the Jharkhand Party belonged 
to the scheduled Tribes* The lone nominee of the HUI jharkhand 
a l so came from the scheduled Tribes, The sole nominee of the 
BJO> was a Rajput, of the two LCD nominees# one was a Bhumibar 
and another one was a Yadav. The s ingle shoshit Dal Minister 
was a Backward Koirl. The only independent member in the Rai 
Ministry was a Rajput* Thus, none of the partners of the 
Congress ^ J - l e a coa l i t ion gave representation to women* 
Regional Analysis 
of the 30 MLa Ministers in the Rai Ministry, f i f teen 
carae from the North p la ins . The south Plains had got ten seats , 
while the tr ibal be l t of chotanagpur could secure only f ive 
ministerial posts* Of the congress (R) Ministers, fourteen, 
e ight cabinet Ministers and s ix Ministers of s ta te , represented 
the North p l a i n s . There were s ix Congress (R) Ministers who 
belonged to the south p la ins , TWO congress (R) Ministers case 
from the chotanagpur region of the s t a t e . Both nominees of 
the jharkhand Party and the lone man of the HUI jharkhand 
belonged to the chotanagpur region, of the two LCD members, one 
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belonged each to the Horth and the south plains* The lone 
Shoshlt Dal nominee and the sole independent nan l a the Ministry 
earn from the south p la ins . Thus, only the congress (R) could 
include representatives from a l l the three regions of the s ta te . 
Rural/urbaa Analysis 
A l l , but three, members of the congr©as(R)-led Ministry 
represented rural areas of the state* of the three Ministers, 
who got e lected from the urban constituencies, two were cabinet 
Ministers and one a Minister of State; two belonged to the 
Congress (R) and one to the jharkhand Pancy* of the two 
Congress (R) Ministers, one was a cabinet Minister and another 
a Minister of s ta te , while the former cacas fro*ft the Korth 
pla ins , the l a t t e r f run the south plains* The Jharkhand Party 
cabinet Minister represented the chotanagpur regiou* 
p a l l of the congress!R)-lod coa l i t ion 
The P.P. Ral Gov&rnment, too* went the way of other 
Coalition Governments in Bihar since 1967. The lo-raonth-old 
Congress (R)-led coa l i t ion Ministry f e l l in Bihar assembly 
on December 18, 1970 on a no-confidence motion by a majority 
80 
of 18 votes - 1*4 votes to 144. The ne-conf tdence motion was 
j o i n t l y sponsored by the SSP, J an sangh, rebel PSP, Janata 
Party, congress(o), swatantra party and the tup. MaudaJL faction 
80. |ndlan gxpress, December 19, 1970* 
of th« shoshit Dal* i s nany a* J*© mean era of both the 
Opposition SVD and fen* ruling coalition participated in tit* 
voting* Bhola paswan shastrl abatained Mid two M * « r i i 
Prabhu iiarain siagfe (BK>) and &*K* Ray (cm) were absent. iaong 
the parties that lined up egainat the motion were congres*(R)> 
CPlt PSP and aom splinter groups and independents. rh* voting 
witnessed denectiona of tour iM&abera from the Congreve{a)» 
enbXoo aisertation of the fiva weaihor rebel PSF# stx-meaber 
BIO and fihosfelt &al<e four tsember faction .lad by &.p*Kandal* 
Ail o£ U*i*» -were in Uie eighvparty coal i t ton. Among th* otter 
constituents, two of the seven nenbers of the Hul jharkhaad 
and four of the eleven mgnnnra of the jharkhand Party MO tad 
against the Government, according to K»K« Singh congresa(o) 
MS»A« Four congress {RJ nenhars who crooaeu the £loor as the 
debate on the notion was on war* - Ralful ASSSB* ftaJeadra 
Pratap siagh, Kanleahwar tas ana Birendra Prasad fiinha. 
Role of the Factional group Lea<*ra 
The aai Ministry was the third to fa l l alnoe the aid-
U m poll in February, 19«a. H U was the second ministry, the 
f i r s t being the Nahanaya Government, to have ruled the state 
for about a year* From the wry inception, there were serious 
*** *•**» Recorder, January 15-21, 1971* 
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• Ttotaa of India* December i»* If 70, 
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dissensions among the constituents. The altercation was 
mainly over the allotment of portfol ios to the representatives 
84 
of the coa l i t ion partners in the council of Ministers* The 
eight-party coal i t ion Government cracked and collapsed not 
because of any pressure or ingenious manipulation of the 
Opposition, particularly the old congress, but owing to I t s 
own unwieldly weight for whicn Rai, h i s party, U±«* Congress(R) 
and the congress (EU High command had to thank themselves* 
The misfortune of Rai began the day he accepted the suzerainty 
of the L.LU Hishra - Ram Lakhaa siagh Yadav ax i s . i f h.p.sinha -
S»N* sinhe * IC.B* Sahay tr io of caste and faction had bossed 
over and controlled the Congress before the s p l i t aad behaved 
as king makers , the same role w&a now sought to be played by 
L.N, Mishra, the then Minister of Foreign Trade in the union 
cabinet and R*L. Singh Yadav, a former General Secretary of 
the congress (R). The leaders had played a crucial role in 
ins ta l l ing the Rai Government and painting rosy pictures to 
83 
the defectors* while Hishra and Yadav tr ied to emerge as 
super bosses, D.P. Rai gradually tr ied to snake off h i s 
subservience to them and build up his own independent base and 
following* This annoyed Mlshra and Yatiav and the group of 
the ir close adherents in the Congress (RJ leg is lature soon 
8$ 
became neo-diss i dents and revolted against Rai. I t i s d i f f i cu l t 
— \wmim*^mmmmmmmmmmmHm*mm*^\\*\m*i\mm~m*m*mmm*<^**to***'mi****\\ nMuWua \\\\m%\\ • II « » ! • ' » » - * ^ < > w w > * » - * * * i » i i n n n i mmm-v — « • » • - • • •«» m w w w — * < • 
84. subhash c* Kashyap, op.clt*, p, 368* 
85
• Thought (Bombay), October 31, 1970, p. 7. 
86. subhash C. Kashyap, op. clt«> p. 3#9. 
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to pinpoint the exact event which preclpated the drawing of 
the battle lines. Perhaps it was the choice of new Ministers, 
in which Rat showed himself to he his own master, or perhaps 
it was the raid by the CBI on R*L. Singh Yadav*s house, or 
perhaps it was the chief Minister** turning down a whole list 
of new postings in the PWD (public works Department) r«n by 
87 
one of Yadav** man* A rebellion against Ral leadership within 
his party started* following his ordering of a'CBI raid on 
Yadav*a house in pursuance* presumably, of his indictment by 
the Aiyar commission. R.L* Singh Yadav joined hands with the 
dissidents because he felt that the raid on his house was a 
deliberate attempt to discredit him and ruin his political 
career. Another reason for Yadav*s decision to join the forces 
against the chief Minister was, per haps, the swing of Yadav 
masses in favour of Ral. R.L* Singh Yadav, the main leader of 
Yadavas (Ahirs), at the pursuance of Lalit Narain Mishra 
(L.N. Mishra), supported only reluctantly the candidature of 
86 
Ral lor the leadership of the Legislature Party. L.N. Mishra, 
it was believed, was playing a dual role* on the one hand, 
he was encouraging the dissidents and, on the other, he was 
89 
trying to convince the High Command that he was pacifying them. 
87* Economic and political weekly, June 20, 1970, p.1839. 
88* GIrish Mishra, "where Daroga Rai Trip<ped*, Mainstream. 
vol. 19, NO. 17, oeceaber 26, 1970, p. 40* """ 
it* Thought, octobei 31, 1970, p. 7. 
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Mlshrn-Yadav combine was joined by other congrees(R) men 
l i k e vldyakar Kavl and Rsjtesh jha, whose claims were ignored 
during the expansion of the Ministry, on October *0# 1970, 
some of the neo*dlssident congress (R) ML A 8, headed by vidyakar 
Ravi, actual ly started a campaign to remove P.P. Rai* They 
net the Prime Minister and the union Finance and Defence 
Ministers on October 14, 1970 to press for the ir demand on 
the plea that the image of the party had been badly tarnished 
because i t s members indulged in corruption, took bribes and 
90 
disgraced themselves through drinking orgies* These new 
diss idents proved the Achilles' heel for D.p. Rai. 
Role of the Congreas (R) party and P.p» Rai 
The Congreas in Bihar bad always been riven with 
factionalism based on casteism and caste al l iances* However/ 
what was causing surprise was the intensity of factional 
f ights l a the congress (R). At the root of t h i s factionalism 
was the continued malady of casteism* corruption and oppor-
tunism la Bihar* Neither the change in the ruling cl iques, 
nor the s p l i t in the congress could change the style of power 
91 
p o l i t i c s in the s t a t e , D . P . Rai did not piny h i s cards well* 
While forming h i s Ministry, he had not given careful thought 
90 . subhash c . xashyap, op* cit*# p. 370. 
91* Ib id . , p . 368. 
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to providing representation to a l l sect ions of the Congress* 
He had Included hi* gelations and favourites inspite of 
objections and warnings iron large sect ions of the congress(R). 
He l e f t both the CPI and che PSP unhappy bv giving •dispropor-
tionate* representation to the Congress (R). The appointment 
of jagdeo Prasad ox the shoshlt Dal/ who proved hjajaal f a 
professional defector# was not proper for Ral. Prasad was 
reported to have made a statement In purnea that he would try 
to exterminate the upper-caste people and give almost a l l the 
Important o f f i ces to the Backward caste men. This statement, 
though l a t e r contradicted by him/ was exploited by Interested 
persons to whip up a psychological fear among the upper caste 
93 
people, i t I s to be noted that Prasad's Inclusion l a the 
Cabinet was also objected to by rival faction of the Dal headed 
94 
by B . P . Manual. The inclusion of Bhishma Prasad Yadav# Rai's 
own brother-in-law and the leaving out of Mrs. Ran Dularl fiiaha, 
a senior and only lady member on the congress (R) benches was 
a l so resented by many l e g i s l a t o r s . His s ty le of functioning 
and h i s preferences to Backward caste o f f i c e r also irr i tated 
not only h is party men, but also the other partners of the 
c o a l i t i o n , TO bols ter up h is personal strength/ D.p. Rai,instead 
92. kink, September 13, 1970, p. 15. 
93 . Qirish Mlshra, op. c i t . , p . 40. 
94. Link, September 13, 1970, p. 15. 
9 5 . Ib id . , November 8, 1970, p . 16. 
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of strengthening the congress (R) organisation, went out of 
h i s way to bring about defections from the syndicate (congress-
0) by promising lucrative posts to the defectors. But when 
he could not keep h i s words, they rose in revolt* 
His ignoring of the co-ordination committee of the 
parties supporting the Ministry, while appointing h i s own 
Caste man, Ram sewak Mandal, a relat ively junior o f f icer to 
the post of the chief secretary* the appointment of Kumar 
Blmal as chief of the Rashtra Bhasha parishad and of L.P.Gyani 
as the Director of public instructions (DPI)* further aggrava-
ted the s i tuat ion . The boycott of the co-ordination committee 
meeting by the CPI and the PSP, the two important partners 
of the ruling a l l iance , on the appointment of Ran sewak Mandal 
made Rat's posit ion very shaky* I t i s also to be noted that 
the post of the chief secretary had been lying vacant for the 
l a s t s i x months and Mandal had held the post as Additional 
Chief secretary* There was resentment against Ral in the 
rul ing congress i t s e l f because of the manner in which he had 
al legedly been bypassing some of h i s cabinet colleagues* 
Role of the congress (R) High command 
New Delhi could not be absolved of i t s share of 
responsibi l i ty for the f a l l of the Rat Ministry* I f D»P. Ral 
96. Times of India, June 24, 1970, 
V zz% 
was finding it difficult to keep his partymen united* he 
should have been guided by the party President and other 
cent ml leaders* If the partymen wanted a new leader one should 
have been found. Minor differences soon led to major conflict* 
resulting in the fall of the Government. Had Rai been compelled 
to step down, the exposure of the Congress (k> aaa party 
97 
with no political purpose could have been avoided. Further* 
had the congress (R) leadership been able to maintain unity 
in the party, the Ministry might have survived the crisis 
created by its minor partners. The attempt to oust Rai fro* 
the chief Ministership failed because he was unwilling to quit 
98 
and the High command was not prepared to force him. Having 
failed to get rid of the chief Minister, the dissidents 
decided to get rid of the Ministry* as a whole. After a period 
of uncertainty, they mustered sufficient strength to gain 
their objective. Differences were reported between the Prime 
Minister and the congress (R) President on the question of 
change in Bihar CLP leadership and Rai himself turned against 
those who installed him in power* **e sought the support of his 
former opponents in dew Delhi and adopted an attitude of 
99 
•after me the deluge1 . 
9 7
• Patriot (New De lh i ) , December 2o, 197Q# 
98. Amrlt Bazar pafcrlka (Calcutta), December 20, 1970. 
99. I,Ink, December 27, 1970, p« 16. 
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wWffff in wil i"ffl i WffflLJJT flSBnw 
iumwr, tao faiiura of tao coooraaa (R) High 
and ta* aplit U th* stnta cengvon* i&) worn oot ta* only 
rooaono for tba fall of too Mtniotry* A alnl*f root, within tat 
0#^^OWOFOWOJB %pBn^njOaoa WJfrOJflp^ agi i^nnvOOnwbOR^OrawoOOJp i M f On^pon OjnWAOOOOijji •JPOjI^ ^^n'aP'OP • • w W OpOO B^' 4o^**O^OnaV 
P8P. BKD, fihoahlt Dai and tho jharkhand Party holpo* la tao 
^BOnFOp^OJap^Bj^ noji ^pop ^MO^O' OtOWB* 0^njwOnvno>aan> ,jy w* J j W ^ ^ i w aopBOjpOjMajl^ VOJt jpOjrtn^MpPOP B*Bjnjn^p» OjtOOonjnr^ 
00**00 rtvan with faattonaUaB and ooot of thair gri«vnaaa« 
war* poraonal, but with rooaatnont ilouriahlng &u around,tho 
Chiaf Miaiotor hardly had tan oouraga bo oapoot thai*. Thaaa 
provorbial aareurlal apl labor and gnglonttl groupo* apparantiy, 
got thair feroaJe-owoy nomefttua fro* tha latacaal rovolt within 
the congr* na (*) and on ijoconbor 4# lt79 foofeod A *iftl-f«on* 
to rapuaanta tb* loadnrahlp of $•?• ROI an* to toppio hio 
gorvazaneat* Th*oa pnrtiao hod boon n eanatnat h*o4*eha to* 
th* chief Mtaiotor by oooaoioanUy threatening «o withdraw 
gjn»oop 0 ) 0 o^ np>OF o^(Mat^o*w aVnnwoononi op^nooowoB^nea-n? owwop ^o^nni^nwjnnjf^nTn1 aantnw 00^^^0*001 o»^^^^^nnPo^^p 
r»o»rrio9 threote to too chief Ktniotar on on isao* or other* 
Tha chief Mlaietar had given a eecoaa cabinet, post to too 
jfcaxkbend forty* sot evidently Btgua woo not happy, HO WOO 
angry tan* xreaeport portfolio bod been taJtan away from hin 
and given bo aotaniow Hayek* who alao belonged to his party* 
— i — — — w » « — M — i ii iniiiiiiimnw i • « » « « » « — » — « • • » — « — i ' i « « » « — — — » « « « » 
v^v^^or oa^^nnnoo^w^nwe ^pw wnjeoejevwr n^^ p* ip ^^ Eb^ o^ ^^ o^^ ea^ BBw W or^r o ? ^ w 
Inte foaxcfafrlghy Wtentmr U # *•*©• 
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sumbrul showed h i s real colour* when, on December IS , 1970, 
he announced h i s resignation from the Government on the floor 
102 
of the Assembly, and hla party withdrew support to the 
Ministry on December 17, 1970. 
However, sumbrul was not the only one to keep on threat-
ening the chief Minister that , If certain things were not 
done or done* the support wi l l be withdrawn* The 11-sum Janata 
Party* which helped the Ral Ministry by abstaining on the 
Bihar Appropriations B i l l s for 1970*71, on June 13, 1970, had 
104 
threatened to go against Ral government* which the party did 
i t atf the t ine of the voting on the no-confidence notion* 
The PSP had also given similar threats for more than 
half a dozen tines* on June 24, 1970 the PSP Legis lat ive Party 
waa s p l i t , when s ix of i t s members under the leadership of 
suraj Naraln sinyh rebelled and formed a <?apar&t£ group and 
announced that: they would vote against the government i f i t 
deviated from tho PSP pol ic ies* Later, on November 25, 1970, 
the group, which cal led I t se l f the Indian s o c i a l i s t party, 
decided to function in the house &s an independent constituent 
105 
of the five-party mlni-iront in the ruling coal it ion* 
102, Northern yndla patrlka (Miahabao^#Deceraber 17, 1970. 
1 0 3
 • State swan, December 18, 1970* 
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 search Light, septcanfcer 11, 1970. 
105* subhash c* Kashyap* op* d t » * p« 367* 
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ultimately, the group bra** amy from ths ruling coalition* 
whan I t* flvo A o i i i t y »a9nors In * Joint latter to tat 
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Ministry. 
Tho Majority grotp (consisting of four snofeors la ths 
Assombly) of too ghoshlt cal bad hurled at least half a dosoa 
throats that If Jagdeo Prasad was node a Minister. I t would 
107 
withdraw I t s support* Prasad was amdo a Minister and ths 
Dal leapt s i lent . Probably, I t was angling for a cab Inst saat 
or to strife* while ths Iron was hot* Ths group did strike when 
I t decided to withdraw support to the D . P . Rai gore meant and 
decided to support ths SVD of the opposition parties If 
106 
Karpoori Thakur wars elected I t s leader. 
Ths BK t also hurled this throat once or twice, bat 
« * - a * , . *~ tb. a** K u a ^
 M ^ - y u « *** * 
would include sons mm aonbers in ths Ministry* 
ths Ministry happened to belong to the upper HOU 
Irony was that almost every mm •snteor in ths &s 
to bo aspirant for Ministership, one MLA lo f t th 
disgust whoa he found that an MLC belonging to t 
*°** woythem India ?atrtka, Deconosr 17, 1970* 
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- aoorch bight* aepteaber 11, 1970* 
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made a Minister. Final ly , the party withdrew i t * support to 
the Ministry and i t a nominee, shankar Dayal Singh, resigned 
from the Government on December 17, If 70, 
Tho position of tha HU1 jharkhand was aqually confusing* 
I t s acknowledged leader Justin Richard had declared that his 
party would not support tha Ministry, But the party was s p l i t 
and the loader of the spl inter group seth Heobrvra was sworu-
in as a cabinet Minister and was given Excise Department. But 
ha became angry at tha persistant refusal of the chief Minister 
to transfer the Excise commissioner against whoa serious 
charges had been l e v e l l e d in tha l e g i s l a t u r e . He was sore 
that , instead of transferring tha Excise commissioner, tha 
Chief Minister tr ied to humiliate him by transferring the 
power to issue l i censes from him to the Dis tr ic t Magistrate. 
some independent ML As also gathered occasionally and 
hurled threats of withdrawing support to tha Ministry i f a t 
l e a s t some of them ware not made Ministers* obviously, the 
Chief Minister, inspite of h i s assurances to them, had not 
been able to make up his mind which independent wi l l bring 
how many MLAe with him i f ha was made Minister* Thus* tha 
withdraw! of support by the mini-front parties commanding 
between some 30 votes made a material difference. 
110. ibid. 
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Role of the c o a m w i t party of India 
The CPI was the l a s t , but not the least* in hurling 
periodic threat* of withdrawing support* i f certain things 
were done or not done* The 25-member CPI carried out the 
threat on June 23* 1970 when i t voted with the opposition on 
the Bihar PrlvHedged persona Homestead Bi l l* The Government 
narrowly escaped a snap defeat on t h i s B i l l with a margin of 
only 8 votes* The party also boycotted the meeting of the 
Co-ordination committee in protest against the appointment of 
Ran sewak Manual as the chief secretary* in fact , the hacking 
of the CPI led to a controversy in the ranks of Rat's party 
and t h i s spread to some of h i s other a l l i e s * The four congress 
(R; members crossed the f loor on the day of no-confidence 
notion to protest against the 'comrounist domination' over the 
Government. This what they cal led night not he accepted as 
t h e i r only ground for defecting from the party* but i t certainly 
showed the controversy within the party over joining hands 
with the communist, 
Thus* each party supporting aa i Ministry wanted to have 
i t s price for supporting the government and started dictating 
the ir terns to the chief Minister* The chief Minister occasion-
a l l y yielded to their threats* He had to do so because other* 
wise h i s Government would not survive* At others* he had to 
111* Time* of India* June 24* 1970* 
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Ignore these threats* because he could not oblige the threat 
givers without jeopardising his posit ion as chief Minister* 
i n such a confusing situation* the house of cords was hound 
to f a l l * Actually any one in h i s place could have cos* up 
against the same kind of problem*, which for a l l practical 
purposes* amounted to no more than achieving a balance between 
caste and sub-caste r iva lr i e s not only in shaving out of 
ministerial o f f i ce s but even in regard to the administrative 
appointments and transfers* 
(D) CI l SkKtVKSk 8QCUh&*H,m> WD G0VBRMW8WT 
Karpoori Thakur (SSP)« the new SVD chairman, was invited 
by the governor* on December 22* 1970* to for* a new government* 
af ter the f a l l of the p.p. Rai government* He had earl ier 
submitted a l i s t of 169 members of the Assembly* who supported 
him* to the Governor. An ll-member SVD Ministry headed by 
114 
Thakur was sworn-in the same day. 
The new SVD consisted of the SSP, the rebel PSP* the 
Jan sangh, the congress (o)« the Janata* the BKD* the swat antra, 
fac t ions of the jharkhand Party* Mandal*s faction of the 
Shoshit Dal* Justin Richard»s faction of the Hul jharkhand 
and an independent group. This was the eigth Ministry to assume 
o f f i c e since the Fourth General Elections and the fourth after 
the Mid-terra poll* The Governor, Nltyanaad Kanungo's decision 
1 1
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to invit« Thakur to form a Mini*try was preceded by hecUc 
p o l i t i c a l act iv i ty in the Raj Bhawan. in a las t -d i tch batt le 
to lns ta l another congress (R)-led Government in the s tate , 
Bhola Pa swan Mat the Governor on December 21, 1970 and put 
forward hie claim to form a Ministry with the support of 167 
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members. Paswan's bid, however, proved abortive. 
Those sworn-in, besides Karpoori Thakur, were one each 
from the SSP, Jan sangh, congress ( 0 ) , Janata, BKD, Mandal's 
fact ion of shoshit Dal, jharkhand and the swatantra. one was 
a former LCD member and the other was an independent. AH of 
them, excepting the swatantra nominee, ware given cabinet 
ranks. Three of the Ministers were new comers. Two of them 
were nominees of the Jan sangh and swatantra and the third 
was the xnaepeaoent Minister. The jharkhand and BKD nominees 
had resigned from the previous congress (fU-led coalition 
Ministry a few days ear l i er hastening i t s downfall and paving 
the way for the instalment of the new Ministry* I t was an 
unique feature of the Ministry-making that from among the 
f i v e claims/its from the independent group for a ministerial 
pos i t ion , jairara Girl was f ina l ly selected by means of a 
116 
'lucky draw*. The chief Minister distributed portfol ios among 
h i s colleagues on December 25, 1970. 
1 1 5
• Times of India, December 22, 1970. 
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The U-man SVD Ministry was expanded on January 10,1971 
with the Inclusion of f i ve cabinet Ministers and eleven 
Ministers of s t a t e . Those sworn-in were seven iron the 
jan Sangh (three cabinet and four Ministers of s t a t e } , three 
from the Janata ?arty ( a l l Ministers of s t a t e ) , two from the 
BKD (both Ministers of s t a t e ) , one each from the shoshit 
of 
Dal and the jharkhand (both/cabinet rank) and tv?o independents 
(Ministers of s t a t e ) , with th i s addition the strength of 
the Thakur Ministry rose to 27. 
The nuraner of Ministers went up to 31 with the swearing-
in , on February 9, 1971, of four more cabinet Ministers and 
119 
one Minister of s t a t e . The new Ministers were two from the 
Congress (<S) and one each from the swatantra and the Hul 
jharkhand. The new Minister of s ta te was a congress (o) 
nominee. The swatantra nominee, Tej Karain *adav, who was 
earl i e r a Minister of s ta te , was promoted to title cabinet rank, 
on February 10, 1971 the Ministry was further expanded 
with tee Inclusion of four cabinet Ministers and four Ministers 
of s t a t e . All the e ight new Ministers belonged to the SSP, 
120 
the single largest party la the SVD. with this expansion 
the strength of the SSP-led SVD Ministry went up to 39. For 
118. Ibid., February 5*11, 1971, p. 9996. 
119. Ibid., March 5-11, 1971, p. 10041. 
120* ibid. 
235 
the third t in* on February 11 # 1971, two More SSP Mini stars 
of State ware eworn-ln raising the strength of the Ministry 
121 
to 41 . The strength of the Thakur Ministry rose up to 47 
with the addition of two Ministers of cabinet rank and four 
122 
Ministers of s ta te on April 5* 1971. Both cabinet Ministers 
and one of the Ministers of s ta te were the nominees of the 
Indian Soc ia l i s t Party (ISP)* which had so far been supporting 
the Ministry from outside* of the remaining three Ministers 
of State* two belonged to the Jharkhand ''arty, while one was 
an independent. 
Again on April 10* 1971, the Ministry's strength rose 
to 52 when f ive Ministers of State belonging to the congress 
123 
(0) were swom-la. once more on April 24, 1971, two store 
cabinet Ministers* both of the ssp* were added to the Thakur 
124 
Ministry, one of tnem.Ram Brikaha Ran, ear l i er a Mint i t e r 
of State* was now given the cabinet rank, with this* the 
strength of the tour-wonth old Thakur Ministry rose to S3. 
Bihar had now 27 cabinet Ministers and 26 Ministers of s ta te . 
party-wise Break-up 
Of the constituents of the SVD* the SSP had bagged 13 
ministerial posts, including the chief Minister (eight cabinet 
121. i b i d . 
122. ibid.* May 7-13* 1971* p. 10139. 
1 2 3 . lJuici. 
124. Ibjd.* May 21-27* 1971* p. 10171. 
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and f ive Ministers of s t a t e ) , congress (0) 9, jan sangh 8, 
Janata 4, jharfchand 4/ BKD 3 , ISP 3* shoshit Dal 2, HUI 
jharfchand 1 and the swatantra 1. The remaining 5 vara indepen-
dents . Table v i shows party-wise break-up of the SVD Ministry 
besides caste/ constituency and region of the Ministers. 
However* the smaller and spl inter groups got highly dispro-
portionate seats in the Thakur Ministry, rhs i«?p (former 
rebel PSP), for sxampie, had only f ive seats In the Assembly, 
but i t had three members (two cabinet and one Minister of 
State) in the Ministry* such was the case with the BKD* 
Shoshit Dal and the jharkhand Party. Similarly, independent 
ML A. a had fa ir ly good numbers in the council of Ministers, of 
the f ive independent Ministers* two were in the cabinet and 
three were Ministers of s t a t e . 
yfcate~wlae Analysis 
From Table VI, i t becomes clear that in the Karpoori 
Thakur Ministry* the upper and Backward castes had almost 
equal number of Ministers. There were twenty Ministers (12 
cabinet and 8 Ministers of s tate) belonging to the upper 
castes* while the number of Ministers coming from the Backward 
cas tes was nineteen (9 cabinet Ministers and 10 Ministers of 
S t a t e ) . The Scheduled castes and the scheduled Tribes had an 
equal share of l i ve each in the Ministry. Of the f ive 
Scheduled caste Ministers* two were cabinet Ministers and 
three Ministers of state* while three scheduled Tribes men 
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TABLE VI 
Showing party, caste/community, constituency, region 
and rural/urban bases of the members of the ssP-led 
SVL Mtnlstry, 1970 
Ha"* /Region "0 caste/ i community 
J 
ff Rural/1/ 
ft Urban ft 
J 2 
constituency 
CABIHET HIM1ST8R& 
North plains 
Karpoori Thakur 
(SSP, MLA) 
Kamaldeo Narain sinha 
(Congressfro), ML A) 
Mahabir Prasad 
(Sho Shi t , ML A) 
Krishna Kant Singh 
(Former LCD, ML A) 
Mot i la l s ingh Kalian 
(Shoshi t , MLA) 
sahdeo Mahto 
(congressrO) #MLA) 
Duaa^lal Baitha 
(Congra»s(o), MLA) 
TeJ Narain Yadav 
(Swatantra# MLA) 
Anuplal Yadav 
(SSP, MLA) 
Ramaaaad Singh 
(ISP, MLA) 
Ram Briksha Ram 
(SSP, MLA) 
south P l a i n s 
Ramanand Tivar i 
(SSP, MLA) 
Nayee 
Kayastha 
Yadav 
Bhunihar 
Yadav 
Koiri 
Dhobi ,sc 
Yadav 
Yadav 
Rajput 
Chamar,sc 
Bramnin 
Rural Taj pur (Darbhanga) 
Urban purnea (purnea) 
fural Blraul (Darbhanga) 
Rural GoreatothM saran) 
urban naaipur (Muzaffarpur) 
Urban Rdsera (tarbhanga) 
Rural RaniganJ (purnea) 
&ural Baherl (Darbhanga) 
Rural TribeniganJ (saharasa) 
Kural Bel sand (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural Majorganj (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural shahpur Cshahabad) 
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Ravi ah Chandra vera* 
(jan sangh, ML A) 
jairam Gir i 
(independent, MLA) 
v l j o y Ktmsr Mltro 
(jan sangh> KLk) 
Ramdeo Hah to 
( jaa sangh, MLA) 
Srlkriahaa Singh 
(SSP, MLA) 
Kayastha 
Rajput 
Behari Bengali 
Kolri 
Rajput 
Chandraaeo Prasad veraa Koiri 
(SSP. MLA) 
Tripurari Prasad Singh Rajput 
(ISP, MLA) 
chotaoaqpur 
Basant Narain Singh Rajput 
( jaaata/ ML A) 
Est gun sumbrul s . T , 
(jharfchand, ML A) 
suah l l Kumar Bage S . T . 
(jharkhand, MLA) 
inamul Hai Khan Muslim 
(SSP, ttLA) 
Region wot c l e a r 
Shankar oayal s ingh Rajput 
(BKI, MLC) 
Ram Kripal Singh Bhumihar 
(jan £ ngh, MLC) 
J u s t i n Richard s . r . 
(Hul Jharkhand, MLC) 
Bhola Prasad Singh Kurwi 
(SSP, MLC) 
Urban 
"ural 
urban 
urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Monyhyr(Monghyr) 
Sherghatti(Gaya) 
Bhagalpur (. Bhagalpur) 
pacna fiast. (pataa) 
Chakai (Monghyr) 
Pal iganj (patna) 
ja»ui (Monghyr) 
Bagodar (Hazarlbagh) 
Chaibasa (singhbhun) 
Kolibira (Ranch!) 
Bhaghnara (Hazaribagh) 
MINISTERS OF STATE 
North plains 
Naglna Ral 
(jaaata* ML A J 
S.M. zarauluddin 
(BKD/ MLA) 
Satya Kara in Biswas 
(independent, MLA) 
M. AzinRUduln (independent, MLA) 
Tulsl Las Mehta 
(SSP* MLA) 
Rata Phal chaudhary 
(SSP* MLA) 
Ram jewan Singh 
{SSP, >TLA) 
Balclya N=tth Jha 
(ssi?, ML A; 
Kasni wath Ral 
(1S?# KLA) 
Raisul A2ant 
(Congrescvo)* MLA) 
Rata Chandra shahl 
(Congress (Q)*MLA) 
Rameah Dutt sharma 
(Congressv0)# MLA) 
Soutii p la ins 
Sahdeo chaudhary 
(Jan sfcngh, KLA) 
Ran Raj Prasad Singh 
(Congress (O).MLA) 
Ran Bi las Singh 
(SSP* MLA) 
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Lhuxuihar Rural 
Muslim Rural 
Bouyali urban 
Beckvrard 
Muslim Rural 
Koiri Rural 
.Mall ah Rural 
Bhumihar Rural 
Maithil Rural 
Brahmin 
Yauav Rural 
Muslim Rural 
Bhumihar Rural 
Bhumihar Rural 
scheduled Rural 
Caste 
Kurmi Rural 
yadav Rural 
Kuchaikot (saran) 
Bal l la (Monghyr) 
Katihar (Purnea) 
Pal a s i (pumea) 
Janadaha (Musaffarpur) 
jhanjharpur (Darbhanga) 
Bariarpur (Monghyr) 
nenlpattl (Darbhanga) 
MasraJch (saran) 
Sikta (Champaran) 
Bararaj (Muzaf f arpur) 
Manjhi (saran) 
RafigenJ (Gaya) 
Chnnfii (Patns.) 
Daudnagar (Oaya) 
JUKI 
Ran BftUabh sr.aran Singh Kumi (Xnoapaodant.. ML A) 
Mfthafeir Chau4haxy 
(Congraaa (o)« MLA) 
qbotaiwiQPug 
Satyn Na&in Ludanl 
{JIM RfMftgh, MLA) 
Lal i t oman 
Uan sangh, MLU 
Goplnatn slogh (jan sangh* ML A) 
Kallaahpati Singh 
l«7HBAt»C-# MLA / 
Fiaghu Kantian vraaaa 
(jailfiW*, MLA) 
imrga charan i a a 
(BKl# ML A) 
Baa aehart Mahto 
(jharkhano, ML A) 
jaduaftth naaki 
vJhorKhaod, MLAJ 
Bhlehma MaraIn Singh 
(C<wgvaaa(o)* M L U 
fcural 
*H*ral 
w » c h iGftya) 
ttafchdanpm- (oaya) 
cant* 
sdr'xatAad 
Trtfen 
Kajpu* 
Rajput 
Koiri 
Echadulotf 
caate 
Koiri 
schcduiaa 
Triba 
najput 
aural 
Rural 
R«ural 
p.urai 
uctoaa 
Rural 
Ktirai 
"«*al 
Rural 
ruadi Ufcaatoad) 
Ciaai Uanchi) 
G&rbwa (calami) 
Lvaari (Kaxaribagh) 
KaaaxifcaginHaaaribagh) 
Chaadankiajri 
(shannatf) 
sarai K«l*( slngfettnan) 
Ghat ahilav Siaghonam) 
• * aaaaanSanwMHHn^vaan ^ ^^waaVBHBWP^ 
12 b. ia> Tha and the party of tha ssp-iad svc Miaiatarat 
Aal*n aaoagaar, January *5-»2i. 1*71, p, 394C* F«hwnry 
5 4 1 , l f 7 l l ?? 999*» March 5 - U , I t t t , p . 1004*1 
May 7-13, mit p . i0139 ana m y 131-127, l * 7 1 , P # i 0 i n , 
4fe) casta of tha Kluiacwra, viila supra Footnotoa 7*Kb)« 
cnoptar I I I , p* 4ot* 
;c> coaaUtuonoy of tho Minintara, vida sxiora iootoota 
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were la the cabinet and two were Ministers of s t a t e . There 
tiers four Ministers in the sSP-led SVD Ministry, of the 
twenty Forward caste Ministers, nine were Rajputs, s ix 
Bhumihars* two Kayasthas and two Brahmins , including a 
Maithll Brahmin. The remaining one Cabinet Minister was a 
Bengali Kayastha. Among the nineteen Ministers coning fro* 
the backward castes* the Yadavas and the Kolris had s ix 
ministers each in the Government. The Kurrais had three men 
in the Thakur Ministry, of the remaining four Ministers* one 
was a Mall ah (Minister of s t a t e ) , one a Marwarl (Minister of 
State)* one a Nayee (chief Minister) and the remaining one 
was a Bengali Backward cas te . 
Among the thirteen SSP Ministers* four belonged to 
the upper castes* seven to the Backward castes* one each to 
the Muslim community and the scheduled cas te . Among the fomr 
upper caste Ministers* two were from the Brahmins and one 
each from the BStenlhar* and the Rajputs, of the seven Backward 
cas te Ministers* two belonged each to the Yadavas and Kolris 
and one each to the Kuxmls* Nayees and Mallahs. of the £smr 
upper caste Jan sangh Ministers* one was a Bhumihar* one a 
Rajput* one a Kayastha and another one a Bengali Kayastha. 
Among the two Backward caste Ministers one was a Koiri and 
the other was a Marwarl. of the remaining two Jan sangh 
nominees in the svx> Ministry* one came each from the scheduled 
Castes and the scheduled Tribes, of the nine congress (o) 
Ministers* four belonged to the upper castes* two to the 
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Backward castas* two to the scheduled castes and one was a 
Muslim* Among the four upper caste Minister®, two were Brahmins, 
one a K&yastha and one was a Rajput, of the two Backward casts 
Ministers/ one was a JQolri and another one was a Kurmi. of ths 
four Janata Party Ministers, two were Rajputs, one a Bhwninar 
and the remaining one was a Kolri. Among the sour uharkh&nd 
members in ths Ministry, three belonged to the scheduled Tribes 
and one to the Backward caste Kurmis. The lone KUI jharkhaad 
Minister also belonged to the scheduled Tribes, of the three 
BKP members in the Government, one belonged each to the Rajput 
(upper cas t e ) . Muslins and scheduled cas te s . Both shoshlt Dal 
nominees were iron the same Backward caste Yadavas. The sole 
swatantra representative was also a Yadav. of ths three ISP 
Ministers, two were upper caste Rajputs and the remaining one 
was a Yadav Backward cas te . Among the five independent Ministers, 
one was a Rajput, one a Bhumlnar, one a Kurral, one a Bengali 
Backward and another one was a Muslim. Thus, of the f ive 
Independent Ministers, two belonged each to the upper caste 
and Backward caste and one was a Muslim, once again, women 
were not selected by any of the coa l i t ion partners, and 
they remained unrepresented in the Ministry. 
Region-wise Analysis 
So far as regional representation in the ssp-ied SVD 
Ministry was concerned, the north plains had the highest 
number of Ministers, of the twenty-three Ministers belonging 
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to this region, eleven were cabinet Ministers and twelve 
Ministers of state. The south plains and the chotangpur 
tribal belt had thirteen ministerial posts each in the Govern-
ment. But while the former secured eight cabinet posts and 
five seats of Minister of state, the latter got four oMnat 
posts and nine posts of Minister of state. 
Of the A H "-India parties constituting the coalition, 
th«* SSF and the congress (o) haa yivan representation to all 
the three regions of the state. The Jan sangh did not select 
any nominee from the North Plains. However* these three pasties 
selected their Ministers from the chotanagpur region. The 
jharkhand groups had all their representatives only from the 
tribal belt of chotanagpur. The Jan sangh had five Ministers 
from the south plains and two from the Chotanagpur plateau. 
The Janata part* had selected its lone cabinet Minister and 
two of the three Ministers of state from the chotanagpur belt. 
Zts remaining one nominee came from U*« North Plains. The 
BXD had one Minister each from the North Plains and the 
Chotanagpur region, while both nominees of the shoshit Dal 
belonged to the North plains. Among the five inoependent 
Ministers, three came from the North Plains and two from the 
chotanagpur belt. 
Rural/urban Analysis 
Most of the MLA members of the Thakur Ministry 
represented the rural masses of the state, out of the 49 
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Ministers, 41 (17 cabinet Ministers and 24 Ministers of Stats) 
represented the rural areas* only eight Ministers oasis f rosi 
the urban areas. Of then, six were cabinet Ministers and two 
Ministers of state. Among them, three (all cabinet) were Jan 
sangh men, two of the congress(o)* one Minister of state of 
the Janata party# one cabinet Minister each of the jharkhand 
and the shoshit Dal. 
I t Is to be noted that four Ministers were MLCS. of 
them, one came each from the SSP, Jan sangh, BKD and the HUI 
jharkhand* while women were not at a l l preferred, Harljans 
were Inadequately represented In the large st-ever and ever-
expanding Ministry In the state. 
Resignation of the ssr-led gyp Ministry 
following the fate of other multi-party coalition Govern-
ment, particularly In Bihar* the last SVD Government led by 
the SSP chairman, Karpoori Thafcur, had to bow out of office 
126 
without a fight in the Assembly on June 1, 1971. just two hours 
before the Assembly was to meet to consider, among other things, 
a no-confidence motion against his Ministry* the chief Minister 
dramatically rushed to the Raj Bhawan and tendered the 
resignation of his Ministry to the Governor, c.K. Barooh« The 
Karpoori Thakur Ministry stayed in office for 161 days only. 
l2b
* Search Light* June 2, 1971. 
245 
This was the eighth Mint*try after the Fourth General Elections 
and the fourth since the mid-term poll* 
Desertion from the ranks of the SVD parties and 
factionalism, group!am and disaidence in his own party were 
mainly responsible for the fal l of the Thakur Ministry. Even 
on the day he resigned/ three ML A a belonging to the jan sangh, 
namely sitaram Prasad, chunchun Prasad Yadav and Ram Briksha 
127 
Chaudhary defected to the congress (R). 
Role of the small Groups 
The SVD Government crumbled under the weight of i t s own 
contradictions* I t was composed of such political groups 
whose credentials had always been in doubt* They had been the 
maker and destroyer of many such governments la Bihar* 
These smaller and regional groups were themselves ridden with 
factions and every MJuA belonging to these groups was aspiring 
to be a Minister* Though Karpoori Thakur went on expanding 
the Ministry * he could not satisfy al l of them* Actually, in 
the prevailing political situation,the SVD Government could 
not be expected to las t long* Thus# from the very start 
Thakur's ramshakable team was doomed to failure* The contra-* 
dictions between the self-seeking parties of the combine and 
the serious internal dissensions within the ss? Itself could 
127* x b i d . 
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not be papered over. By the time Karpoori Thakur resigned, 
h ie Ministry had alreauy been reduced to a hopeless minority 
with withdrawl of support by minor parties l i k e the jharkhand, 
Hul jharkhand, shoshit Dal, BKD and the ISP and by the stream 
of defection© from the Congress (o)« Jan sanyh and the SSP i t s e l f . 
I t was typical of the period that while only a few weeks earl ier 
these groups had given the ir whole-hearted support to the 
Ministry, they were soon engaged with a l l their might in pulling 
down the same government* 
The 1971 Mid-term Parliamentary poll and Defections 
Defections were a continuous process in Bihar p o l i t i c s 
ever since the 1967 General Elections* Even the 1969 Mid-term 
pol l fa i l ed to check th i s process* on the contrary* two develop* 
ments accelerated t h i s process* F i r s t , the s p l i t in the congress 
Party on a l l India l eve l in 1969 and emergence of Mrs* Indira 
Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, as a dominant personality, and 
second, the 1971 e lect ions to the Lok sabha* Despite the S5P-
led SVL Government being in oft ice at the time of the Fifth 
Lok sabha po l l s , the resul t s in Bihar were not different from 
the rest of the country* The congress (R) contested 47 of the 
53 seats and won 39. The swatantra, CPI(M), PSP# BKD and Janata 
part ies faced tota l rout, none of the other parties opposing 
128 
the congress (R) could secure more than 3 seats* such sweeping 
128* Lok sabha e l ec t ions and Results, Asian Recorder, 
April 16-22, 1971, p* 10103. 
247 
Congress (R) success unnerved the SVD parties and had a 
demoralising effect on their MLAs* A spate of defections 
towards the congress (R) followed. The congress (o)^particu-
larly, seemed to be in for landslide defections. At least 
three SSP legislators had crossed over to the congress! R) 
along with eleven from the congress (0) and three from the 
129 
j an sangh. in fact, as many as six of the ten partners of 
the ruling SVD» namely the ssp, congress (o), Janata, BKD, 
ISP and the &agun Group of the All "India Jharkhand were la 
130 
serious tremble after the Lok sabha poll. Even the Ministers 
started fleeing away from the SVD Government, TWO Ministers, 
satyanarain Biswas and Ram Chandra shahl resigned from the 
Ministry on May 30, 1971. Even before this, on May 17,1971, 
the ISP had called upon its three Ministers to resign forth-
132 
with and work for overthrowing the Ministry. 
Role of the samyukta socialist Party 
The SSP had its share in the fall of almost all the 
non-congress governments in Bihar. However, this time it was 
expected that the party would learn to behave because, apart 
from the largest share of ministerial posts in the SVD Govern-
ment, its nil "India chairman happened to be the chief Minister. 
129
• Mainstream (Editorial),vol.9,NO.40,juae 5,1971,pp,&-6. 
130. subhaah c. Kashyap, op. clt., p. 374. 
131. Hindu (Madras), May 31, 1971, 
132.Times of India, May 16, 1971. 
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But again t h i s pious hope was be l l ed . Actually, the party had 
never been a cohesive and homogenous one. Every SSP member 
i n the leg is lature seemed to he h is own master and functioned 
under hie own d i sc ip l ine . This proved disastrous for the 
l i f e and smooth running o£ the ruling coal i t ion* Besides, 
some of i t s members were ever-ready to cross the side unless 
given ministerial seats or some other profitable jobs, jus t 
a f ter one and a half month of the formation of the SVD 
Ministry , 14 ML As belonging to Thakur's own party SSP had 
given notice that he must appoint store Ministers by a specific 
133 
date or for fe i t their support, on February 15, 1971, these 
l e g i s l a t o r s under the leadership of an SSP# MLA. Ran Chandra 
Bhanu formed a diss ident group ostensibly in protest against 
the 'inadequate representation* given to the Martjane, 
134 
minorit ies and women in the SVE Government. Although after 
t h i s protest , one SEP man belonging to the Muslim minority 
and another one from Harijan community were appointed cabinet 
Ministers, t h i s threat of wlthdrawl of support by the SSP 
men continued unabated. Even some Ministers joined the fray. 
ru l s i Das Mehta tendered his resignation to the chief Minister 
on April 27, 1971, on the pretext of •fundamental differences' 
135 
with the functioning of the coal i t ion Government in the s ta te . 
133. i b i d . , February 13, 1971. 
134. subhash c . Kashyap, op. c l t . , p. 373. 
135. Asian Recorder, May 21*27, 1971, p. 10171. 
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Another- SSP cabinet Minister, xraamul Hal Khan, on May 17,1971, 
13« 
resigned from the SVD Government led by h is party chairman. 
in the prevailing s i tuat ion, i t was d i f f i cu l t tor the 
SVD Ministry to stay for long. Karpoori Tnakur himself 
confessed t h i s , when in h i s l e t t e r of resignation to the 
Governor he statea* " in the face of defections and norie-
tradlng* after a great deal of deliberations and consultations* 
we have cone to the conclusion that the best Interest of 
the s t a t e demands that we should not continue in office* in 
order to put an end to the demoralization of public l i f e and 
137w 
undermining the integrity of the people," 
However* Thakur'a attack on the then prime Minister 
for deputing her Private secretary* Yaspal Kapoor,at patna 
138 
to bring about defections by hook or by crook was not ful ly 
tenable* The presence of Yashpal Kapoor raised doubts* 
e spec ia l l y , in view of the a l l out bid of the congress (R)-led 
progressive vldhayak ee l under the leadership of Bhola Paswan 
to topple the Ministry, out even without t h i s e f fort of the 
Congress (ft) and i t s a l l i e s * the SVL Government wan In such a 
hapless shape that i t was bound to col lapse, i t did not 
much matter whether i t happened after a defeat in the Assembly 
or ear l i er . 
136. Ibid.* June 11-17* 1971, p. 10205. 
137. Ibid., July 2-8, 1971* p. 10237. 
138. Zbld. 
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(E) TOf CQimSSSfa)>LgB PROGRgffilVg VIBBAYAJC DAL qCVBRHHgrT 
immediately af ter the Thakur Ministry resigned, Ram 
ja lpa l siagh yadav, leader of the congress (R) leg is lature 
party, Sunll Mukherjee, leader of the CPI leg i s la ture wing 
and Haslbur Rahman, leader of the 12-member PSP legis lature 
party, cal led on the Governor end urged him to invi te Bhola 
paswan shastrl to foxa a new government. The Governor, D.K. 
Barooh, then rejected the demand of the outgoing chief Minister 
for dissolution of the Assembly and holding mid-term poll at 
139 
the ear l i e s t opportunity, and invited ?aswan to f o n a Ministry* 
4 three-member progressive vidhayak Dal (PVD) coal i t ion 
Government headed by Bhola Paswan shasxri was sworn-la at pataa 
on June 2, 1971. The two Ministers sworn-In with Paswan were 
Ram Jalpal singh Yadav and Hari c ha ran soy of Horo faction of 
140 
the jharkhand party* paswan, former chairman of the dissolved 
Loktantrlk congress/ was then an independent. For the third 
t i n e in the l a s t three years, paswan became the chief Minister 
of the state* But now he was leading a congress(R)-led PVD 
coa l i t i on , while on ear l i er occasions he was the chief Minister 
of the non-congress coa l i t ion Ministries* 
The PVL consisted of the 105-member Congress(R), the 
25-member CPI and the 12-wember PSP, besides the spl inter and 
l 3 9
* Aslaa Recorder, July 2*8, 1971, p. 10237. 
1 4 0
• Bihar Government Gazette, July 1, 1971, 
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regional parties like the BKL, jharkhand Party, HUI jharkhand 
and the Shoshlt Lal. The PVD claimed support of 176 members 
141 
la the Assembly with an effective strength of 312. 
Sight cabinet Ministers* all of the congress (R), 
were added to the PVL Ministry on June 9* 1971 raising the 
142 
number of Ministers to H . of them, Laliteshwar Prasad shahl* 
former Loktaatrik congress member had joined congress (R). 
For the second time in four years Bihar was obliged to have 
a Leputy chief Minister* -Che leader of congress (R) legislature 
party was made Deputy chief Minister. The 11-member paswan 
Ministry was expanded on September 6, 1971, when six cabinet 
Ministers* nine Ministers of state and two J.eputy Ministers 
143 
were sworn-in. Among new entrants were four defectors from 
the SSP* one of whom was given a Cabinet rank and one was made 
a Minister of state, TWO were appointed Deputy Ministers. 
Eight of those who took oath belonged to the Congress{R), while 
three of then were cabinet Ministers* five became Ministers 
of state. The ssp-derector, xmaraul Hal Khan was a cabinet 
Minister in the Karpoori Thakur Ministry* but he resigned only 
three weeks after his swearing-in. Later he joined the 
Congress (R) and was rewarded with a cabinet post in the new 
*4l. Asian Recorder* July 2-8* 1971* p. 10237. 
142. Bihar Government Gazette* July 14* 1971. 
143. Asian Recorder* October 1-7* 1971* p. 10385. 
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PVL Ministry. Among the Ministers of s ta te , Ram Chandra shahi 
was a s ta te rank Minister in the SSP-led SVD Ministry repre-
senting the congress (o ) . But he resigned from the Ministry 
and then from the party to jo in the congress ( R ) . satya 
Narain Biswas was a l so a Minister of s tate in the Thakur 
Ministry . but he, too, resigned along with Ram Chandra shahi 
to become a Minister again in the new council of Ministers. 
Four more Ministers were scheduled to be sworn-ln, 
but they could not be contacted in time. They were three 
from the congress (R) and one from the shoshit pal* The 
Shoshit ral anc two of the congress (R), nominees were to 
be sworn-ln as Ministers of s ta te , while the remaining one 
Congress (R) member was to be appointed as a i^eputy Minister. 
Of these, Radha Nandan Jha and sloheshwar Prasad Singh (both 
of congress-R) were sworn-in on September 7, 1971 as a 
144 
Minister of s ta te and Leputy Minister respectively. The 
remaining one nominee of the congress (P.) along with the 
Shoshit Dal member was swom-ln as Minister of State on 
September 8, 1971 raising the strength of the PVL Ministry 
145 
to 32. 
The Bihar Ministry was further expanded on October 24, 
1971 by the Inclusion of the two cabinet Ministers and one 
144. Ibid. 
145. Indian nation, September 9, 1971. 
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Minister of s t a t e . Those sworn»ln were two from the PSP 
and one f root the BKD. one of the PSP nominees was taken as 
146 
a Minister of s t a t e , with th i s addition* which was the 
s ix th , the strength of the Paswan-led PVD Ministry went up 
to 35. Of then, 19 were cabinet Ministers* 13 Ministers of 
State and 3 Deputy Ministers. Table v i l show? the deta i l s 
of the PVD Ministry. 
Party-wise Break-up 
Out of the 35 members of the PVD Ministry* the 
Congress (R) had secured twwnty ministerial berths, of them, 
twelve were cabinet Ministers* seven Ministers of s tate and 
one Deputy Minister* Among the other partners of the ruling 
coal it ion* the PSP got two seats (one cabinet ana one Minister 
of s tate)* the BKD two (both of cabinet rank)* the jharkhand 
and Hul jharkhand got one se&c each (both cabinet) and the 
Shoshit Del got two posts (both Ministers of s t a t e ) . Four 
ministerial posts were offered to the sSP-defectors. Tier* 
wer«* three xncepeadents* including the chief Minister, in a l l* 
s i x defectors were Included in the PVD Ministry. Apart from 
the four SSP-defectors, the other two were Ram Chandra Prasad 
Shahi and satya Narain Biswas (both Ministers of s t a t e ) . 
The CPZ was the only partner of the PVD which did not join 
the government and decided to support I t front outside. This 
146. Asian Recorder* November 26 - December 2 , 1971*p. 10481. 
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TAi&g VH 
Showing party, casts/community, constituency, region 
and rural/urban basts of the Busbars of the PVD 
Ministry, 1971 
9 c a s t s / 
leanauaity 
i 
9 Rural/9 
9 urban A 
J t 
Name/Region constituency 
CABINET MINISTERS 
North plains 
Bhola Paewan shastri SusadXsC 
(Independent, fCA) Chief Minister 
Ram Jaipal Singh Yacav yadav (Congrea3&,MX.A)Deputy Minister 
Kedar Pandey Brahmin 
(Congress (R),MBA) 
Mrs.Ram cularl stnha Ra/iput (CongxeatdO, MLA) 
Nagendra jha Maitfiil 
(Congrasa(R),MLA) Brahmin 
Laliteahvar Prasad shanl 
(Congress (iv J, MLA, Bhumihar 
RafIqufe Alas 
(Congr«s»( R),MLA) 
zawar Hussain 
(Congre^RhMLA) 
Baleshw^r Rao 
^Congress(R),MLA) 
Muslim 
Muslim 
ThaJcur oiraja Hand Singh Rajput 
(BKD# MLk) 
Rural Xorha tpumea) 
Rural coneour (saran) 
Rural Nautan (champaran) 
u rban Gopalganj (saran) 
Rural KanigachriiCDarbhanga) 
Rural vaishali(Muaaffaapur) 
Jrban Kishanganj(Purnea) 
Rural Ziradel (saran) 
Dua&dh.sc Rural Hayaghat (tJarbhaaga) 
Rural sheohar (Muxaffarpur) 
South plains 
Chandra shekhar Singh Rajput 
(Congress(R)/MLA) 
Ram Mandan Singh yadav yadav 
(Congre8a(a),MLA) 
Rural Jhajha (Monghyr) 
Urban Patna South(patna) 
ass 
Lai Singh xyagl 
(Congr*sfi(R),MLA) 
seth Herabrum, 
(Hul jharkhand, ML A) 
Khaduan Singh 
(BKD# MLA) 
Blptn Bihar Slnha 
(PSP# MLA) 
KVpat Rural Bkangar saral(Pauia) 
Scheduled Rural Borlo (S.P.) 
Triba 
Bbwkihar Rural Blkraa (Patna) 
Kayaatha urban sasaram (shahabad) 
Chotaaagjsar 
Hart chax&fc soy (Jharkhana, MLA) 
T.Mochi Ral Munda 
(Congre«s( R ) ,m*k) 
imamul nai Khan 
(SSPrdeiector, ML A) 
fcchedultd. urban chRkradharpur( slnghbhua) 
Tribe 
scheduled Rural Khuntt (Ranch!) 
Tribe 
Muslim Rural Baghra&xra (Dhacbad) 
North pla ins 
Nitlshwar Prasad Singh Rajput 
(Congres«u;,MLAj 
Narsinyn aaltha 
(Congtess( H ) /ML A) 
Ramesh jha 
(CongresB(RKMLA) 
Malthl l 
Brahmin 
Rural Gal ghat 1 (Muzaffarpur) 
uhobi,sc Rural Eagaha (Charaparan) 
Ram Chandra Prasad shahl Bhuaihar 
(Congre»a<
 h ) »MLA) 
satya Naratn yaoav Yadav 
(Congress (R>,MLA) 
Satya Karaln Biswas Bengali 
Unaependaat, ML A) Backward 
Radha nandan jha Maithii 
(Congress uw, MLA; Brahmin 
Ramanand Yadav Yadav 
(Congress ( R ) , MLA) 
urban Saharasa (Saharasa) 
Rural Bartaaj (Muzaffarpur) 
Rural Narpatganj < purnea} 
urban KEtihar (Purnea) 
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south piata» 
Nand Kishore Prasad siftgh 
(Shoahit, ML A) Kursti 
Heoant icuaar Jha MalthU 
(SSP-def ©ctor, MLA) Brahmin 
l&rani Prasad Singh Rajput 
(Independent, MLfc) 
Ram seran Prasad Singh Kunni 
(PSP, MLA) 
Rural A sthawan(Pataa) 
Rural Godda ( s .P . ) 
Rural Tarapur (Mon^hyr) 
Rural Islampur (Gaya) 
Chotanagpur 
Brindawan swan s i 
(Shoshit, MLA) 
scheduled 
casta 
Rural s l l l l (Ranch!) 
DEPUTY MINISTERS 
North plains 
Kunbh saraln sardar 
(SSP-defector, MLA) 
scheduled Rural chhatapur (saharasa) 
casta 
South plains 
Sidhesbwar Prasad Singh Bhumlhar 
(Congress(R), MLA) 
chotanappur 
Tanesnwar *zad 
($SP-ds£ector, MLA) scheduled Caste 
Rural ftarahiya (Monghyr) 
Hural Gawan (Hazaribagh) 
147.(a) Manes and party of PVD Ministers* Bihar Gazctfce,july l 
and *4 , I97lf Asian Recorder, October i - 7 , 1971,p» 10385; 
Indian Mation, sepieaper 1THt971; Asian Recorder/ 
" November !z* - recenfcer ?.,1971, p.iolfel. 
(b) caste of the Ministers,vide supra Footnote 78(b), 
Chapter I I I . p. 109. 
(c) constituency of the Ministers, Footnote 29(c),chapter IV, 
p. 186* 
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was the first time in Bihar that an independent legislator 
was heading a Ministry* all members of the Third Paswan 
Ministry were MLAS. 
caste-wise Analysis 
It is to he noted at the very outset that for the 
second tine after the mid-term poll* a woman was appointed 
Mini ster* the first being the Harihar Singh Ministry. But 
on that occasion the woman Minister belonged to the Janata 
Party* while this time she came from the congress (R).Fifteen 
Ministers of the Paswan Ministry belonged to the Forward 
castes, of them* eight were cabinet Ministers, six Ministers 
of state and one Deputy Minister. Of these Forward caste 
each came 
Ministers* five/from the Rajputs and the Brahmins* including 
the Maithll Brahmins* four from the Bhumihars and the 
remaining one belonged to the Kayasthae. Among the eight 
backward caste Ministers* four (two cabinet Ministers and 
two Ministers of state; were Yadavas* three KUcmls (one 
cabinet and two Ministers of state) and one Minister of state 
was a Bengali Backward caste. The Muslims and the scheduled 
tribes had got three posts each (all cabinet rank) in the 
PVX Ministry. The scheduled castes had six men (two each 
in the ranks of cabinet* Ministers of state and Leputy 
Ministers). 
Among the twenty Congress(R) Ministers* nine belonged 
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to th« upper cas tes , s ix to the Backward castes* two to the 
Scheduled castes and one to the scheduled Tribes. The Jhaxkhand 
and the HUI jharkhand nominees came from the scheduled Tribes. 
Both nominees of the BKD belonged to the Forward castes* 
while both shoshlt Dal Ministers came from the Backward castes . 
Among the two PSP momlnees* one was a Rajput upper caste and 
the other was a Kurmt Backward cas te , of the four sSP-defectors* 
one was a Ma i t n i l upper casts* one was & Muslim and the 
remaining two were scheduled cas te s . Among the three indepen-
dents* one belonged each to the upper castes and the scheduled 
castes* while the another one was a Bengali backward. Thus 
almost a l l important castes and communities had their men 
in the Ministry headed by a scheduled caste man. But the 
upper castes had the upper hand. 
Region-vise Analysis 
in comparison to the North and the south plains* the 
Chotanagpur plateau had fewer seats in the PVD Ministry. I t 
had three cabinet posts* one Minister of s tate and one Deputy 
Minister. The North p la ins had secured 19 ministerial posts. 
of them, ten were cabinet Ministers* eight Ministers of state 
and one Deputy Minister. There were s ix cabinet Ministers* 
four Ministers of s tate and one Deputy minister belonging 
to trie south pla ins . 
of the congress(R) Ministers* f i f teen came from the 
North plains* four from the south pla ins and one from the 
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C ho tana gpur belt* Thus, the party gavo inadequate representa-
tion to tne chotanagpur* The jharkhand nominee belonged to 
the chotanagpur, while the Hul jharkhand Minister belonged 
to tribal belt of the south plains, of the two BKD nominees, 
one belonged each to the North and the south plains, while 
both PSP nominees came from the south plains. Among the two 
Shoshit Dal nominees, one vas from the chotanagpur, while 
another one was from the south Plains* of the four SSP-defectors, 
two were from the chotanagpur region and one each from the 
North and the south plains. The chief Minister and one indepen-
dent Minister represented, the North plains* while another out 
belonged to the south plains* Thus, the Congress*.r-; being a 
big organization was the only party which selected nominees 
from all three regions of the state* 
Rural/Urban Bases 
only seven members of the PVL Ministry represented the 
urban people of Bihar* of these, five were cabinet Ministers 
and two Ministers of state.Among them three cabinet Ministers 
and one Minister of state, were the congress(R) nominees* of 
the remaining three, one belonged each to the FSP and the 
jharkhand and -another one was an independent* Of the five 
Cabinet Ministers, two came each from the North plains and 
the south plains, while the remaining one belonged to the 
Chotanagpur belt. Both Ministers of state came from the North 
plains. 
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F a l l of the PVD Ministry 
The f a t e of the Bhola Paswan-led pvk Ministry was not 
d i f f e r e n t from the previous c o a l i t i o n Ministries since 1967. 
After remaining in power for 198 clays* Paswan submitted the 
res igna t ion of h i s Third Ministry to the Governor, L.K. Barooh, 
148 
on December 27, 1971. This was the n in th Ministry to f a l l 
i n quick succession since the Fourth General E lec t ions . 
Defect ions 
i n the preva i l ing p o l i t i c a l atmosphere a Government 
could hardly expect a longer l i f e , m t h i s period, defections 
and f loor -c ross ings were the ru l e s of the game and no principle 
o r Ideology was involved in the making and breaking of 
M i n i s t r i e s . The congress(R) Leg is la tu re Party pledged to 
carry out the e lec t ion promises of the Congress braced by 
Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi, had increased i t s s t rength in the Assembly 
In a questionable manner with defect ions from the SSP , 
Congress (o) and the j an sangft. These defect ions had, t i l l 
t he o the r day, supported the Thakur Minis t ry . I t was unthink-
able t h a t these elements had overnight changed t h e i r b e l i e f s 
and commitments. The record of these defectors sho. ed t ha t 
they had no commitments, except to themselves, nor any i n t e r e s t 
t o serve bes ides t h e i r own. The Congress(R)-dorainated Govern-
ment had rewarded defectors by taking e igh t of them in the 
Minis t ry , s ix of whom were inducted the very day the s t a t e 
cab ine t had approved a cen t r a l b i l l banning the appointment 
.48. A_siaa Recorder,Jamiarv 2 1 ^ ^ ^ 1 , 1 0 7 ?
 p I033; , 
261 
14S 
of defectors as Ministers* Four of the defectors belonged 
to the SSP, while three, namely Lai Singh Tyagi, Ram Chandra 
Shahl and slaheshwar Prasad singh to the Congress(o)*Khaderan 
Singh came from the BKD. 
The support to the paswan Ministry was also based on 
those unscrupulous elements and disparate smaller parties 
which, t i l l the other day, propped up the Thakur Ministry in 
the hope of sharing in the power and pelf that i t could offer* 
There was hardly any guarantee that these po l i t i ca l black* 
mailers would des i s t from resorting to the same t a c t i c s , 
which had been the undoings of other chief Ministers in the 
past* 
Role of the congress(R) Ministers 
The PVD Government headed by Bhola paswan, which assumed 
of f i ce with the claim of a comfortable majority, soon started 
facing a c r i s i s owing to the dissensions among the constituents 
of the coal i t ion as well as within the congress(R) Legislature 
Party. From the outset , the chief Minister was subjected to 
mounting pressures from the supporters of fcallt Naraln Mlshra 
to scrap the Dutta commission, set up by the previous SVD 
Ministry* The commission was set up to enquire into the 
charges of d e f a l c a t i o n of the B ha rat sevak samaj (fiss)funds 
149, Hindu, October 6, 1971. 
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by L.N. Mlahra and a former congress(R) Minister* Lahtan 
150 
Chaudhary. The Congress(R) Minis ters belonging to the 
Mishra ' s group vied with one another in demanding the abo l i -
t i o n of the commission and demonstrating thereby t h e i r loyal ty 
t o the Foreign Trade Minister , L.N. Mishra. The most voci-
ferous of the l o t was ^al i teshwar Prasad shahl , mforna t ion 
Minister* who threatened the chief Minister* on the eve of 
h i s departure for New Delhi in the second week of Ju ly , t h a t 
i f he did not forthwith a f f ix h i s s ignature to the cabinet 
memorandum asking for scrapping the Lutta commission, he 
would leave New Delhi not as a 'chief Minister but as a 
commoner'• simultaneously, some o ther Minis ters threatened 
151 
to res ign if the Enquiry commission was not scrapped, in 
such a s i t u a t i o n , the chief Minis ter , on h i s re turn from 
New Delhi on July 17, 1971 decided to scrap the commission, 
ignoring the t h r e a t of the CPI to withdraw support to the 
PVL Ministry if the commission was terminated. 
The communist party of India 
Soon the rea f t e r , the CPI withdrew i t s support to the 
PVD c o a l i t i o n posing a ser ious t h r e a t to i t s s t a b i l i t y , 
though i t d id not demand the res ignat ion of the Government, 
150. i b i d . 
151 . i b i d . 
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nor joined any other a l l iance . The CPI did so In protest 
against the scrapping of the outta commission, as also the 
Congress(R)~led government's fai lure to introduce b i l l s in 
the s ta te Assembly seeking to impose a ce i l ing on urban 
152 
properties and reduction of the land c e l l i n g . Apart from 
the CPI* a tew other constituents and a section of the congress 
IR) Legislature party hao also opposed the decision to scrap 
153 
the Lutta commission, sar l ler the CPI had also threatened 
to withdraw support from the coa l i t ion on the question of 
ce l l ing on land up to l o acres and a ce l l ing on urban property 
up to 5 lakhs. However, the Ministry promulgated an ordinance 
154 
to t h i s ef fect and sent i t to the President to assent. 
Praja s o c i a l i s t Party 
The paswan Ministry faced another threat when the ?SP, 
another major partner of the coa l i t ion , was asked by i t s 
High command to pull out of the coal i t ion following I t s deci-
sion to merge with the SSP» Six, out of 12 members of the 
PSP, however, rebelled against the decision of the ir central 
155 
leadership and chose to stay on In the coa l i t i on . 
152. ibid; swarajya, August 21, 1971, p. 10; Link, October 3, 
* 9 7 * , p . 4>y• 
153. Po l i t i ca l and Economic Revtew,yol.2,No.l9,1971,o.9. 
154. swarajya, August 21, 1971, p. 10. 
155. Hindu, October 6, 1971. 
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With the withdrawl of support by the CPI and a section 
of the PSP« the Ministry had l o s t i t s majority in the House. 
The congresslR) leaders, however* began wooing the splinter 
and regional groups l ike the Janata party and the independents 
in a bid to bolster the strength of the ruling coa l i t i on . K 
powerful section of the s tate congress (R) had a l l along baa 
averse to an al l iance with the CPI and one of i t s spokesmen, 
Raroesh Jha, had warned immediately after the formation of the 
PVD Government against •seccumblng to CPI pressure. This 
sectloft would have l iked very much to keep the CPI away* 
although the l a t t e r i t s e l f might have been wi l l ing to reconsi-
der the question of extending i t s support to the Government* 
Role of the Congress!R) party 
The congress(F) Legislature party I t se l f was crippled 
by a serious s p l i t in i t s ranks, s tra ins had been developing 
between the two factional leaders* L.N. Mlshra and R.L.Singh 
Yadav* who together headed the majority group in the state 
Congress(R). Mishra's supporters* i t was reported* were 
aggrieved with Yadav* because* according to them* the la t ter 
did not work earnestly enough for the scrapping of the putta 
Commission. Yadav* i t appeared* wanted Mishra to use his 
influence to ge t him a clean chit from the CBI on the follow 
156. Ibid. 
2*5 
up action against him la the l i ght of the Alyar commission 
157 
Report. According to Informed sources, Mlshra became 
suspicious of Yadav, when the l a t t e r . Ignoring him, sought 
to build up a direct l ine of access to the prime Minister 
through the congress(R) General secretary, chandrajlt Yadav* 
whatever be the reasons, the break between Mlshra and yadav 
was Inevitable In the very natuxe of thine s . Both of them 
had assumed the role
 0 f king-makers and they had to part 
company when their Interest clashed* The subsequent tussle 
between the two group leaders cams to be reflected Inevitably 
In the expansion of the Ministry and the distribution of 
portfolios* At one staye In August, 1971, when the rival 
leaders fa i led to compose their differences over the selection 
of the Ministers from the party and procuce an agreed l i s t , 
the Prime Minister, In exasperation, postponed the expansion 
of the PVD Ministry* Finally the Prime Minister gave In and 
21 Ministers drawn from congress(K) and other smaller parties 
were swojcn-in on September §,7 and 8, 1971* of these a l l the 
ten congress(R) Ministers swora-in belonged to the Mlshra 
group* xhe nominees of Yadav, including Raraeshwar Paswan, 
Shatrughan sharan slngh, who were members ofthe f i r s t Congress 
158 (K)-led government and Mahablr Prasaa Yadav were not taken in* 
Apart from Mlshra-yadav faction, there was also a 
d iss ident group In the Congress(R) Legislature party,headed 
157. ib id . 
158. Ibid* 
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by D.P. Rat* a former chief Minister. His group was annoyed 
with both the Mishra and the Yadav groups* Following i t s 
strained relat ions with the yadav group, the Mishra group had 
been trying to woo Rai group* which claimed the support of 
40 out of 127 congress(R) ML As* The dissident group, headed 
by Rai, was also b i t t e r because the l i o n ' s share in the govern-
ment hao gone to Mlshra's men. i t was also unhappy with the 
replacement of the pec president with an adhoc committee, one 
of i t s spokesmen, Budhdeo Singh, a former FCC General secretary, 
had gone to the extent of demanding the dismissal of the 
CongressdO-led government followed by Assembly e lect ions in 
159 
the s t a t e , 
From the above analysis , i t i s d e a r enough that the 
Congress(R) Legislature party was so badly riven with faction-
alism and group!am that i t was hardly in a position to run a 
government. Both L.N. Mishra and R.L. Singh Yadav were mainly 
instrumental in causing the resignation of the PVD ruling 
Coal i t ion. They were also responsible for the f a l l of the 
L . P . Rai Ministry. 
Piecemeal expansion of the government,, inordinate delay 
in the distribution of portfol ios and inclusion of defectors 
were the tac t i c s adopted by paswan Ministry with a view to 
1 S 9 . l b l a . 
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sat i s fy their supporters and holding on to power as long as 
poss ible . But these t a c t i c s aid not provide any re l ie f to 
the PVL Ministry. The ruling coa l i t ion was in such a disarray 
that i t was hesitant in cal l ing the session of the Legislature 
even to ratify the 24th Amendment B i l l and wanted to run the 
government as lony as possible without cal l ing the Legislators. 
The l a s t deadline for cal l ing the Assembly, missed by accident 
160 
or by design, had been set for December 30, 1971. But before 
that , confronted with the showdown and with a mult ipl icity 
of pressures working on him to step down, the chief Minister 
threw up the sponge on December 27, 1971* The reason behind 
h i s hesitat ion in cal l ing the Assembly was that there was no 
knowing how the various groups of members would vote in the 
wake of the f r i c t ion that haa developed* 
I t i s also important to note that the party, which made 
Paswan the chief Minister of the s ta te , also forced him to 
step down* Luring the l a s t a few days of November and early 
December, the D . P . Rai group in the congress(R) demanded a 
reconstitution of the Ministry or fa l l ing they wold withdraw 
16* 
supports to the Government* By December 15, 1971, jagnarayan 
Fathak, the general secretary of the BPCC, publicly demanded 
the resignation of the chief Minister at a meeting of the 
Congress(R) Legislature party, on December 17, the congress(R) 
l 6
° * swjirajy_a,December 25,1971,p*i4;January 26,1972,p.2. 
161. i b i d . , January 26, 1972, p. 2* 
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Legislature party was reported to have given an ultimatum 
to the chief Minister to quit by December 25, fa l l ing which 
the oarty would e l e c t a aew leader of the ruling PVD in his 
162 
place by teceraber 30, 1971. The chief Minister, who had been 
summoned to New Delhi by the prime Minister returned to 
Patna on December 27, and after a hurried special session of 
the cabinet submitted the resignation of his Ministry. I t 
seems clear that the chief Minister, who hau no party of 
h i s own and no following in the coal i t ion behind him,complied 
with'the order of the prime Minister* reinforced by the 
163 
threat of withdrawl of support by the congress(R). Bhola 
pa swan had no alternative but to give up his Chief Ministership* 
Conclusions: 1969 - 1971 
Thus, from February 26, 1969 to December 27, 1971,there 
had been f ive Ministries in Bihar, apart from a spell of 
227 days ot President's Rule. The congress (R)-led coal i t ion 
Government headed by D . P . Rai, had the longest l i f e among 
these Ministries , while the third US Government, headed by 
Bhola paswan was the shortest-ever ministry in the s ta te . 
The average l i f e of 5 months 9 days of these Ministries was 
suf f ic ient Indication of the deep malady of ins tabi l i ty that 
t h i s poor State had been suffering from. The causes that led 
162. XM£. 
163. zbid. 
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t o the f a l l of as many as f ive Min i s t r i e s in three years 
( t h i s period becomes 2 years* 2 months and 7 days i f we 
deduct the period of 7 months 17 days of Presudent*s Rule) 
were a lso the same - the manoeuvres and sabotage by the 
d i f f e r en t group l eader s In the l e g i s l a t u r e . The method to 
achieve t h i s undemocratic and ant i -people ends had ai so been 
the sane in case of everyone of those Min i s t r i e s - defections 
and f loor -c ross ings induced by promises of m in i s t e r i a l ber ths 
and o the r p rof i t ab le j obs . The Congress had not shown a 
high degree of r e spons ib i l i t y in Bihar . The non-congress 
p e r t i e s , of Right and Left , generally had shown no greater 
respect for democratic norms. 
As in the f i r s t phase since 1967, during the second 
phase of c o a l i t i o n Governments a l s o , every member of the 
Assembly belonging to the rul ing Coal i t ion wanted to become 
Minis te r of some s o r t . The b a r r i e r of qua l i ty had long been 
broken. Any member of the Assembly, no matter what reputat ion 
he enjoyed about h i s a b i l i t y and i n t e g r i t y , was considered 
su i t ab l e for being appointed a Minis te r , in t h l s mass 
•manufacture* of Minis te rs , publ ic i n t e r e s t s and the needs 
of the adminis t rat ion were e n t i r e l y ignored. The only consi-
dera t ion t h a t was kept In view was the need to save the 
Ministry from being defeated in the Assembly. The party 
loya l ty was el so wearing ou t . There was no guarantee tha t , 
a t l e a s t , some members of the party would remain loyal If they 
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were not offered loaves and f ishes of o f f i ce . Quit© a number 
of Ministries collapsed because the chief Ministers concerned 
were not In a position to low leve l beyond a certain l imi t , 
If any chief Minister tr ied to exercise his supervisory powers, 
the s tab i l i ty of h i s Ministry viae Immediately threatened. so, 
a clever chief Minister wanted to take a l l possible precaution. 
Because of the composition of the s tate Assembly* In 
which no party commanded an overall majority, independents, 
defectors and rainl-partles found an excel lent opportunity to 
f i sh In troubled water. The subsequent division of the Congress 
created a new scope for defectors. A jump from one Congress 
to the other was even a l e s ser load on one's confluence. Some 
l e g i s l a t o r s and also some Ministers were closely watching the 
pendulum of po l i t i ca l developments. As soon as they fomnd that 
the Ministry, they were supporting, was on way out, they quickly 
jumped the fence and got on the bandwagon of a probable winner. 
in t h i s way, they were able to maintain the ir Interests.Although 
party leader* were never t lrea of t a l l talks about the need 
to put down defections. In actual practice, defectors were 
always welcomed and generally offered every tempting terms. 
Some would have nothing l e s s than Ministership, others were, 
of course, sa t i s f i ed with l e s s er patronage. 
Bihar had, thus, passed Into I t s third spell of President's 
Rule in f ive years In a bid to find a stable government, which 
271 
no party or combination of parties had been able to provide 
since 1967. Thus, for five years, Bihar remained paralysed 
by instability, political opportunism, unprincipled alliances, 
defections and corruption, bringing development works 
to a virtual standstill. what was more deplorable in such 
a situation was the claim of every chief Minister co greater 
political rectitude than others* 
CHAPTER V 
THB QMS PARTY GOVERKMEMTS 
(4) The 1972 general Elections: coming of the congress 
The General Elections to the Assembly held In March, 1972 
reversed the trend set by the 1967 General Elections and 
confirmed by the 1969 Mid-term poll* The multi-party and mini-
party system gave way to the one party system* After experiencing 
a period of f ive years of short-l ived governments* the Bihar 
e lectorate gave a clear mandate In favour of the congress Party* 
Having won 167 out of 261 contested seats In the 318 member 
Assembly* the congress got a chance again to give Bihar the much 
needed po l i t i ca l s tabi l i ty* which had eluded i t for the past**** 
years* The charismatic leadership of the then Prime Minister 
Mrs* Indira Gandhi, and the unmatched resources and organization 
were the two major asse t s of the congress Party* in 1969 mid-
elect ions* the lndlvided congress had won 118 seats and polled 
30*12 per cent votes as against 34*12 per cent t h i s time* 
Table z shows party-wise break-up of contesting candidates and 
the ir resu l t s In the General Elections to the Bihar Assembly* 
An Important feature of th i s e lect ion was that the parties 
of opportunists and regional parties got a heavy blow from the 
electorate* of the 20 parties In the e lect ion arena* nine were 
completely wiped out* independents* however* were very much 
1* M*K* Thakur/Bihar poll Analysis*" Hindustan Tines (New Delhi)* March 16* 1972* 
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TABLE Z 
Showing party-wise break-up of the contesting candidates 
and the ir results in the e lect ion to the Bihar Legislative 
Assembly in 1972, 
_ p _ g _ _ _ 2 j 
Parties 0 contesting ft seats won 
0 candidates 0 
Congress 
Congress (organization) 
jan sangh 
swatantra 
Communist Party of India (CPI) 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
S o c i a l i s t party (SP) 
Republican Party of india(RPI) 
Forward s l o e 
Revolutionary s o c i a l i s t party (RSP) 
Bharitlya Kranti Dal (BKD) 
Bharltiya Backward c lass Dal 
Bihar Praatlya Hul jharkhand 
progressive Hull jharkhand 
Hindustani shoshlt Dal 
Al l India jharkhand 
Soc ia l i s t unity centre (sue) 
Jharkhand (Horo Faction) 
Revolutionary s o c i a l i s t Party (SL) 
Chotanagpur Bhuml Rakshak 
independents 586 16 * 
Total 1.982 318 
2. General Elect ions , 1972, Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly, 
s t a t i s t i c a l Analysis (Patnat cabinet secretariat and 
Coordination Department« Bihar) 
* independents include 4 members of the Break-way PSP, 
Hindustan Times* March 15* 1972. 
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273 
271 
49 
55 
50 
257 
2 
5 
4 
8 
9 
16 
5 
31 
44 
13 
41 
1 
1 
167 
30 
25 
1 
36 
-
34 
-
-
«• 
-
-
2 
1 
2 
4 
-
1 
-
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there with 12 seats to the i r credi t . The shoshlt Dal could 
manage to secure two seats* four l e s s than In the dissolved 
House. 
in the tribal belt of chotanagpur and santhal Paragnas 
(6P)# the congress made spectacular gains at the cost of the 
tour jharkhand splinter groups. The congress bagged 47 out of 
3 
76 seats In this region* At the tine of the last roid-term 
poll* there were two political groups of the tribals - All India 
Jharkhand ana Hul jharkhand* How there were four such groups 
and their total strength had been reduced to 8 In the new House* 
The swatantra Party could secure only one seat and Its chairman 
y a eh want Kumar chaudhary was worsted In his own den, Dalslngsaral. 
The rump PSP had done a shade better* it had managed to win 
four seats as against three In the previous House. The Janata 
Party had disappeared from the political scene of Bihar after 
Its merger with the jan s&ngh on the eve of the poll* 
Apart from the smaller and the regional parties* It was 
for the socialists a virtual rout although it contested 257 
seats* Eversince 1967 it had been the second largest party In 
the Assembly* But now It had just 34 members in the new House* 
Quite a few of its stalwarts were defeated* including Ramanand 
Tlwarl* a former Police Minister and the leader of the opposition 
In the Assembly* shri Krishna singh, a former Food Minister 
3* N*K* Thakur* op* cit* 
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and upendra Math verma* chief of the state party unit* The 
election had proved equally disastrous for the Jan Sangh with 
271 candidates in the field. It had secured as many as 34 seats 
in 1969. But for the merger of the Janata Party* the Jan sangh 
would have fared even worse* it was largely because of Janata*s 
influence which gave the Jan sangh five seats in Hazaribagh 
4 
where it had won none in 1969, 
Compared to the socialist and the Jan sangh, the congress 
(0) had given a better account of itself* As against 18 members 
in the dissolved House, it had now 30 and it could boast of 
having unseated the congress from at least 13 out of 273 
5 
constituencies it haa chosen for contesting the election* Its 
main strength, however* remained confined only to Patna# Gaya 
and shahabad districts of south Bihar, which had together given 
the party 16 seats* The party had, of course/ suffered major 
reverses in the defeat of its stalwarts like Krishna Kant Singh* 
jageshwar Mandal, both vice-president of the state unit* 
Mrs* rarkeshwart sinha and Baldya Nath Mehf&* chairman of the 
Assembly Accounts Committee* 
certainly* the electoral alliance proved a GOd-sent for 
the CP1# which improved its position from 25 in the dissolved 
House to 35 in the new House* xt is to be noted that the congress 
Party had an electoral alliance with the CPI and fch© break-way 
4* Ibid, 
5* Ibid* 
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group of the PSP. The electorate of Bihar had been soft on 
the former chief Ministers/ irrespective of their party a f f i l i a -
tion* AH the seven of them, who sought electoral favour in 
the Assembly pol l , were returned. They were Maharaaya Prasad 
Slnha (congress), B . P . Mandal ( s o c i a l i s t ) , Bhola paswan shastri 
(Congress), Harlhar Prasad Singh (congrass-o), £ .?• Rai(Congress), 
icarpojri ThaJair ( S a c ) , Deep Narain singh (congress). After 
the e lec t ions , the Bihar Asseiably wore a new look. There were 
202 nev; faces , including 8 women* of the 273 s i t t ing members, 
who entered the fray, 116 retained their sea t s . There were 12 
woman members - congress 10 and CPX 2- in the 318-member 
6 
new Assembly* There were only 4 women in the l a s t Assembly. 
The xedar pandey Ministry 
prom the e lect ion resul ts , i t was clear that the congress 
Party hao gained much from the l o s se s of the opposition part ies , 
while i t s l o s s in 1969 mid-term poll had not meant a gain -for 
any other party, one of the most important features of th i s 
e lec t ion was the end of tortuous coal i t ion period* After f ive 
years, Bihar could claim to have a fu l l fledged congress 
Government* Kedar Pandey, the former Minister for Industry and 
River val ley Project, was nominated leader of the CLP on 
March 16, 1972 by the Prime Minister after her Party's new 
7 
l e g i s l a t o r s unanimously authorised her to se lec t a new leader* 
6. Ib id . 
7* Hindustan Times, March 14, 1972* 
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Composition 
An eight-member Kedar pandey team was sworn-in at Patna 
8 
on March 19, 1972 by the Governor D-K. Barooh. seven other 
colleagues of Pandey were Ministers of cabinet rank, of them 
D.P. Ral was a former chief Minister and five others were 
Ministers at one time or the other* Two Ministers, Narslngh 
Baltha and Ram Raj Prasad Singh got themselves promoted from 
the rank of Minister of state, one of them, Theodore Bodra was 
the Deputy chairman of the vldhan Parishad. 
on March 20, 1972, the Pandey Ministry was expanded with 
the swearing-in of 19 Ministers - 4 of cabinet rank., 11 Ministers 
9 
of state and 4 Deputy Ministers, of the cabinet Ministers, 
jagannath Mishra (J.K. Mishra) was the younger brother of 
L.N. Mishra, a dominant figure in Bihar politics. He was an 
independent member of the Bihar vldhan Parlshad and joined the 
10 
Congress on December 17, 1971. xn 1972 Assembly elections, he 
got himself elected to the Assembly from jhanjharpur constituency 
in Darbhanga district, other men had been Ministers in the 
previous congress (R)-led coalitions, of the eleven Ministers 
of state, seven, namely chunchun Prasad yadav, Prlthvl chand 
Klsku, Ramaahray Prasad Singh, Biharl Lakra, Mrs. B. Douza, 
8* Asian Recorder, April 29 - May 5, 1972, p. 10740. 
9. Ibid. 
10. subhash c Kaanyap, The politics of Power (New Delhit 
National publishing, 15»"M), p. Yl3. 
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Olnesh Kumar Singh and Vishnu shankar were new entrant*. 
Chunchun Prasad Yadav was a Jan sangh member in the previous 
Assembly but he joined congress (R) on June 1* 1971,the day 
Karpoorl Thakur Ministry resigned* Dtnesh Kumar stngh and Vishnu 
Shankar were members of the vidhan parishad. with the exception 
of Madan Prasad Singh, three other Deputy Ministers were new 
entrants* singh was a Parliamentary secretary in the B.P.Rai 
Government* 
one cabinet Minister* five Ministers of state and two 
Deputy Ministers were added to the Pandey Ministry on March 21, 
11 
1972. of the Ministers of state, Budhdeo Singh and Mi art sada 
were new comers* Taneshwar Azad was promoted from a Deputy 
Minister to be a Minister of state* Bhishma ^arain singh was 
a Congress (o) nominee in the Thakur Ministry* Ram Brlksha 
Chaudhary and alteram Prasad were also new entrants* Both ware 
Jan sangh members in the previous House and defected to 
Congress (R), along with chunchun Prasad yadav* 
With this swearing-in, the strength of the Ministry rose 
to 35* including 13 cabinet Ministers* 16 Ministers of state 
and 6 Deputy Ministers* in all, there were 17 new faces* 
including three cabinet Ministera* nine Ministers of state 
ana five Deputi Ministers* 
on August 30* 1972, xedar Pandey reshuffled the portfolios 
11* Hindustan Times* March 21 and 22, 1972* 
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of several Ministers after Manorama Pandey and Bandhu Manto, 
Deputy Ministers for Information and police and Tourism respec-
12 
t ive ly had been sworn-in as Ministers of state* The 35-member 
Ministry nov bad 13 cabinet Ministers, 10 Ministers of state 
and 4 Deputy Ministers. Araong these affected by the reshuffle 
were the Agriculture and Minor Irrigation Ministsr L.P. Shahl 
«nd Housing and i,ocal-sel£ Government (X-SG) minister safique 
Alan, shahi was qiven community Development, Gram Panchayat 
and Rural Bnyimering organization. Agriculture went to the 
Finance Minister D>P. Rai and Minor Irrigation to the Revenue 
Minister Chandra shekhar singh. Rafdque Alaia now retained only 
Transport and wakf; Housing and Local-self Government were 
shifted to Ram Raj Prasad Singh/ who retained Public Health 
Engineering Department (PHED). 
There were also an interchange of portfol ios between the 
i rr igat ion Minister Abdul gayura Ansari (A.Q. Ansari) and the 
Cooperative Minister J.N. Mishra. Mishra was also given two other 
important portfol ios of Irrigation and Power* Ansari retained 
the portfol ios of welfare and J a i l s . 
Among the three Ministers of s tate affected* one was 
Hemant Kumar jha* who l o s t Housing and LSG and got community 
Development and Rural Engineering Organization* tie was attached 
to L.P* Shahi* Dlnesh Kumar Singh* Minister of s tate for 
12 , Asian Recorder, September 9-15, 1972, p. 10976. 
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community Development and Gran Panchayat was now shifted to 
the Education Department. Misri sada, who was Minister of state 
for Education* was now allocated Labour and Employment.He was 
attached to the Minister for Labour* Mrs. Ram Dulari sinha. 
caste-wise Analysis 
out of 35 Ministers of the xedar Pandey Ministry, eighteen 
were Backwards, Harijans and Adivaals. fourteen members of the 
upper castes, two Muslims and one christian. Table u shows 
caste, constituency, region and rural/urban base of the 
Ministers, out of fourteen upper caste Ministers, five were 
Cabinet Ministers and nine Ministers of state, of them, six 
were Brahmins, including three Maithii Brahmins, four Rajputs, 
three Bhumlhars ana one Kayastha. 
There were ten Backward caste Ministers in the Pandey 
Ministry, of them, three were cabinet Ministers, four Ministers 
of state and three deputy Ministers. Among these Backward caste 
Ministers, three were Yadavas, three Banias, one Kurmi, one 
Koiri and one Mallah. The remaining one Minister also belonged 
to a Backward caste, of the four scheduled caste Ministers, one 
was a cabinet Minister, two Ministers of state and one a Deputy 
Minister. Among the four Scheduled Tribe Ministers, two were 
Ministers of cabinet rank and two Ministers of state. Both 
Muslim Ministers were of the cabinet rank. The lone christian 
candidate was a Minister of state. 
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TABLE XX 
Showing caste/community* constituency, region ana rural/urban 
bases of the members of the xedar pandey Ministry/ 1972 
8 Caste/ 
6 community 
J 
* Rural/ « 
Region/Name urban 4 
ft 
Constituency 
£4£X££2L!4ftl2§£££ 
Worth plains 
Kedar Pandey (MLA) Brahmin 
Daroga Prasad Rai (MLA) Yadav 
Lallteshwar Prasad shahi(MLA) Bhumihar 
Mrs. Ram oulari sinha(MLA) Rajput 
Jagannath Mishra (MLA) Maithll Brahmin 
Lahtan chaudhary (MLA) Bania 
Rafique Alam (MLA) Muslin 
South p la ins 
Abdul Qayum Ansari (MLA) Muslim 
Ram Raj Prasad singh(MLA) Kurmi 
Chandra Shekhar singh(MLA) Rajput 
Chotanagpur 
Theodore Eodra (MLA) scheduled Tribe 
Mochirai Munda (MLA) scheduled Tribe 
MINISTERS OF STATE 
North plains 
Radha Nandan jha(MLA) Maithil Brahmin 
Magina Rai (MLA) Bhumihar 
Mrs. B. Doza (MLA) Christian 
Ramesh jha (MLA) Maithil Brahmin 
Bahdnu Mahto (Ml.A.) Kolri 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
urban 
Rural 
Rural 
urban 
urban 
Rural 
aural 
Urban 
Rural 
Nautan (champaran) 
parasa (saran) 
vaishali(Muzaff arpur) 
Gopalganj(saran) 
Jharijharpur (Darbhanya) 
Maheshl(Saharasa) 
Kishanganj (purnea) 
Dehri (shahabad) 
Chandl(Patna) 
Chakal (Monghyr) 
Chakradhanpur (Slnghbhum) 
Khunti (Rnnchi) 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Madhupu r(Darbhanga) 
KuchalkotCsaran) 
Barsol(purnea) 
Saharasa(saharasa) 
Blnhutlpur 
(Darbhanga) 
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south plain* 
Henant Kumar jha (MLA) Malthil Brahmin 
Chunchim Prasad Yadav(MLA) Yadav 
Prithvi chand Kiaku(MLA) scheduled Tribe 
Rameshray Prasad Slngh(MLA) Bhuraihar 
Budhdeo Singh (MLA) Yadav 
Misrl sada(MLA) scheduled casta 
Mrs.Manoraraa Pandey(MLA) Brahmin 
Chotanagpur 
Bihari Lakra (MLA) scheduled Tribe 
Shibaanjan Khan(MLA) Teli 
Bhlshna Naraln singh(MLA) Rajput 
Taneshtrar Azad(MLA) scheduled caste 
pine ah Kumar singh(MLe) Rajpetc 
Vishu.u shankar (MLC) Kayastha 
DBWTY MIHISTERS 
Horth Plains 
Ran Brlksha Chaudhary(MLA) Bania 
sitaran prasad(MLA) Bania 
south p la ins 
Hadan Prasad singh(MLA) Mall ah 
chotanagpur 
Ran Denl Ran (MLA) scheduled caste 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Godda (SP) 
Nathnagar(Bhagalpur) 
Poraihat ISP) 
KUrtha (Gaya) 
panapur (Patna) 
Alauli (Monghyr) 
Karakat(shahabad) 
Lohardagga( Ranchi) 
Baharagaon(singhbhum) 
Lesliganj (palamu) 
aavan (Hazarlbagh) 
Rural Pupri(Muzaffarpur) 
Rural shikarpur(champaran) 
Rural Gopalpur(Bhagalpur) 
Rural Bishraropur (palamu) 
I3.^a)riam«s of the Ministers; Asian Recorder, April 29-May 5, 1972, 
p. 10740# Hindustan Times, March 21,1972, 
(b)caste of the Ministers, vide supra Footnote 78(b), chapter i l l , 
p. 109. 
(cConstituency of the Ministers, general Elect ions, 1972, Bihar 
Legislative Assembly, s t a t i s t i c a l Analysis (patnai cabinet 
Secretariat and coordination Department* Bihar). 
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Region-wise Analysis 
Out of the 33 MLA. Ministers* fifteen came from the North 
plains/ including the chief Minister* of them eight were cabinet 
Ministers, five Ministers of state and two Deputy Ministers. 
The south plains had got eleven seats in the pandey Government* 
Among theiu, three were cabinet Ministers, seven Ministers and 
one Deputy Minister* There were seven Ministers coming from 
the chotanagpur region* Of them two were cabinet Ministers, 
four Ministers of state and one Deputy Minister. Thus, the 
North plains got dominance in the first congress Ministry after 
the 1972 election, claiming more than half cabinet posts* 
Rural/Urban Analysis 
All but five Ministers of the congress Ministry represented 
rural areas in the Government* of the five Ministers representing 
urban people, three were cabinet Ministers and the remaining 
two were Ministers of state, of the three cabinet men, two 
belonged to the North Plains end one to the south plains* of 
the two Ministers of state, one came each from the North and 
the South plains* 
It is to be noted that two women got place in the pandey 
Ministry, one was a cabinet Minister and another one was a 
Minister of stace. The former was a Rajput, the latter came from 
the christian minority community* while the former represented 
the uiLaa people, the latter was elected by the rural tribal 
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masses* However, both of them belonged to the same North Plains* 
Two colleagues of Pandey were MLCS. Both these members of the 
Vidhan Parishad were Ministers of s t a t e , 
Beginning of Factional Feuds 
Kedar Pandey started we l l . He completed the constitution 
of h i s Ministry within three days and almost simultaneously 
distributed the portfol ios , which was Indeed not a mean achieve-
if*ent, because another chief Minister Harihar Singh went out 
of o f f ice without even distributing portfolios* But factionalism 
and g roup ism in the ruling congress Party did not come to an 
end* xnis was clearly manifested when Kedar Pandey contemplated 
a major reshuffle of h i s cabinet* The main purpose of Pandey 
behind h i s cabinet reshuffle was to reduce the grip of L.N.Mishra 
14 
over Lihar po l i t i cs* in consultation with uma shankar Dlkshit, 
the then Home Minister* and Yashpal Kapoor, principal private 
secretary of the prime Minister, chief Minister decided to 
reconstitute h i s cabinet by dropping seven Ministers (one of 
Cabinet rank and s ix Ministers of s t a t e ) , who were loyal to 
Kishra and disloyal to him* The Ministers to be dropped were 
Cabinet Minister Ram Raj Prasad Singh and Ministers of state 
Radha Nandan jha, vlshnu sh&nkar, audhdeo Singh, Nayina Ral, 
15 
Chunchun Prasad Yadav and shiburanjan Khan. However, four of 
the seven Ministers refused to resign on the ground that pandey 
14. Link, June 3, 1973, p. I9f organizer, June 9,1973,p.4* 
15* Asian Recorder, July 16-22, 1973, p* 11500* 
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16 
himself did not enjoy the confidence of the CLP* Faced with 
the ir refusal to resign he himself resigned on May 27, 1973 and 
17 
secured the invitat ion of the Governor to form a new government. 
A 23-mernber congress Ministry headed by Kedar pandey was 
sworn-ln on May 28, 1973 in the midst of deepening c r i s i s in the 
18 
fact ion - ridden ruling party. The reconstituted Ministry was 
to have 37 members - cabinet Ministers 16/ Ministers of state 16 
and Deputy Ministers 5* But fourteen, of those whose names were 
announced by the chief Minister, did not turn up to take oath. 
Among them were D . P . Rai, J.N. Mishra, Rafique A lam, Lahtan 
Chaudhary, Mrs. Ram Dularl Slnha. The seven absentee Ministers 
of s ta te were Mlsri sada, Biharl Lakra, p . c Kiaku, Hemant Kumar 
Jha, Dinesh Kumar Singh, umesh Prasad verma and Nagina Rai. vexma 
was a new entrant. Nagina Rai was ultimately retained in the 
ministerial team in pursuance of the l a s t minute instruction from 
the Congress High command. The absentee Deputy Ministers were 
19 
Sitaram Prasad and curga charan jamuda. Jamuda was a new entrant. 
Eleven cabinet Ministers, Including the chief Minister 
took oath. Ram Jalpal Singh Yadav,former Deputy chief Minister, 
Imamul Hal Khan, Ram sharan Singh and Bindeshwarl cubey were new 
entrants . L.P. Shahi, Chandra shekhar Singh, Narsingh Baitha, 
16. Link, June 3, 1973, p. 9; organizer, June 9, 1973, p. 4. 
17. Asian Recorder, July 16*22, 1973, p. 11499. 
18. Ibid. 
19. ib id . 
28* 
Theodore Bodra, T. Mochl Rat Munda were members of the old 
Pandey Ministry* Taneshwar Azad was promoted to the cabinet 
rank. He was a Minister of s tate ear l ier . 
Mrs. Klahorl Devi/ Faguni Ram, idr i s Ansari (a l l new 
coiners), Ramesh jha, Bhishroa Narain Singh, Mrs. Bind a rouza, 
Mrs* Manoraroa pandey, Ramashray Prasad singh and Budhdeo Singh 
took oath as Ministers of s t a t e . Mrs* Kishort Devi was a member 
of the vidhan parishad. The three Deputy Ministers were Ram 
Brlksha chaudhary, Ram Dcni Ram and Maaan Prasad Singh* 
However, a l l the 14 appointed Ministers, who had stayed 
away from the swearing-in ceremony took oath of o f f ice only a 
day after on May 29, 1973, raising the strength of the Ministry 
20 
to 37. But a signature campaign was launched by Mishra's 
supporters to secure Pandey's ouster, sensing the mood of the 
partymen in patna, the congress President asked pandey to restore 
Ram Raj Prasad sin^h and Radha Nandan jha to their position and 
21 
take Ramdeo Rai, a new man, in place of chunchun Prasad Yadav* 
consequently, on May 30, 1973, these Ministers were sworn-in, 
22 
rais ing the strength of the Ministry to 40. However, before 
swearing-in, Singh and jha had to tender an apology in writing 
to the Governor and the chief Minister for thc&x statements, which 
20 . i b i d . , p. 11500. 
21 . Link, June 3, 1973, p. 19. 
22. Asian Recorder, Julyl6 - 22, 1973, p« 11500. 
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were Interpreted as challenging the constitutional authority 
23 
of the Governor and the democratic right of the chief Minister. 
I t i s Interesting to note that the exercise which began 
thunderously ended almost in a whimper* Kedar Fandey had to 
eat humble pie by taking back four of the seven dropped Ministers 
and h i s entire purpose of the reshuffle was defeated* He was 
l e f t in no doubt about where he stood. Another consequence of 
t h i s drama was the intra-party r iva lr ies at the centre, which 
was rehearsalled in the state p o l i t i c s . The clearance given 
by c ikshi t and Kapoor to drop Miafera's supporters from the 
Ministry was one way of 'wrecking vengeance • on Mishra for his 
a l leged involvement on the side of the Soc ia l i s t Forum in the 
24 
parliamentary Party elections* when Mishra cane to know of 
pandey's intention, he l o s t l i t t l e tins in retrieving h is position. 
Ultimately, i t was Pandey who had to swallow the b i t t er p i l l 
and reaccommodate four of the seven Ministers, who not only 
forced him to resign and reconstitute the Ministry, but also 
openly threatened to throw him out* 
ouster of Pandey 
However, the•campaign for Pandey*s ouster' continued and 
ultimately a date, July 24, 1973 was fixed for a t r i a l of strength 
between the warring groups in the CLP. The situation became 
23. ib id . 
24
• Statesman (New Delhi) , June 1, 1973. 
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c l e a r when 24 out of 40 Ministers openly started working against 
the chief Minister* and even close colleagues l ike the Finance 
Minister D.P. Rai, PWD Minister Narsingh Baltha, Ministers of 
State Ramesh jha, Radha Nandan jha and Bhishma Narain Singh, 
2ft 
jumped out of the sinking ship, on June 22 , 1973, in a bid to 
precipitate the ministerial c r i s i s , these 24 members of the 
26 
Council of Ministers submitted thex resignation. The decision 
to quit the Pandey Ministry was taken ear l i er at a meeting at 
the residence of Chandra shekhar Singh* Revenue Minister. 
Briefing newsmen, singh said, "we have taken this step so that 
27 
we ma> be able to work freely for the ouster of Pandey". Of 
those who resigned, nine were cabinet Ministers, twelve Ministers 
of s ta te and three Deputy Ministers* They were r..P. Rai,Chandra 
Shekhar Singh, J.N. Mlshra, Ram Raj Prasad Singh, Rail que jUara, 
Narsingh Baltha^ Mrs. Ram Dularl Sinha, L ah tan chaudhary and 
L . P . shahi ( a l l cabinet Ministers) , Hemaht Kumar jha, Raefca 
Nandan jha, Ramesh jha, Nagina Rai, Bhlshma Narain singh, Rama-
shray Prasad singh, Bandhu Mahto, Manorama pandey, Bihari Lakra, 
Misri sada, P .C Kisku and Ramdeo Rai ( a l l Ministers of s ta t e ) , 
Ram Deni Ram, Ram Briksha chaudhary and Madan Prasad singh (a l l 
Deputy Ministers) . 
in such a s i tuat ion, when majority of h i s cabinet colleagues 
25. Link, June 24, 1973, p. 19. 
26. Asian Recorder, August 20-26, 1973, p. 11556. 
27. ib id . 
389 
and partyraen went agains t him, Kedar pandey on June 24, 1973 
bowed out of off ice a f t e r 15 months of r u l e , when he was denied 
f resh mandate a t a spec ia l ly convened meeting of the CLP. Pandey, 
who had been asked by the Congress High command to seek a vote 
of confidence a f t e r a sustained campaign agains t h i s leadership, 
l o s t by 153 votes t o 79. Four votes were declared inva l id . Half 
a dozen l e g i s l a t o r s abstained from vot ing , prominent among them 
were Hartnath Mishra, speaker of the Assembly, Abdul Ghafoor, 
Chairman of the vidhan p a r i shad and Maharaaya Prasad* a former 
28 
Chief Minister* 
Xhe e x i t of Kedar Pandey as the chief Minis ter of Bihar 
fol lowing h i s f a i l u r e to secure a vote of confidence in the CLP 
was admittedly an important chapter in the none-too-happy 
p o l i t i c a l drama of Bihar . Acclaimed about 15 months ago as a 
wise choice of Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi, chief Minis tership of Kedar 
Pandey had been k i l l e d without much ceremony not by h o s t i l e hosts 
b u t by the fact ion l ed by L.N. Mishra, now Railway Minister in 
29 
t h e union cab ine t . The r e s u l t s showed t h a t Pandey had l o s t h i s 
hold on the party o r had been made to lose i t by the manoeuvrings 
of L.N. Mishra, whose protege Pandey was when he was asked t o 
30 
l ead the pa r ty . By camping in Patna for several days, Mishra 
could be said to have influenced the decision of the CLP on 
28. ib id . 
29. Thought (£>elhi), xecember 7, 1973, p. 5. 
30. Assam Tribune (Gauhatl), June 26, 1973. 
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on June 24, 1973. I t was d i f f i c u l t to appreciate him when he 
•a id that Pandey»s f a l l was the peoples victory* on the contrary, 
there was substance in Pandey's statement that he was forced 
out because he was no match to the 'money and might* deployed 
n 
against him. 
From the moment pandey was elected the leader of the 
party , the diss idents within the party began to undermine h i s 
posit ion both within and outside the cabinet on the spacious 
plea that he was •foisted* on them by the party's central leader-
ship* That most of them owed loyalty to L.N. Mishra only showed 
how they cared for party unity or the accepted canons of 
democratic behaviour* 
on the other hand* Pandey himself,a nominee of the Prime 
Minister* fa i l ed miserably to keep the disputed factions in the 
party together or for that matter, to attend to any of the 
pressing problems of the Backward s ta te . He proved to toe a 
palty pol i t ic ian and tota l ly inadequate as a chief Minister* 
Most of h is colleagues regarded him as a pawn of the central 
leadership, ent irely lacking local po l i t i ca l backing, in fact 
he doggedly held on to o f f i ce , when i t was clear that he had 
l o s t the majority in the s tate congress l eg i s la ture Party. 
pandey also fa i led to keep harmonious relat ions with the Pec. 
On many Issues the pec Chief,vidyakar Kavi.and the chief Minister 
31* national Herald (New Delhi) , June 2j§, 1973; Thought, 
BecMber 7, W J , p* 5. ="— 
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did not see aye to eye with each other* Kavl had made no secret 
of h i s opposition to the reimposltlon of land rent on uneconomic 
holdings* uniform rate of Wheat levy on the rich and the poor 
farmers al ike and the Government's reluctance to honour the 
agreement reached between the BPCC and the striking non-gazetted 
32 
State employees. The result was that Kavl and some other PCC 
o f f i ce bearers sided with the dissidents* Four General secretaries , 
three of whom were l eg i s l a tor s , along with CLP General secretary 
33 
and chief whip, openly demanded Pandey's ouster. 
Thus, i t was clear that factional in-f ighting within the 
ouster 
ruling congress was the main reason of Kedar Pandeyslf rom chief 
Ministership* Another important reason was h i s bid to come out 
of the grip of L.N. Hlshra and to challenge h i s hold over the 
Bihar Congress* Three aspects of th i s drama were note-worthy. 
The f i r s t was that L.N* Hlshra continued to have a dominant say 
in Bihar pol i t i cs* By persuading Mrs* Gandhi apparently without 
much d i f f i cu l ty f i r s t to reverse the direct ives of Dikshlt and 
then to ask pandey to seek CLP confidence, Mlshra had demonstrated 
that he retained the confidence of the prime Minister* so long 
as t h i s position was maintained his Influence in Bihar congress 
p o l i t i c s remained undiminished* 
secondly, Pandey's position was unenviable. Everslnce, he 
32 . Link, March 25, 1973, p. 20. 
33* Ib id . , June 24, 1973, p. 19. 
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took of f ice he had been under heavy pressure from the three 
prominent groups In the s tate congress, namely L.N. Mishra's 
R . L . Singh yadav's and jagjivan Ram's group, pandey was chosen 
by Mrs. Gandhi to head the Ministry, largely because i t was* 
thought that h i s non-controversial background would produce 
homogeneity. But th i s proved to be wishful thinking, though the 
reason lay more in group p o l i t i c s in Bihar than in pandey. what 
happened at patna on June 24, af ter months of dog-fighting was 
one more reminder that the Congress was a confused jumble of 
o f f i c e seekers for whom nothing was sacred except their precious 
h ides . 
The third aspect was the most disturbing since i t related 
to the congress leadership's style of party management. To 
saddle Pandey with Ministers of particular group was bad enough. 
what was worse the covert and overt encouragement given to him 
to intrigue for their ouster. The high drama accompanying the 
reshuff le , ultimately proved f u t i l e again largely because of 
remote control operations which robbed Pandey of a l l raanoeuvara-
b l l l t y . A chief Minister, who was forced to give the impression 
of being a puppet, could not have much cred ib i l i ty . If pandey 
had proved ineffect ive so far, at l e a s t part of the blame rested 
with the centre. As i t was, most of the chief Ministers, 
'nominated' by Mrs. Gandhi, did not have a strong pol i t i ca l base 
34. statesman (New Delhi) , June 1, 1973. 
• 
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at home, nor had they been able to function without the 
'blessings' of the central leadership, what the Ministers 
did by refusing to resign was a deviation from parliamentary 
norm, but they argued that since the chief Minister had 
been selected by the High command, he was not entitled to 
ask them to resign, only the High command could ask them to 
resign. 
(B) THE ABOIL GHAFOQR GOVERNMENT 
Choice of a Mew Leader 
The long negotiations that sldharth shankar Roy, the 
High command emissary, held with L.N. Mlshra and the outgoing 
Chief Minister failed to find a successor of Kedar Pandey. 
As the rival factions were in a state of confrontation 
presenting persons of their choice, the selection of a new 
Chief Minister was left to the Prime Minister by an unanimous 
35 
resolution of the Congress Legislature party. The Prime 
Minister, once again, obliged the Bihar Congress Legislature 
Party by selecting Abdul Ghafoor, the chairman of the Legis-
lative council, as the new leader of the CLP. The choice of 
the prime Minister was communicated to L.N. Mlshra and Kedar 
pandey during a meeting held at the congress President shankar 
35. statesman, june 25, 1973. 
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36 
Dayal Shanna's residence. However, i t appeared that L.N. 
Mlshra, who used to control Bihar p o l i t i c s from New Delhi, 
had the final say in choosing ohafoor as the new Leader and 
Kedar pandey, who was against Ghafoor and wanted Harinath 
Mlshra, the speaker of the Assembly, to succeed htm, had to 
37 
y i e l d . 
Ministry Making 
Headed by Abdul Ghafoor, a new 15-man Ministry was 
sworn-In at Patna on July 2, 1973. Earlier he had resigned from 
the chairmanship of the upper House of the Bihar Legislature 
and the Governor accepted the resignation of the caretaker 
38 
Pandey Government. Besides Ghafoor, others*who took oaths of 
o f f i ce and secrecy, were Ministers of the cabinet rank. 
The Ghafoor Ministry was the eleventh since 1967 and 
second after the 1972 General Elect ions. Ghafoor was the f i r s t 
Muslim and the second member of the vidhan pari aha, the f i r s t 
being B . P . Mandal, to become the chief Minister of Bihar. Of 
the f i f teen Ministers, eight were members of the ousted pandey 
Ministry; of them Ram jalpal singh yadav became a cabinet 
Minister in the reconstituted Pandey Ministry. The remaining 
seven were new comers. Notable among them was vldyakar Kavi, 
36. ib id . 
37. Ibid., june 27 and 28, 1973. 
38. Asian Recorder, August 20-26, 1973, p. 11556. 
295 
EPOC president. Except for him and three others. Including 
Sldhu Hembrum, Karara chand Bhagat and j a l Naraln Mehta, a l l 
the new entrants were former Ministers, 
I t I s Important that in the composition of the new 
Ministry, preponderance was given to the majority group owing 
al legiance to L . N . Mishra. The group got 13 berths In the 
Cabinet, as against two a l lot ted to the composite group 
controlled by xedar pandey, Jagjiwan Ram and Ram Lakhan Singh 
Yadav. in the new but incomplete cabinet that Ghafoor had 
choosen, he had given weight age to the backward castes* in 
a 15-member cabinet, nine, including two Harijana and two 
Adlvasls, were from the Backward cas te s . The al location of 
port fo l ios among these cabinet Ministers was announced on 
39 
July 13, 1973. 
The strength of the Ghafoor Ministry rose to 37 with 
the addition of six cabinet Ministers and sixteen Ministers 
40 
of state on September 25, 1973. It took the chief Minister 
two months and three weeks besides three long trips to New 
Delhi to get clearance from the central leaders for the 
expansion of his Ministry giving credence to the criticism 
that he was even more under remote control from Delhi than 
39, Bihar Government Gazette, August 1, 1973. 
40. statesman, September 26, 1973. 
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Kedar pandey. of the cabinet Ministers* Baleshwar Ram had 
been a Minister In Harihar Singh Ministry* D.P* Rai Ministry 
and Bhola pa swan-led PVE Ministry, kn important feature of 
t h i s expansion was that Kedar Pandey was persuaded to join 
the Ghafoor Ministry* The remaining four were Ministers In 
the Pandey Ministry* of them elndeshwarl Dubey became a 
Minister In the pandey second Ministry* Of the Ministers of 
State* eight were new entrants and seven of them were freshers* 
They were Tapeshwar Deo* chaudhary salaluduln* suraj Nath 
Chaubey* purnendu Naraln sinha, sadanand Singh* Mra.Rajeshwarl 
saroj Das and Khalid Anwar Ansarl. Among the freshers* Ansarl 
was the son of A.Q. Aasari* a cabinet Minister in the Pandey 
Ministry, He got himself e lected to the Assembly in a by-
e lect ion caused by the death of h i s father* of the remaining 
eight* seven were Ministers in the outgoing pandey Government. 
Nltishwar Prasad singh was a s tate Minister in the D.P.Rai 
Ministry* while Budhdeo Singh was a Minister of s ta te in the 
f i r s t Pandey Ministry* 
The chief Minister al located portfol ios to 37 Ministers* 
including sixteen Ministers of state* after making a major 
41 
reshuffle of some portfol ios on September 27* 1973. The 
and Health Department 
PHED/held by the chief Minister were allocated to Rafique Alam 
and Kedar Pandey respectively* The Food and supply Department 
*1* Asian Recorder* November 19-25* 1973* p, 11708. 
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held by Mungerl Lai was al lotted to L .P. shahi. Lai was 
a l l o t t e d Mines and Geology* held by Finance and planning 
Minister D.P. Rai. J . N . Mishra continued to be incharge of 
the power and irr igat ion Departments, Including River val ley 
project (RVP) . But the Minor irrigation Department was 
excluded from the irrigation Department and a l lot ted to 
Theodore Bodra. Baleshwar Ram was given the info una t i on and 
Tourism Department held so far by Chandra shekhar Singh and 
Mrs* Ram Dulari Sinn a respectively, shatrughan sharan Singh 
was divested of Transport portfolio and given the sugarcane 
Department held by Chandra shekhar Singh. The Transport 
port fo l io was allocated to Bindeshwari nubey. There was no 
change in the portfol ios o£ Ram Raj Prasad Singh, vidyakar 
Kavl, ciarslngh Baitha and Jal Naraln Mehta. 
The Ghafoor Ministry was further expanded on November 
17, 1973 with the addition of one cabinet Minister, four 
Ministers of s ta te and four Deputy Ministers, with this the 
strength of the second congress Ministry since 1972 went 
up to 46. This time a l l the nine Ministers had been drawn 
42 
from the majority group owing allegiance to L . N . Mishra. The 
cabinet Minister, shankar Dayal singh, was formerly in the 
BKD and had contributed to the making and breaking of many 
Coalit ion governments in the period between February 1969 -
42. Hindustan Times, November 18, 1973. 
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December 1971. with the except ton of Mlsri sada, Bhishma 
Narain singh and Madan Prasad Singh, who were Ministers in 
the pandey Government, a l l others were new entrants* Barring 
Shanker Dal Singh* a l l were allocated portfol ios on December 
4, 1975, 
Thus, the Ghafoor Ministry was composed of 46 Ministers, 
including 22 cabinet Ministers, 20 Ministers of s ta te and 
4 Deputy Ministers. This was the largest three- t ier Congress 
Ministry since independence and the second largest Ministry 
since 1967; the f i r s t being the SSP-led SVD Government of 
Karpoori Thakur. in a l l , there were as many as 22 new faces 
la the Ghafoor Ministry, including the chief Minister himself* 
Of them, 9 were cabinet Ministers, 10 Ministers of s tate and 
3 Deputy Ministers. Five colleagues of Ghafoor were members 
of the vldhan Pari shad, i t was fojp the f i r s t time that so 
many members of the upper House were taken as Ministers, of 
them, two were cabinet Ministers and three Ministers of s ta te . 
Table i n shows the deta i l s of the Abdul Ghafoor Ministry. 
caste-wise Analysis 
As i s clear from Table i n , there were 21 Forward 
caste Ministers (nine cabinet rank and twelve Ministers of 
State) in the Ghafoor Ministry, of them,eight were Brahmins, 
including three Malthil Brahmins, seven Rajputs, f ive Bhumlhars 
and one Kay as the. Among the nine Backward caste Ministers 
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£&§££. 
43 
Showing party, caste/community, constituency, region and 
rural/urban bases of the members of the Ghafoor Ministry, 
1973. 
Reglon/feame 
CABINET MINISTERS 
North p l a i n s 
Daroga Prasad Ral 
Mrs.Ram Dularl 
Sinha 
jagannath Mlshra 
Narslngh Baltha 
Ram J a i p a l Singh 
yadav 
Vldyakar Kavl 
J a l Naraln Mehta 
Kedar Pandey 
Baleshwpr Ram 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
Lal i te shwar Prasad 
Shahl MLA 
Raf ique Alam 
Lahtan chaudhary 
South p l a i n s 
Chandra shekhar 
Singh 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
Shatrughan sharan MLA 
Singh 
Ran Raj Prasad 
Singh 
MLA 
v c a s t e / v Rural/ 9 
ft community ft urban ft const i tuency 
0 ft ft 
Yadav 
Rajput 
Maithl l 
Brahmin 
DhobitSC 
Yadav 
Raj Bhat 
Kolrl 
Brahmin 
Dusadh,sc 
Bhumlhar 
Muslim 
Banla 
Rajput 
Bhumlhar 
Kurml 
Rural 
urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
parasa Isaran) 
Gopalganj (saran) 
jhanjharpur (Darbhanga) 
Bagaha (Champaran) 
Sonepur(saran) 
Alamnagar (saharasa) 
Lhamdaha (purnea) 
Nautan(champaran) 
Hayaghat(Darbhanga) 
ValshalKMuzaf farpwr) 
Klshangan j (purnea) 
Mahlshl (saharasa) 
Chakal (Monghyr) 
Hlsua (Gaya) 
chandl (patna) 
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Chotanagpur 
Sidhu Hombrum MLA 
Karam chand Bhagat MLA 
Theodor Bodra MLA 
Bindeehwarl Dubey MLA 
Shankar Dayal 
Singh 
Abdul Ghafoor 
Mungerl Lai 
MLA 
MLC 
MLC 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
scheduled 
Tribe 
scheduled 
Tribe 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Muslim 
Dusadh,sc 
Rural jagannathpur (singhbhum) 
Rural Bero (Ranchl) 
u rban chakradharpur( Singhbhum) 
Rural Topchanchi (Dhanbad) 
MINISTERS OF STATE 
North plains 
Radha Narxdan jha MLA 
Nitlahvar Prasad MLA 
Singh 
Chaudhary salaluddln 
MLA 
Hay ilia Rai MLA 
S h a m b h u s h a r m n MLA 
Thakur 
Mr8•Prabhawatl 
Gupta 
South plains 
Budhdeo Singh MLA 
Mrs* Manorama MLA 
pandey 
Rsmashray Prasad MLA 
Singh 
Balthi l 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Muslim 
Bhuaihar 
Bhumihar 
MLA nania 
Yadav 
Brahmin 
Rural Madhepur (rarbhanga) 
Rural Gaighatti(Muzaffarpur) 
Rural simri Bakhtlarpur 
(saharasa) 
Rural Kuchalkot (saran) 
Rural Kantl (Muzaffarpur) 
Urban Motlhari (champaran) 
urban Danapur (Pataa) 
Rural Karakat (shahabad) 
Bhumihar Rural Kurtha (Gaya) 
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Hemant Kumar jha MLA 
Prithvi Chand 
Ktsku 
MLA 
Suraj Nath chaubey MLA 
Sadanaad slngh MLA 
Khalld Anwar Anearl MLA 
Matthll Brahmin 
Rural 
scheduled Rural 
Tribe 
Brahmin Rural 
Kurmi Rural 
Muslim Dsban 
Godda (SP) 
poralhat (SP) 
Shahpur(shahabad) 
colgong (Bhagalpur) 
Dehri (shahabad) 
Mlsrl sada 
Ciaotanagpur 
Tapeshwar D«o 
Bhlshma Narain 
Singh 
MLA 
MLA 
MLA 
1 inesh Kumar s ingh MLC 
smt.RaJeshwari 
saroj cat 
pumendu Narain 
Sinha 
BIPUTY MINISTERS 
North p l a i n s 
B i l a t **aswan 
F a l s u l Azan 
south p l a i n s 
MLC 
MLC 
MLA 
MLA 
Mactan Prasaa aingh MLA 
Awadheshwar Ran MLA 
scheduled 
c a s t e 
Rajput 
Rajput 
Rajput 
scheduled 
Tribe 
Kayastha 
Dusaoh, 
SC 
Muslim 
Mallah 
Cha*»r,SC 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Alaul i (Monghyr) 
Chatra (Hazaribagh) 
Les l l ganj (palamu) 
Rajnagar (Darbhaaga) 
S ikta (Champaran) 
Gopalpur(Bhagalpur) 
imamganj (Gaya) 
43* (a) Names of the Ministers* Asian Recorder, August 20*24, 
1973,p.11556; statesman,September zt> and November 18, 
(b) caste of the Ministers,vide supra Footnote 78(b), 
Chapter III, p. 109. 
1*73. 
(c) constituency of the Ministers, vide supra Footnote 13(c), 
Chapter V, p. 282. 
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(five cabinet* throe Minister* of state and one Deputy 
Minister), three were Yadavas, two Banias, two Kurrals, one 
Koiri and one Mail ah. There were five Muslims, including the 
Chief Minister* of them, two were cabinet Ministers, two 
Ministers of state and one Deputy Minister. The Ghaf oor Ministry 
had six scheduled caste Ministers* of them, three were cabinet 
Ministers, one Minister of state and two Deputy Ministers. 
There were five Ministers belonging to the scheduled Tribes* 
Among them, three were cabinet Ministers and the remaining two 
were Ministers of state* 
There were four women in Ghafoor Ministry, one was a 
cabinet Minister and three Ministers of state* while the 
cabinet Minister was a Rajput, of the Ministers of state, one 
was a Brahmin, one a Bania and the remaining one was an Adlvasi* 
TWO women Ministers represented the urban areas of the North 
plains, while one was an MLC and the remaining one came from 
a rural area of the south plains* 
Regional Representation 
So far regional representation In the Ministry was 
concerned, the north plains had again got the highest number* 
Among the twenty Ministers belonging to this region, twelve 
were cabinet Ministers, six Ministers of state and the remain* 
ing two were Deputy Ministers* of the fourteen Ministers 
coming from the south plains, three were cabinet Ministers, 
nine Ministers of state and two Deputy Ministers* The tribal 
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belt of chotanagpur bad secured seven ministerial posts* of 
them, five were in the cabinet and the remaining two were 
Ministers of state. 
Rural/urban analysis 
only six members of the Ghafoor Ministry represented 
the urban areas of the state* of them* three were in the cabinet 
and two were Ministers of state* while three belonged to the 
North plains, one each came from south plains and the chotanag-
pur* 
ReconatltutioB of the Ministry 
By March 1974, the politics of Bihar took a new but 
explosive turn* The 'student Movement* later known as *JP 
Movement' was started with a massive demonstration by the 
students before the Assembly on March 13, 1974 against "The 
high prices, rampant corruption and mounting unemployment 
44 
among the educated youths** Apparently, shaken by the events 
of March 18, the chief Minister attempted, at the instance of 
the central leadership, to reconstitute his Ministry* The 
High command sent AICC General secretary, Mrs* M* Chandra 
shekhar to Patna, on April 9 to prepare the ground for a 
reshuffle* on April 10, within twenty-four hours of her arrival, 
44* Ghanshyam shah. Protest Movemements in TWO Indian states 
U>elhi, Ajanta, AV/7J, p, ¥1. 
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a i l the 45 Ministers in Ghafoor's l0*month*old government 
handed him their resignations * voluntarily' and 'uncondition-
a l l y ' in the presence of Mrs* M. Chandra shekhar. This paved 
the way for a cabinet reshuffle as desired by the congress 
45 
High command. 
The chief Minister, on April 18, dropped 35 of h i s 44 
Ministers and announced a new l4~member (a l l of cabinet rank) 
46 
Ministry. Three new faces were named* They were umesh Prasad 
verma, simon Tigya and suresh Kumar* The cabinet Ministers 
retained were Kedar Pandey, D»P* Rai, Mrs. Ram Dularl slnha, 
Chandra shekhar Singh, J.N. Mtshra, Lahtan chaudhary, sldhu 
Hembsum, Narsingh Baltha, Ram Raj ^rasad Singh and Ramashray 
Prasad Singh. The l a s t named, a Minister of s ta te in the 
outgoing Ministry, was promoted to the rank of cabinet Minister* 
The Governor* R.D. Bhandaca* accepted the resignation of the 
35 dropped Ministers; twelve of them being of Cabinet rank, 
nineteen Ministers of s tate and four Deputy Ministers* Among 
the notable Ministers dropped were the dissident leader, Ran 
ja lpa l Singh yadav, Raf ique Alam, Baleshwar Ram* vldyakar xavi 
and Blndeshwary Dubey. of the four new Ministers, two, namely 
Ramashray Prasad Singh and Simon Tigga were sworn-in on 
47 
April 22 and uraesh Prasad vezma was swom-ln on April 23,1974* 
15* Data India (Press i n s t i t u t e of India, New Delhi),April 8-14, 
W 4 , p. Si* 
46* I b i d . , May 6-12, 1974* p* 98* 
47* Hindustan Times, April 23 and 24, 1974* 
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guresh Kumar/ son of Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister, declined 
to jo in the reconstituted Ministry on April 24* reducing 
i t s strength to 13* 
Of the 13-members of the reconstituted Ministry* there 
were two members each of Rajput and Brahmin and one each of 
Bhuralhar and Kayastha castes* 'There were two men of the 
A divas i s , one of them Simon Tigga was a Minister of s ta t s in 
the f i r s t UF government and again In the shoshlt pal Ministry* 
The Backward castes hao three men, one Yadav, one xurml and 
one bania, in the council of Ministers. There was one man 
each of the Muslims and the scheduled castes* Thus, la the 
reconstituted Ministry * there were s i x members of the upper 
castes* three of the Backward castes* two of the scheduled 
Castes and one each of the scheduled castes and the Muslims* 
However* i t was the party factional infighting which 
was mainly responsible for the prunnlng* The mounting student 
agi tat ion provided an a l i b i for th i s action* The chief Minister 
Abdul Ghafoor* l i k e h i s immediate predecessor* Kedar Pandey, 
was becoming t ired of h i s role as L . N . Mishra's chief Minister 
by proxy* He was in search of some occasion to drop J.N.Mlshra 
and some other Important followers of L.N. Mlshra* The student 
movement provided him an occasion and the encouragement was 
believed to have come from uma shankar Dlkshlt and jagjIvan 
48 
Ram* who v i s i t e d patna soon after March 18* 1974* The chief 
48* ibid** May 29, 1974* 
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Minister had been under constant pressure from the dissidents 
to reconstitute his Ministry, as i t was packed with Mishra*s 
supporters* After March 16, th i s pressure was further increased* 
Zt became clear* when a dozen anti-Ghafoor MLAs led by 
R . L . Singh yadav, Nagendra jha, and Ram Gharan Prasad Singh 
« e t Mrs* M* Chandra shekhar at Patna on April 9, 1974 to 
t e l l her that the Government had virtual ly ceased to ex i s t 
49 
a f ter the March 18 movement, one of the purposes of th i s 
purging drama, as i t was advertised, was to eliminate the 
Ministers with questionable reputations* If i t were so, then 
some powerful men (belonging to Mishra fact ion) , against whom 
some grave charges had been l eve l l ed on the f loor of the 
50 
Assembly* would not have been retained* 
Whatever might have been the motives behind th i s minis-
t e r i a l reshuffle, the chief Minister simply failed* He could 
not refurbish the Image of h is Ministry because men of doubtful 
integr i ty again got into the cabinet* Nor could he succeed 
in gett ing rid of L . N . Mishra's remote control. The reconstl-
tured Ministry merely re-affirmed Mishra*s hold on Bihar 
po l i t i c s* Perhaps, the High command was not In a position to 
ignore Mishra, at l e a s t , in Bihar p o l i t i c s . Mishra had 
succeeded in retaining most of the Ministers belonging to his 
*
9
 • &ata India, April 8*14, 19?4, p. 11* 
50. Hindustan Times, May 29, 19741 Hindu, May IS, 1974* 
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group In the reconstituted Ministry* Excepting two or three, 
a l l members of the pruned team of thirteen belonged to hie 
51 
fac t ion . Thus, the objective of reducing the welghtage in 
favour of Mishra group and, at the same time, getting rid of 
deadwood had not been achieved* 
in tens i f i ed Factional infighting 
The drama of the re constitution of the Ministry only 
Intensif ied the factional s t r i f e In the party and Ghafoor's 
posit ion In the party became untenable* The dominant group 
l ed by L . N . Mishra was suspicious of the loyalty of the chief 
Minister because he had thought of jet t i soning J.N. Mlshra* 
The dissidents were unhappy because none of them found a berth 
In the reconstituted Ghafoor Ministry* on the contrary, their 
sole nominee. Ran Jalpal Singh Yadav, was dropped* some 
dias luents , Including R . L . Singh Yadav and shankar Dayal slngh, 
met the AICC General secretary, on April 20, in new Delhi and 
demanded that besides Ram jalpal slngh Yadav, at l eas t three 
more from the ir group should be Included In the cabinet* They 
a l so urged that some of those whom Ghaf oor had retained and 
against whom there were charges of corruption should be dropped 
1*2 
If the Ministry was to have a better Image. The High Command 
a lso appeared to be convinced that as the reconstituted Cabinet 
51. Hindustan Times, April 19, 1974* 
52. I b l o . , April 24, 1974* 
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was heavily weighted in favour of Mlshra's supporters* it 
could be suitably expanded to meet the demands of a section 
of the party* The chief Minister was summoned to New Delhi 
and there was a rumour that some more dissidents would be 
taken into the cabinet as the Prime Minister was taking direct 
53 
interest in finding a solution to the problem, unfortunately* 
for Bihar, nothing came out of these speculations and the 
infighting within the Congress went on unabated* The congress 
Central leadership itself was divided on this issue, jagjI wan 
Ram* in particular was annoyed that he had not been consulted 
in the matter* It was because of this he eld not permit his 
son to join the reconstituted Ghafoor Ministry* The Defence 
Minister* however* did not come openly against Ghafoor* but 
the dissidents camping in Mew Delhi made it clear that a 
sectional Ministry could not hope to get the united backing 
of the party, in fact* sixty-three dissidents* at a meeting 
on April 21* at the residence of Taneshwar Azad, arrived at 
a consensus that unless the leadership of the Bihar CLP was 
changed and Ministry headed by a new leader* who was not a 
nominee of the "ruling coterie of the union Railway Minister* 
feeling of the 
L.N. Mlshra"* was installed* the/people of the state would 
54 
not be • assuaged ' nor would the current agitation subside" • 
53. Ibid.* April 24* 1974* 
54. Ibid.* April 22* 1974. 
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A deputa t ion of congress MLAs,headed by shatrughan sharan 
Singh, a former Minis ter , c a l l ed on the Congress p res iden t 
55 
and several c e n t r a l l e ade r s and demanded Ghafoor's ous te r . 
Abdul Ghafoor's ous t e r 
The reorganizat ion of the Ministry f a i l ed to c rea te any 
favourable Impact on the course of t he J P movement. There was 
hardly anything to d i s t inguish those , who had been reta ined 
from those 
o r inducted in to of I ice,/who had been dropped, ins tead of 
unifying the Congress in Bihar* i t divided the pa r ty . The 
number of former d i s s iden t s was considerably swelled a f t e r 
they were joined by the'dropped Min i s t e r s ' in t h e i r e f fo r t to 
ous t Ghafoor. over a t h i r d of the 184-member in the Assembly 
were in ac t ive dlss idence consequent upon t h e i r finding no 
56 
represen ta t ion in the refurbished Minis t ry . Yet another weird 
t w i s t was given to the fac t iona l drama when son© of Ghafoor's 
m i n i s t e r i a l colleagues turned aga ins t him, A new and drol l 
category of "Minis te r ia l d i s s iden ts" was added to those of 
honest-to-God d i s s i d e n t s and "dropped Min is te r s" . These 
mutually antagonis t fac t ional impulses converged into a 
chal lenge to Ghafoor, which only the prime Minis ter was able 
t o squelch for him. Abdul Ghafoor, on h i s pa r t , made many 
a t tempts to r e c o n s t i t u t e h i s Ministry again by dropping some 
of Mlshra ' s suppor te rs . He was understood to have told the 
5 6
• I b i d . ( E d i t o r i a l ) , April 26, 1974. 
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High command that the exit of some of Ministers (Mlshra's 
supporters) particularly J.N. Mlshra, would have a favourable 
Impact on the political situation In the state and ensure 
57 
smooth functioning of his Ministry. But the High command was 
not prepared to heed his advice. Father* it had decided to 
accept Ghafoor*s offer of stepping down from the chief Minis-
tership, which he had made, it appeared, in sheer exasperation 
and disgust. The congress Parliamentary Board, on March 11,1975, 
decided to accept the offer of Abdul Qhafoor to step down, 
but a formal announcement had not been made; firstly, because 
the Board had not yet been able to decide on his successor. 
Second, the state Assembly had been in session and it would 
have been unwise to change the chief Minister in the middle 
58 
of the session. However, very soon the Bihar CLP was allowed 
to choose a new leader. 
Thus, another sordid drama came to an end In Bihar 
politics with the exit of Abdul chafoor. Apart from the 
factional fighting, which hact been the legacy of the Congress 
Party, the reconstitutlon of the Ministry hastened the process 
of his exit. Above all, L.N. Mlshra had prepared enough ground, 
before his death on January 2, 1975, for his ouster. Ghafoor 
himself did never claim that he enjoyed the confidence of the 
57
 • Ttsies of India, July 8, 1974. 
58. Hindustan Times, March 12, 1975. 
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party* He had stayed la of f ice a l l th i s time ent ire ly on 
the strength of the support of the central Congress leadership* 
when he was Instal led as the chief Minister* he was given 
out as a Mishra-man selected toy the Prime Minister and was 
widely believed to be Inclined to take the l ine of l e a s t 
res istance, which in effect* meant obeying the 'diktat* of 
L . N . Mishra* This Impression* he proceeded to confirm by 
packing h is Ministry with Mishra*s supporters to the exclusion 
of other groups* EUt the same Mishra turned against him when 
he saw him asserting his independent status* This was not the 
f i r s t time tlvit a puppet had turned against h i s manipulator 
and a •compromise candidate* had proved not so pl iable after 
a l l * The dissidents had never reconciled to the leadership 
of Ghafoor* for the obvious reason that they were not given 
adequate share in the ministerial cake. Large scale prunnlng 
of the council of Ministers* in which 35 Ministers of a l l 
ranks were dropped* created more enemies than Ghafoor could 
manage. Min i s ter ia l i s t s of yesterday turned dissidents of 
today* The other Ministers in the cabinet* some of whoa 
happened to be the lormer chief Ministers* saw a chance for 
pushing themselves into the chief Minister's gaddl in Ghafoor*s 
place* J.N* Mishra also looked for a similar chance for himself* 
Abdul Ghafoor* on h i s part* had encouraged no sychophancy* 
Partyraen and l e g i s l a t o r s expected no financial support from 
him and hardly made a beeline to h i s residence* He had also 
discouraged what was cal led *palrvi' by l eg i s la tors for 
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transfers and postings of o f f i cers . He, of course* had the 
reputation of being more honest than his r ivals / a point 
which jp , too/ made more than once even after he had taken 
up the leadership of the student Movement and made the fight 
60 
against corruption one of I t s plank. But th i s reputation 
nad long ceased to be h i s asse t . He was not so le ly to blame 
for t h i s . The central leaders as well as factional leaders 
in patna prevented him from purging hie cabinet of men of 
doubtful Integrity or even expanding i t in order to bring in 
the l e g i s l a t o r s loyal to him* As a result* few among his 
Cabinet colleagues had any loyalty to him* They continued to 
speak deris ive ly for hire, flouted h is orders* behaved in the 
manner of independent warlords* in such a murky situation* 
he had no alternative but to step down* 
(C) Wfi JAGAMNATH MISHRA GOVERNMENT 
Mlshra as the New CLP Leader 
Removal of Abdul Ghafoor as the only common cause brought 
the diverse factions within the Congress together to campaign 
for a change in leadership. But as soon en the Congress central 
leadership conceded their demand* th i s new-found convenient 
cooperation ended and these groups raced against each other 
59. Chandra Mohan Mlshra,'^ Confusing picture14. Link* January 26* 19?5* p. 37* — 
6 0
 • Times of India (Editorial)* February 8* 1975* 
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in staking the ir claims to leadership. The two main contenders* 
however, were Kedar pandey, the f i r s t Congress chief Minister 
a f ter 1972, and Jagannath Mlshra, an ambitious member of the 
Ghafoor cabinet* Although, the names of Harlnath Mlshra* the 
Speaker of the Assembly and sitarara Kesari# the BPCC President, 
were put up by some groups of l eg i s la tors , they were not very 
serious contenders* However, i t was the familiar magic formula 
of "the Prime M i n i s t e r s wishes", which seemed to have stal led 
a l l opposition to J.N. Mlshra's unanimous election* Though 
the congress High Command had expressed a desire to l e t the 
Legislature party e l ec t i t s leader, apparently, i t could not 
r e s i s t the temptation of interfering at the l a s t moment* in 
f a c t , i t s emissaries were active in promoting a consensus 
and the Prime Minister's name was freely used to create the 
bandwagon ef fect , which compelled Pandey to opt out of the 
61 
race, on April 4, 1975, Kedar pandey publicly stated that 
since i t was the desire of the Prime Minister that J.N .Mlshra 
should be e lected leader, he was withdrawing from the contest 
62 
i n Mlshra's favour* Mlshra had a c lear majority in hie favour 
in the CLP, and the High Command's role in Bihar had, thus, 
given Pandey a chance to save h i s face* By withdrawing from 
the contest for the chief Ministership, Pandey had done the 
63 
only thing he could to avoid defeat, in the circumstances, 
6 1
 • Statesman (Editorial ) , April 7, 1975. 
62* i b i d . . April 5, 1975. 
63* I b i d . , April 7, 1975. 
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J.N. Miehra was* unanimously. e lected the leader of the 
Bihar CLP* on Aprii 6, 1975. Mishra's name was proposed by the 
outgoing chief Minister Abdul ohafoor* who presided ©vsr the 
64 
meeting and i t was supported by Kedar pander • 
Ministry Making 
A lo-meaber two-tier Bihar Ministry* headed by j.N.Mishra, 
was sworn-in on April 11/ 1975/ by the Governor R.I . Bhandare. 
Of these* fifteen* including the chief Minister* were Ministers 
of cabinet rank. The remaining one member was a Minister of 
State* 
Three of the Ministers were not members of e i ther House 
of the Bihar Legislature, They were Nawal Kishore Prasad sinha 
and sukhdeo veroa* both members of the Lok sabha* and zawar 
Hussaln* then the vice-chancellor of the university of Bihar* 
While sinha was a Member of the Lok sabha from Muzaffarpur 
parliamentary constituency in the North plains* vexma was froa 
Nawada Parliamentary constituency in the south plains* zawar 
Hussaln had been a cabinet Minister in the Harihar Singh* 
D.p. Rai and B.p. Pa swan-led FVP coa l i t ion Ministries* Before 
1967* he was a cabinet Minister in the B.N. jha Ministry* 
foxoed in 1961 after S.K. s inha's death. Nawal Kishere Prasad 
Sinha (N .K. sinha) was also a s ta te Minister in the K.B.sahay 
Government. 
6 4 a
 Data India* April 7-13* 1975* p. 236. 
• * • Asian Recorder* June 11-17* 1975, p . 12631. 
3lS 
Five Minister*/ including the chief Minister, were 
members of the reconstituted Ghafoor Ministry. The other four 
were Mrs* Ran cularl slnha, Ram Raj Prasad Singh, Narsingh 
Baltha and Ramashray Prasad Singh* Five Ministers, namely 
Ram Jaipal Singh Yadav* vtdyakar Kavi, Bindeshwari Dubey, 
Theodore Bodra and Karen chand B ha gat were Ministers la the 
e a r l i e r Qhafoor Ministry* Mohairjnad nussain Azad and Ran Ratan 
Ran were new entrants* while the fomer had been a Minister 
in the Harlhar Singh and the D.P. Ral Ministries, the l a t t e r 
was a f i r s t timer* The s tate Minister, Taneshwar Azad, was 
a Minister of s ta te in the f i r s t pandey Ministry and a cabinet 
Minister in h i s second Ministry* 
J . N , Mlshra* 38 years of age, was the youngest chief 
Minister* after sat i sh Prasad singh* the stop-gap-chief 
Minister in 1968* Mlshra Ministry was the smallest-' w l t h the 
I 
exception of the purged Ghafoor Ministry in Bihar since 196?. 
His waa the third congress Ministry after the 1972 el set lens 
and he was the 15th chief Minister since independence and 
12th since 1967• while three of the Ministers were not members 
of the Bihar Legislature* none was taken from the vldhan 
parishad* Table zv shows caste* constituency* region and 
rural/urban bases of the members of the Mlshra Ministry* 
Caste-wise analysis 
of the sixteen Ministers* six were from the upper castes* 
three from the Backward castes* three fron the scheduled castes* 
JUaSStmmmmS&m 
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showing casts/community, constituency, region and 
rural/urban bass* of the maabars of tho j.N.Mlshra 
Ministry, 197S« 
T cas t* / 9 Rural/9 
6 community* urban | 
i ! L 
Ragloa/teame Constituency 
CAbXMJBT MIMISTERS 
jagaaaath Mishra MLA Maithil 
Brahmin 
Mrs.kam sular l slaha MLA Kajpufc 
R « Jalpal singh 
YaOav 
Vldyakar KBV! 
MLA Yadav 
Rural 
Rural 
Narslngh Baltha 
Mohd^Huasaln Aaad 
South Plains 
Ram Raj Prasad six 
Raaashray Prasad I 
£hot 
MLA Raj Bhatt Rural 
MLA Dhobt,6C Rural 
MLA Muslim Rural 
jhanjhsrpur 
(Darbhaaga) 
Gopalganj (saxaa) 
Soneour (saran) 
Alamnayar (?n harass) 
Bagaha(Chawparan) 
Thakurganj (puraea) 
Blndeshwari Dubsy 
Theodora Bodra 
Karaa chand Bhagat 
Ram Ratau Ran 
Moo-Leglslatora 
zawar Hussain Azad 
MLA Kurral 
jh MLA Bhumihar 
MLA Brahmin 
MLA S.T. 
MLA S«T* 
MLA chamar«sc 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Chandl (pataa) 
Kurtha (Gays) 
Bermo (fiazarlbagh) 
Chakrad harpurt slnyhbl—i) 
Bero iRanchi) 
S l l l l (Ranchl) 
Muslim vPormer vice-chancellor, Bihar 
University, Nusaffarpur) 
Nawal Klahor* Prasad sinha 
MB Bhumihar 
sukhdeo vara* MB Kolri 
chotaaaopur 
TaBMfttsIrAsad MLA S.C. 
Musaf f arpuriMusaf farpur) 
Nawada (Gaya) 
uiral Gawan (liazaribagh) 
66Hteaaas of the Ministers, Asian Recorder, Juno U - l 7 , U 7 S . n . l 2 4 1 1 . 
(b)caat* of the Mlniste rsVVMi M i O S o t n o t o 11<bi.cbj*c*r m ? 
( c o n s t i t u e n c y of the Ministers, v ide supra Footnote 11(e)* 
cnaptar v , p. 262* 
317 
two from the scheduled Tribes and the retoaining two were 
Muslims* Among the Forward caste Ministers, throe were Brahmins, 
including a Maithll Brahmin, two Bhumihara audi one was a 
Rajput* of the three Backward caste Ministers, one belonged 
each to Kurml, Koiri and Yadav castes* Among the three 
scheduled caste Ministers, one was a Minister of state. 
Regional Representation 
The North plains hao got seven ministerial seats, 
including that of NKP sinha, in the J.N, Miahra Ministry.All 
of them were in the cabinet* There were five Ministers who 
came from the tribal belt of chotanagpur* one of these was a 
Minister of State. The south Plains hao got three seats in 
the third congress Ministry since 1972. This induces sukhdeo 
verma also* 
Barring two cabinet Ministers, all other members of the 
Mlshra Ministry represented the rural areas of the state. Of 
the two Ministers coming from the urban areas, one belonged 
each to the North plains and the tribal belt of chotanagpur* 
with regard to the composition of the J„N. Mlshra 
Ministry, it is important to note that the three non-Legislator 
Ministers, who had been brought in, perhaps, to give the 
Cabinet a • clean image*, had to resign from the cabinet after 
six months, as they failed to get themselves elected to any 
•7 
of the Houses of the Legislature* They resigned on October 9/1975. 
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With the ir resignation, the Mishra Ministry consisted of 
13 Ministers/ the same number as in the prunned Ghafoor 
Ministry, of these Ministers* f i ve were of the upper castes 
(three Brahmins, one Rajput and one Bhumihar)* two Backward 
caste Ministers* three scheduled caste Ministers* two of the 
Scheduled Tribes and the remaining one was a Muslim. 
Dismissal of the Mishra Ministry 
The J . N . Mishra Ministry remained in of f ice t i l l April 
30, 1977. on une same day* the acting president, B . D . j a t t i , 
dissolved the Assemblies in nine congress-ruled states* 
including Bihar, and placed them under president's Rule t i l l 
the completion of the fresh e lect ions in the middle of June 
that year. An o f f i c i a l release said that Ministries in the 
nine s ta te s - ut tar Pradesh* Bihar* west Bengal* or issa , 
Madhya Pradesh* Punjab* Haryana* Hlraachal Pradesh and Rajasthan 
68 
had 'vacated' o f l i c e . 
in the period ranging from April* 1975 to April* 1977* 
some important events had taken place on the po l i t i ca l scene 
of the country* which favourably contributed,to a large extent, 
to the continuity of the Mishra Ministry. Mrs. Indira Gandhi's 
e lec t ion to the Lok sabha in 1971 was declared void by the 
Allahabad High court on May 12* 1975 and debarred her from 
66. Asian Recorder* June 4-10* 1977* p. 13766. 
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holding any e l ec t ive of f ice for s ix years on grounds of 
corrupt pract ices . This verdict brought in a po l i t i ca l storm 
in the country* The opposition parties/ with the exception of 
the CPI* started demanding the resignation of the Prime 
Minister and threatened to launch a nation-wide agitation for 
t h i s purpose* on June 26, the Government of India proclaimed 
a s tate of emergency throughout the country to counter an 
al leged conspiracy aimed at v io lent ly overthrowing i t* Thus, 
by mid-1975 p o l i t i c a l s ituation came to such a pass that 
Congressmen had to ra l ly round Mrs. Gandhi. Hot that they 
forgot the ir personal ambitions, nor did their factional 
infighting came to an end, but in the 'hours of c r i s i s ' , they 
had to show superficial unity. 
Barring these fateful events, there was nothing la the 
Mlshra Ministry, which could provide s tab i l i t y to h i s Govern* 
ment. on the contrary, there were signs of yet another 
ministerial c r i s i s . For one thing, the takeover by Mlshra had 
not brought about any qual i tat ive change in the s i tuation. 
The finf ighting in the s tate congress had only been s t i l l e d 
for the time being and the Mlshra Ministry was hardly an answer 
to the factionalism in the party, in fact , Mlshra had himself 
sprung a few disagreeable surprises. Neither Kedar Pandey nor 
Abdul Ghafoor had been accommodated and R . L . Singh Yadav's 
claims had been ignored, prom among the followers of these 
69 
three only two had been included la the cabinet, in th is 
6 9
• Statesman, April IS, 1975. 
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s i tuat ion, Mlshra had not been l e f t in any doubt about the 
resentment he had provoked among the factional leaders* Except 
Ghaf oor, none of them were present at the swearing-in of the 
new government, even the BPCC chief, sltaram Kesari, stayed 
70 
awayy. 
Miahra's own followers and the f ence - s i t t ers , who had 
subsequently jumped on his bandwagon,were not going to wait 
indef in i te ly for the payment of their price for support.There 
were as many as 80 aspirants in the Mlshra camp for ministerial 
berths and only 11 of them had so far found a place in the 
71 
Ministry. Already, there was wide-spread discontent in his 
camp over the Induction into h is Ministry of the two members 
72 
of the Lok sabha and the vice-chancellor of the Bihar university, 
Further, Mishra owed h i s elevation to the chief Ministership 
to a powerful group of congressmen created by h i s elder 
73 
brother L.N* Mlshra's 'po l i t i c s of money and patronage'. The 
l a t e Mlshra, however, had the a b i l i t y , cleverness and resources 
to handle ana control the 'Frankenstein* he had created. He 
was the acknowledged boss and mentor of h i s followers. But 
with the death of h i s po l i t i ca l mentor and h is inabi l i ty to 
70. ibid. 
7i
• Hindu, May 6, 1975. 
72. ibid. 
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obl ige most of h i s followers by making them Ministers or by 
offering them profitable and juicy jobs* smooch sai l ing for 
the younger Mishra could not be expected. Mlshra's unopposed 
e l ec t ion as the leader of the CLP was due, at l ea s t in soae 
degree, to the psycholotical climate resulting frost the 
samastipur bomb blast , which caused the death of the elder 
Mishra* Moreover, the quest for contrived unanimity, which 
was then the rule rather than an exception, seemed to have 
become a fe t i sh with the congress* The Congress appeared to 
have considered a contest a p o l i t i c a l set-back for the party* 
But given the unstable s ituation in the s ta t e , th i s sort of 
unanimity was hardly an enduring po l i t i ca l asset* There was 
no guarantee that Mishra would not s l i p into the same situation 
in which both Kedar pandey and Abdul Ghafoor found themselves 
soon after assuming office* Bihar's record did not support 
the assumption that the High command's Involvement in Mlshra's 
e l e c t i o n was enough to shield him from factional attacks* 
past experience was enough to show that papering over of 
differences seldom lasted and i t would have been a matter of 
months, i f not weeks, before the rival fact ions began clamour-
ing for more posts a l l over again* 
* 
Moreover, JP Movement was expected to be intensif ied 
after, a massive 'March to parliament' in March 1975 and i t 
was hard to see how Mishra was better equipped than his 
predecessor to deal with a situation that was getting d i f f i cu l t 
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Thus* given the circumstances* in which Mishra had. won the 
race, i t could hardly be taken for granted that he could 
have remained in of f ice much longer than h i s predecessors* 
conclusions* 1972-1977 
That three congress Ministries came to power in a 
period of three years and three months (from March 1972 to 
june 1975} was a clear testimony of the oligarchic nature 
of governments in Bihar* corruption and ins tabi l i ty were only 
the symptoms* The hope of the Bihar electorate, that the 
Congress party* headed by Mrs* Indira Gandhi* would provide 
s t a b i l i t y to the s tate administration* was simply belled* 
The surfe i t of promises with which the Congressmen fed the 
poor masses of Bihar a t the time of e lect ion - of stabil ity* 
prosperity and better l i f e - proved to be mere sound and fury 
signifying notning. They forgot the promises* they had made 
to the people of the s tate and got busy in factional fighting 
for a share in the ministerial cake. The irony of the 
s i tuat ion was that a l l the three chief Ministers were the 
•unanimous' choice of the congress l eg i s la tors in Bihar* but 
the moment they assumed office* they came under heavy pressure 
from the prominent groups in the s ta te congress* which claimed 
patronage of some central leaders* pressure by the aspirants 
to the Ministership never ended and the chief Ministers soon 
rea l i sed that they could not please everybody in the party* 
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Then came the diss idents , who were thirsty of the chief 
Minister's blood. Lissldence In Eihar had been bui l t up not 
over Ideology and ministerial programme and performance, but 
over the inclusion in or the exclusion from the cabinet of 
some leaders of pressure groups and fact ions . Thus, there 
was no group interested in addressing i t s e l f to the task of 
bringing about much needed basic economic and social changes 
in the s t a t e . They fought among themselves for the division 
and redlvision of spoils* 
The congress central leadership must share the blame 
that i t never allowed the s tate party a free choice to e l ec t 
i t s leader. They fa i l ed in preventing the men at the centre 
from interfering in the s tate party a f fa irs . The root cause 
of the ministerial f iascos in Patna was the fact that state 
p o l i t i c s for long been subjected to long distance control 
by central leaders, particularly L.N. Mishra. He had assumed 
the ro le of the 'king maker' in Bihar. He was instrumental 
in making 1 .p • Rai the chief Minister, immediately after the 
Congress s p l i t in 1969 and he got him thrown out in no time. 
After 1972, f i r s t xedar Pandey and then Abdul Ghafoor became 
the chief Ministers with h i s backing. But he soon got d i s -
i l lus ioned with them, because both of them refused to be his 
mere puppets at patne for a very long, consequently, both 
of them had to go. 
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The real tragedy of the Bihar goings was that these 
compulsions of party bickerings and manoeuvres had so badly 
engaged the congressmen that they fa i led to read the wrrttng 
on the wall even after March, 1974. instead of facing the 
s i tuation unitedly* their only concern had been a continuous 
jockeying for power of which the campaign for the ouster of 
the chief Minister had been but one of the manifest symptoms. 
Thus, the continuous misgovernment of Bihar had landed the 
State in such dire s t ra i t s that even the worst c r i t i c of JP 
would have to concede that he had ample provocation. The 
chronic administrative incompetence and corruption had been 
compounded by exclusive ministerial preoccupation with shame-
ful infighting and a constant struggle for sheer survival. 
Thus, the period was also one of continued Instabi l i ty worse 
than under the united Fronts. The Front part ies , at least , 
had the f lg leaf Ideology to cover their dissioence, but the 
Congress Party, having got brute majority in the legis lature, 
had nothing to hide their hunger of power. The Instal lation 
of third Ministry in three years bore testimony to the ruling 
party's determination to hang on to power by any means. 
CHAPTER VX 
PERFORMANCE OF THE QOVBRMMEltrS 
For the purpose of evaluating the performance of the 
governments th i s chapter has been divided into two parts tone 
dealing with the coa l i t ion governments and the other with 
Congress governments* 
COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
Most of the coa l i t ion governments came to power on the 
bas i s of an agreed comroon-mtnimum-programroe. However, the 
common minimum programme cannot Include a l l the promises of 
the part ies forming the coal i t ion because coal i t ion formation 
involves the process of cleavage and consensus* Naturally, 
a l l the promises of the constituent part ies , which they had 
made to the e lectorate of Bihar in 1967 and 1969 elections* 
could not find place in different common minimum programmes* 
But a common minimum programme can be taken as promises of 
a particular government to the people of the state* 
Programmes of the F irs t united Front Government 
The f i r s t UF government started functioning on the basis 
of a 33-point common minimum programme* The then Governor of 
Bihar, Ananthsayanam Ayyangar, while addressing the joint 
1* J .C. Johari, 'Reflections on Indian pol it ies ' , (New Delhi? 
S. Chand & Co. , 1U74), p* 6V 
325 
326 
sess ion of the Bihar Legislature announced the following 
2 
33-point programs. 
1 . Fixation of price with a view to reducing the foodgraln 
prices and the cost of essential goods and taking 
drastic actions against blockmark©ting, hoarding* 
profiteering and speculation. 
2 . Bringing about Improvement in the distribution of 
government foodyralns and ending the system of private 
s tockis t s In the distribution of foodgralns. 
3 . Cancellation of notices served on agriculturists under 
foodgralns levy order and withdrawl of cases launched 
in th i s connection. 
4. Arrangement of proper help to the drought affected 
people of the s ta te , especial ly the students and 
suspension of land rent for the current year. 
5. sarly completion of irrigation* drainage and flood-
control schemes and giving priority to the pumping sets 
and tubewells in e lec tr i f i ca t ion and fu l l u t i l i sa t ion 
of irr igat ion fac i l i t y* 
6. (a) Taking necessary steps to withdraw increase in irrigation 
rates* 
(b) school fees and municipal fees during the last two 
years and cancellation of irrigation cess. 
2. Indian Nation (patna), March 18, 1967. 
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7. Abolition of land revenue ay stem. 
8. ending Tata's special rights in Jamshedpur city. 
9* Restoration of the ancestoral forest rights of the Klsans 
living in forest areas* 
10. Taking proper steps to minimise rural indebtedness. 
11. Giving necessary financial help to small peasants through 
the cooperatives to increase their productive capacity. 
12. iistribution of arable barren land among landless. 
13. immediate tenancy rights to land labourers anc landless 
peasants on homestead land. 
14. Linking of n.A. of the nongazetted employee? with the 
central Government employees. 
15. Reorganization of the trade unions on the basis of plebiscite. 
16* Execution of decisions of the courts and labour tribunals 
and all actions against the defaulters. 
17. judicial enquiries into the Klahanganj, samastipur, 
Muzaffarpur and patna police firings. 
18. Release of all political prisoners and withdraw 1 of cases 
against students and political workers, withdrawl of all 
restrictions on public meetings and demonstrations —*J 
banning the entry of police into educational insti 
without the permission of their respective heads. 
19. Amendment in the police manuals and framing them a 
to democratic needs. 
20. Taking necessary steps to give a new direction to educational 
policy and giving Immediate attention to the demands of 
the students and teachers. 
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21 . severe austerity in administration and of governmental 
lavishness ana misuse, reduction of salaries and 
allowances of the Ministers* 
22. Appointment of a separate junior Public service commission 
for the nongazetted employees* 
23* Jill governmental work to be done necessarily in Hindi, 
recognition of Urdu as the second o f f i c ia l language 
and encouragement and protection to the languages of 
jUivasis and minority communities* 
24* Taking proper steps for the upliftraent of narijans, 
Adivasi£ and backward classes* 
25* Proper constitution of Panchayat Samities, z i l a Parishads 
and other local bodies after e lect ion within a year and 
ending the nomination system in the local bodies and 
replacing them with system of cooption, 
26* Reconsideration of the s t a t e ' s Fourth Plan and redrafting 
i t according to the development needs of the state* 
27* organization on a large scale the small and home indus-
t r i e s in rural and urban areas for the unemployed masses* 
26* Demand for more financial and industrial rights to the 
State from the union Government with a view to strengthen-
ing the s t a t e ' s economy* 
29* Taking ef fect ive steps to end corruption in general 
administration and reform the administrative machinery* 
30. Taking necessary steps to enquire into the bungling* 
of the Road Transport corporation and the Bihar State 
e l e c t r i c i t y Board* 
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31* Appointment of a higher power commission to probe 
cases of corruption* 
32* Appointment of a separate commission to be presided 
over by a High court judge to enquire into definite 
charges of corruption against the members of the l a s t 
Council of Ministers* 
33. submission of accounts of the personal and family 
property by the members of the present ministry to the 
State Legislature within a week of the commencement 
of the present session. 
Thus* the programmes of the f i r s t UF government can 
be c la s s i f i ed into f ive categories:-
( I ) concession to various Interest groups l ike students, 
teachers, government employees and supporters of Urdu; 
( I I ) Rectif ication of alleged congress misdeeds - release 
of po l i t i ca l prisoners, ins t i tut ion of judicial inqulrl* 
Into charges of corruption against Congress Ministers 
and pol ice f i r ings under the congress regime; 
( i l l ) wlthdrawl of unpopular measures and taxes - grain 
procurement order, previous Increase in taxation, the 
land revenue; 
( iv ) provision of various agricultural benefits; 
(v) Promise to provide e f t l c i en t administration, eliminate 
corruption and check r is ing prices* 
people and did not seek to touch any major problem ot casic 
c lass relations* However* the programme was progressive and 
democratic and did not contain even a s ingle communal and 
reactionary slogan. 
programmes of the F ir s t and second shoshlt Dal Governments 
The formation of the f i r s t shoshlt Dal Ministry under 
Satlsh Prasad Singh, as i s mentioned in the third chapter* 
was a stop-gap arrangement to make the way clear for B»P. 
Mandal. The Mandal Ministry was a defector's government and 
i t s main object was to seize power* L.N. sudhanshu termed 
the s no sh i t Dal Ministry as "a group of power-hungry persons 
reared on the i l l - g o t t e n money of ill-famed and power-
3 
hungry politicians**. Prem Bhashin, the General secretary of 
the PSP, described shat the way Mandal was made chief 
Minister as "nothing short of fraud on the democratic consti-
4 
tutlon of India". The Times of India commented edi tor ia l ly 
that Mandal was a leader not of any party but of a group of 
defectors and any fa i lure to provide suitable berths to a l l 
3 . New Age (Delhi) , March 3, 1968, p. 9 . 
4 . gnbnaah c . Kashyap, 'The p o l i t i c s of Power',(pelhit 
National, 1974). p. 3TH 
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the supporters were l ike ly to snap the only bond which holds 
5 
them together. Therefore, a government of purely self-seeker* 
and power lovers did not Introduce any common minimum 
programme In order to form a government* 
Programmes of the Fourth coa l i t ion Government 
The fourth coal i t ion and the second UF government, 
under B*P* shastr i , came to power on the basis of a 31-ooint 
common minimum progra rame. i t i s important that the const i -
tuents of the UF f i r s t formulated a 17-point tentative 
programme, avoiding controversial points, to prevent the 
6 
Governor from delaying the formation of the government* 
The 17-point programme was further improved and elabora-
ted into 31-point programme by the coordination committee 
of the UF in i t s meeting on April 25, 1966* 
7 
The programme envisaged the following measures:" 
1* TO strengthen the financial posit ion of the statej 
2. TO str ive for getting from the centre reasonable 
share of financial assistance for Bihar; 
3* TO make Bihar se l f - suf f i c ient and strengthen the 
financial position of s tate Road Transport Corporation, 
5« Sold. , p. 323* 
6* Jagannath sarkar, 'Problems and Prospects of Bihar SVD 
government', Hew Age, June 9, 1968, p. 9 , 
7* Indian Nation, April 27, 1968* 
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State E lec tr ic i ty Board and such other autonomous 
bodies in the public sector; 
4. TO effect austerity and eliminate wasteful expenditure 
in administration! 
5 . To set up at the ear l i e s t an all-party committee to 
recommend measures to improve the administration and 
to implement the recommendations at the ear l ies t ; 
6* To improve the entire administration of s ta te besides 
educational ins t i tut ions and law and order situation; 
7 . To guarantee the rights of freedom to the c i t izens; 
8 . TO provioe adequate protection to comparatively weaker 
sections of the people and develop national outlook 
by eliminating casteism and communal ism. 
9 . TO ef fect necessary amendments in the pol ice and j a U 
manuals* 
10 . TO hold e lec t ions in the Panchayats* Panchayat saraitis 
and local bodies* to abolish the system of nominations 
and to implement at the ear l i e s t the panchayat Raj 
Scheme in the s tate; 
11 . TO appoint a high power anti-corruption commission 
for taking suitable steps in the cases of I l legal 
amassing of wealth and Indulging In corrupt practices; 
12* To make proper arrangement for smooth functioning 
of Aiyar Commission. 
13 . TO take the following steps tn order to make the 
State se l f - suf f i c i ent in food production at the ear l ies t ! 
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(a) extention of Irrigation system with special 
stress on the use of underground water resources; 
(b) early Implementation of rural electrification; 
(c) to take necessary steps for the modernisation 
and improvement of agricultural methods and use 
of improved seeds, necessary fertilizers and 
intensive cultivation; 
(dj to pursue the policy of price-support and see 
that the farmer got reasonable prices for their 
produce* 
(a) To set up new industries and expand the existing 
ones in order to earn additional revenues for the 
State; 
(b) TO solve the problem of unemployment* particularly, 
those of technical men and reduce economic and 
social disparities and to give preference to local 
people in the appointment of industrial undertakings* 
(a) TO rigidly enforce labour laws and Implement the 
Tribunal awards and compromise and take suitable 
action against the offenders; 
(b) TO guarantee security of service to labourers and 
employees and solve the problem of recognition of 
trade union by plebiscite. 
To take effective measures for streamlining the 
posting and service conditions of the nongazetted 
employees and teachers so that they are not deprived 
of justice and equity; 
To take necessary steps to Implement measures under 
land ceiling, consolidation of holdings and other 
land reform scheme; 
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18. TO tate stops for the restoration of Il legally 
occupied land of Adlvasi*; 
19. TO give proprietory rights to the landless people and 
cultivators on the homestead lands; 
20* TO distribute available fallow land culturable 
government land among the agricultural labourers ana 
poor fazwsrst especially Harijans and Adivasis; 
21* TO state suitable amendoente in the Bihar Money Landing 
Act and set up panchayat Boards to reduce the pressure 
of old debt on the f ana era and agricultural labourers; 
22* TO abolish the remaining intumeoiary zamineari rights; 
23* To exempt uneconomic holdings of th6tn ,p o v e r l 8 h e d 
peasants from the payment o£ land rent; 
24. TO implement the recommendations of the chebar 
commission, Kate Kalelter commission and Thakkar Bappa 
commission for the welfare and upllftment of Harljans, 
Aulvasls and backward classes people*-
25. TO protect and restore the traditional rights of 
people l iving in forest areas provided these do not 
come in the forest; 
26. TO reorganize the educational system as par recommen-
dations of the Hotharl commission in such a way as to 
mate possible national solidarity* economic upllftment 
and social changes and strive for securing adequate 
financial help from the union Government to achieve 
these ends; 
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27. TO Introduce free and compulsory education up to 
the middle stage as a f i r s t step towards achieving 
the goal of free and compulsory education upto 
secondary stagey 
28 • TO take necessary steps for the development and protec-
t ion of a l l languages studied, written and spoken 
In Bihar; 
29* TO take drastic steps against profiteers and black-
marketeers and make available foodgralns and other 
essential commodities to consumers on reasonable price; 
30 . TO make the Fourth Five year plan of the s tate 
agriculture and employment - oriented; 
31* TO reconsider such decisions and orders taken by the 
outgoing shoshit Dal government as were against public 
Interests . 
The main thrust of the 31-point programme was toward 
Improving the socio-economic conditions of the people and also 
streamlining the administration of the s t a t e , i t may be 
mentioned* however, that some of the points, which created 
b i t terness among the constituents of the f i r s t UF, were not 
mentioned spec i f i ca l ly in the new programme* For example, the 
abol i t ion of the Tata's zamlndarl at jamshedpur was not 
mentioned clearly though Item number 22 of the 31-point 
programme did include Tata's zamlndarl also* similarly* the 
question of the protection of rights of 'bataldars* was not 
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mentioned* so was the case with making Urdu the second 
o f f i c i a l language of the s t a t e . The programme was also non-
commltal about Immediate switch-over to Hindi or disconti -
nuance of English in o f t l c l a l work. 
Programmes of the Fi f th coa l i t ion Government 
The f i r s t - ever congress-led coa l i t ion .headed by 
saxdar Harihar singh,had no specif ied programme agreed by 
the partners of the coa l i t ion , nevertheless* the budget 
address of the Governor mentioned some pr ior i t i e s of the 
8 
governments 
1. TO remit 50 per cent of the foodgralns that farmers 
were asked to pay under procurement drive. The rice 
miller8 and wholesalers $ howefeer* would have to pay 
at the old rate. 
2. TO ensure maximum economy in administration and to 
eliminate wasteful expenditure. 
3. TO obtain assistance from the centre to quicken the 
pace of agricultural development! to make the state 
self "-sufficient in food. 
4. TO provide irrigation facilities and to implement 
flood protection and drainage schemes expediously. 
5. TO take steps to reduce the indebtedness of the 
8. ibid.. March l4« 1969. 
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Klsana and to lncr«as« the purchasing power with the 
help of cooperative societies* 
6. TO maintain law and order at all costs. 
7* To take steps on a massive scale to establish small 
scale industries in rural and urban areas to reduce 
the presence of unemployment. 
8. To make special efforts in the direction of bringing 
the economy of public sector undertakings like the 
Electricity Board and the state Transport corporation 
in order. 
9, (a) TO take special measures to provide the much needed 
facilities to private sector industrialists; 
(b) to make land and power available to Industrialists 
at reasonable and concessional rates; 
(c) to take steps to organise Industrial estates being 
run by the industrial Development corporation in the 
State to Increase their production capacity. 
10. TO expedite all schemes aimed at increasing food 
production. 
11. To give top priority to irrigation and flood control 
schemes and to make available to farmers loans on 
easy terms. 
12. TO make provision of land* water* transport and power 
for faster development of Industries, specially 
small scale units In the private sectors. 
13. To take steps to Improve educational institutions and 
public health measures. 
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14. To give special care to schemes for the upl i f t of 
Harijans* backward c lasses and Adivasls* 
15. To set up a Regional Advisory Board to look into 
the special problems of chotanagpur and santhal-
paraganas. 
of these programmes* item number 9 shows that private 
Industr ia l i s t s had considerable influence on the Government. 
This might have been included on the behest of the Janata 
party and the swatantra Party whose support was v i ta l for 
the survival of the government* The pro gramme fa i l ed to 
mention any step to eradicate corruption in the s tate adminis-
tration • I t was s i l e n t s ignif icantly on taking steps to 
implement land ce l l ing laws and protecting the rights of 
sharecroppers* 
Programmes of the s ixth coal i t ion Government 
The second sheshiri Government did not introduce 
any fresh common minimum programme, i t was formed on the 
b a s i s of the 31-poittt programme which had been agreed upon 
by the constituents of the UF at the time of the formation 
of the fourth coa l i t ion government headed by shaetri himself. 
However* the jan sangh wanted some modifications in that 
9 
programme a l s o . The government resigned after remaining in 
9 . X a t i e r , "Tete-rele, po l i t i ca l Ethics" # Indian nation, June 30, 1969. 
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power for nine days only as the jan sangh withdrew I t s 
support to the government, 
Programmes of the seventh coal i t ion Government 
The congress(R;»led coal i t ion government under the 
leadership of D.P. Ral formulated a 35-point common minimum 
programme as guideline for I t s functioning. The programme 
drawn by the six-party al l iance submitted to the Governor 
in the night of February 13, 1970, 
The preamble of the programme declared that i t had 
been drawn up by the common desire to improve the social and 
economic conditions of the people to reduce social inequali-
t i e s , ensure social reform and ensure a clean e f f i c i ent and 
democratic administration, to abolish a l l forms of exploita-
10 
t ion and to achieve goals of democracy and socialism, 
The programme* i t was said* would have to be implemented 
in phases. However, the following items would be implementedi 
1 , TO implement agrarian reforms such as recording of 
homesteads, reduction in the ce l l ing on land holdings, 
distribution of waste lands, 
2 , TO provide drinking water to Harljans and Adivasls, 
3 , TO provide irrigat ion, e l e c t r i c i t y and various technical 
aids for the speedy development of agriculture, 
10, Indian Nation, February 14, 1970, 
340 
4* To abolish rent on uneconomic holdings* 
5. TO reduce unemployment. 
6* To protect the legitimate rights of workers* 
1. TO safeguard the interests of the weaker and backward 
sections of the people and minorities* 
The other important points of the programme werej 
6* ensuring clean and efficient administration, and for 
tnls purpose the -
(a} institution of Lok pal and Lok Ayukta to investi-
gate into complaints of corruption against 
ministers and high government officials and to 
(b) expeditiously examine the findings of the Madholkar 
and Aiyar commissions of enquiry for taking 
appropriate follow-up action* 
9*(a) To set up consultative committees attached to every 
ministry and of a 
(b) state Administration Reforms committee* 
lo. To modify police code and the jail code to make them 
conform to a democratic set up, 
11* To abolish upper council. 
12* TO take over the zamindari rights of Tata* 
13* To nationalise sugar industries* 
Thus, the D.P* Rsi Ministry was the first to give top 
priority to agrarian reforms, land ceiling and distribution 
of surplus and waste lands* It was again the seventh coalition 
that envisaged the institutions of Lok Pal and Lok Ayukta 
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to check corruption in high-upa. Abolition of the upper 
House of the s tate Leglslatto re and nationalisation of sugar 
industries were also the innovations of th i s government. 
Apart from tne above mentioned programmes* D.p. Rai, 
while broadcasting in the night of February 16* 1970, assured 
the people that (a) law and order would be maintained without 
fear and favour, (b) problems of non-gazetted employees 
would soon be dealt with, (c) service conditions of the 
Panchayat sevaks, jan sevaks, Dafadara ana chowkldara would 
be studied, and (d) education upto the middle standard would 
11 
be made completely free . 
programmes of the slgfch coa l i t ion Government 
The constituent units of the ssP-ied SVD Government 
f ina l i sed the following 26-point programme, which was 
announced by the Governor in his budget adore as to the state 
12 
Legislature. 
l * (a ) TO end land rent on uneconomic holdings; 
(b) TO make a new law on land ce l l ing; to form a land 
Commission to define profitable holding* decide boundary, 
ce i l ing and implement other measures of land reforms; 
11. Ib id , , February 17, 1970. 
12« Governor's Address, Bihar Legislative Assembly Debates* 
Vol. v i . No. 1, March 16, 1971, pp. 10-12; Lata indiTT 
(Delhi) , April 23-29, 1971, p. 10115. 
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to take steps to bring uniformity in land revenue 
along with land ce l l ing; 
(cj to implement s t r i c t l y and honestly the exist ing Act 
of land ce i l ing as long as a new Act i s not passed; 
(d) To take immediate steps to end i l l e g a l occupation or 
i l l e g a l arrangements and i l l e g a l transfers of land; 
(e) To guarantee legal rights of the share-croppers and 
Implement the laws concerning these measures* 
2 . To give rights to privileged persons on homestead land 
and distribute culturable and fallow land to the landless 
people« 
3 . i o take steps to provide drinking water to Harijans, 
Adlvasls and other v i l lages of poor people* 
4* To make necessary amendments in Homestead Act and 
implement them in the urban areas where i t seems to 
be necessary; 
5* TO hold secret poll for e lect ion of proper representa-
tion of Labour unions and matter relating to th«ir 
recognition* 
6* (a)To end the use of English in o f f i c i a l work; 
(b)to end the use of English as a compulsory subj< 
a medium of instruction in educational lnstitut 
( c ) to end the use of English in the working of cov 
(d)to discontinue the provision of compulsory EngJ 
the examination of public service commission. 
7. TO bring uniformity in primary education. 
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8. TO Introduce free and compulsory education upto 
Class VII • 
9 . TO provide special f a c i l i t i e s and opportunities in 
education and employment to Harljan, Adlvasls*women 
and other social backward castes* 
lo* TO provide to the farmers water, e l ec tr ic i ty* seeds, 
f e r t i l i z e r s etc* at cheaper rates and give priority 
to small farmers* 
11 , TO use on a large-scale governmental and non-governmen-
tal resources for irrigation of cultivable land of 
Bihar* 
12 . To se t up ins t i tut ions of Lokpal and Lok Ayukta for 
clean and e f f i c i ent administration; to take action 
according to the recommendations of the commission 
established for ending corruption* 
13* To make police force strong and efr lc lent and implement 
the recommendations of the pol ice commission* 
14* To prepare a so l id plan for the development of industry 
in Bihar in such a way that new Industries may be 
set up* 
15* To take steps to make public sector industries* 
corporations and boards profitable and to give workers 
share In their management* 
16* To prepare a free and broad Five year Plan in order 
to provide employment to I l l i t erate* half-1 Iterate 
and 1iterated unemployed; to provide employment to 
technical hand within f ive years* 
U4 
17. TO end the system ©* money landing In tr ibal , mines 
and industrial areas and to provide a special system 
of debts in these areas; to implement s t r i c t l y the 
laws for restoring i l l e g a l l y acquired land to A diva s i s . 
18 . TO restore to the people l i v i n g in the forest area 
their ancestral rights provided they do not hinder 
protection and development of forests* to make farm 
land available to poor people in forest belt* 
19. To set up an Autonomous Regional Development Board 
for chotanagpur and santhal paraganas# the powers and 
functions of these Boards would be determined by the 
State Government. 
20. TO implement the recommendations of Lhebar commission* 
Kaka Kalelkar commission, Thakkar aappa commission 
and Niyogl commission and Adlvasi and Harijan commissions 
21 . TO take steps for the upllftment of the economically 
weak sect ions . 
22. TO hold e lect ions for a l l suspended municipalities 
within s i x months and to convert exist ing notif ied 
areas into v i l lage panchayat or municipalities* 
23* TO implement immediately the panchayat Raj scheme 
in the s t a t e . 
24* TO give priority to road construction in vi l lages* 
25* TO implement Forest l e t s to protect and preserve 
animals. 
26* To control unnecessary transport of food grains in 
the s t a t e . 
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The 26-point programme of the Karpoorl Thakur-led 
SVD Government had some interesting features* I t envisaged, 
for the f i r s t time, very d e a r l y the end of English in 
administrative sphere* in the working of courts, la education 
and in the public service examinations. Zt was the f i r s t 
government which made promise to provide compulsory and free 
education to a l l children upto c la s s VII* Though the Jan 
Sangh* congrese(o) and the swatantra party were important 
partners* the ssp-led Government succeeded in incorporating 
in the programme items l ike land reform* protection of the 
r ights of share-croppers* ending of i l l e g a l occupation or 
transfer of land and distribution of surplus government land* 
programme of the Ninth coa l i t ion Government 
The congress(R)-led PVD Ministry .headed by B.P.Shaatri, 
did not produce any new common minimum programme* The 
partners of the coa l i t ion agreed to adopt the programme of 
the previous congress(R)-led government headed by D.P.Ral* 
I t may be noted that only four coal i t ion governments 
had clear cut policy and programme statements* these were 
the f i r s t UF government* the second UF government* the f irct 
Congress(R)-led coal i t ion headed by I .P. Rai and the SSP-led 
SVD government. Three governments* namely both Shoshit Dal 
governments and the f i f th coal i t ion headed by Harlhar Singh* 
cane to power without any programme, TWO coal i t ions headed 
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by B.P. Shastrl in 1969 and 1971 accepted the programs 
of the previous •£ *tee previous governments* I t may also be 
noted that the coa l i t ions formed on the basis of an agreed 
programme survived a b i t longer than those which had no 
such programme* 
ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE COMMON MINIMUM PROGRAMME 
The f i r s t UF Government took action on the following 
Items* -
1 . Fixation of prices to reduce the prices of food-grains 
and essential commodities and taking drastic action 
against hoarders* profiteers and blackmarketeers. 
Foodgralns were distributed throughout the s tate 
and fa i r price shops were opened which resulted In 
13 
s tabi l i s ing the prices of food-grains. Nearly 7,000 
tonnes of food-grains were unearthed by raiding the 
godowns of big traders and big land-owners* over 50 
hoarders were put behind bars under Preventive Detention 
14 
Act (PD Act) . 
13 . Kaplldeo singh. Food Minister of the f i r s t UF, In an 
Interview with the author on February 16, 1980, 
14 . Governor's Address, Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates, 
v o l . 3-4 (part I I ) , NO, i , January 18, I96fl, pp.i-17; 
Indradeep slnha, *The Bihar Experience', Link, January 
26, 1968, p. 37; Indian Nation, Decejaber""I37 ^ 6 7 . 
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2. improving the distribution system of government foofl-
grains and abolit ion of private stockist system la the 
distribution of food-grains. Private s tockists were 
not allowed to operate and cei l ing was placed on the 
stock of foodgralns that a wholesaler or reta i ler 
15 
could keep. The government aoolished private stockist 
16 
system in foodgralns from way 1, 1967, 
3* withdrawl of levyt NO levy was imposed on agriculturists* 
Zt was Imposed on rice mill-owners* wholesale foodgrain 
17 
dealers and on big farmers. 
4* i-o make immediate steps for completing irrigation, 
drainage and flood control schemes with priority to 
the pumping sets* tubewells and e l ec tr i f i ca t ion for 
agricultural purposes and fu l l u t i l i za t ion of irrigation 
powers for the f i r s t time boring and pumping se t s were 
introduced in Bihar on massive scale . 1*000 s tate 
tubewells* 3*000 private tubewells, 6*000 diesels* 
15*000 pumping s e t s , and 5*000 borings were completed 
to cover 2.25 lakh acres for irr igat ion . Electric i ty 
was supplied to 12*276 pumps during the f i r s t eight 
months of 1967*68 where there was no e lectr ic i ty* 
18 
dlese l was supplied. 
15. Kaplldeo Singh* o£. c i t . , 
16. Governor*s address, o p . c l t . , indradeep sinha, op .c i t . , 
search Light (patna), June 10* 1967. 
17. Kaplldeo Singh, o£. cit* 
18 . Governor's Address,op.cit.;Kaplldeo s lngh ,o£ .c i t . 
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5* withdrawl of (a) Increased irrigation rates; (b) school 
fees; (c> municipal taxes levied during the last two 
years; and (d) irrigation cess. 
Three months* school and college fees were remitted 
19 
throughout the state, increased holding tax was withdrawn 
20 21 
in Patna only. Irrigation cess wqs cancelled in the State* 
6. Remission of land rent* The government decided to 
abolish the present system of land rents which were in 
continuation of the semi-feudal money rent of the 
permanent zamlndarl system* it also decided to impose 
a graded land tax on the bigger land holders and complete 
22 
exemption for the uneconomic holdings. 
7. Abolition of Tata's zamlndarl1 The government introduced 
l eg i s la t ion for the taking over of the zamlndarl rights 
23 
of the Tatas in jamshedpur. 
B. Land Reform: The government cancelled the circular 
imposing a ban on the enforcement of legal r ights of share-
24 
croppers as l a id down in the exist ing Tenancy laws* 19. Governor*s Address, op.clt»?indradeep sinha, og. clt* 
20. Bihar Raj n i t i kl waye sisha (Pol i t ica l Report accepted 
in the 8th Bihar s tate conference of the communist party 
of India, Katihar, October 14-18), (patna: communist 
Party of India Publication, 1968), p. 24* 
21 . Governor's Address, op. c l t . 
22 . i b i d . ; indradeep sinha, o£. c i t . 
23. indradeep sinha, o£. c l t . 
24. Ibid. 
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9 . To give immediate attention to the demand* of the 
teacher* and students and introduce a new direction to 
education policy* The government anntled Art* 357(a) 
and (b) of the Education code and removed the restr ic-
t ions on the c i v i l rights of the teachers imposed by 
25 
the Brit ishers and continued by the congress regime* 
10 . TO conduct a l l government business in Hindi with Urdu 
a t the place of second state language and give encourage* 
ment and protection to a l l languages which are studied* 
written and studied in the state* 
As a matter of fact* introduction of Hindi in 
o f f i c i a l work was started during the period of the 
f i r s t UF. English as a compulsory subject on secondary 
leve l was abolished and the students were allowed to 
pass without English* in the combined competitive 
examinations of the Bihar Public service commission Hind 
26 
was made a compulsory paper* However* emphasis on Urdu 
created bi t terness among the partners of the government 
and resulted into communal riots* 
11. steps to end corruption! (a) to take ef fect ive steps mo 
end corruption in general administration; (b) taking 
necessary steps to enquire into the bunglings of the 
Road Transport corporation and Electr ic i ty Board; 
25* Governor's Address, o p . d t * 
26* Ibid. 
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(c) appointment of a high power commission to probe 
Into the cases of corruption; (d) appointment of a 
separate commission to look Into the charges of corrup-
tion against Ministers of the last Ministry! 
The anti-corruption Department detected 480 cases 
of corruption, of them 16 gazetted officers were 
27 
compulsorlly retired and 41 were suspended. The govern-
ment set up Alyar Commission to probe Into the charges 
of corruption against the chief Minister and four of 
28 
his colleagues of the last congress government* 
12. civil Rights; (a) Release ot all political prisoners 
and wlthdrawl of cases against students and political 
workers; (b) removal of restrictions on public meetings 
and demonstrations; and (c) banning the entry of police 
Into the educational Institutions* 
Political prisoners not Involved in criminal 
cases were released and cases against political workers* 
students* teachers and employees were withdrawn. The 
government scrapped the Bihar Maintenance of public 
Order Act, debarred the police from violating the 
sanctity of educational institutions and removed the 
29 
ban on the participation of school teachers In polities. 
27. Ibid, 
2 8
* search Lisftt, September 14, 1967; Indradeep Slnha,opcclt» 
29. Governor's Address, o£« c l t . ; indradeep sinha* og. c l t . ; 
Mahamaya Prasad slnha, jab Main MUkhya Mantrl The 
Urrah; puatak sadan, li/'M). p. JM. "— 
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13. judicial enquiries into police firings at Klshanganj* 
Samastipur* Muzaffarpur and patnat The government 
•at up commissions to go into the details of these 
firings. However, the jputta commission justified the 
30 
f ir ing in patna on January 5, 1967. The U . N . sinha 
Commission, appointed to probe into the Muzaffarpur 
firing* leameif unjustif ied pol ice f ir ing in R . D . S . 
College on December 10, 1966 but Just i f ied the f ir ing 
31 
near Ram cayalu Kagar Railway s ta t ion . 
14 . Austerity in administration and submission of s tate -
ments of asse t s by Ministers* Ministers belonging to 
the CPI and Deputy chief Minister xarpoori Thakur took 
3a 
R S . 500 only as the ir salary, chief Minister M.P.slnha 
and some of his colleagues submitted de ta i l s of their 
as se t s to the Assembly. The colleagues who submitted 
accounts were Karpoori Thakur* Kapildeo slngh,srikrishna 
Singh, Ramanand Tlwarl* $ . K . Mltra, sabhapatl Singh* 
upendra Bath verma* Ramdeo Mahto* xndradeep slnha* 
33 
Tej Naratn jha, B . P . Mandal and Hasibur Rahman. 
15 . Arrangement of proper help to the drought affected 
people of state* especial ly students. 
30. Indian Nation, May 10, 1969. 
31 . Ibid.* March 26* 1969. 
32. Kapildeo Singh* 0£. c i t . 
33. Indian nation, July 4* 1967. 
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I t may be said without hesitat ion that the f i r s t UF 
government fought the bat t le of drought heroically* At the 
time of i t s assuming power, Bihar was in the grip of famine 
unprecedented during the l a s t hundred years* The production 
of foodgrain had fa l len to 3 mil l ion tonnes as against 7«3 
tonnes which was the normal output, wel ls and tanks had 
34 
dried up In 24,000 out of 67,000 vi l lages* 
The finances of the s ta te were in a bankcrupt condition* 
*'he government had inherited empty coffers and exhausted 
Amanatl Fund (consolidated fund)* The public fund amounted 
to Rs. 464 crores involving a repayment l i a b i l i t y of RS*59 
crores during 1967-68* There was a heavy overdraft of Rs.17 
35 
crores on the Reserve Bank, 
The government declared 'famine* in 187 and 'scarcity' 
36 
in 280 out of 587 blocks in the state* The former covered 
an area of over 24,000 sq* miles with a population of over 
13 mil l ion people* while the l a t t e r covered another 20,000 
37 
sq* miles with a population of 20 mil l ion, co l l ec t ion of land 
rent and loan was Immediately suspended in the whole state* 
Approximately RS* 66 crores were spent on re l ie f and loans 
34* Governor's Address, op. c l t . , indradeep slnha, 0£. clt* 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid* 
37. Link* August 20, 1967, p. 19* 
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during the seven months from March to September. 1967, as 
against 9.75 cxores during the preceding f ive mouths of 
38 
October 1966 to February 1967 under the congress Government• 
During t h i s period* foodgrains were supplied to a l l the 
people in the famine area* 50 percent to 90 percent in 
scarcity area and 40 percent in other areas* thereby covering 
70-75 per cent population of the s ta te excluding the famine 
striken people. Relief materials costing over Rs. 50 crores 
were received from non-official agencies - national and 
40 
international . Emancipation and disease did certainly cost 
a few hundred l ives* but there was no starvation death* no 
mass migration* begging on the s treets and dying on the 
pavements* 
SENSITIVE ISSUES 
During f ive months of i t s existence the main concern 
of the government was confined to providing reltftf for the 
famine and scarcity affected areas* plfferences in the 
government and the UP surfaced as soon as issues affecting 
c lass Interest were taken up. 
Food policy 
The policy of the government to unearth hoarded food-
38. Governor's Aduress, op.cit«*indradeep Binha*op.cit. 
39. Governor'8 Adoress, o p . c i t . 
40. indradeep sinha, op. c i t . 
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grains was not supported by the a l l Front partners* Houses 
of a number of ML As belonging to the SSP and the JXD were 
raided In accordance with th i s policy* A warrant of arrest 
was Issued against shatruraardan shahl, a JKD member. Due to 
t h i s s tr ic tness adopted by xaplldeo Singh, the Food Minister. 
the affected l e g i s l a t o r l e f t the Front and joined the shoshit 
41 
Dal. 
Levy 
one of the items in the 33-point programme was ending 
the levy* But the Food and supply Minister was in favour of 
42 
t h i s system* The cabinet also passed the levy order* However, 
the Jan spngh and JKD were against the imposition of levy* 
43 
The former even passed a resolution against th is policy. 
Tarani Prasad* a JKD member, also c r i t i c i s e d Kapildeo singh 
for real i s ing levy from the farmers having more than f ive 
44 
acres of land* Thus* both these po l i c i e s did not succeed 
and resulted in reducing the strength of the coal i t ion* 
Urdu 
The coa l i t ion had promised to make Urdu as the second 
41* Mahamaya Prasad sinha, op* c l t» , p* 16. 
42. i b i d . 
43. Indian Nation, August 23, 1967* 
44* Glrish Mlchra and Braj Kumar pandey,'united prontiBalance 
•*»•*•• Mainstream, February 10, 1968, p* 10* 
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of t i d a l language of the s t a t e . But a memorandum providing 
some f a c i l i t i e s to the Urdu speaking students and people 
created tension between the Jan sangh and the SSP. i t ultimately 
45 
resulted in communal r i o t s in different places in the s ta te , 
Language issue also became a law and order i s sue . Thus, the 
issue was sidetracked. 
Bataldari 
Among the agrarian reform measures the most controver-
s i a l was the problem of •Bataldari'* The implementation of 
the ex i s t ing Tenancy Laws providing some protections to the 
Bataldars* the santhals and other Adlvaal peasants triggered 
off the b i t t ere s t controversy among the coal i t ion partners* 
Thsagh no law was Introduced by the government, i t s Revenue 
Department under communist zndradeep slnha, issued a circular 
explaining the exist ing Bataldari rights in the old Tenancy 
46 
Act. But the Jan sangh opposed t h i s . Thakur Prasad, the 
Bihar*jan sangh president, cr i t i c i s ed the Revenue Minister 
for creating controversy over the Bataldari laws without 
prior approval of the coordination committee* He appealed to 
the chief Minister to prevent Zndradeep slnha from raising 
47 
controversial i ssues l i k e Bataldari i ssue . Ramdeo Mahto, 
45* f o r detai l see chapter III* Pp. 131 -134. 
46* Bihar Main Rajnit i kl Nayse plsha, op. eft*, p . 29; 
indra&eep slnha, 'under Bihar UFI Struggle for Agrarian 
Reform1, Mainstream, February ,1948, pp. 5-12. 
47* Indian Nation, October 27, 1947* 
35* 
I 
the jan sangh co-operative Minister* characterized the 
Communist leaders attempt as creating chaos and confusion 
among the people. He f e l t that t h i s would encourage then to 
l o o t the properties of the haves under the pretext of provid-
es 
ing and protecting the have-nots* The controversy over the 
issue also disturbed the peace in the s tate especial ly In 
49 
puraea anil tarbhanga d i s tr ic t s* The nine-nan committee set 
up by the coordination Committee on November 20, 1967 fai led 
to resolve the differences between the cpl and the jan sangh 
50 
as both parties could not reach an agreement. Thereafter* 
both Jan sangh and the CPI continued mud slinging on each 
other* While the former announced that i t would re s i s t the 
implementation of Bataldarl Act and threatened to quit the 
Ministry, the l a t t e r blamed the former for obstructing the 
SI 
implementation of the law. 
Demand of Enquiry 
The controversy between both these parties reached 
such a point that both of them started demanding the sett ing 
up of an enquiry body to look into the ir conduct* I t was 
V.K. Mitra* jan sangh Agriculture Minister* who, on October 
26, to ld pressmen at Patna that he was going to request the 
48. Ib id . , October 17, 196?. 
49* Mahamaya Prasad sinha, oju c i t« , p. 52. 
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* Indian Nation, November 21* 1967* 
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Chief Minister to set up a judicial body to inquire into 
charges of corruption and misuse of power against some of the 
52 
Ministers of the coalition. Though he refrained from mentioning 
the name of any Minister* from his very statement it was clear 
that he hinted at the c?I Ministers. He repeated his demand on 
S3 
December 28* 1967. on the other hand* indradeep sinha made 
several allegations against the JS Ministers, though he too 
did not mention their name and requested the chief Minister 
54 
to set up an enquiry into the conduct of Ministers* Although 
no enquiry was set up; the ill-will between the CPI and the 
jan sangh was a clear signal that the UF was Cracking up. 
Thus, the first UF Government did not introduce any 
basic reorganization of the administration or did not bring 
any basic change in the existing moral ethos. It failed to 
take any successful actions on some important issues affecting 
feudal socio-economic structure of the society. The promise 
of abolition of land rent meant nothing more than the suspen-
sion of collection of land rent for a couple of months and 
the Bataidari Act was half-hearted, suspension of raids against 
blackmarketaers and hoarders created suspicion in the minds 
of the people. The programme to abolish the zamlndarl rights 
of Tatas at jamshedpur remained only a threat, students found 
no improvement in the condition of life and study. Programmes 
5 2
 • search Light, October 27, 1967. 
53
• Xndian nation, December 29, 1967. 
54
• Xbid., December 31, 1967. 
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regarding uplif tment of Harijans, &divasls and other weaker 
sections of the society remained only on paper, so was the 
case with the item concerning a new education policy* 
The government did not begin to tackle the problem of 
rooting out red-tapism, nepotism and corruption* on the 
contrary* some of i t s Ministers started taking actions, 
specially in transfers and postings, on the basis of casta 
55 
consideration. The Government failed to bring communal 
harmony. Rather i t took an ugly turn during i t s regime. The 
r iots in Ranchi, Hatia and sursand were i t s glaring examples* 
in the battle for survival* instead of going down fighting, 
the Front Ministry started compromising and bargaining on 
principles with the result that good administration and welfare 
of the people were seriously hampered* The withdrawal of 
appeals pending in the Calcutta High court against the Raja 
of Ramgarh and his brother involving Government claims of 
several erores of rupees was i t s glaring example* This appeal 
was withdrawn on January 25, 1968, the date on fetich the UF 
was voted out of power* 
performance of the shoahit pal government 
The shoahit sal Government was not formed oa tile basis 
of any clear-cut programme and policy* The oal had no political 
55* Mahamaya Prasad slnha, op .c l t . , p. 17; itadhu Llmaye, 
'David and Goliath' in if.C. sahnt (ed*), 'coalition 
Polit ics In India•(jullunder* New Academic, 1971), P*l2e* 
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philosophy of i t s own* neither was i t in a posit ion to formulate 
a d e a r and def inite programs and l i n e of action, because a l l 
shades of opinion had their place in the Dal. Devoid of any 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy, the Dal Government was l ike a rudderless 
ship and saved according to the desires of sons powerful 
congress individuals* 
In the beginning the shoshit Dal Government aroused new 
hopes in the minds of somt backward community, because the 
whole edi f ice of the Dal had been bu i l t on the slogan of back-
ward caste rule* The Dal also succeeded in drawing 38 ML As in 
i t s fold mostly from scheduled Tribes, scheduled castes and 
5* 
Backward community* But soon their hopes were bel ied and they 
were disenchanted when they found that the Government was 
Virtually run by discredited congress leaders serving the 
in teres t s of vested classes* 
Retrospective steps 
During i t s one and a half month existence, the shoshit 
Dal did hardly take any step toward the well-being of the 
exploited (shoshit) masses of the state* what was worse, some 
progressive measures of the f i r s t UF was undone by i t* The 
Government decided to reimpmse land rent which was abolished 
57 
by the UF Government, i t also abondoned the proposal to levy 
St . Anjani Kumar slnha, "Have UF Government Failed in Bihar?", 
Mainstream, July 13, 1966, p* 30. 
5 7
• yy[_* q e ' March 3, 1968, p* 9; Asian Recorder, April 15-21, 
I t e T / p * 8272* 
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a graded land tax on big landholders* Moat shocking was the 
Cabinet *a decision not to implement the land reform msmenre 
i n i t i a t e d by the UF Government on the plan that t ine was "not 
ye t ripe* for implementation of the Bataidari provisions of 
58 
the Bihar Tenancy Act* 
The fa i lures of the Dal Government was openly admitted 
by Ram Chandra Prasad* a Hinister nf s ta te in the shoshit 
Ministry* in h is view,the shoshit Dal was "unable to deliver 
goods to the people". He described the Dal as an organisation 
having "groupism, casteism. Internal bickerings as i t s main 
features whose p o l i c i e s and programmes are being Influenced by 
a handful of congress stalwarts to serve their vested interests". 
He further said that i t "shocked my conscience to find that the 
Shoshit Dal Government has also been neglecting the legitimate 
59 
cause of Harijan and Adivasts. 
s e n s i t i v e issue 
The shoshit Dal Government, i t may be noted, got divided 
over the Issue of levy on land-grains, in cabinet meetings 
on February 13 and 20, 1968, there was sharp division over 
whether levy should be continued or abondoned completely* 
jagdeo Prasad, power and irr igat ion Hinister, and satlsh 
Prasad slngh. Food and supply Minister, favoured the continuance 
5 8
• New Age, March 3 , 1968, p. 9 . 
59. Indian nation, March 17, 1966. 
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of the levy order* But Tarani. Prasad slngh, Transport and 
PHED Minister, threatened to quit the Government i f levy order 
60 
was not withdrawn. As a face saving device, the cabinet 
decided to withdraw the levy order and In i t s place to enforce 
61 
State l i d of Grains and paddy order* 
performance of the Fourth coa l i t ion 
The fourth coa l i t ion Government} headed by B . P . shastrl 
had inspired new hopes in the people of Bihar in general and 
in the Harljang. A diva s i s and other weaker sections of the 
society in particular* He was the f i r s t Harijan to be the 
Chief Minister of Bihar* This was a s ignif icant event in the 
Caste rldaen p o l i t i c s of Bihar* pa swan hao a yooct image among 
the people as he was a principled and honest pol i t ic ian and 
had no scandal behind him* His Government came to power on 
the basis of a 31-point programme which was clearer and an 
improvement upon the 33-point programme of the f i r s t UF Govern-
ment* But the programme could not be put into action, f i r s t , 
because the Paswan Ministry did not have suff ic ient time at 
i t s disposal and secondly,because some of the constituents 
particularly the Janata party did not show any cooperative 
at t i tude in accordance with the Joint programme* The SSP and 
the communists took several weeks to decide to join the 
Ministry* This inevitably created a good deal of uncertainty* 
60* Ib id . , February 14 and 21, 1963. 
61* Xbld*, February 29, 1968. 
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What paswan headed was not a team but a group of 
opportunist*, and because of internal wrangle* the Ministry 
paid l i t t l e attention to the problems of the state, "He was 
struggling for survival and his colleagues neither co-operated 
with him nor showed any interest ia making the Government 
62 
stable*• "All through i t s career of 90 days the paswan 
Ministry was faced by one cr is i s after another and i t never 
63 
had a chance to settle down". The Raja of Ramgarh was his 
main problem. The way in which the Raja and hie Janata Party 
bargained with Paevan would not have been tolerated by any 
Chief Minister* 
However, during its short tenure in office, the paswan 
Ministry did make an impact by firmly handling the affairs 
of the state. From the very beginning, Paswan refused to be 
bullied by the Raja of Raregarh. He die not oblige the Raja 
by allocating the portfolio of Mines and Minerals to him or 
by elevating him to 'Deputy chief Ministership*. He incurred 
the wrath of Raja by not ordering the withdrawal of 280 cases 
against his firm and by refusing to engage the lawyer of his 
64 
choice on the Government side* He ordered prompt inquiry 
into the police firing in chri in chotanagar belt, even after 
the threats and pressures from the Jan sangh, he did not 
allow certain items like the land reform measures, protection 
and development of the Interests of the minorities being 
62. Batlonal Herald (Editorial),(Delhi), . T ^ YJJ ^ffc 
*
3
* JPaiaa Sxpreas (Editorial), (nalbi), June 27, 1968. 
64, For detail see chapter m , part c. P. IM, 
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deleted from the programme. 
It must be mentioned that after the shastri Gore rumen t 
resigned and was asked by the Governor to continue as a 
t 
caretaker Government, i t took improper actions such as constitu-
t ion of the Dis tr ic t Education Planning committees and 
Regional Transport Authorities in an irregular manner* some 
of the Ministers la the caretaker Government had also attempted 
to f i l l up different boards/ corporations and committees with 
u l ter ior motives, some Ministers, in collusion with their 
favourite high-ups in different departments, hurriedly made 
transfers , postings and provisions for certain o f f i c ia l s* 
Moreover* they placed Government orders for supply of goods 
66 
with tneir own favourites* 
performance of the Fifth coa l i t ion 
The congress-led f i f th coa l i t ion under the leadership 
of Harlhar Singh went out of o f f i ce without formulating a 
c lear cut programme of action* All the time Harlhar Singh was 
In office* he was busy in s i f t ing the claims and counter-claims 
for cabinet posts of congress l eg i s la tors on the one hand and 
67 
the partners of the coal i t ion on the other hand* considering 
the multi-party character of the coal i t ion and the lack of 
65. GIrish Mishra and Braj Kumar pandey, "Bihar's second UF 
Government", Mainstream, June 29, 1968, p, 31. 
*
6
* Search Light (Editorial ) , July 4, 1968. 
67. see chapter IV, part A* 
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cohesion within the congress party, ihe Ministry was a hetero-
genous, unwieldly team. I t fa i l ed to arrange distribution 
of portfol ios during i t s 115-day rule* such a Ministry could 
not impart s tab i l i t y to the administration or launch any long 
term programme of development for the s t a t e . Though the 
Government had spel t out sons programmes in the Governor's 
Adcress* nothing was done to give them practical shape. 
T n e
 Hindu commented, "in a l l th i s , the worst sufferer 
was the welfare of the people and the administration of the 
State* The administration came to a s tandst i l l , and the state 
was sinking deeper into the morass of financial bankcruptcy. 
The Government seemed to have l i t t l e tine to attend to pressing 
problems of the s tate , wholly pre-occupled as i t was with the 
68 
problem to keep i t s e l f in o f f i c e . I t seemed as i f sorae kind 
of paralysis had overtaken the administration during the 
period Harlhar Singh was in o f f i c e . He did not endeavour to 
Improve the image of h i s Government by providing the state 
with a clean and e f f i c i en t administration. He proved a captive 
69 
of the big bosses and danced to the ir tune. Harlnath Mlshra, 
the tnen Loktantrik congress leader, described the congress-led 
coa l i t ion as "the rule of a coter ie , by a coterie for a 
coterie" and "an engine of oppression and blackmail" for the 
mass of the people, shoshlt Dal, a constituent of the ruling 
6b
* Hindu (Editorial) , (Madras), June 13, 1969, 
6 9
 * Search Light (Editorial) , June 22, 1969. 
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Coalitton, accused the Chief Minister of caateism and faction-
70 
allsm and even threatened to walk out of the coalition. The 
removal of S.v. sohoni, the chief secretary and the elevation 
of S.N. Singh to the post, who belonged to the sane caste 
as the chief Minister, was a clear cat* of casteism. The 
non-Rajput officials Aid not seen to make a secret of their 
71 
being in resentful and defiant mood over this appointment. 
Even worse was the row in the Bihar cabinet over the posting 
of some District Magistrates and the demand for posting or 
not posting of officers of certain castes* The search Light 
editorially commented* •'when caste becomes an important 
factor in the postings of officials and the matter is debated 
in the cabinet meeting itself* it is obvious that political 
corruption has reached a high watermark and IS bound to 
afreet whatever efficiency and integrity is still left in 
72 
the administration? 
i h e main aim of the Harihar Ministry was seated to be 
the maintenance of law and order in the s t a t e , but during the 
per iod of four months* that i t had been in power* there had 
been no improvement in the s i t u a t i o n , on the other haafl* in 
r e s p e c t of c e r t a i n crimes de ter iora t ion in the s i tua t ion was 
73 
c l a a r l y v i s i b l e . 
7 0 . Link, Apri l 13 , 1969, p . 24 . 
7 1 . subhash c* Kashyap* op. c l t . * p . 354. 
7 2
• search Light ( E d i t o r i a l ; , May 18* 1969. 
7 3 . i b i d . ( E d i t o r i a l ) , June 21* 1969. 
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However, the moot controversial act of the Harihar 
Ministry was the appointment of a Briefing committee supposedly 
for helping the Aiyar and Mudholkar Commissions of Inquiry 
In expediting their work* But* in actual practice i t was 
a bid to save the skin of S.N. Sinn a, Amblka Sharan Singh, 
Raghvendra Nftrain singh, Ram Lakhan singh and the Raja of 
74 
Ramgarh. i t evoked spontaneous opposition and not only the 
Opposition parties but a section of dissident congress 
75 
leaders sharply reacted to it. Even seme constituents felt 
flabbergasted at this act and threatened to withdraw from 
the coalition, because of strong public criticism the chief 
Minister hac co beat a hasty retreat and scrap the Briefing 
7© 
committee. 
performance of the s ixth coa l i t ion Government 
The sixth coal i t ion headed by B . P . shastrl was the 
shortest - l ived Government in Bihar, i t remained in power for 
ten days only, i t was composed of some smaller and splinter 
groups arid,of course, some defectors. None of the major 
partners of the coa l i t ion - SSP# CPI, PS? and Jan sangh -
joined the Government on the ground that they wanted to act 
77 
as watch-dogs to ensure the implementation of the programe. 
74. i,ink, April 13, 1S69, p. 24. 
7 S
- search Light, April 6, 1969. 
76. ibid., April 11, 1969. 
77. see chapter IV, Part tu 
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Ultimately, the Government resigned following the withdrawal 
of support by the 34-member Jan sangh group la the Assembly, 
without taking any steps towards implementing the common-
minimum programme. 
performance of the seventh coal i t ion Government 
The congress!p.)-led ruling coal i t ion headed by D.P.Ral 
took measures on the following items of the 35-polnt programme i 
*• To abolish rent on uneconomic holdings> 
The Government abolished land rent on 2?g acres of 
78 
irrigated land and 5 acres of unlrrigated land* 
2• TO take over the zamlndarl rights of the latasi 
The Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly passed the Land 
Reforms (Amendment) b i l l , 1970, on June 22, introduced 
by the Rat Government* empowering the Government to 
79 
abolish the Tata samindari at jamshedpur. I t may,however, 
be noted that the b i l l was returned to the speaker 
without presidential assent, which was a must for such 
measures, with the recommendation that i t be modified 
to ensure that the growth of industries in Jamshedpur 
80 
was not hampered* 
/ a
* Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates, vo l .v , No.2(Part B), 
December 18, 1970,p.1; Llnk,pecember 27,1970,p*l6rJagannath 
Barter,"Problems Before*gew' Ministry1*,Mainstream, May 30, 
1970, pp. 17-20; paroga Prasad Rai, interview with the 
author on February 9,1980; Rajnitik Report, 9th state 
Conference of the CPI, oarbhanga, September 14-20,1071, 
pp. 20-21. 
79 . Asian RCcordei, August 6-12,1970, p.9686; Llnk,pccember 
27, 1970, p. 16, D . P . Rai, op. c i t . 
80. Link, April 23, 1972, p. 21. 
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Land Reform 
(a) Recording homestead land sad giving right* to 
privileged persons on homestead land; 
(b) Reducing celling on land holdings* 
(c) Distribution, of waste and surplus land. 
The Government includec 'Kala' and 'Bari • In the 
In the homestead land and gave away 'Parchas' to 2,10,000 
families on homestead land* By amending the Homestead 
Land Act, the privileged persons were given tenancy 
81 
rights over the homestead land without any compensation. 
The Governor, on September 10, 1970, Issued a land reform 
ordinance empowering the s ta te Governnent to acquire 
and distribute surplus land ( in excess of land cel l ing) 
82 
speedily and e f fec t ive ly . Accordingly, nearly 10,000 
acres of Government fallow land was released from the 
i l l e g a l occupation of landlords and nearly 1,50,000 aires 
83 
fallow land was distributed among 1,40,000 families . 
Reform in Administration: 
iQ sdt up Administrative Reforms committee* the 
Government se t up a a Administrative Reforms Committee 
neaded ny Harinath nishra. But, according to D.P. Ral, 
81 . D . P . Ral, op. d t . ; RajnltIk Report, 9th s tate Conference 
of the communist party of India, Darbhanga, September 
14-20, 1971, p. 21. 
82. Asian Recorder, October 15-21, 1970, p. 9808. 
83. D . P . Ral, op. c l t . ; Raj n i t Ik Report, 9th state Conference 
of the Comcaunist Party of India, op. c i t .y Link, December 
27, 1970, p. 16. 
3*9 
I t proved frui t less* f irs t* because i t was set up very 
lata and, secondly, Mishra Indulged too much in theore-
84 
t l c a l aspects of the problem. 
5 • steps to End Corruption: 
immediate examination of the finding s of the 
Aiyar commission for taking appropriate follow-up actions 
A retired chief secretary from orissa was called to 
examine the Report* on his report some actions were 
taken against some o f f i c i a l s , but there was no ground 
to take actions against po l i t i ca l leaders, though CBI 
85 
raids were conducted on their house3, 
Besiaes, the Government, by amending Bihar Tenancy Act, 
imposed res tr ic t ions on i l l e g a l occupation of oataldar's land 
and set up Tripartite Board for the solution of Bataidari 
disputes* By an ordinance, the Government imposed restrict ions 
on 168 big landlords for sel l ing land beyond ce i l ing , nearly 
500 acres of land misappropriated by money-lenders were 
86 
returned to the Aaivasis. 
I t i s , thus, obvious that except land reforms, hardly 
any other item of the minimum pro2ran.me wu3 touched* sven in 
84. D.P. Rai, op» c l t . 
85* IbJ£. 
86. Rajnitik Report, 9th stite conference of the Communist 
Party of India, op. clt., pp. 20-21. 
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t h i s respect much was lacking* Hundreds of cases a r i s ing out 
of the land s t ruggle were s t i l l pending* the repression against 
the Bacaidars , ag r i cu l t u r a l labourers and Adivasis continued* 
Landlords were frequently resor t ing to f i r i n g s with the 
connivance and even backing of ths po l i ce , Not a s ingle Batai 
Board panchayav W:JS s e t up. The fa te of th* proposed t r ibuna l s 
t o d i s t r i b u t e land to Adivasis was no b e t t e r , i n Indus t r ia l 
a r ea s , the c o l l i e r y owners were Indulging in gangstelsm and 
nothing was done by the pol ice and the a ^ h o r i t i e s to check 
87 
i t . 
The CPI* a cons t i tuent of the rul ing coal i t ion* in a 
r e so lu t i on said* "Performances of the Government has been 
woefully poor in mat ters of policy regarding labour and 
i n d u s t r i a l re la t ions* employment and Indus t r i a l i za t ion*cred i t 
ana i r r i g a t i o n s ! l a c i l l t i e s for peasants* rooting out corrup-
t ion and nepotism in administration* curbing gangstelsm of 
l and lo rds , Mahajans and col l iexy owners and putt ing down 
highhandedness u£ the pol ice and the bureaucracy against 
6b 
workers and peasants . 
The u*y. Rai Ministry die. nut being improvement in t he 
adminis t ra t ion* His Government's work had been reduced to 
8 7
• H«w_*ge (Sd i to r i a l )* December 8, 1970* p . 2? jagannath 
sarl»r» o]3» c i t . 
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tranesers anil postings* Even In transfers and postings of 
Government o f f i c i a l s a l o t of favouritism and unfairness was 
openly practised which further demoralised the already 
90 
shattered administration in the s ta t e , Raisul &za» (congjress-o) 
and saaftu saran sani ( P S P ; , on Kay ts #1970, alleged in the 
Assembly that Rai Ministry was inuulging in whimsical transfers 
91 
and appointments to serve i t s own interes ts . D.P. Rai did 
not conduct himself creditably during the period he was in 
of f ice* Even his own partyraen leve l led grave al legations 
92 
against him challenging h is integri ty and sincerity* charges 
of corruption were leve l led against some Ministers at a meeting 
93 
of the congress l eg i s la ture party* what was worse, an open 
charge of bribery against a Minister was leve l led by Harinath 
94 
Mishra, a respected leader of the state* in the Assembly* I t 
was not surprising, therefore, that tne Rai Ministry did not 
take any action against the po l i t i c ians indicted by Aiyar 
Commission. 
Law and order in the s tate was fas t deteriorating* 
89* i b i d . 
90* search Light (Editoria l ) , December 20, 1970* 
91* ibid*, May 16, 1970. 
92. ib id*(Editorial ) , December 20, 1970. 
93 . i b i d . , December 29, 1970. 
94. ib id . (Editorial ) , May 27, 1970. 
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"Lawlessness seemed to have let loose specially In rural 
areas and an impress ion was created that the Government was 
95 
not keen to protect the life and property of peaceful citizens? 
Even satya Narain sinha* union Minister for Communication, 
informacion and Broadcasting* had to express grave concern 
96 
over the deteriorating law and order situation in the state. 
The Hindustan Times gave the following break-up of crimes 
recorded between May and July, 1970, by different police 
stations in and around patnai armed robbery 40, murder 27, 
dacoity 19, burgery 214, theft (including copper wire) 566 
97 
and riot 96* 
performance of the Eighth coal i t ion 
The ssp-led SVD Government headed by SSP Chairman 
Karpoori Thakur took actions on the following items of the 
26-point programme}" 
1
 • To End Land Rent on uneconomic Holdings: 
The Government abolished land rent on holdings 
upto 6Jr acres of unl.rrigated and 3*5 acres of irrigated 
lands* 
95. Ibid. (Editor ia l ) , ixcember 20, 1970. 
96. i b i d . , October 12, 1970. 
97. Hindustan Times, August 3 , 1970. 
98. Governor's Address, Bihar Legislative Assembly Debates, 
v o l . v i , NO. 1 (part I I j / Marcft i s , i?7x, p. 34; Asian 
Recorder, April 23-29, 1971, p. 10115. 
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2
* Land Ref orwt 
To establish a land commission to define profitable 
holding* decide boundary* ce i l ing and Implement other 
measures of land reform* 
The Government appointed a Committee headed by 
Krishna Kant Singh, a cabinet Minister in the SVD 
Government,to suggest land retforas afresh« But i t proved 
frui t less* because the commission did not even commence 
99 
i t s work, 
3 . Languaget 
(a) to end the use of English in o f f i c ia l work; 
(b) to end the use of English as n compulsory subject 
and as a medium of instruction in educational 
Ins t i tut ions . 
( c ; to end the use of English in the working of courts* 
The SVD Government ended English In c f f l c i a l work* 
I t also abolished English as a compulsory subject and 
students were allowed to pass without English upto the 
Matriculation stage* i t also ended English as a medium 
loo 
of instruction* 
4* Administrative Reforms; 
(a) to make pol ice administration strong and efficient 
99. Krishna Kant Singh, interview «§th the author on 
February 9, 1980* 
100, zbld. 
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and Implement the recommendation of Police commission; 
(b) to hold e lec t ions for suspended municipalities and 
convert the exist ing Notified Area committees into 
Vil lage panchayats or municipalities* 
Notified Area committees of Mokemah, D©hri-on-»one. 
Dalmianagar* jahanabad* Khagaria* Beguaarai* Lalchisaral* 
lOi 
saharasa and supaul were convered into municipalities. 
5* To set up an Autonomous Development Board for chotanagpur 
and santhal Paraganasj An Autonomous commission for chota-
nagpur *and santhal Paraganas was set up. But i t was not 
102 
e f f ec t ive . 
I t i s clear that during i t s 161-day regime* the SVD Govern-
ment touched very few items of the common minimum programme. 
Out of f ive items regarding land reform* only one was touched* 
So was the case with other items. The SVi. Government, l ike i t s 
predecessors* soon l o s t i t s enthusiasm and idealism and bogged 
down in a b i t t er struggle for i t s own survival. Thakur expanded 
h i s Ministry no l e s s than eight times in l e s s than s ix months 
and acquired the dubious dis t inct ion of heading Bihar's largest 
ever (53;-council of Ministers* "such ministry could not have 
taken any concrete steps in the interests of the people, parti-
cularly in respect of land reforms and economic development of 
101* Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates* vol* VII* No, 9 (part i l 7 , June it>, xvix, pp. 8- iu. 
1 0 2
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the s ta te when major partners of the combine were there to 
block any radical measure and safeguard the feudal landlords 
103 
and industrial tycoons". 
The record of the EVX Govemaent in respect of land 
reform was regretable to say the least* in order to oblige 
i t s vested interes ts and owing to i t s anxiety not to lose 
power, Th&kur Ministry resorted to the subterfuge of appointing 
a Commission to aelay and obstruct any seeps in t h i s direction* 
Thakur halted -he implementation of even petty land reform 
measures set in notion by the congress!R)-led Coalition* Even 
the recovery of land from the i l l e g a l occupation of landlords 
ana the concurring of occupancy right on the landless on their 
homestead land were not convenient to the sSP-led coalit ion* 
All the SSP demands for reduction of ce i l ings on lana were 
104 
conveniently forgotten* 
A mockery was made of the anti-corruption drive* some 
actions were taken when i t became clear that the Ministry 
would not survive* But otherwise corrupt oft leers had a wonder-
ful time* A po l i t i c ian indicted by the Alyar commission was 
appointed as chairman of the Bihar Financial corporation* An 
off icer / who was under a cloud %P a result of the findings of 
the Alyar commission, was rewarded* Karpoori Thakur himself 
was not free from blame* ue threw a l l norms and decencies 
l 0 3 #
 Mainstream (Editorial ) , June 5, 1971, pp. 5-6* 
104* Link, June 6, 1971, p* 16* 
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overboard and appointed a son and a son-in-law of two p o l i t i -
cians indicted by the Alyar commission as chairmen of the 
two important Boards dealing with crores of rupees* 
Bihar had seen quite a number of corrupt and ineff ic ient 
ministries* one excell ing the other* But the Thakur Ministry 
e a s i l y surpassed a l l of them. All the sacred and valued 
106 
principles of administration were thrown to the winds* 
L.P* Ral Ministry was accused of being engrossed in transfers 
and postings* But the racket of transfers and postings 
became worse under the Thakur regime* Officers were trans-
ferred, retransferred and transferred again before they 
107 
had joined the place of their f i r s t transfer* Favouritism 
and nepotism committed during the chief Ministership of 
D.p* Ral paled into insignificance when compared to what 
happened during the Thakur Ministry* A large number of 
irregular, i l l ega l and indefensible decisions were taken in 
various departments causing heavy lo s s to the Government and 
106 
hardship to the people* A writ pet i t ion was f i l ed before 
the chief j u s t i c e K.B.N. Singh of the Patna High court by 
Kuldip Narain jalswal on May 6, 1971 alleging that Bagun 
105* search Light (Editorial) , July 4, 1971. 
106* i b i d . 
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» * Link, June 6, 1971, p* 16* 
108. search Light (Editorial) , July 4, 1971* 
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sumbrui, Minister of Excise in the Thakur Ministry, had 
demanded a bribe of Ks* 1,00,000/* for awarding the contract 
109 
for supply of liquor. Already one BSP Minister had changed 
another SSP Minister with having taken bribes of R o•40,000/-
110 
from so** colliery owners* 
The law and order machinery had virtually broken down 
resulting In large number of aurders and dacoitiea during 
the period of the svr rule* The murder of the principal of 
RQjendra college* chapra, in his office in broad day-light 
and the looting of a train and kidnapping of two brides by 
oacoite ahowed the chaotic conditions prevailing in the state* 
suraj Narain Singh, chairman of the Indian social ist party, 
a partner of the SVD, on June 26* 1971, assailed the Govern-
ment in the Assembly for what he called i t "utter failure" 
in checking aounting incidence of robberies in trains and 
buses* He adoed that *the whole administration had collapsed 
1U 
and i t was suffering from cancer4** 
performance o£ the Ninth coalition 
*MaaeaBMNeaeeMMwiMflMMMMM«M««MMMMMriMN»^ 
The PVF Ministry headed by B*P* shAstrl, as has been 
mentioned above, adopted the 35-point programs of the 
109* |bld*. May 9, 1971, 
1 I Q
*
 L l c k
* May 9, 1971, p* 16, 
111* search Light, June 26, 1971. 
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Congress!R)-led seventh coal i t ion headed by u.P. Rat. But 
i t s performance In giving e f fect to those programmes was far 
from sat isfactory. The Paswan Ministry survived by some 
adjustment among the coa l i t ion , but I t made no effort to 
implement any programs "Before he assured o f f i ce , Paswan 
made lavish promises but after his resignation, he had only 
• X m 
a laegely barren records to look back upon*. Expansion 0* 
the Ministry and distribution of portfol ios had been the sols 
pre-occupation of the Government since I t assumed of f i ce . 
Horning could be more characteristic of the situation tha» 
the fact that when the cabinet expansion came up before the 
Congress High command in August 1971 about 50 congress(R) 
aspirants pitched their tents In New Delhi and were busy 
convasslng for themselves and for the ir friends, Bihar was 
then la the grip of the worst flood and the Prime Minister 
113 
had to t e l l them bluntly to go back. There was a prolonged 
t u s s l e for key portfol ios l ike Finance, PWL, PHED. industries, 
i rr igat ion , Power, Excise and Transport, between Ministers 
belonging to rival L . N . Mishra and R . L . Singh yadsv group©. 
from 
Ministers drawn {other constituents were also making their 
respective claims. F i l e s piled up In the chief Minister's 
secretariat and the rel ief work virtual ly came to a halt as 
paswan had l i t t l e time for anything e l s e , except entertaining 
112, national neraia (New pel h i ) , peceraber 29, 1971. 
113. Hindu (ftaaras). October it, 1971. 
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the r ival claims for 'juicy portfol ios '* what was more, 
he had no t i n s to s i x a data for debate oa the grave flood 
s i tuat ion and bungling in re l ie f operations as demanded by 
115 
a delegation of opposition parties led by Ramanand Tiwarl* 
The Paswan Ministry fa i led to take any steps to check 
corruption in administration. A s ignif icant act of his 
Ministry was to scrap the Latta commission of inquiry set 
up by the Thakur Ministry to probe into the charges of 
misappropriation of Bharat sevak samaj fund by Lai i t Narain 
116 
Mlshra ana some other Bihar congress leaders. 
The Paswan Ministry had a plus point* I t promulgated 
two ordinances seeking to lower the ce i l ing on land holding-
ranging from 4 hectares to 12 hectares per male co-sharer 
depending on the category of land, and fixing a cei l ing on 
urban property ranging from 5 lakhs to 10 lakhs* However* 
t n e
 •'•Imea of inula commenting on land cel l ing wrote, "Bihar's 
lana ce i l ing oxainance i s unlikely to satisfy those who 
are in favour oi drastic land reforms* inepite of a 50 per 
cent reduction in the maximum permissible s ize of holdings 
of various categories che number of landowners who will be 
affected i s l e s s than 4,000, in the face of i t , the ordinance 
114. Ibid. 
115. swarajya VEditoriai), November 13, 1971. 
116. For detail see chapter IV, part E.PPi4i-26z.. 
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tho atainta quo". TOO paawaa Minlatry f*Uod to laplon«at 
other aaaaaroa of land rafoana and to givo protection to 
aharo*efopporo» Tim bmtal amoa a**ronc of gaathal ahaio* 
l i e 
eroo-pora by ***** landlorda woo a glaring maapU, 
TaU analyaia of tho parfoaaaneoo of the various 
coalition apvarnwanta ahows toot although «ix eovomnonta 
ogxoo4 on eonaom • l o l i i progrwnan for too battacmmt of 
tho l l fo of tho pooplo* aoat ltona of too otagfi—aa mam toad 
aji^^^apao i^^ woBw a^ O^^ ^WP i^ ^wvaj^ ^vaa F^ af^ ^^^a^^^ * ^F p^atH^ aKaNp^ ^^ p P^P^ P* o^^^^w^^ia*u ^wp^^a^a ao^^na wa^ap^p 
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4p*a |a otruo^la for thair own ourvlval* Thoy had l l t t la 
iln* to attaoo to tha pros*lag psobloaa of tho stato ao tholr 
main coooaca waa a&thor warding off throata to tttolr govaxa-
^^o^poavoa Mnv ^niaaajpaoiwoaw* '^iap**o apTiw ^pa^^w a^»w^poa*aw^o*J| aaa^paa ^ B O w O o O ^ » W w o W I O p^?^ a a^^p '^a^aa^^ 
folloa* whatovar 11 tela tin* thoy anno* tram thoao pxobloaa, 
thoy apoat i t on poatlnga and traaafora of gowainaant offIciala 
fo r aolf loh owto« 
TO moapitulata briafly what haa boon aal4 oarlior 
In thia cfcaptar about tho acta of oalaaloaa and conaiaslona 
of tho varloaa noaoeaaanto* i t eon too raaarfcatf hara that tho 
f Irat y# uevnxaooat Old a coananOahla joh la facing tho 
calanvlfcv of tJha naauoht ano orovldlna aoao OHMUT laaacliann 
117. Tiaaa of lo«*la imltorlal}, ftoptat »• 1*71. 
Ufa* |||ajK» January a* l»7a» p. a?« 
18* 
r e l i e f to the people* i t s other main work was the setting 
up the Aiyar commission. The Mudholkar commission, appointed 
by the Mandal Government to probe th» charges of corruption 
against 14 UF Ministers* said, "most of the Ministers tried 
as best as they ecu Id do to Improve the conditions of the 
people" and they "were responsive to public grievances which 
they sought to remove speedily often, however. In an 
119 
unorthodox manner" 
insptte of the acknowledgement of the Mudholkar 
Commission that "they may emerge perhaps even bet ter than 
120 
the ir admirers claim for them", the UF Government did 
nothing to bring changes in the administrative setup and 
socio-economic structure of the society* what was worse, the 
government compromised with the Raja of Ramgarh for the sake 
of i t s survival* The Inclusion of Raja and his younger 
brother in the cabinet was i t s e l f against the interest of 
the state* commenting on the conduct of the Raja, just ice 
Mudholkar said, 'I am surprised that the Mines and Geology 
portfol io; would have been offered to a person who, despite 
h i s denial , has substantial interest in mines in a state 
which i s one of the richest in the country in mineral 
ia 
deposits'* • 
l i t . Free Press journal (Bombay), and Times of India, 
December *3, J>9e9. 
120. ibid* 
mmmmmmm 
121* search Light, December 12, 1969* 
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The fourth Coalition created great pol i t ica l impact 
by refusing to bow before the Raja ana compromising the 
in teres t s of the state* I t was the seventh coal i t ion which 
i n i t i a t e d some land reform measures making l eg i s la t ion 
regarding abol i t ion of Tata's zamindari r ight , conferring 
r ights on homestead land and distribution of fallow and 
surplus land. The eighth coa l i t ion , l i k e i t s immediate 
predecessor, abolished land rent on uneconomic holdings. 
However, I t s main concern seemed to be abolishing English 
from every sphere of l i f e of the state* The ninth coal i t ion 
did one Important work* i t promulgated ordinances seeking 
t o f i x ce i l ings on land holding and urban property* However, 
i t earned a bad name by scrapping the cutta commission* 
During the whole period of the Goalltlon governments 
no ef fect ive steps were taken to better the l o t of the poor, 
exploited and suppressed section of the society, insplte of 
the fact that several governments had promised through their 
programmes to do that* Their promise to lessen the pressure 
of loans on the poor farmers, agricultural labourers and to 
end the system of money-lending in t r iba l , mines and indus-
t r i a l areas and to introduce a special system of loans proved 
a mere slogan, NO steps were taken to bring improvement in 
the administration and to check corruption* The seventh and 
the eighth coa l i t ions had promised to s e t up the inst i tut ions 
of Lok pal and Lok Ayukta for checking corruption in the 
administration but nothing was done in th i s direction. 
383 
on the contrary, the general f a l l in the standard and 
ef f ic iency of administration was more steep In the State 
than elsewhere, commenting on the stare of the administration, 
the search Light wrote, 
"one of the greatest bane i s casteism which 
has seeped in everywhere, whether in appointments 
or promotions or seeking favour i t plays a role* 
What i s more distressing i s that casteism has 
become a dominating factor in the realm of education 
also whether a t university level or in col leges 
or schools. Another marked feature i s the misuse 
of o f f i c i a l machinery to obtain personal and 
private gains. Many in the higher rungs of services 
are in fact the biggest defaulters in th i s respect 
and have se t the pace". 2 2 
The Government's promise to introduce reformation in 
the education system was conveniently forgotten, so was the 
case with the promise to revamp the economy of the s ta te . 
Even the land reform measures taken by some governments were 
far below the mark. This resulted in large number of agrarian 
agi tat ions in Bihar. The statement given below shows agrarian 
123 
agi tat ions in Bihar, 1967 - 70. 
Agrarian agitations in Bihar,1967-70 
year Agitations 
1967 - 22 
1968 - 82 
1969 - 90 
1970 - 649 
122. ib id . ^Editorial), September 24, 1969. 
123. K .C . Pant, "violence in a Period of social Change", 
Young Indian , vol* m , NOB.29-30, June 28, l973,p, l5 
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However, the moat deplorable was the law and order 
s i tuat ion In the s ta te throughout the whole period of 
Coalition governments* I t was disturbing to note that not 
even the minimum of the security of l i f e and honour that 
the c i t i zen was ent i t led to could be guaranteed to hiin.The 
search Light wrote, "while pol i t ic ians are fighting tor power 
l i k e kllkenny cats* lawless elements are having a f i e l d day 
124 
in most parts of the state"* i t further wrote that "people 
have begun to lose fa i th in the pol ice as a law enforcing 
authority and indeed have reconciled themselves to the 
125 
s i tuat ion that not much can be expected of i t " , gven in Patna, 
the s t a t e capital* the people found themselves very much at 
the mercy of the ruffians, what was more worse was the 
emergence of a new c lass of law-breakers* I t Included some 
so-cal led respectable elements who secured impunity from 
l ega l consequences because of their connection in high quarters* 
i n many cases* the pol ice expressed helplessness in dealing 
with th i s c l a s s of ant i -social elements quite a number of 
126 
whom had penetrated one po l i t i ca l party or the other* The 
following Table shows the increasing number of crimes during 
the coa l i t ion perloa* with exception of a f a l l in 1971 in 
the f i r s t two columns. 
124* search Light* December 17* 1970. 
125. Ib id . , December 17, 1970. 
126* Ib id . , December 17* 1970. 
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Table - shoving true cases of serious crimes 
In Bihar, 1967 - 71 during coa l i t ion 
period. 
5 1 « 1 
year ft Rioting I Murder ft Dacolty ft Robbery 
* ft I a 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
8,282 
8,048 
8,334 
10,239 
8,306 
1,367 
1,282 
1,299 
1,523 
1,318 
1,752 
1,580 
1,333 
1,626 
1,976 
1,080 
978 
923 
1,045 
1,256 
CONGRESS GOVBRMMBBTS 
The 1972 General E lec t ions to Assembly resu l ted i n 
the end o£ mult i -party and mini-party c o a l i t i o n system and 
the return of one party system* After f ive years, Bihar 
could have a ful l - f ledged congress Government* The Congress, 
in i t s Election manifesto, had made the following promises 
128 
to the peoples -
Promises 
1* To obtain sel f -suff ic iency in economy* (a) to organise 
127. Bihar s t a t i s t i c a l Hand Boole, 1976(Patna: Directorate of 
S t a t i s t i c s and Evaluation of Bihar), p. 105* 
128* chunao Ghoshna Patra(Election Manifesto), mdian National 
Congress, l u 71-72. New Delhi* 
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economic programmes and to mobilise material and mental 
resources in such a way that will help getting self-
sufficiency without foreign aid; (b) to eliminate 
drawbacks In economy in order to get full productive 
capability of steel, fertilizer etc.; (c) to reorganise 
production structure in such a way that will help in 
producing employment opportunities, defence-oriented 
essential commodities and capital oriented goods; 
(d) to curtail the consumption of those sections of 
society which have benefitted most by social programs*s 
for the purpose of mobilising more means; (e) to have 
humonious relations between workers and management and 
to get workers' share in management at all levels of 
production. 
ro remove social and economic injustices; to better 
the income standard of the weakest sections so that 
they may fulfil their minimum needs; to set up a system 
that will provide them essential commodities at proper 
rates. 
To establish proper harmony between the state and the 
centre in economic programmes* agricultural production, 
irrigation and electricity, education, health and the 
welfare of scheduled caste, scheduled Tribe and Backward 
classes. 
ro bring fundamental reform in education and examination 
system in order to Inculcate new social values,enhance 
secularism and national unity, help In adopting a humane, 
387 
rat lmal and se l f - su f f i c i en t outlook and to help students 
in developing the ir ful l personality and face challenge* 
of the fas t developing wo eld, 
5# To provide compulsory education to a l l children upto 
11 years by 1975 and upto 14 years by 1980. 
6* '*o take steps to give teachers due respect in society 
and improve the ins t i tut ions in which they work. 
7* The stafee Government wi l l be ful ly responsible in imple-
menting the programmes aiming at providing employment to 
weaker sections, educated unemployed, specially techniciai 
ana engineers and in providing benefits to small,marginal 
and agricultural labourers. 
8 . To take steps to bring land reforms and to implement 
them eftect ively* 
9. safeguarding the interests of minorities t (a) to provide 
educational f a c i l i t i e s to a l l l ingu i s t i c classes?(b) to 
attend to the socio-economic problems of Muslims, 
Christians and other re l ig ious and l ingu i s t i c minorities; 
(c) to provide proper place to Urdu; (d) to take steps 
to check discrimination in appointments and promotions 
against minorities; (e) to take special care of education 
employment and welfare of weaker sections, particularly 
Scheduled cas te , scheduled Tribe and Backward c lasses . 
However, the f i r s t congress Government, headed by Kedar 
pancey, spel l out the following 13-point pr ior i t i e s of his 
129 
Government. 
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1. Rehabilitation of the famil ies of jawans and off icers 
k i l l ed or disabled in the war with Pakistan, 
2* Expansion of irrigation network and rural e lectr i f icat ion 
to boost agricultural production and small scale 
industries , 
3 . provision of drinking water f a c i l i t i e s and construction 
of v i l l age roads, particularly in the sugarcane-producing 
b e l t . 
4 . improvement of c iv i c amenities in big towns l ike patna 
and Rancht. 
5* More primary school buildings and repair of old buildings. 
6. introduction of panchayat Raj in a l l d i s tr ic t s* 
7, introduction of better farm techniques and subsidiary 
agro-industries. 
8, special care and welfare of the scheduled castes , 
Scheduled Tribes and Backward classes* 
9 . introduction of land reforms and fixing of ce i l ings on 
urban property. 
10, Provision of compulsory education to a l l children in 
the 5 - 1 1 age group by 1975 and those of the 11 - 13 
age group by 1980* 
11 , Reorientation of v i l l age plans and providing jobs to 
rural unemployed particularly the unemployed landless, 
12 , Provision of jobs for educated unemployed, particularly 
those holding engineering degrees and technical diplomas. 
13, Review of the Fivo year Plan to f u l f i l the needs of 
the Backward s tate with an increased subvention from 
the centre, 
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It may be mentioned, however* that from July, 1975 
onwards, the state Government declared its determination 
to Implement the following 20-point programme* announced 
130 
toy the prime Minister In the night of July 1, 1975*-
1 . continuance of steps to bring down prices of essential 
commodities, streamlined production, procurement and 
distribution of essential commodities* s t r i c t economy 
in government expenditure. 
2. implementation of agricultural land cel l ing and 
speedier distribution of surplus land and compilation 
of land records. 
3 . stepping up of provision of house-sites for landless 
and weaker sect ions . 
4 . Bonded labour, <vherever i t e x i s t s , wi l l be declared 
I l legal • 
5 . plan for liquidation or rural Indebtedness. Legislation 
for moratorium on recovery of debt from landless 
labourers, small farmers and art isans. 
6. Review of laws on minimum agricultural wages. 
7 . Five-million more hectares to be brought under irriga-
t ion . National programme for use of underground water. 
8 . ft.n accelerated power programme, super Thermal stations 
under central control* 
130. Times of India, July 2, 1975. 
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9, New development programme for development of handloom 
sec to r . 
10. improvement in qua l i ty and supply of people ' s c lo th . 
11* s o c i a l i s a t i o n of urban and urban!sable land , ce l l i ng 
on ownership and possession of vacant land and on the 
p l in th area of new duel l ing u n i t . 
12 . Special squads t o r valuat ion of conspicuous construction 
ana prevention of tax-evasion, summary t r i a l s and de te r -
rent punisnmant to economic offences. 
IB* special l e g i s l a t i o n for confiscation of smugglers' 
proper t ies* 
14. L ibe ra l i sa t ion of investment procedures. Action against 
misuse of import l i cences . 
15 . #ew schemes for workers' associa t ion in indust ry . 
16 . National permit scheme for road t r a n s p o r t s . 
17 . income-tax r e l i e f to the middle-class exemption l i m i t 
r a i sed to KS. 8 ,000/- . 
16 . Essent ia l commodities a t control led pr ices to students 
in h o s t e l s . 
19. Books ana s ta t ionery a t control led p r i ces ; and 
20. new apprent iceship scheme to enlarge employment and 
t r a i n i n g , spec ia l ly of weaker sec t ions . 
PERFORMANCE Off SHE PANJ3BY GOVERNMENT 
Land Reform 
The f i r s t congress Government* headed by Kedar Pandey, 
f ixed a maximum ce l l i ng on a g r i c u l t u r a l land by amending the 
391 
exis t ing Land Reform Act. Under the new Act passed by the 
leg i s la ture in June 1972, while the ce i l ing for per family 
of upto f ive members for canal or s ta te cubewell Irrigated 
land was 15 acres* i t was I s acres for private tubeuell 
irrigated land, 30 acres for non-irrigated land in the plains 
and 37^ 5 acres in the reverine b e l t and 45 acres of h i l l y 
or sandy land* The ce i l ing on homestead land was reduced 
from 10 acres for each co-parcener to one acre for a family 
and the ce i l ing on orchards from 15 acres f o r each co-parcener 
131 
to three acres for a family. By enforcing th i s Act, the 
Government acquired 6,000 acres of surplus land by February, 
1973 and expected to acquire more than 500,000 acres of 
surplus land for distribution among landless t i l l e r s * Before 
t h i s Act, the Government distributed 2.75 lmkh acres of land 
132 
among 2*30 lakh landless families* 
The Government distributed 9,000 acres of land among 
3,700 retired army men. s imilarly, i t distributed 4.28 lakh 
acres of agriculturable land, obtained under the Bboodan 
133 
Scheme, among landless t i l l e r s * 
131. Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates* vol* 2, NO* 28, 
(Part n ) , June 28, i972, p* 131* 
132* Ib id . , vol* 5, NO* l(Part II;,February 26,1973,pp.1-26. 
133* Ibid. 
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urban c e l l i n g 
Bihar was perhaps the f i r s t s ta te to have passed a 
B i l l in June, 1972 f ixing a ce l l ing on property worth RS. 2 
lakhs In a town whose population exceeds lo ,ooo . But when 
a family exceeds l i v e members etch adaitiaxal member vas 
allowed to have property worth RS« 20,000 each, with the 
134 
provision that the total* In no case, would exceed 3 lakh. 
Administrative Reform 
in order to bring improvement and eff iciency In the 
administration, the f i r s t congress Government created 12 new 
d i s t r i c t s , 19 sub-divisions and a new Koshi Division. I t also 
created 14 new police s tat ions to maintain law and order* 
135 
To check train robbery, i t s e t up a special squad. 
i r r iga t ion 
The pandey Government started work on west Koshi canal 
which had been stopped in 1966 due to the objections raised 
by the Naples© Government.* i t sanctioned Ra. 9 crores. i t 
started a special scheme for minor irr igat ion, road construc-
t ion , tree plantation and land consolidation in areas l ike 
136 
palamu, jamui anu Bhabhua-sasaram-Nawada areas. 
134. Ibid. 
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industry 
The Government decided to s e t up autonomous author i t i e s 
for t h e development of fereas s e l e c t e d for i n d u s t r i e s . I t 
e s t a b l i s h e d such a u t h o r i t i e s for Acittyapur and Bokaro by 
i s s u i n g an ordinance on May 15, 1972. i t s tar ted work In 
Patratu # I*eh*i, Gatalsut , patwah and H&jipui. for the establish-* 
raont of i n d u s t r i a l e s t a t e s . I t a l s o s tar ted work in 1,437 
137 
Indus tr ia l u n i t s . 
E l e c t r i c i t y 
I t was during the pandey regime that the f i r s t honest 
e f f o r t was made to put the s t a t e E l e c t r i c i t y Board In order 
earn a t no time so many tubewel ls were bored and energised as 
138 
during one year Pandey was in o f f i c e * The production of 
e l e c t r i c i t y was increased from 165 MW to 300 MW. For the ffcst 
139 
time 600 Harijan v i l l a g e s were e l e c t r i f i e d * 
Education 
i n order t o remove i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and growing Indisc ip l ine 
i n u n i v e r s i t i e s , the Government* by promulgating an ordinance 
i n Apr i l , 1972, dismissed senate , syndicate . Academic Council 
137. I b i d . 
1313. Julnk, June 10, 1973, p . 22. 
139 . Governor's Address, op , d t . 
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140 
• t c . and vested their powers In new I.A.S. vice-chancellors. 
I t had a t e l l i n g e f f ec t on the regularity and fairness of 
141 
examinations and publication of results* The Government 
appointed a high l eve l committee to recommend ways to bring 
reform in the structure of univers i t ies and their adminls-
142 
trat ion , i t establish? d a new Mlthila university. 
The Government opened 75 residential schools, Including 
6 meant for girlc* for the educational u p l i f t of scheduled 
Caste8 and scheduled Tribes* The students of these schools 
were provided lodging* boarding, clothing and other f a c i l i t i e s 
by the governments. All Harljan and Adlvasl mtrltdrlous 
students were given scholarships* in a l l 2,99,800 students 
143 
were given scholarships during 1972-73. 
However* the Pandey Government could not do much to 
f u l f i l the promises given by the congress* Even some Important 
items in 13-point priority spelt out by h i s Government were 
not touched. H l s Government took a number of unpopular 
decisions more to protect the interests of the rich than to 
give re l i e f to the poor* His Government reimposed land rent 
140. ib id . 
141. Link* June 10* 1973* p. 22. 
142* Governor's Address* op. c i t* 
143* Ibid. 
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on uneconomic holdings abolished by the previous two govern-
144 
meats. Even in the new land reform lav, he provided various 
exemptions which were exploited by individuals and organiza-
t i o n . This bel ied the Government's expectation about surplus 
land* in spite of t a l l claims, only 770 acres of surplus land 
145 
were distributed among the landless t i l l e r s . Karpoori 
Thakur ( soc ia l i s t ) and Chandra shekhar slngh (CPI), while 
speaking on Governor's Address* cr i t i c i s ed the Government 
for i t s fa i lure in checking price r i»e , supplying essential 
commodities* imposing land rent on uneconomic holdings, 
implementing land reform measures, protecting the right of 
share-croppers, checking the evict ion of landless on homestead 
land, providing irr igat ions! f a c i l i t i e s , providing security 
146 
to aarijans, /t diva s i s and minorit ies . They also cr i t i c i sed 
the Pandey Government for not bringing any reform in the 
administrative se t up, i t s fai lure in providing employment 
to educated unemployed and checking Increasing rates of crimes, 
robberies, dacolt ies and train robberies. Harihar slngh 
(Congress-o), janardan Yadav (jan s**ngh) and Kapildeo Singh 
also c r i t i c i s e d the Government for i t s fai lure in controlling 
corruption in administration and for i t s action for increasing 
147 
taxes , land rent and e l e c t r i c i t y rate , chaturanan Mishra(CPl), 
144. Asian Recorder, April 23-29, 1973, p. 11357, 
145. limes of India, October 31, 1972. 
146. Bihar Assembly Debates, Vol. 5, No.3, February 28,1973, 
pp. i.4 - 18. 
147. Ib id . , pp. 18-20. 
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B.P. Mandal ( soc . ) and Rarajl Prasad Singh (Jan sangh), while 
speaking on the budget cr i t i c i s ed the Government for i t s 
146 
fa i lure mentioned above* Thakur Munlshvar Hath singh(*>c.) 
c r i t i c i s e d the Government for i t s fai lure in tackling 
unemployment* He gave the following figures of educated 
unemployed! Matriculation 1,42,545, Between Matriculation 
and Graduation 53,582, Graduates 51,374, above graduation 
3,716, overseers 8,857, Engineers 3,929, Doctors 278* 
i n a l l there were 5,46,875 unemployed in Bihar by the end of 
149 
June, IS*72. 
instead of rooting out corruption, sonae of Pandey's 
colleagues Indulged in i t* several serious charges were 
l e v e l l e d on the floor of the Assembly against some Ministers* 
Kaplldeo singh l eve l l ed charges of corruption and misuse of 
o f f i c i a l posit ion against Lahtan chaudhary, and L.p.shahl 
150 
(both cabinet Ministers) and produced some photostat copies* 
janardan Tiwari (jan sangh) l eve l l ed serious charges of 
corruption against senior o f f i c ia l s* He also l eve l l ed charges 
of corruption against L . P . shahi and charges of castelsm 
151 
against another Minister Ramesh jha. sunil Mukherjee (CPI) 
152 
to ld pandey, "Your ministry i s certainly under suspicion" • 
14H. i b i d , , No.ii,March 12,1975, pp.25,27»p33-3», 40-45: 
149. Ibid*, pp. 1*7— 51-
150* Ib id . , vol* 2, No* 26, June 26, 1972, pp. 23-30. 
151* Ib id . , p* 85* 
152* i b i d . , p. 63* 
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Tims* the pandey GoveroMmt functioned on the old 
and beaten track of other Governments and fa i l ed to bring 
any fundamental change* In the socio-economic pol i t ica l 
setup of the s t a t e . The hopes raised by Mrs. Gandhi in 1969* 
1971 and 1972 and the promises made by her party in Bihar 
were be l ied . Excepting land reform and maintaining discipline 
in the universit ies* pandey's performance in sal other f ie lds 
was far from sat isfactory. He swore by the name of the poor 
and the downtrodden yet under no regime wer® so many Indus* 
t r i a l workers and landless peasants ki l led by the police or 
153 
the landlords as during his tenure. 
His performance on law and order front was in no way 
better than the coal i t ion Governments. Rather his Ministry's 
record began with the sp i l l ing of blood, on the eve of his 
assumption of power* a CPI HLA Mazaharul Hasan was murdered 
in the Patna MLA Hostel and t i l l his ouster Pandey was unable 
to locate the murderer. Another MLA., th i s time of the 
S o c i a l i s t party, a veteran soc ia l i s t and freedom fighter* was 
beaten to death by Kedar Pandey's police when he was on fgjfc 
demanding recognition of the union he led . n was not nl 
the murder of the MLAs that blackened the Pandey Ministry's 
record, s ix peasants and a coranuniet leader santu Mahto 
were k i l l ed by the landlords backed by police in broad day-
l i g h t at se l iber i v i l lage in Madhubaai d i . t r i c t and the «aia 
153. Link, June 10, 1973, p. 23, 
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culpr i t was not apprehended. The police opened f i re at Slrka 
154 
col l iery* Kumardhubl and Bokaro k i l l ing 20 workers, in a l l , 
the t a l l y was of 35 legal i sed murders committed by pandey's 
po l i ce , .some 40 share-croppers were k i l led by landlords in 
155 
a bid to suppress the ir claim to land. Kaplldeo s lngh(soc ) 
gave the following figures of crime during f ive months from 
156 
March to June, 1972i-
Crimes 
Murder 
Dacol ty 
Loot 
surgery 
Theft 
R i o t 
r 
0 
ft March 
124 
233 
116 
1,406 
1,956 
705 
" 1972 
1 Apri l 
114 
277 
122 
1,159 
1,669 
746 
1 May 
125 
171 
121 
1,349 
1,839 
735 
9 June 23 
N.A. 
112 
88 
1,657 
1,710 
723 
Other sections of the population also received shocking 
treatment from pandey. in September, 1972, students,journa-
l i s t s and even ML As were beaten by the pol ice when the 
157 
students were demonstrating before the s ta te Assembly^gmte. 
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155* New Age, June 17, 1972, p. 1« 
156, Bihar Assembly Debates, v o l . 2, NO. 26 (Part n ) , June 
26, 1972, pp. 23-30. 
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His performance on food front was an utter fa i lure . The 
complete fa i lure of the crash programme for wheat production 
and the wheat procurement drive created d i f f i c u l t food 
s i tuat ion in the s t a t e , znsplte of 125.37 crores spent on 
wheat production, the production remained where i t was l a s t 
year* i . e . around 29 lakh tonnes. As against the procurement 
and levy target of mix lakh tonnes* two months of special 
158 
drive yielded only 22 thousand tonnes* The Time a of India 
commenting on Pandey Ministry performance wrote, "During 
i t s year of o f f i c e , the p&ndey Ministry has been unable to 
159 
cope with any of the pressing problems of that backward state". 
The Patriot commented, "His administrative ventures were 
" * 160 
always l u d i c r o u s - . 
PERf CRMANCB Of THE QHaFOCR GOVERWEMT 
i rr igat ion 
The Qhaioor GO Vermont created an additional irrigation 
f a c i l i t y for 3*47 lakh acres of land under the 'Emergency 
Agriculture Production* programme apart from the irrigation 
f a c i l i t y provided to twenty-five thousand acres of land under 
161 
the *speclal Employment scheme'. 
158. ib id . 
159. Times of India/ June 15, 1973. 
l 6 0 #
 Patriot* June 25* 1973. 
164• Governor's Address, Bihar Legis lat ive assembly Debates* 
v o l . 8, NO. I (part I D * March 18, 1974, p. 2-8. 
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Employment 
The Government started special Employment scheme and 
'Half-a-million job Programme'• under these programmes, by 
December 31, 1973, 10,328 persons were provided regular 
employment. Besides, 19, $20 educated unemployed vie re given 
162 
e i t h e r employment or training for employment* The Government 
a l so started 'employment incentive* programme in the year 
1974*75 under Instruction from the Planning commission. 
Foodgrains 
in order to make available foodgralns at cheaper and 
proper rates , the second congress Government opened 24,717 
foodgralns shops, i t also started dehoarding and procurement 
164 
drive . 
Small Marginal Farmers and prinking water 
The Government, with the purpose of benefitting the 
small and marginal farmers, started small and Marginal Farmer 
programme in purnea, Patau, champaran and Rohtas d i s t r i c t s 
165 
with the help of the union Government. The Government 
provided 7,500 hand-pipes, 1,050 tube wells and 350 dri l led 
162. Ib id , 
163. Governor's Address, Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates, 
vo l . i i , NO. 1 (Part i l ) , feSruary IS, IVJS, pp.2-.19. 
164. ibid. 
*65. Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates, v o l . 8, op. c i t . 
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tubewells to the rural people under 'Drinking water supply* 
166 
scheme. 
Freedom from pefat 
The Ghafoor Government enacted a lav under which land-
l e s s and agricultural labourer*, Harljana, Adivasis and 
Backward castes (Annexur* I) were freed from a l l kinds of 
debts* The Government made law to end the age-old bonded 
167 
labour system. 
industry 
For the systematic development of industrial areas* 
the Government enacted Bihar industrial Area Development 
Authority Act ana set up Development Authority in Adityapur, 
Bokaro, Ranchi and Patna. The Ghafoor Government started 
the spun s i l k Mill in Bhagalpur in 1974 and Increased the 
production capacity of the super phosphate Factory and 
Electrical Equipment Factory in s indari . Apart from these, 
the Bihar s ta te znduetrial Development corporation started 
work on a scooter factory* which i f started production, would 
168 
provide employment to 1,800 people. 
Education 
The Government set up a committee consisting of educa-
t ional experts,headed by zawar Hu&sain,to recommend measures 
166. i b i d . , v o l , i i (part n ) , No.l , February 12, 1975, 
pp. 2-19. 
167. ib id . 
168. Ibid. 
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for educational reforms, TO provide lodging f a c i l i t i e s to 
the students, the Government decided to build two hostels in 
each university of the s tate and released two lakhs rupees 
169 
to each of them as a f i r s t instalment of i t s share. The 
Government also increased the number of scholarships from 
170 
2,250 to 4,000, 
Administration 
in order to bring impartiality and eff iciency in the 
State administration, the Government took: steps for on-the-
spot inquiry by the f lying squads of al legations against 
administration, set up 'Technical supervisory c e l l • to check 
misappropriation of Government fund In the public works 
Department, I t a lso set up an Ant 1-corruption committee at 
171 
the d i s t r i c t l e v e l , 
However, the Ghafoor Government was taken to task by 
the Members of the Assembly for i t s fai lure in tackling the 
problems of r is ing prices , mounting unemployment, non-availabi-
l i t y of consumer goods and foodgrains and prevailing 
inef f ic iency, corruption, favouritism and nepotism In the 
administration. The Government was also cr i t i c i s ed for 
deteriorating law and order situation and increasing crimes 
M i . Ibid, 
170. i b i d . , v o l , 8 ,NO.3 (Part li) ,Harch 21, 1974, pp. 2-7, 
1 7 i
* Ibid, ,vol .11 ,No. l,February 12, 1975, pp. 2-19. 
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In the state. 
The sufferings caused to the common people by the 
non-availabil i ty of foodgrains and soaring prices were 
accepteo by the Government also in the Governor's Address to 
172 
the l eg i s la ture In 1974. Chandra shekhar Singh (CFI), while 
participating in the 'Motion of Thanks' to the Governor, 
c r i t i c i s e d the Government for i t s fai lure In making foodgrains 
avai lable , controlling rising prices and mounting unemploy-
ment. He also cr i t i c i s ed the Ghafoor Government for adopting 
pro-hoarders, bXackmarketeers and pro-vested interest policy* 
The CPI leader blamed the Government for the fai lure of land 
reform measures. He cr i t i c i s ed the congress Government for 
the plight of the poor Hart Jans, &divasla and other poor 
sect ions of the soc ie ty , in the opinion of the Communist 
leader* the s ta te administration was too corrupt to take 
steps In the interest of the common people* He alleged that 
cabinet Ministers took bribes and were busy in postings and 
173 
transfers only. 
Thakur Mukeshwamath Singh (congress(o) alleged that 
the ruling party was involved in the process of Government-
breaking, Minister-making and Minister-removing, while the 
people of the s tate were suffering fron non-availabil ity of 
foodgrains, r is ing prices, unemployment and corruption la 
172. Ib id . , v o l . 8 , No.l (Part n > , March 18,1974, p. 2 . 
173. i b i d . , v o l . 9 , NO.2 (Part I I ) , June 6, 1974,pp.25, 
23PO-34. 
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174 
the administration. Sot only opposition member* but some 
important congress members l ike Deep Naraln slngh* Prabhunath 
Singh and vidyakar Kavi also cr i t i c i s ed the Govej.-nment for 
price r i s e , unemployment* inefficiency* corruption and 
175 
nepotism in the administration. According to Kavl, the 
Government was not paying attention to the basic problems 
of the common masses and was concerned only with transfers* 
postings* promotions* extentIon and money allotment. Develop-
ment works were at a s tandst i l l and corruption was showing 
176 177 
i t s real colour* umraon salho Kujur and Bagun swribrui 
c r i t i c i s e d the Ghafoor Government for tne exploitation of 
Adlvasls and deteriorating law and order s i tuation, 
During debates on the Governor's Address to the state 
l eg i s la ture in 1975 also* chatwaran Mtshra (cpl) and Bhola 
Prasad singh (Rebel sP) c r i t i c i s e d the Ghafoor Government 
for pr ice -r i se , non-availabil ity of foodgrains at proper 
rates and growing unemployment* They held the Government 
responsible for hoarding* blackmarketlng and corruption in 
the state* These leaders expressed deep concern at deteriora-
t ing law and order and increasing number of murders and 
dacc i t i e s and robberies in trains and buses, Echoing the 
sense of Insecurity prevailing in the state* the CPI leader 
174. Ibid.* p. 38. 
175. Ibid.* No.8, June 12, 1974, pp. 15-18/ MO. 12* June, 1974, 
pp. A3-16 and 62*63. 
176. ibid.* No. 4* June 10, 1974, pp. 15-16. 
177. i b i d . , HO. 5, June 11, 1974, p. 39. 
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said that the Government, unable to preside security to 
MLAs, MPs and Ministers, Including union Ministers, could 
not provide security to the common man* Finally* both 
these leaders criticised the Government for its utter 
178 179 
failures in land reforms* Nand Kishore singh, satyanaraln 
180 
Singh and Rajo Singh (all Congress; expressed their anxiety 
at the growing number of crimes in the state. Kamdeo Singh 
(also of the congress) expressed his dissatisfaction at the 
lbl 182 
performance of the Government. Theodore sodra and paika 
183 
Munau (Congress; criticised the Government for neglect and 
exploitation of the Adlvasis in chotanagpur and santhal 
184 185 
Paragenas. Mahabir Paawan and Ram Chandra paswan expressed 
their concern at the plight of Harljans. None of these 
problems, however, were new. it is significant that R.N.Jha, 
an important congress leader, criticised his own Government 
186 
for not fulfilling the promises flven to the people. 
1169
 *bld»« vol. 11, No.3 (part II),February 14,1975,pp.37-42. 
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180. Ibid., NO.5, February 18, 1975, pp. 26-31. 
181. Ibid., p. 9. 
182 . I b i d . , No. 7, February 20, 1975, pp. 40-41 . 
1 8 3 . i b i d . , NO. 8, February 21 , 1975, p . 25 . 
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I t i s also Interesting to note that while the chief 
Minister was reported t o have said that 7$ per cent of 
187 
Supply inspector* in Bihar were corrupt, Birendra Pandey, 
a congress member in the Assembly, l eve l l ed charges of 
corruption against the chief Minister Ghafoor* Finance 
188 
Minister D.P. Ral and industry Minister Chandra shekhar singh. 
The s ta te was practically without ef fect ive administra-
t ion apart from what central Reserve and local police was 
189 
able to provide. "Bihar topped the l i s t of s ta tes requiring 
ass istance of the defence forces for maintenance of law 
190 
and order ae well as essential supplies during l a s t year"• 
in fact* the going-on in the ruling party leading to 
periodical replacement of a se t of Ministers by another set 
of Ministers appeared to the people of Bihar to be a vast 
Irrelevance, while the problems of the s tate cried for 
resolute action by purposeful administration, a l l that the 
party in power was able to do was to act l ike "martonetters 
191 
worked by the pupeteer from New Delhi". 
187. National Herald, March 26, 1974. 
188. Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates* Vol. u , NO. 2, 
February117, HJ'K/p. 3; Indian Nation, March 20, 1975. 
189. Times of India (Editorial) , February 8, 1975. 
190. Hindustan Times, January 6, 1975. 
191. Motherland, September 2, 1974. 
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PKRTORHAMCE OF THE MISHRA GOYEBMMPJT 
The third congress Government, headed by jagannath 
Mishra, started functioning on the basis of 20-point 
program* announced by the Prime Minister on July 1/ 1975* 
The Mishra Government took the following steps to f u l f i l 
the promises given in the programmej-
Prlce control 
in© Mishra Government succeeded In lowering the prices 
of foodgralns between 32% to 43'*, as compared to 1974* After 
the declaration of emergency there was further fa l l la 
prices between 12% to 33%• rhe Government also intensified 
actions against hoarding* i t raided the godowns and houses 
of 5,005 traders and farmers, arrested 601 persons and 
unearthed 2,08,700 qultal of foodgralns. i t also raided r ice -
m i l l s and dehoarded 65,000 quintals of paddy and 2*624 quintals 
of r i c e . The Government raided simultaneously the shops of 
kerosene o i l dealers and arrested 8 persons under various 
192 
charges. 
Procurement and production 
As against the rice procurement target of 25,000 metric 
tonnes, the Government procured 60,000 a. tonnes rice in 
1975-7&. i t a lso succeeded in procuring 52,000 m. tonnes of 
193 
wheat against the target of 50,000 m. tonnes. During ths 
192. Bihar Hex*. 20 su tr i Asxthic Karya-jcram, July, 1975-June, 
T$v© Information and public Relatione uepartaent, 
Government of Bihar), pp. 1-3. 
193. i b i d . , p. 3 . 
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tenure of Mishra there was a record production of 95 lakh 
194 
n . tonnes in foodgrain* aa against 82.50 m. tonnes in 1974-75. 
Land Reforms 
under land reform measures, the Government acquired 
1,27.000 acres of surplus land, while upto 1974-75 only 
97,000 acres of surplus land had been acquired, of these 
73,000 acres were distributed among the landless t i l l e r s . 
About 3.32 acres of Government land were distributed 
among 3,66,000 narijans, Adivasts. Backward c las ses and 
ret ired axmymen. Also, about 11,166 acres oi land were 
195 
restored to 14,477 A. diva s i s . 
Home F a c i l i t i e s 
By the end of May, 1976, 17,239 homestead lands were 
distributed among 54,000 landless families under 149 blocks. 
Besides, 10,000 houses in the s ta t e , excluding the 400 houses 
in Patna alone, were being b u i l t for those landless and 
poor families whose houses were either damaged or completely 
196 
washed away in the 1975 floods. 
Bonded Labour 
After July 197b, 581 bonued labourers in palarau and 
194. A age Badha Bihar Hamara (information and public Relations 
Lepartment, Government of Bihar}, p. 1. 
195- Bihar Men 20 sutr l Aarthic Karya-icram, op. c l t» , pp.7*8 
Bihar Assembly pebate, v o l . v i , MQ,I (part ilJ,March 12 
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G&ya d i s t r i c t s were l iberated from exploitation of landlords* 
They were also freed from the debt of R». 36/114 and 19 
acres of land were also restored to then* Besides* 376*65 
acres of Ofcftir Maxrooa* (Government land) were eiven to 
l iberated bonded labourers* Two landlords who violated the 
197 
law were put behind tne bars fox a year. 
Minimum wages 
in order to l iberate landless , labourers and poor 
fanners, the Government promulgated an ordinance in November, 
198 
1975 and sent i t to the President for his assent* The Govern* 
ment a l so fixed minimum wages for agricultural labourers 
in irrigated area hs . 5 a day and in unlrrigated area; 
a s . 4*50 a day besides Re. 1 for food* in order to implement 
I t , the Government appointed o f f i c i a l s at block l eve l , 
199 
d i s t r i c t level and in the secretariat* 
Irrigat ion 
under 20-polnt programme, 98,000 hectares of land were 
provided irrigation f a c i l i t i e s and RS* 41*21 crores were 
spent on Irrigat ions! f a c i l i t i e s * Besides RS* 5 crores were 
al located to Gandafc planning which provided additional 
irr igat ion f a c i l i t i e s to 63,000 hectares of land* During 
197. ibid*, p*llj Bihar Assembly Debates, op, c l t . 
19e
* Bihar Ken 20 sutr i Karya-Kram, op, c i t . , p, 1 2 , 
199. i b i d , , p. 14; Bihar Assembly Debates, op* c i t . 
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Rabi season 4.43 lakh hectares of land were provided 
irrigation facilities. Apart from these, the Government 
200 
distributed 21,676 tubewells and pumping s e t s . 
E lec tr ic i ty 
During 1975-76, 2,247 m.w, units of e l ec t r i c i ty were 
produced as againsc 2,070 ra.w. units in 1974-75. Between 
ju ly 1975 to June 1976, 1,714 v i l l ages and, 1,069 Harljan 
v i l l a g e s were e l e c t r i f i e d . During t h i s period, 177 Govern-
ment tubewells, 13,620 private tubewesls were provided 
e l e c t r i c i t y . Also, 2,640 industrial units were provided 
201 
e l e c t r i c i t y f a c i l i t i e s . 
Employment 
The Government opened 9,581 controlled clothes shops, 
of these 7,744 shops were started by unemployed youths. 
The banks provided loans of Rs» 1,25,91,863 to 2,261 unemployed 
youths** under self-employment scheme. Besides, 549 motor 
co-operative sarcitis ware s e t up which provided employment 
to about 3,294 educated youths* Further 900 new enterpreneurs 
202 
were given training under self-employment scheme. 
200. Bihar Men 20 gutrl Karya-xram, op. c i t . , p. 15j Aaqe 
Badna Bihar Haaara, op* c l t . , p. 3* 
2 0 l #
 Bihar Men 20 sutri Karya-Kram, op, c i t , , p, 17. 
202. Ibid . , pp. 23* 37 and 39. 
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Studenta' welfare 
The Government opened Book Bank In 239 col luges and 
university departments in order to provide book f a c i l i t y to 
students* There was twenty per cent f a l l in the prices of 
school and college books. The Government also supplied* on 
controlled rates , foodgralna and other essential commodities 
203 
to students residing in 842 hostels and lodges* The Government 
also increased the amount of scholarship awarded to the 
students belonging to scheduled castes* scheduled Tribes and 
204 
other Backward classes* The Government provided lodging 
f a c i l i t i e s to Harijan and Adlvasi students by building 40 new 
205 
hostels* 
Legal Aid 
The Government set up legal aid committees in 10 d i s tr ic t s 
to provide legal help to landless* Harijans, Adivasls and 
weak sections* The Government issued an ordinance to end the 
exploi tat ion of rickshaw pullers* As a result 9,700 rickshaw 
pul lers were provided ownership to their vehicles in Patna alone* 
in Ranch!, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur# oarbhanga and saharasa 
207 
about 7,000 rickshaw puller were made owners of the ir rickshaws* 
203. Aaae aadha Bihar Haaara, op. c i t . , p. 7* 
204* Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates, o p . c i t . , pp.24-45. 
205* A age Badha Bihar Hamara, op. c i t . , p* 6* 
206. Ib id . , p. 8* 
207, Bihar Men 20 sutri Karya-Kram, op.c i t* , p. 41 . 
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Streamlining Administration 
The Mlshra Government took actions to streamline the 
administration. The Indian Nation commented, "A perceptible 
change In attendance ana work i s v i s ib l e in almost a l l the 
government o f f i ces including new and old secretariats since 
the proclamation of Emergency, k general climate of alertness 
and promptness in work seems to be gaining ground* The 
o f f i c i a l sloth and lethargy,which was not long ago a common 
feature of Bihar, i s on the wane now. There i s a marked improve-
208 
ment in puntuality and disc ipl ine in off ices"• The govern-
ment sacked 52 o f f i cers , including three 14s officers* one 
DIG rank pol ice o f f i cer , f ive departmental heads* including 
Engine er-ln-chlef and three select ion grade doctors because, _ 
209 
according to the chief Minister .they ceased to be e f f i c i en t . 
Mlshra further declared that 100 more officers* who have 
210 
ceased to be eff icient* might be coiapulsori&y retired* The 
Government also decided to withhold one increment of a l l 
those Government o f f i cers wno resorted to 'pairvl' and reseat 
representation through public men for the ir transfers during 
211 
Emergency. 
I t thus appears that the Mlshra Government fared for 
208. Indian Hat.ion, July 29* 1975* 
209. i b i d . , August 1* 1975. 
210. ibid.* August 6* 1975. 
211. ibid.* January 20* 1976. 
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better than the previous two congress governments. But a l l 
that g l i t t e r s i s not gold, NO doubt, due to fear psychosis 
created by Emergency, Mlshra fared comparatively better on 
some fronts* particularly land reform and price control. 
He a lso succeeded in maintaining what was cal led 'disc ipl ine' 
in administration. All th i s he did in the early phase of 
the Emergency. After this everything seemed to be relapsing 
to the old ways. This was conceded by no l e s s a person than 
Mrs. Gandhi herself in the conference of chief secretaries 
tta t "though the emergency had brought about some discipl ine, 
212 
the i n i t i a l alertness has slackened". The Mishra Government, 
with a l l Emergency force behind i t , fa i led to bring any 
real change in soc io-pol i t ica l se t up of the state* i t did 
not touch the real i l l s of Bihar administration, namely 
corruption, favourutism, nepotism and castelsm. similarly, 
Lu th-i- f i e ld of education, no change was so light to be dons. 
What was worse corruption was on the Increase in the 
State administration* This becomes d e a r by the Report of 
the A"ti-Corruption committee of the Assembly, headed by the 
Deputy speaker,shakoor Ahmad* Brist l ing with str ictures 
against the staff of the supply Department in particular and 
top o f f i c i a l s in the secretariat in general, the Report 
expressed grave concern that at a time when drastic action 
against corruption was the declared objective, the administra-
t ive machinery should s i t t ight over several reports including 
2(11. Indian nation. May *** 197«. 
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o f f i c i a l and non-official* As regards corruption in the 
Supply Department the Committee said that essential commodities 
including sugar meant for distribution in rural areas never 
reachad the Intended place because "a well-knit gang1* of the 
panchayat Mukhiya, the dealer, the BBO, the Supply inspectors 
and others worked in unison to divert the gooas for surrep-
213 
t i t l o u s sa le in urban areas. 
sunll Mukherji (c?X)>leader of the opposition in the 
Bihar Assembly, c r i t i c i s e d the Mishra Government for i t s 
fa i lures in lowering the prices of industry-based goods, 
controll ing the beating and murders of Harijans, Adivasia and 
share-croppers, checking dacolt ies in buses and trains, 
checking corruption, favouritism and misuse of o f f i c i a l posi-
t ion even in Emergency, checking excesses of o f f i c i a l s In 
co l lec t ing land rent and Government loans. He also cr i t ic i sed 
the Government for i t s utter fai lure in implementing minimum 
wages even In Government owned factories and in tackling the 
114 
growing problem of unemployment. Bhola Prasad Singh (rebel 
S o c i a l i s t ) c r i t i c i s e d ths Government for i t s failures in 
21S 
checking increasing corruption and briberies and crimes. 
Anirudh jha (rebel Jan sangh) blamed the Government for 
2 i3 . Indian Express, August 4, 1976. 
2 1 4 ,
 Bihar Legis lat ive Assembly Debates, v o l . VI, No. 2 
(part I I ) , March 19, 1976, pp 17^15, and 22-27. 
215. Ib id . , pp. 32-37. 
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216 
prevalent i rregular i t ies la administration and education* 
pun i t Roy (congress) blamed the Government for i t s negligence 
of chotanagpur belt* He cr i t i c i sed the Government for I t s 
fai lures in maintaining lav and order and for the increasing 
217 
number of robberies and dacoit iee . iranardsn Tiwari (rebel 
Jan sangh) also cr i t i c i sed the Government for corruption in 
218 
education and administration. 
The three congress governments, l ike the previous 
Coalit ion governments,, fa i led to tackle pressing problems 
facing the common people of the s t a t e . They a l l fa i led in 
bringing revolutionary changes in the exist ing administrative* 
economic and po l i t i ca l set up, though some steps were taken 
by these governments to provide immediate rel ief to the masses. 
What was agonising was that during the congress regime also 
there was a mad rush for the ministerial cake and juicy 
por t fo l io s . Factional fighting* based not on the performance 
of the government and devoid of any principle and ideology 
brought down the pandey and the Ghafoor Ministr ies . in view 
of the behaviour of congress l eg i s la tors and their changing 
factional l o y a l i t i e s , i t appears that the Mishra Government 
219 
would have met the same fact had there been no Emergency* 
216. Ib id . , pp. 49-52, 
217. Ib id . , pp. 53-56. 
2 1 8 . I b l d
" N). 3 , March 20, 1976, pp. 17-21* 
219* For detai l see chapter V. 
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The congress c l i t f Ministers, l ike the coal i t ion ones, were 
busy store In shif t ing threats from one corner to another 
than l a implementing the programmes of their governments. 
Their non-performance on the law and order front was most 
conspicuous. The following statement shows their failure in 
maintaining law and order and providing security to the 
220 
people. 
Statement of serious crimes in Bihar, 1972-1975 
,
 f ? j j 
year (> Rioting 0 Murder I Dacoity i Robbery 
I I ! I 
1972 8,207 1,291 2,060 1,329 
1973 9,904 1,572 1,822 1,236 
1974 12,597 1,822 2,866 1,783 
1975 10,ISO 1,713 2,765 1,745 
1976 Not available -
I t i s c lear that occurrence of serious crimes during 
the congress regime was on the Increase. Among the congress 
xs^FisawmisxmnKifrsretiiiBwnsmYY 
governments, the Mlshra Government succeeded, to sons extent, 
in checking crime rates* But during chis Yegime also the 
s i tuat ion was worse than during any of the coal i t ion governments. 
220. Bihar s t a t i s t i c a l Hand Book (Directorate of s t a t i s t i c s 
and Evaluation of Bihar, J.978), p. 104. 
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From the above analysis , i t appears that coal i t ion 
and congress governments were two s ides of the same coin. 
They were basical ly similar in nature, character and 
performance. They were not honestly de-voted to the causes 
of the poor and the exploited masses* Therefore, a l l of 
then fa i l ed In bringing qualitative change In any sphere of 
l i f e in the s ta t e . Their performance i n sons v i ta l f i e lds , 
namely land reform, administrative reform and educational 
re-orientation was far from satisfactory. Even the steps in 
these f i e l d s that they took were not adequate. This was 
conceded In personal interviews with the author by Ram 
221 222 223 
La khan Singh Yadav, Daroga Prasad Ral, nam Raj Prasad Singh, 
224 225 
Krishna Kant Singh, Harihar Prasad Singh, Bhola Prasad 
221. in an interview with the author on February 15,1980, 
Yadav, A FWL Minister in the K.B-Sahay Ministry, an 
important congress leader during 1967-77, i s , at present, 
Vice-President of the Congress(U) In the s t a t e . 
222. i n an interview with the author on February 9,1980. Ral, 
Deputy Minister in 1959, s tate Minister in 1963,cabinet 
Minister in 1969, chief Minister in the seventh 
Coalition, a powerful Minister in the Pandey and Ghafoor 
Governments, i s , at present, in the Congress (X). 
223. in an interview with the author on February 12, 1980. 
Singh, a Minister of s tate in the Eighth coal i t ion and 
a cabinet Minister in a l l the three congress Governments, 
i s , at present, in the congress ( I ) . 
224. xn an Interview with the author on February 9,1980. 
Singh, Deputy Minister from 1957-62 and a cabinet 
Minister in the fourth, s ixth and eighth coal i t ion , i s , 
at present, in the Congress (U). 
225. in an interview with the author on February 13, 1980. 
Singh, a cabinet Minister in the second shoshit Dal 
Government and chief Minister of the f i f th congress-
led Coalition, i s , at present, leading a retired l i f e . 
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226 227 228 
Singh, Kaplldeo Singh and Karpoori Thakur. They ware 
kind enough to give oral or written answers to a 
questionnaire presented to them by the author* k number 
of other leaders were also approached b»t they could 
not find time either for an interview or for written 
answers to the questionnaire. 
226* xn an interview with the author on February 15/ 1980. 
Singh/ LSG Minister in the first UF Government/ and 
a cabinet Minister in the Eighth coalition* is* at 
present* a Member of the National Executive of the 
janata(s) (Raj Narain). 
227. in an Interview with the author on February 16/1980. 
Singh* Food Minister in the first UF Government and 
Agriculture* and Parliamentary Affairs Minister in 
the first Janata Government* is, at present* General 
secretary of the Bihar Lok Dal. 
228, in an Interview with the author on February 22*1980, 
Thakur* Deputy chief Minister in the first UF Govern-
ment* Chief Minister of the Eighth coalition and 
first Janata Chief Minister after the 1977 election * 
Is* at present, leading Lok Dal in the Bihar state* 
CHAPTER. VXZ 
ffROTBST MOVEMBOT III BIHAR 
The governmental Instabi l i ty at the top did not take 
long to travel down to the po l i t i ca l base - the masses* 
Discontent spread fmr and wide and vocal and po l i t i ca l l y 
act ive elements assumed positions of leadership. Agitations 
snowballed into a movement which further complicated the 
already instable , direct ionless and chaotic p o l i t i c s of 
Bihar* i n t h i s sense, the year 1974 constituted another 
landmark in the none-too-happy state of Bihar pol i t ics* 
Taking a cue from the success of the "students1 Movement'' 
in Gujarat, the students of Bihar started a Gujarat type 
movement in March, 1974* Though the students' Movement,which 
l a t e r on became famous as 'JP Movement*, started with the 
March 18 massive demonstration to the Bihar Assembly, i t was 
the result of people's long-standing grievances and demands 
which had remained unheeded or heeded only i n words* There 
had been, no doubt, some immediate sparks that l ighted the 
fuse* 
Having experienced uninterrupted congress rule, the 
people of Bihar, in 1967, gave a chance to the opposition 
part ies in the hope that they would solve their basic problems* 
But the opposition parties also got involved in manipulative 
power p o l i t i c s , worse than the Congress, and ignored the 
promises on the basis of which they had got people's verdict* 
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The electorate of Bihar turned again to the congress* headed 
by Mrs. Indira Qandhl and gave I t , in the 1972 Assembly 
elect ions* a massive mandate on i t s promises of 'Garibi 
Hatao'and other populist slogans* But* again* they were 
cheated by their 'own' representatives* The congress fond 
of preserving their legacy of factional strife* remained 
riven with factions based neither on c lass Interest nor on 
p o l i t i c a l ideology* They also forgot the ir promises to the 
people* 
Thus the po l i t i c ians instead of taking care of people's 
interest* took care of the ir own interests and fought for 
p o l i t i c a l power for personal gain. For achieving* holding 
and advancing their power* they resorted to manipulative 
t a c t i c s and treated po l i t i c s as their 'private enterprise'* 
They used propaganda and organizational ski l l* <noney* might 
anct patronage to win elections* Having acquired power* they 
t r i e d to maintain i t by hook or by crook* The result was 
that the state* since 1967* continuously suffered more than 
any other s ta te , from ins tabi l i ty of governments* 
consequently* the gap between heightened public 
consciousness and unfulf i l led promises got widened* The 
Congress Government* when i t returned to power* displayed 
extreme anemia and drift* a procl ivity to hide behind 
unconvincing a l i b i s and a tendency to Increase the role of 
bureaucracy at the expense of the party which inhibited 
po l i t i ca l communication and increased the gap between the 
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Government and the people. The hardships of the ordinary 
people, d i spar i t ies between them and the upper c lass , mal-
distr ibution of the essent ia l commodities and Indifference 
to poverty and unemployment in practice* despite rehetoric 
to the contrary# were a l l on the increase. 
Mot only was there a l e t down in respect of po l ic ies 
and performance, the operators of the system showed scant 
regard for the rules of the game which had been bu i l t step 
by step over a long period and which provided the basis for 
the system's legitimacy and appeal. Men in power e i ther 
behaved irresponsively or claimed ignorance of where respon-
s i b i l i t y lay and generally permltted-actlvely or through 
connivance-unfair practice and foul means in the conduct 
of po l i t i c s* 
The normal mechanism of the system and the rules of 
the game on which i t was based were not used as they should 
be . The practice of choslng puppets for different state 
capi ta ls had certainly done much to undermine the people's 
basic fa i th in s tate Legislatures and administrations. The 
tragedy of Bihar was that i t had been governed for long 
through remote control by individuals, who had been reluctant 
to assume direct authority. Bihar had been saddled with such 
a s e l f i s h , short-sighted, corrupt and faction-ridden ruling 
1 . Rajnl Kothari, "The Year of Turmoil", seminar, January, 
1975, p. 23. 
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party* Ministers and leaders of the ruling party had earned 
notoriety for spending more time in t r ips to and from Delhi 
than in tackling urgent problems of the s tate or rendering 
2 
urgently needed re l ie f to the people. 
Besides the Bihar Government found i t necessary to 
•rule by ordinance* at the rate of one for every two days of 
i t s existence so far* other states* too* from t ine to time 
may have been gui l ty of promulgating ordinances without 
necessari ly replacing them by Acts duly passed by their 
Legis latures . But the practice had assumed scandlous propor-
t ion in Ghafoor*s Bihar. The then Home Minister uma Shankar 
Dikshit had to await In the Lok $abha on August 29, 1974 
that "the practice of repromulgating ordinances instead of 
replacing them by Acts of Legislature i s an unsatisfactory 
practice1* • However* he tried to explain i t away by speaking 
of i n s t a b i l i t y and short- l ived governments in Bihar since 
4 
1967. commenting upon th i s sorded affair* the Hindustan Times 
wrote* "Nothing so exposes the inglorious record of the 
ex i s t ing Bihar Assembly as jp 'a t e l l t a l e statement that the 
State Government has adopted 258 ordinances over the past 
5 
two years* 176 of them in a single year* .Thus* the Assembly 
2 . xndradeep sinha* "Bihar* Decisive Battle Ahead" *now Age* 
September 29* 1974* p. 1 . 
3 . s r i Mulgaokar* MRule By ordinance'* * seminar* January 1975, p.44. 
4« Everyman's (Delhi) , September 21* 1974* p. 13. 
5. Hindustan Times (Editorial)* October 28, 1974. 
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was reduced to a use less body* 
Whereas complaints of Incompetence or corruption on 
the part of the s tate Government were relat ively of recent 
or ig in , the malaise I t se l f was of chronic nature la Bihar 
ever since independence. I t was nor* or l e s s universally 
recognised that Bihar was about the worst governed state 
la the ent ire country and that I t s people had to put up 
with the venality of pol i t ic ians in power to such an extent 
and for so long a t ine as to strain the tolerance of the 
most philosophical* the roost cynical and the most supine 
e 
among them. The administrators were not much interested In 
carrying out their duties* The conscientous among them 
7 
found their work •frustrating and point less". 
Corruption among pol i t ic ians was a rule . "\ minister 
took a bribe of Rs. 1,75,000 from a contractor , a son of 
a chief Minister used 500 acres of government land for ten 
years without paying rent or compensation* tenders of one 
company were accepted over those of others because i t paid 
money or because the owner belonged to the Minister *s or 
secretary's cast* or kin group; Ministers entered Into 
6 
shady transactions with firms*. 
6. Eastern Economist (Editorial) , March 22,1974* p. 611. 
7. ohanshyam shah, protest Movement in Two Indian statest 
A study of the Gujarat and Bihar Movement (pelhtiajanta 
l u l l l c a U o n s , m l ) , p. HO. S 
8. A . G . Hoorani, Ministers' Mlsconduct(jelhlt vikas Publishing, 
1973), pp. 123? 127 and U2-150. ^ 
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Several such shady deals were mad* by the power-proud 
and power-hungxy po l i t i c ians . None other than R.D.Bhandare, 
the then Governor of Bihar* stated in Bombay that "there 
would not have been agitation In Bihar i f action had been 
taken on what he had suggested a year ago* He had then said 
that he was In possession of inte l l igence reports pertaining 
9 
to corrupt practices by several Bihar Ministers". "It was 
a naked struggle for power with no holds barred and with 
each faction regarding public o f f i ce as a means of furthering 
i t s own posit ion, charges of corruption, nepotism and plain 
10 
abuse of power were fseely bandied about1*. Even today SOBS 
of the leading pol i t ic ians of the s ta te , with whom the author 
was able to have personal Interviews, admit that corruption, 
favouritism and nepotism in administration was rampant in 
Bihar. The leaders giving such opinion were Ram Lakhan 
Singh yadav, Daroga Prasad Rai, Ram Raj prasad Singh,Krishna 
Kant slngh, sardar Harihar singh, Bhola Prasad Singh, xapi l -
11 
deo singh and Karpoori Thakur. 
while the Government and the Congress Party behaved 
l a t h i s manner, the record of the opposition parties had 
been miserable, to say the l e a s t . Their role in 1974, as 
often before was quite apportunlstlc* The Issues that were 
9
* Hindustan Times (Editorial) , October 26, 1974* 
10. A..G. Nooranl, op. Git . , p . 121. 
11. supra, Footnotes 221 - 226, chapter VI, pp. 417-418. 
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s t irr ing the masses and throwing them behind Jaya Prakash 
Marayan had become particularly sens i t ive In the s ta t e . If 
they had tackled them more effect ively in the ear l i er y e a n , 
If they had not cut themselves off from the masses and run 
only after power* whether inside or outside the Congress; 
if they had not jumped at short-cuts and forfei ted their 
moral authority; If they had not been clever only in small 
things and inept in big ones* they would have been the 
inspirers and leaders of the student upsurge or perhaps the 
neve 12 
s i tuat ion that had led to the upsurge wouldi;never arisen* 
Love of power more than the sp ir i t of service had caught hold 
of most of the opposition party leaders* 
While po l i t i c ians were playing the game of power* the 
common people were reaping the harvest of ris ing prices* 
scarcity of essent ia l commodities* hoarding, blackmarketlag 
and profiteering* The poor people in the v i l lages were victims 
of inhuman forces* a hybrid between crafty feudalism and 
greedy capitalism* The Invidious dist inct ion between the 
high-born and low-born has made the socio-economic system 
cal lous and unbearable* with the r is ing prices of foodgrains* 
the landless poor in the v i l l a g e s found i t d i f f i cu l t to 
procure food with the meagre wages they used to get* Even 
i f the centre allocated food for them* they had no money to 
purchase i t nor would the crafty po l i t i c ians and the corrupt 
bureaucracy allow i t to reach them* 
12* Prem Bhaoin, "The significance of Bihar"* Janata (Bombay), 
August 15, 1974, p* 11. — — 
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Agrarian Trouble* 
Agrarian unrest had been very acute In Bihar* in 1970, 
there were 649 agrarian agitations* seven times more than 
13 
90 only of the previous year, in August that year, the BSP 
and the CPI had launched 'land grab' movement and in the 
process a b i t t er clash occurred in chanpatia in chaatparan 
d i s t r i c t between them and the landlords in which Ramanand 
Tiwari was fa ta l l y assaulted. The Kaxalites and the Left 
part ies were engaged in mobilising poor peasants and landless 
labourers and clashes between then and the landlords were 
frequent, in June 1973, about 5,0QQ people, mostly landless 
labourers and poor peasants, carrying CPI banner attacked 
the house of a farmer in Gnorbanki v i l lage in Madhubanl 
d i s t r i c t . They took away a l l that he had in cash and kind. 
The estimate l o s s was about R S . 50,000. i t was reported 
tta t 70 bighas of h i s land were graced by the armed mob 
and his ploughs and oxen were also taken away, sut'Ghorbanki 
was only one in hundreds of such cases , in a l l , about 1$,000 
cases arising out of agrarian troubles were pending in 
the d i s t r i c t" . 
Urban unrest 
Teachers, Government employees and other sections of 
the art iculate urban middle c lass raised their voice against 
13. supra- Footnote 123, chapter VI, p. 383« 
11 .Indian Mation (Editorial ) , July 7, 1973. 
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•oaring prices and increasing hardships. The imposition of 
profession tax up to the income of Rs- 300 per month la 
1973 added insult to injury. The opposition parties and trade 
unions formed an organization, Bihar pajya Mahagai Abhab 
Pesha Kar virodhi Mazadur swa icararachari sangharsh samltl 
(The Bihar s tate struggle Committee of L**»urers and Employees 
to oppose Price a lee and profession rax) to launch a struggle 
IS 
against the imposition of the tax . The committee organised 
a massive ra l l y before the s tate Assembly on December 17,1973 
against high prices , non-availabil ity of essent ia l comaodltses 
and imposition of the profession tax* More than 120 trade 
unions, including those of industrial workers, teachers* 
engineers* journal is ts , government and university employees, 
rallwaymen e t c . participated in the demonstration. The main 
slogan of the procession wast pura R&shan pura Kam, Nahlto 
Hoya chakka Jam (we want fu l l ration and fu l l work, e l se the 
wheel would stop moving)• The demonstration was addressed 
by the trace union leaders of different po l i t i ca l parties, 
including the CPI and the jan saugh. 
Again, the samyukta sangharsh samitl (The united 
Struggle committee) of the CPI, C P I ( K ) , SSP, jan sangh and 
other smaller groups gave a ca l l tor "Bihar Bundh" on January 
21, 1974 in protest against high prices and scarcity of 
15 . ohanahyam shah, op. d t . , p . 64. 
16. Indian Nation, December 16, 1973. 
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essent ia l commodities. The bandh was supported by nearly 
17 
400 trade union* and I t was a complete success. However, a 
•mall section of the Jan sangh had reservations about the 
bandh c a l l , so , the party organised a separata procession to 
support the bandh. on the day of bandh clashes occurred 
between the administrative authority and demonstrators at 
Ranchl, Begusaral, oaya, Katihar, Motlhari and jahanabad. 
Pol ice f ired at the crowd at Kodorama Railway s tat ion. 
Student unrest 
Side by side the rural and urban unrests* student 
unrest regarding f a c i l i t i e s on the campuses, reduction in 
f ees , concession in buses and cinema t i cke t s , etc* erupted in 
patna and other towns, i n Patna, students hijacked two state 
Transport buses on December 4, 1973. clashes between students 
and Road Transport authority continued for a few days, on 
December 10, several hundred students of the Magadh university, 
students and non-teaching employees of the patna university 
and col leges a f f i l i a t e d to i t , Anand Margis and their suppor-
ters and students of Homeopathic co l lege hold demonstrations 
before the old secretariat for varying demands of the ir own* 
The pol ice f ired 1? rounds ot tear-gas she l l s to disperse the 
19 
demonstrators. This was followed by regular strikes and 
17. Ib id . , January 22, 1974j Arvind Narayan Das, "Misleading 
Quiet**, Economic and po l i t i ca l weekly, August 3, 1974, 
p. 1223. 
13 . Indian Nation, January 22, 1974. 
19 . Ib id . , December 5 and 11, 1973. 
429 
demonstration* in several parts of the s t a t e . OR January 22, 
1974* la a symposium on 'Youth for Democracy • organized by 
the Patna university students union, jp cal led upon the 
students fee take a few days' leave from their universi t ies 
and go to v i l l ages where people belonging to lower strata 
of society were not allowed to exercise their right of 
franchise. He expressed the view that only the student* could 
do t h i s successful ly. If they did not come forward, democracy 
20 
was bound to prove a fa i lure In the country* K . B . sahay also 
exhorted the students and youth to come forward in large 
numbers and take over from the older generation the respon-
21 
s t b i l i t y of reconstruction of the country, similarly*xarpoorl 
Thakur appealed to the opposition parties , lovers of democracy 
Intel lectuals* students and youth to declare a 'jehad' on 
the pattern of Gujarat for ending the congress 'misrule1 In 
22 
Bihar. 
Meanwhile* the Bihar bandh of January 21 was followed 
by a month of hect ic consultations among the various groups 
taking part In the agitat ion, j o i n t Action committees were 
s e t up and meetings were held* At th i s point polarisation 
of sorts started. The students soon started dividing between 
•Leftist* and 'Right is t ' , when the Patna university students 
union organized a convention on February 17 and 18 to plan 
20. i b i d . , January 23* 1974. 
21 . ibid.* February 4* 1974. 
22. ibid** March 3* 1974. 
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a Gujarat type agitation la Bihar, the CPI student wing, 
Al l India student federation (AISF) and Marxiat-Leniist 
students belonging to the Bihar students association(BSA) 
walked out of the met ing in protest against the insistence of 
th« Akhll Bharatiya vidharthi part shad (ABVP) on the need 
for 'Bharatiya Education* and 'equal d i s tmce in re lat ion's 
with Russia and America* The Lef t i s t students organised a 
separate conference on February 26, and 27, and formed the 
Bihar chhatra Naujawan sangharsh Morcha (BCNSM) with a long* 
term programme of struggle starting from March 16* I t s demands 
were, inter a l i a , supply of foodgrains and essent ial commodities 
at subsidized rates* unemployment allowance to the educated 
unemployed youth and establishment of students' union in a l l 
col leges* The rest formed the Bihar chhatra Sangharsh samltl 
(BCSS)# and decided to launch an organised struggle In protest 
against soaring prices, prevailing corruption, scarcity of 
e s s e n t i a l commodities* supply of ration at the rate of IS kg* 
per person per month, mounting unemployment and to press for 
adequate f a c i l i t i e s and amenities for the students and change 
24 
In the system of education to make i t job-oriented. Thus, 
both the student organizations* communist and non-conwunist, 
started separate preparations to mobilise students and youths 
in favour of the ir agitations* 
23* Ghanshyam shah, op. c l t . , p. 87; Arvlnd Narayan Das, 
op* c l t . , p* 1223. 
24. Indian Nation, March 16, 1974; search Light,March 18,1974* 
*JNP*w 
Earlier, the students of MUZ af farpur organised a 
procession against price r i se in the town on February 13* I t 
turned v io lent and the ma© smashed the windscreen of three 
trucks. The agitators also s e t f ire to an empty bullock cart . 
Ag&ln on February 16, the students staged a demonstration 
demanding reduction i n the price of text books and concession 
in cinema tickets* They also formed a f lying squad to check 
the distribution of essent ia l commodities* The CPI workers 
of Muzaf farpur also organized an anti-price r i se rally on 
25 
February 26, in front of the D i s t r i c t Magistrate's office* 
on March 2, 1974, a meeting of businessmen, o f f i c i a l s , 
students and youth of Musaff arpur was cal led at Gandhi peace 
Foundation to make available and to f ix the price of vanas-
patl ghee for the coming *Holl Fest ival ' • This meeting was 
attended among others by the Dis tr ic t Development Officer, 
D i s t r i c t supply o f f i cer and sub-Divisional officer* I t was 
ca l l ed by the newly foraed 'chhatra yuva Manch', consisting 
of students and youth of different po l i t i ca l parties apart 
from the people attached to the Gandhi peace Foundation* The 
Manch then formed a f ly ing squad and checked the stocks of 
wholesale traders ana male Vanaspatl gheje available at 
Rs. 8.75 per kg* Before t h i s , vanaspatl gfree was either not 
26 
available or was sold at RS* 11,50 per kg. Encouraged by 
2 5 ,
 Indian Natlqa, February 14, 17 and 27, 1974* 
26 • Banwarl, "Aathwein Daahak km Doosra Mohbhang" ,pjnman, 
March 5-11, 1978, p, 27? suresh sharma, "Kaaran Ab Bhl 
Maujood Hain", plaoan, March 19-25, 1978, p* 2B* 
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t h e i r success, the Manch tr ied hard to f ix the prices of 
fooayrains and other easential commodities* The Manch called 
a meeting ot o f f i c i a l s and businessmen on March 13, in which 
Traders 
besides the Di s t r i c t Magistrate, representatives of several/ 
Associations participated, nut by then the traders had 
changed the ir mind and did not provide the previous prices 
of essent ia l commodities to enable the meeting to f i x a new 
and reasonable prices of essential commodities* on March 16, 
the Manch produced the l t e t of prices prepared by the 
students* But the representatives of the business community 
perhaps were not prepared to accept the l i s t and went away 
from the meeting on the pretext of the non-arrival of some 
of the ir important men. The c i t y Magistrate cal led another 
meeting on March 17, but neither the o f f i c i a l s nor the traders 
turned up at the meeting. At l a s t , on March 19, 1974, the 
27 
Manch announced the prices prepared by i t at a general meeting. 
Thus the stage was se t for a confrontation between the 
students and the businessmen* 
Meanwhile, by the end of the f i r s t week of March, 
Chhatra sangharsh samltles were formed in several d i s tr ic t s 
of the s ta te and demonstrations were staged under the ir banner* 
Their r a l l i e s in sltamarhl and Bhagalpur were, particularly, 
impressive* The steering committee of the BCSS decided to 
28 
gherao the Assembly on March 18 in favour of i t s demands* 
27* sure ah sharma, o p . c l t . , pp, 28-29; Banwari, "March 18 
Apne xrd Gird MlXa*7~Plnman, March 19*25, 1978* 
28* Banwari» Aathwein Dashak kft loosra Mohbhang",op. d t . , 
p* 27* 
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in Patna, the students of Anugrah Naratn col lege took 
out a procession and paraded la the main thoroughfares of 
the town on February 27 demanding the removal of the College 
Principal , formation of students* union and a complete change 
29 
In the present educational system, on March 13, the students 
of Bihar university se t f i re to the university building and 
demanded the postponement of the dates of M.A. and M.sc. 
30 
examinations as c lasses had not been held for a fu l l session. 
in protest against the Government's closure of Patna university/ 
about two hundred students raided the university of f ice on 
March 14 and forced out the vice-chancellor, o f f i cers and 
s ta ir of the university, seized the keys and locked up a l l 
the aoors and declared Bashishtha Naratn Singh (B.N.Singh; 
31 
a senior member of the B@SS* as their vice-chancellor* 
on March 4, the BCNSM gheraoed the Di s t r i c t Magistrates 
of Patna, Barh, patwah and Mokemah. They demanded that the 
aut horitte s concede the pending demands of the Homeopathic, 
ayurvedic, I I T and B . N . col lege students and hijacked nine 
32 
buses of the s ta te Transport. The BCSS also held a demonstra-
t ion on March 4, before the residence of the Education Minister 
29. Indian nation, February 28, 1974. 
30. i b i d . , March 14, 1974. 
31 . Ibict*, March 15, 1974. 
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to press for i t s demands. The Minister assured the students 
33 
t t e t h t would put their demands before the cabinet. 
/ 
The youth congress* too, organized demonstrations In 
th« chotanagpur area against soaring prices* scarcity of 
e s sent ia l commodities/ mounting unemployment and rampant 
corruption, black-marketing, hoarding and profiteering, At 
some places* processions and demonstrations took a violent 
turn. At Motlhari* the students raided and ransacked the 
34 
Railway stat ion and the telephone exchange. 
Thus* the events of February and early March 1974 were 
a c lear signal of widespread unrest in Bihar. The Indian 
Nation commented, "leaving them to the care of frustration 
and hunger i s neither socialism nor capitalism. The govern-
ment ought to real ise that the inst inct for survival i s 
compelling many of them to resort to extremist measures. 
What i s happening at present may be jus t a rehearsal of what 
may come on a bigger scale in the near future i f the govern* 
35 
ment takes no steps to prevent catastrophe" • Taking the 
above mentioned factors into account, i t i s surprising, as 
to what happened on March 18* 1974* could not occur earl ier 
in patna. Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav* ahola Prasad Singh, Kaplldeo 
Singh and xarpoorl Tnakur a l l admit that rising prices* 
— * W I B H I W — w n m IWIIIIIIII 11•••••» •—..»—.•.—•••••wwin »M. i • •mwii»•••—n^wm, i m im-mmmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
33. Banwarl* "Aathweln Lashak ka Doosra Mohbhang"*op.cit»» 
p. 27. 
14. Gtianshyam shah, op. c l t . * p. 89. 
35. Indian nation <,Editorial), March 8* 1974. 
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mounting unemployment amongst the educated youths. Irrelevance 
of present day education, non-implementation of the congress 
promises to the people, apart from corruption, favouritism, 
and nepotism in the administration were the most important 
causes that gave r i s e to the protest movement in Bihar* 
in the opinion of Harihar Prasad slngh and Krishna Kant 
Singh, "general deterioration in every aspects of l i f e and 
frustration among the people compelled the people to r ise 
in revolt** 
The Turning Point: 18th March 1974 
on March 16, BCWSM organized processions before the 
Collectorates a l l over the s ta te to press the ir demands 
which included checking price r i s e . Implementation of land 
reform measures, closure of university for a year and state 
takeover of the un ivers i t i e s . •Bihar bhl Gujarat Banega' was 
their main slogan* The processionists clashed with the 
pol ice at Arrah, Motlhari, s i taaarhi , Begusarai, Darbhanga 
and other places* There took place a ding dong batt le , 
l a s t ing several hours, between the processionists and armed 
pol ice in Bettlah in which at l eas t seven were k i l led and 
f i f t y - f i v e injured* in patna, the members of the Morcha 
clashed with the police before the residence of the Education 
Ministers . The demonstrators brickbat ted the residence 
of the Minister ano the police burst tear-gas shel ls* When 
the Minister came out to meet them, he was manhandled and 
436 
h i s •kurta* was torn up. The demonstrator* also brlckbatfcad 
the o f - t ees of the Indian Nation, search Light* Aryavarta* 
34 
pradeep and Press T«s»t of India. 
on March 18* the BCSS organized a gherao of the Assembly 
and the Governor to prevent him from addressing the jo int 
sess ion of the Legislature, The BCSS programme for the gherao 
of the Assembly was jo int ly sponsored by different student 
and youth organizations, such as the youth wing of the congress 
(0 ) / ABVP* TSS, samajwadi Yuvajana sabha (SYS)» Bihar state 
Students* council* Bharatiya Krantlkari yuvak sangh and 
37 
Bharatiya Yuva Sahha. The BCNSM did not oppose the 18th 
March programme, but asked i t s members and supporters not to 
participate in i t . in a jo in t statement on March 17, the 
members of the BCSS* the President of the patna university 
Students* union* Lallu Prasad Yadav and the president of the 
Bihar chhatra parishaci, Narendra Kumar slngh* warned p o l i t i -
cians not to involve the students in the game of power 
p o l i t i c s , flthey asked then to keep their hands off "tomorrow's 
gherao and demonstration before the Bihar Legislature".They 
said that po l i t i c ians would not be allowed to participate In 
the demonstration because the ir main object i s to gherao 
the Governor* Ministers and MLAs, belonging to a l l po l i t i ca l 
part ies . "our agitat ion la against the high prices* rampant 
*•• IDt<*» * March 17 and 18* 1974* Arvind Narayan pas*op.clt.* 
P» 1223? Bamrari* "March 18 Apne ird Gird Mila* *ptn«anT 
March 19-25, 1976, p. 27. 
37. Indian Nation* March Xb, 1974. 
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corruption and mounting unemployment among the education 
38 
youth"• 
on March 18, tens of thousands students'from patna and 
other parts of the s tate picketed the Assembly building in 
an attempt to prevent the Governor from opening the budget 
39 
sess ion . The Governor* however, changed the route and eluded 
tliem. But direct confrontation between the police and the 
students took place near the Assembly. The police responded 
with tear-gas she l l s and charged with long steel-t ipped 
bamboo s t i cks . The students pushed back from the Assembly 
went on a rampage through tte town looting and sett ing f ire 
to public buildings, hotels and shops. A mob attacked news* 
paper o f i l c e s and set f i re to the o f f i ces of the English dally 
search Light and the Hindi daily Pradeep, both housed la 
the sane building. The police themselves l e t loose a reign 
of terror against the BCSS demonstrators. At l eas t f ive 
persons were reported to have been ki l led and scores Injured 
In police f ir ing, and a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed in 
patna. in Gaya, the CRPF and BSF and other para-military 
personnel entered houses and brutally attacked innocent 
c i t i z e n s . Almost the entire azned forces available to the 
State Government had been pressed into service to •protect' 
the Assembly, the secretariat and the 'Raj Bhawan* and no 
protection was provided by authority to newspaper of f ices , 
40 
government of f ices or private buildings. The Indian Nation 
38 . i b i d . " 
39.Sim Times (London), March 19, 1974. 
40 .Indian Mat ion, March 2Q,l974i Arvind Narayan oas, o p . c l t . , 
p. 1223; Ghanahyam shah,op.clt . ,P.31 yTimss,March 19,1974. 
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and the Ary&varta would have met the same fate* i f their 
41 
workers had not risked thair l i v e s to save then* 
The incidents of March 18 o i led the wheel of agitation 
and i t spread to different parts of the s ta t e , on the 
following day disturbances took place in Ranchl, Dhanbad, 
Chapra* Saharasa, oaya* Madhapura* Hazaribagh and Monghyr. 
Railway stat ions , poat-ol f ices , courts, s tate dispensaries 
and other buildings were the main taryets of attack, in 
Bhagalpur, a bomb was thrown on the f i re brigade of f i ce , 
and two f i sh-plates on the main railway l ine between Man si 
42 
and Mahesh KUnt stat ions were removed. By March 20, curfew 
was imposed on eleven towns - patna, Ranch!, Bihar Sharif* 
jahanabad* Gaya, Monghyr, chapra* Bettlah* Bhayalpur,Glridih 
and chalbasa. on March 20 alone four persons were reported 
k i l l e a when the police opened f i re on raobs# which attacked 
and se t f i r e to Railway s tat ions and rol l ing stocks in 
43 
Monghyr and sitaraarhi d i s t r i c t s . By March 25* according to 
the police sources* 1,800 people were arrested* 28 ki l led 
44 
and 86 were iagfrurod in shooting incidents. Riots police and 
border yuaxus poured into Bihar from the neighbouring states 
to add to the tens of thousands already on duty. Tne amy 
41. Indian Nation (Editorial)* March 20* 1974. 
42 . Ghanshyam shah* op. c i t . * p. 92. 
43 . 'jfieaea, March 21* 1974. 
44. Guardian (London)* March 26* 1974. 
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was cal led out at several places and ordered to shoot at 
s ight . 
The trouble also spread to rural areas, A. v i l lage 
Poat-of t i ce in jagdishpur was attacked. At Garhan sons 
o f f i c e papers were destroyed. Two Pos t -o i i i ce s In Manfthaul 
v i l l a g e in Begusarai d i s t r i c t and aegla v i l lage were heavily 
brickbatted. o f f i ce recoros were thrown into a we l l . Block 
45 
o f f i c er s at Hussainabad, Majhiwad and chainpur were attacked. 
support for students came from jaya prakash Naratn, 
who advised the Bihar Chief Minister Abdul Ghafoor to step 
down for h is 'inept handling of the s i tuat ion 1 . Commenting 
out the March 18 Incident, JP said in a statement* on March 20, 
th» t'W any democratic country after such *» monumental failure 
of the administration as patna witnessed on Monday l a s t , 
( i . e . March 18) the Government would have resigned. But in 
t h i s country we are pastmastere In covering up things and 
making a l i b i s and scapegoats"• He further added that, "Not 
only has tne search Light, that beacon of the freedom move-
meat, been destroyed, but much e l s e , i t i s Bihar's very soul 
that i s torn and bleeding today. X wonder i f Bihar would be 
46 
allowed to be destroyed. 
45. Ghanshyara shah, op. c t t . , p. 93 . 
•*• Motherland (Delhi) , March 21, 1974; Lakshrai Narayan Lai, 
jayo Prakash? Rebel extraordinary (New Delhii Indian 
BOOK company, ivrt;, p. 173. 
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in protest against the pol ice a t roc i t i e s , Indiscriminate 
arrest of students and refusal to allow a s i l e n t procession 
on March 21, the BCSS gave a Gall for Bihar bund on March 23 • 
p o l i t i c a l demands - resignation of the Ministry and dissolu-
tion of the Assembly - cane to be raised only after this* 
on March 29, the BCSS threatened to launch a movement "to 
paralyse the Government* i f the Ministry headed by Ghafoor 
did not submit i t s resignation by April 8* z t also demanded 
immediate reopening of the colleges* withdrawal of the police 
forces/ unconditional release of a l l students and payment of 
47 
compensation to families of the victims of police-firing* 
By t h i s time the agitation was joined by college girls ,house-
wives, lawyers* doctors* teachers* a r t i s t s and other sections 
of the urban middle c l a s s . Different groups organised 
processions* observed fast or gheraoed o f f i ces and congress 
leaders* simultaneously, violent incidents such as throwing 
of crackers* setting f i re s to public buildings* looting of 
shops and brickbatting of the police and Government of f ices 
continued a t several places. Public Transport - symbol of 
Government authority - was a traditional target . 
up t i l now, jp was not direct ly Involved in the student 
ag i ta t ion . However, on March 30, he warned the Government 
tnt Hx cannot remain a s i l e n t spectator of misgovemment, 
corruption and the rest whether in Patna, fielhl or elsewhere". 
47. Indian Nation, March 30, 1974. 
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X have decided to f ight corruption and mlsgovernment and 
black-marketing* profiteering and hoarding, to f ight for 
overhaul of educational system and real peoples democracy. 
He urged the Government to understand that violence was 
"brewing in the very heart or the people" and that anger of 
the people was "reaching wnite heat, on account of their 
misery that i s growing day-fcy-day". He further warned the 
Government that i f i t continued to suppress peaceful movement, 
he wi l l lead a demonstration of shautl sanike, students and 
other c i t izens despite h i s poor health**• "This shall be the 
48 
beginning. The rest wi l l follow, on April 6, the president 
of the patna university students' union along with some 
student leaders met the sarvodaya leader and requested him 
to take over the leadership of che movement. They assured 
him that they would abide by his guidance and follow his 
/ 
direct ion, j ? , sympathetic to the students, had been watching 
49 
the events in agony and so he agreed to lead the movement. 
The student-led agitation in Bihar entered a new and 
decis ive stage on April 6 with jp leading a s i l en t procession 
of one thousand people of satyagrahis, chhatra sangharsh-led 
youth and students, teachers and sarvodaya workers in Patna 
in support of the 25-day old agitation against corruption, 
high prices and alleged police a t r o c i t i e s . The processlonlsts 
48. Times of India (New Delhi); Sunday standard (New Delhi) , 
March 31, 1974. 
49. search Light and Indian wation, April 7, 1974. 
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had covered the ir mouth* with saffron-coloured scarves and 
t i ed their hands on their back. Their slogans depleted 
on playcards were* "Lathi, Goli, Hlnsa, Loot - Nahln Klsike 
Isk l choot" (Noone has got the l icence to wield la th i ,bu l l e t 
and indulge in violence and loo t ) ; "Manhgai, Berozgari, 
Bharashtachar - satta Hi Hal Jlmmedar" (The administration 
i s responsible for price rise* unemployment and corruption); 
"Chhubadha Hlrdaya Hal - Band zaban* (Hearts are embittered 
but tongue8 are t ied)* A new slogan emphasising non-violence 
was also raised: "Hamla chahe Jalsa HO - Hath Haraara Nahln 
uthegaM (whatever be the form of attack, we shall not raise 
our hands In re ta l ia t ion) , s i l e n t processions of teachers 
and students were also taken out at cava, Motlhari, Dhanbad, 
Sltamarhl and other d i s t r i c t headquarters to express solidarity 
with the BCSS. The sangharsh samltl reiterated i t s earl ier 
decision to launch ••paralyse-the-Government'* movement from 
SO 
April 9 to press their demands. 
several programmes such as observing 'Black D a y , 
'Janata curfew', 'Dharnas', taking out ' s i l ent Processions', 
'Torch Processions' e tc . also continued throughout April. 
Checking prices, unearthing hoarding, distributing essential 
commodities at fixed prices e tc , also continued in some towns 
of the s t a t e . General enthusiasm was at i t s peak, i t may be 
50. Banwpri, "Nagrik kl Garlma", pinraan, April 16-22, 1978, 
p# 27; search Light, April 9, 1974; Motherland and 
Hindustan Times (New Delhi3, April 9, 19V4. 
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notad that teacher*, engineers* non-ga2etted employee* etc* 
ware also f ighting for the redress of their grievances* This 
51 
a lso added to the surging tempo of the agitation* 
Thus, what began in the third week of March in Bihar 
as a purely grievance-oriented non-political agitation by 
students, centering round supply of foodgralns and text-books 
and stationary had snowballed into a people's movement 
against corruption, inf lat ion spiral and foodgrain scarcity 
with the ultimate aim of bring about the resignation of the 
Ghafoor Ministry, dissolution ol the Bihar Assembly leading 
to a fresh e lect ion and a moral revolution* Pol i t i ca l leaders 
also joined the st ir* Mahamaya Prasad slnha, a former chief 
for 
Minister and a congress leader, cal led/the resignation of the 
Ghafoor Ministry and the dissolution of the s ta te Assembly* 
Karpoorl Thakur also supported the agitation* However, I t 
was JP who provided teeth to the movement* He mobilised 
hundreds of people, raised several issues and launched several 
programmes* After June 5, 1974, JP announced "Total Revolution* 
and an "all round revolution" i*e* soc ia l , economic, po l i t i ca l , 
moral and cultural revolution as the ultimate objective of 
52 
the movement* A coo ruing to JP, "This struggle Is not for 
any petty or small alms* I t is-*revolutionary movements He 
stressed "the internal and external change, changing the 
$1* Qhansuyam shah, op* c j t . , p. 94. 
5 2
• JJVttryrcan's, June 22, 1974, pp* 1-9. 
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ent i re society from within and also from the out aids, individuals 
S3 
as well as inst i tutions" • 
jp , however, did not unfold the various stages of the 
revolution, in h i s opinion, a po l i t i ca l party starts with 
a programme, policy statements and so ons 
"This i s not a po l i t i ca l party that I t should 
have a policy statement and a detailed blueprint 
of a l l the steps leading to revolution* That short 
of rising i s meaningless and impractical. This Is 
a people's movement started by the students who 
are s t i l l carrying i t s main burden* A really revo-
lutionary movement involving the people has to go 
step by step* ?he next step has to be formulated 
according to the situation as i t develops with each 
step".34 
I t i s to be noted that the movement started with 
twelve demands; eight of them were related wholly to students' 
issues* Four other dealt with issues of wider Interests 
affecting the people. These were the basic demands bat in 
the opinion of the sarvodaya leader, i t was not possible to 
f u l f i l them without complete p o l i t i c a l , economic and social 
transformation in society* "you cannot keep everything as 
i t i s today and say that you wi l l remove corruption, remove 
unemployment and so on. Therefore, you must think in terms 
of social change, administrative change, po l i t i ca l change, 
cultural change and so on* in fact , th is i s a beginning of 
S3* Ibid*, December 22, 1974, p* 8* 
54. Ibid. , August 3, 1974, p* 1. 
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a social revolution that wi l l touch a l l aspects of social 
55 
l i f t and even individual l i f e " , T h i s struggle in Bihar 
i s not juat a flaah in the pan of history, but a continuing 
process of revolutionary changes* That i s why I have called 
56 
i t a struggle for total revolution"* Nevertheless* he gave 
a long l i s t of proposals* "agricultural development»equitable 
landowner ship, application of appropriate technology to 
agriculture* such as improved labours in tensive tools and 
gadgets of which the gobar gas plant i s a f ine example, 
development of domestic and rural industries and the widest 
possible spread of small industries* regional planning and 
development* po l i t i ca l and administrative decentralization 
of a kind qual i tat ively and materially different from the 
present congress decentralization that we have in the shape 
of gram panchayats* panchayat samitls and Ella parishad, e tc . 
drast ic educational reforms to destroy i t s e l i t i s t character 
and to relate i t to the problems of socio-economic develop-
ment and the l i v e s of the students themselves* dismantling 
the hierarchical structure of Hindu society and dismantling 
a lso the economic hierarchical structures in a manner that 
wi l l not discourage production or create a privileged class 
of managerial bureaucracy linked with the po l i t i ca l and 
57 
administrative c lass that we have today"• 
55* N.s* jagannathan* *A Revolution in the Making "(An 
Interview with j p ) , Indian Express (New Delhi)* 
August 26* 1974. 
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HO further added thati 
"We want to reshape the economic policy end 
administration of the state so that youngmen,both 
educated and uneducated* nay secure gainful 
employment, peasants acquire ownership over the 
land they till and also get; adequate facilities 
like water.fertiliser to improve the yield from 
it and people working in offices* factories and 
nines become free from the scourge of inflation 
and also secure their due place in the management 
of the concerns in which they are engaged"*58 
The issues 
initially, the movement started with tv/eave demands, 
but new ones were added from time to time, while some got 
priority* some others remained in the background* 
price Rise 
Price r i se was one of the most glaring of the Ministry*s 
fai lures* Rot only that ,essent ia l commodities had a tendency 
to disappear from the market overnight* These were among 
the main grievances that triggered of the agitation* The 
State was facing acute shortage of foodgrains and the govern-
ment had fa i led to check hoarding* blackmarketing and 
profiteering* The l a i r price shops were sporting nothing 
except signboards in most part of the state* excepting big 
towns l i k e patna. Ranch! and jamshedpur and the Industrial 
59 
and co l l i ery b e l t . The fa i lure to keep the fa ir price shops 
58. Ib id . , January 19, 1975, p, 3 . 
59, Ibid. , May 18, 1974* p* 6. 
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going la rural area* had pushed up prices of foodg rains far 
beyond the capacity of people deprived even of seasonal 
employment in the f i e lds on account of flood and drought, 
The people uemanded unearthing of hoarded commodities and 
equitable distribution of essential commodities at fixed 
prices* The Government and i t s authorit ies were charged with 
protecting the black-marketeers and hoarders, jp held the 
Government responsible for the hardships experienced by the 
common people* 
Students' problems 
As already mentioned most of the demands of the students 
in the early phase of the movement were related to their 
educational problems* one set of demands concerned with 
students' future after they had ceased to be students* They 
demanded employment-oriented education* assurance of employ-
ment, unemployment allowance, provision of bank loans to the 
educated unemployed for starting industries etc* other demands 
related to the ir educational f a c i l i t i e s . They demanded 
Increase in the number of scholarships and supply of books, 
stationery, food etc* a t dmeaper rates* They also demanded 
provision for proper hostel f a c i l i t i e s , representation of 
students in policy making bodies of the univers i t ies such as 
the senate, the syndicate and the Academic council , sett ing 
up of students' union in every col lege, decentralization of 
examinations, removal of percentage res tr ic t ions for in ter 
Science students appearing in competitive examination for 
448 
admission to medical colleges, combining of narks la written 
papers and practical etc. TO tbmam demands was added the 
demand for concessional rates la bus fares and cinema tickets 
60 
etc* 
These demands were further broadened by JP. KC said 
that the present system of education had 'outlived' Its 
41 
utility. After completing their studies "what the students 
get in the name of education equips them for nothing but 
salaries and white collar jobs. This is true of technical 
education as well, what they seek is the security of jobs 
62 
or security of bondage in order*** in his view, "the first 
requirement of a better and more meaningful education is the 
presence among youngmen and women a sincere desire for 
knowledge and skills'** He said, "i have been appalled to 
find that only the small percentage of our students today 
are charged with such desire* The rest want nothing more 
than a degree, which is prized not for Its educational but 
for commercial value* A degree for most students is a mere 
passport to employment* Guardians and parents, too, have 
63 
the same attitude towards education and degree", HO was in 
60* Ghanshyam shah, op* clt., p. 106* 
61* Indian nation, September 19, 1974* 
42* Everyman's* July 20,1974,p.13/ Indian Mation,June 30,1974* 
63* JP Narayan, "Educational plan for studies in stir", 
Indian Nation, September 5, 1974* 
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favour of delinking education with employment and appealed 
to the students to discard the ir present att i tude toward 
education, "NO educational reform of a basic nature i s 
possible unless either (*) degrees are abolished or ( i i ) ths 
64 
degrees are delinked from employment". 
corruption 
one of the most important issues of the Bihar movement 
was corruption* For years Bihar had been knmvn as the most 
corrupt and caste-ridden s tate in India* in the 1967 elections* 
the opposition part ies , the teachers and the students made 
i t a major issue In their campaign against the congress regime. 
The f i r s t united Front Government inst i tuted an enquiry 
commission to go into the charges of corruption against some 
of the congress Ministers. The shoehlt Dal Government and 
the ssP-led SVD Government also s e t up similar enquiry commi-
ss ions to probe into the charges of corruption against some 
of the leading po l i t i c ians of the s ta te , in such a situation 
i t was not shocking i f the students and JP made corruption 
a central Issue of their movement. According to JP, "in Bihar 
65 
corruption i s a t l eas t ten times greater than in Gujarat" • 
Therefore* he warned that -I f i t i s not checked* the whole 
66 
country wi l l be drowned in the bog of corruption11 • The 
•*• Everyman's* September 14* 1974* p« 5. 
65. Ib id . , June 1* 1974* p. 5. 
66. Ibid.* July 20* 1974, p.lf Indian nation* June 30*1974. 
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sarvodaya leader believed that "unless corruption i s brought 
unosr control even the best socio-economic po l i c i es wi l l 
67 
go wrong and no 'ism', social or any other, can have a chance*. 
"corruption i s prevalent not only in the Government but in 
the whole system, i t 1* not only a moral question, i t touches 
68 
the very bread of the people* p o l i t i c a l corruption* in h i s 
view* was the worst form of corruption because i t bred many 
o t ter forms. According to him, the central Government was 
69 
the Gangotrl* the fountainhead of corruption. He, however* 
assured the business community that the movement was not 
against them because he did not bel ieve that businessmen were 
responsible for corruption* The movement was against the 
Government because i t was the licence-and-quota policy of 
the Government which by forcing them to give money to p o l i t i -
70 
clans* made them corrupt, 
Democracy, Dictatorship and Election 
Indian democracy, according to J P , was in-heading for 
ruin In i t s present state of af fa irs •.'*rhe ut ter confusion, 
lack of direction and purposelessness, galloping corruption 
~gf. Everyman's, June B, J-974, p, 4 . ~ - ~ — 
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- maian Nation, April 10, 1974#" N.s . Jagannathan,op.clt«, 
Banwari, "congress Hatao Paryapta Nahin (Removal of 
the congress i s not English)", p Iran an. May 7-13, 1978, p.13. 
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70 . GhanshysJB shah* op. c l t . , p. 107, 
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at a l l l eve l* of p o l i t i c s and Government may su i t to Prime 
Minister Mrs* Gandhi's s ty le of leadership tout i t spal ls 
ruin for the Congress as a democratic organisation and democracy 
71 
I t se l f" . Ha was of the opinion that "behind the facade of 
72 
democracy the country i s slowly moving towards dictatorship! 
"Even the s tate Governments under Congress-rule, today, has 
been reduced to the status of municipal councils due to the 
dominating power of the Prime Minister", said the sarvoday 
73 
leader* H« f e l t that the congress seemed to be consciously 
lad towards the 'democratic centralism* a soviet euphemism 
74 
for dictatorship* During the course of movement, he accused 
the ruling party and the Prime Minister of working for dicta-
torship* He protested against the repressive measures taken 
to curb the fundamental rights of the people, jp and h is 
colleagues f a i t that the weakening of democracy in the country 
reached the point where the mechanism of self-correction has 
7S 
completely broken down, i t i s* therefore, necessary that the 
people - the real masters - should r i se and take recourse to 
peaceful means to assert themselves and bend the powers that 
be to their w i l l . This wh*% he called the cor^rol of 'Loksbaktl* 
over the 'Rajshaktl'* 
7 1 . Indian Express and Motherland, April 1, 1974. 
72 . Everyman's, November 23, 1974, p« l o . 
73 . Indian Nation, May 5, 1974. 
74 . Indian Express and Motherland* April 1, 1974* 
75. Everyman's, December 8, 1974, P* 7* 
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jp f e l l that "democratic process* today* 1* restricted* 
distorted and vulgarised*. "Elections are today neither free 
nor fair* Election of f icers ftre bribed or threatened or 
influenced by caste considerations* Booth capturing* bogus 
7* 
voting and similar actions follow"• He wanted the electoral 
system be changed radically, under the present system, "the 
unlimited use of money* large-scale impersonation* use of 
force to prevent the weakest sections from exercising their 
franchise* abuse of electoral machinery* hood-winking of the 
people* particularly the poor and the unsophisticated* by 
at tract ive and fa l se promises etc* have robbed the elections 
of much of the ir value and eroded the people's faith in 
them* i f th i s l o s s of fa i th pers i s t s and deepen* we would 
77 
soon have a dictatorship in t h i s country*. But "let no one 
think that the ruling party alone has been gui l ty of distor-
t ion of e lectoral process* whichever party* Irrespective of 
I t s ideology* that has found possible to Indulge in any of 
the corruption or i l l ega l methods, has not hesitated from 
resorting to I t on the ground that they are fighting elect ions 
78 
to win and not to loose"• He wanted the elect ions to be 
"genuinely free by curbing money power and creating people's 
power in i t s place by giving the people of the constituency 
76* Old .* June 29* 1974* p* 1 . 
77* jaya prakash Narayan* "The Meaning of Bihar Movement"* 
Indian Express* May 22, 1974f Everyman«s* May 25* 1974* 
P* 1 . 
7 8
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the dominant, role in the selection of candidates for these 
79 
e lect ions" . "Election expense* should be curtailed i f you 
wsnt that a poor candidate, a peasant or a worker may contest 
60 
e l ec t ions , a party of the poor nay set up i t s candidates* 
JP also wanted that elected representatives should be respon-
s i b l e to the electorate.'*what I want i s that those who 
represent the people in the leg is latures should be under 
the control of the people, that they should not be masters 
81 
but their servants" • For this purpose he suggested the 
inclusion of the right of recall in the electoral law* 
Dissolution of the Assembly 
The resignation of the Ministry and the dissolution 
of the Bihar Assembly did not form part of the original 
twelve demands of the student B. i s a matter of fact, when 
the dissolution demand was f i r s t raised by the BCSS# 3* 
82 
advised them not be rash and not to try to imitate Gujarat* 
He made i t d e a r thmt he was not interested in th i s or that 
Ministry being replaced or the Assembly being dissolved*. 
"These are partisan aims and their achievement wil l make 
l i t t l e difference. I t woul d be l i k e replacing Tveedledua 
79. Ibid , , January 19, 1975, p. 3 . 
80 . i b i d . , June 22, 1974,p.9; Indian Nation, June 6, 1974. 
8 l«"j .p . on His Bihar Movement? Janata, v o l . 29, NO. 24, 
July 24, 1974, p . 3 . 
82. j . p . Narayan, "Bihar Movement", Indian Express,June 14, 
1974; Everyman*a, June 15, 1974, p . i» 
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83 
with Tweedlede*" X* was only (a) when the po l i t i ca l and 
administrative corruption in the s tate showed no algae of 
abatement despite the mounting opposition to i t ; (b) When 
the Bihar Government remained paralysed for months due to 
unedifylng factional and infighting among congress leg is lators 
and leaders, to the Irreparable damage to the people's 
in teres t s ; (c ) when the Bihar Government stumbled from one 
se t of misdeeds and fai lures to another in dealing with the 
peaceful movement of the Bihar students and people that i t 
became inevitable that the demand or the resignation of the 
Ministry and dissolution of the Assembly, under whose authority 
the Ministry functions* should be raised and should gather 
64 
force and momentum* The events that were decisive for him 
were-, (a) the unwarranted* unprovoked and unjustified Gaya 
f i r ings and the (b , Abraham committee*a report declaring* 
according to the press reports* a l l the three f ir ings at 
85 
Gaya to be ful ly just i f ied* wihe Assembly by endorsing the 
Government's repressive measures became a symbol of dishonesty* 
I t gave an apparent popular sanction to the Government which 
84 
the people would never endorse"• Had the Assembly censured 
83. Times of India., March 31, 1974. 
84. J .p . Narayan* "Bihar Movement** Indian Express, June 14, 
Wl*i Everyman «s* June 15, 1974* p* *• 
85. Ibid* 
84. j*p* on His Bihar siovem«nt, Janata, op» e i t . 
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the Bihar Government for i t s Inefficiency, corruption, mis-
management of the people•» af fa irs and i t s wrongs and misdeeds 
and established a cleaner and better government, the situation 
8? 
would have been very d i f ferent . But the Assembly became 
the source of "all s ins that the Government has committed* 
88 
That's why the Ministry must 90* The Assembly must go". 
JP f e l t that the Assembly was not performing i t s functions, 
the congress High command having reduced i t "to an unnecessary* 
89 
burdensome and costly farce". I t had abdicated i t s l e g i s l a -
t i v e function to the Executive vhich ruled the s tate with 
the help of ordinances. The Bihar Government has established 
a record in th i s respect having enacted no lessthan 176 
90 
ordinances within a year* Therefore, JP said, "Bihar MLAs 
have no moral and po l i t i ca l authority to represent their 
91 
constituents"• "what the Assembly members were gui l ty of 
was nothing short of betrayal of the mandate which they 
92 
received in 1972 from their electorate". They should, there-
fore, go to the electorate and seek the ir votes . 
67* J.P. tfarayan, Bihar Movement, Indian express,op*clt» 
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89. Ibid. 
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91 , Ibid. , May 18, 1974, p. 3 . 
92, Indian Express, June 14, 1974* 
456 
Jp quoted A.G. Noorsnl'a article* published la the 
Sunday standard * few days ago* la which Noorani had quoted 
Licey, according to whoa "dissolution In assanca is an appeal 
from the legal to the political sovereign"• The people are 
the political sovereign, the supreme power, and therefore they 
93 
had the right to ask for the dissolution of the Assembly, AS 
regards the ML As having been given a mandate of five years 
and that nobody had the right to ask then to resign earlier, 
the sarvodaya leader maintained that there being no "right to 
recall " in our constitution and the democratic institutions 
and the process having been so abused and distorted, the people 
have no alternative except to demand the resignation of their 
representatives if and when they forfeit their confidence. 
people can not be expected to wait for five years and bear 
94 
everything in silence even if things became intolerable* JP'S 
contention got support from an important journal 1st, sham Lai, 
according to whom, "A majority secured at polls only gives 
the winning party a mandate to serve the people and provide 
them food, cloth, shelter and education* It does not give it 
the right to betray the people and then expect to wait for 
another three or five years before they can get a chance to 
95 
secure redress tor the wrongs they suffer" • 
93. gverytaaa«s, November 23, 1974, p. 10* 
9
** Ionian Express, June 14, 1974* 
95. sham Lai,"The National scenesBitter Fruits of sweet Life", 
Times of zndia, November 7, 1974. 
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Thus, the agitation which began as non-political 
centering sound the educational and economic issues because 
p o l i t i c a l . Dissolution of the Assembly became the a l l important 
i ssue of the movement and other aspects and other objectives 
l i k e fighting corruption and blackmarketing, dehoarding, 
bringing about educational reform e t c . receded to the back-
ground. This was accepted by JP himself. "Dissolution of the 
Assembly and the resignation of the Ministry i s the f i r s t 
s tep , when t h i s f i r s t step i s over* the direction and the 
character of the movement wi l l change and i t wi l l become 
constructive. At present, i t I s , undoubtedly, agitational 
96 
and confrontational but inevitably so". 
programmes 
several programmes were chalked out and launched* 
keeping in view the requirement of the movement. They can 
be placed under two important categories! (1) People's 
awakening or mobilising programme! (2 ; constructive or issue-
oriented programmes. 
Awakening 
The programmes of people's awakening included organising 
processions* demonstrations* ral l ies* public meetings and 
undertaking fas t s to mobilise the people and explain to them 
the programmes and their objectives through speeches and 
distr ibution and sale of l i t erature . 
96 . N.s . jagannathan* op. c i t . 
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There had been three major processions* upto the 
declaration of Emergency, on June 5 and on November 4, 1974 
and on March IB, 1975. They a l l were massive though the 
strength of the each successive procession was smaller ia 
s i ze because of the repressive measures of the Government. 
on June 5, patna witnessed an unprecedented mass upsurge 
when a f i ve -k i lo metre long procession led by JP submitted 
to the Governor a truckload of memoranda with about 10 million 
signatures and thumb impressions of voters collected from 
different constituencies demanding the resignation of the 
Ghafoor Ministry and dissolution of the Assembly, The tailend 
of the procession was s t i l l at i t s originating point at 
Gandhi Maidan when the vanguard reached the Rajbhawan. This 
was done inspi te of the active h o s t i l i t y of the ruling party* 
what was worse, shots were f i re a a t the procession from a 
f lat* which housed the off ice of the 'Inalra Brigaie * a 
pro-congress mil itant organization. Tne f l a t was booked in 
the name of phulena Rai, a congress MLA. Despite a l l t h i s 
97 
the process ionists , fai thful to their pledge.remained peaceful. 
on November 4, 1974 the scss and the Bihar Jana 
sangharsh s&mlti (BJSS) planned to organize a procession and 
gherao the Ministers to demand their resignation, on the 
other hana, the Government took a l l measures to f o i l the 
programs. Barricades were put up in and around patna upto 
97. Indian Express and Motherland* June 6, 1974; 
Ghanshyaa shah, op. c l t . , p. 111. 
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a radius of about 30 ratios to prevent people from a l l over 
the s tate from jo in tug the programme; f i f ty -e ight trains on 
the Eastern Railway were cancelled* 'a l l steamers on the 
oanga and several state Transport buses stopped plying; a 
number of private vehicles and public carriers were also 
impounded by the Government* About 3,000 persons had been 
98 
arrested by the evening of November 3# 1974* 
Despite a l l the repressive measures a big procession 
of students, youth, sarvodaya workers and aerabers of pol i t ical 
part ies , was led by JP from Gandhi Maidan* pol iee burst 
several rounds of tear-gas she l l s and resorted to both mild 
and severe la th i charges at a number of places to stop the 
process ionists , jp himself received a la th i blow on his 
head, the second blow aimed at him was taken on his arm by 
Nanaji Deshiaukh, the next was stopped by Baburao chandavar, 
a sarvodaya worker* JP's eyes and throat were affected by 
tear gas. ye t JP along with the processionist managed to 
reach the secretariat* couunanting on t h i s process, the 
Indian nation wrote in i t s editorial,** that in spite of the 
heaviest pol ice bandobast - in the history of the s tate , 
barricades and restr ict ions and what not, jp could take out 
a big procession in Patna goes to prove that he i s a force 
to reckon with. Lakhs of rupees spent on the security 
arrangements could very wel l go for the expansion of 
99 
irrigation f a c i l i t i e s ? 
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98* Ghanshyam shah, op* c l t * , p* 112* 
99 . Indian Nation, November 8* 1974* 
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I t i s to be noted, however, that a l l the throe process-
ion* focuased oa one po l i t i ca l issue* the dissolution of 
the Assembly, out of the 25 slogans prescribed for June 5 
procession. 11 were of p o l i t i c a l nature, 6 related to 
Government repression, 2 concerned corruption, 2 slogans 
concerned with price r i s e , 2 demanded changes in the education 
system and 2 asked people to be ready to f ight find sacrifice* 
on November 4, none of the slogans was related to economic 
i s s u e s . "The Pol ice i s our brother, we are not fighting 
against them", was introduced on November 4* similar slogans 
100 
were repeated at March 18, 1975 procession. 
August 1 was observed as "Anti-corruption Day"In Patna, 
thousands of men and women took the pledge to end corruption 
standing in pouring rain at a meeting addressed by jp.August 
9 to 15 was observed as'Total Revolution w«ek'* August 15 
was observed as •Peoples1 Freedom Day* and January 26, 1975 
was celebrated as 'peoples' Republic Day*, on both these 
occasions different csss and JSSS organized separate f lag-
hoi station programmes* At some places f lags were unhuried 
by rickshaw pullers* 
Kntl-Represston u&y or Black nay was observed on 
August 23 and November l i against police atrocit ies* Black 
f lags were hoisted on some buildings and students, youth, 
members of the pol i t ica l parties and sarvodaya workers wore 
100* Ghanshypjs shah, op* c l t « , p* 112* 
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black badges* JP appealed a l l to observe a •dawn-to-dust 
f a s t ' ami did I t himself a t patna along with a batch of 180 
followers* in July and September, groups of satyagrahis went 
on fas t la front of tho Assembly gate* demanding the dissolu-
tion of tho Assembly, This was followed at d i s t r i c t and sub-
divis ional headquarters and at some places including blocs* 
Meetings were also held to explain the purposes and 
the issues involved in the movement and also to give instruc-
t ions regarding future programmes* JP himself toured and 
addressed meetings in d i s t r i c t s and sub-divisional towns and 
invariably attracted large crowds* on June 5 and November 19 
h i s meetings a t Gandhi Maldan in Patna were among the biggest 
in the history of the state* The Indian Mat ion commenting 
on the November meeting said»~H 
"For two reasons the public meeting addressed 
by jp was of great significance* xt demonstrated/ 
i f any demonstration was necessary, that the counter-
offensive launched by the congress and ttoe CPI has 
made no impact whatsoever on the minis of the 
people who are under the magic spell of the magnetic 
personality of JP. with sheer numerical weight, the 
Gandhi Maidan meeting of the ag i ta t lon l s t s has more 
than neutralised ths impact of the ral ly held by 
the congress Party* m making a comparison between 
the two one should not forget that while the congress 
ral ly was a laboured af fa ir , the other one was to 
a great extent, e f for t l e s s , spontaneous".101 
several important leaders belonging to different 
Opposition parties also auureased meetings in different 
101, Indian Nation, November 21, 1974* 
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parti of the state* student leaders, sarvodaya workers, 
teacher** art i s ts* writers organized street corner meetings 
In c i t i e s and towns to explain the need and purpose of the 
agitation* But th i s did not continue f or long* 
Leaflets* generally Issued by the BCSS and local csss 
and JSSS were the common means of communicating programmes, 
instructions cad jp«s appeal. 
issue-oriented progresses 
The issue-oriented programmes can be divided into two 
102 
categories as suggested by jp himself: (1} struggle Programmes* 
involving confrontation with the authority, and ^ c o n s t r u c -
t ive A c t i v i t i e s . 
Struggle programmes:- several satyagrahas were launched as 
part of the struggle programme, demandisg 
the dissolution of the Assembly* The largest of these was 
the satyagrah from June 7 to 12, Every day a batch of satya-
grahls, enrolled in advance by the BCSS* sat at the gates of 
the s tate Assembly and the secretariat and tried to prevent 
the MLAS irom attending the Assembly* on June 13, SOOOB of 
the volunteers manhandled f ive l eg i s la tors and tore their 
c lothes while they were going to the Assembly* However* JP 
103 
tendered personal apology for the incident* 
102* Ghanshyam shah, op. clt>* p* 116. 
1 0 3
• Everyman's, May 18, 1974, p* 4* 
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in October and November, 1974* the a g i t a t o r s gheraoed 
Government o f f i c e s to paralyse t h e i r working* on November 4 , 
the Minis ters were gheraoed* This programme of ten l e d to 
confrontat ions between the a g i t a t o r s and the p o l i c e . Bandh 
was an a t t r a c t i v e programme for the students and the youth. 
The Bihar bandh c a l l between October 3 and 5 , 1974* was a 
complete s u c c e s s . Normal l i f e a l l over the s t a t e , except l a 
some industr ia l towns or south Bihar* remained paralysed on 
a l l the three days* a l l shops remained c lo sed , buses, r i ck -
shaws, cars e t c . went o f f the* roads, law courts wore a 
deserted look, Government o f f i c e s worked p a r t i r l l y , t ra in 
s e r v i c e s on many s e c t i o n s of the North-Eastern Railways were 
d isrupted , the tracks a t several p laces having been removed, 
t h e telecommunication system was snapped and some s t a t i o n s 
gheraoed by the supporters of bandh. J P l e d the satyagraha 
a t the s e c r e t a r i a t gate on October 3 and 4 . confrontation 
between the centra l Reserved p o l i c e (CRPj)and the youth took 
p lace a t several p l a c e s . About 2,500 persons were arrested 
and 13 persons* according to o f f i c i a l sources , were k i l l e d . 
Eusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed in several towns, including 
104 
patna , Bihar became normal only a f t e r October 7, 1974. 
The 'Dissolve Assembly week* from May 8, 1974 was 
observed by the BCSS and B J S S . J P wrote an open l e t t e r t o 
the ML A s asking them to res ign i n the I n t e r e s t of "good, 
104* Gh an shy am shah, op . c l t . , p . 116. 
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clean and e f f i c i e n t government1* * TO the opposition ML A a he 
•a id , "so, i f you opposition ML A a, continue to st ick to your 
seats 1ft the Assembly, you s o t only expose your erstwhile 
support as being hollow, but a lso become a party to a l l the 
105 
wrongs perpetrated by the Bihar government" . T h e Opposition 
parties also asked their ML As to resign from the Assembly, 
About 40 opposition ML A a old so but many defied the directive* 
The SSP, the SP , the congressto) and the Jan sangh, who were 
supporting the movement were s p l i t into two. Later sons of 
them joined the congress, i t was a pity that the movement 
which had for i t s objects the overhauling the entire pol i t ica l 
system resulted in spl i t t ing the entire opposition* 
No-Tax campaign, 
in order to paralyse the Government* 9? asked the 
people In July, 1974 not to pay taxes* But the programme did 
not receive any response in urban areas though a few farmers 
106 
did not pay the land revenue or the levy to the Government* 
Picketing of l iquor shops was part of no-tax campaign. But 
the Government and the l iquor contractors joined forces, and 
the students were unable to r e s i s t the police and privately 
hired goondas of the shopkeepers* so , the picketing programme 
was abandoned, similarly* the s t i r against cinema houses 
107 
was a lso abandoned. 
«* * •—-———— I I . I i —
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Janata sarkar 
Soon after the three-day baadh In October* 1974, JP 
cal led upon the people to set up "people's Assembly and 
paral le l Government" If the Assembly was not dissolved by a 
deadline "to we set up in near future*** The CSSs and the 
JSSs were to se t up candidates and hold e lect ions to the 
peoples Assembly* soon after JP*s announcement, reports of 
the formation of parallel government in three or four blocks 
were received. However* a reporter of the Indian Nation, who 
v i s i t ed the waraaliganj block in Nawada d i s t r i c t (known to 
be running a parallel government) reported: "supporters and 
act ive workers of jp- led agitation in Nawada are more amused 
than jubilant over the reported claim of formation of a 
"parallel Janata Government*1 in the d is tr ic t* At waraaliganj 
t h i s r-porter could not locate a single active worker of thi 
Action committee, i t s o f t i ce was also locked ••• Krishna 
Murari (16) i s a scud win t of class eleven ia the school and 
he said he had heard of such a government formed by Jj?* ia 
answer to a question whether such an ins t i tut ion existed at 
waraaliganj* he saldi "Not here* but at pataa under JP's 
108 
leadership" • 
in January* 1975* JP gave the programme of the Janata 
sarkar. i t was to be formed from the v i l l age upwards* i t 
was decided to form Janata sarkar in ISO blocks out of the 
1C8. Indian Nation* October 16, 1974. 
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587 blocks in the state* by the end of March, 1975. in May* 
the CSS decided to aet up Janata sarkar In 300 blocks but 
only a few days l a t er JP declared in Madras that Janata 
110 
Sarkar would cover the entire Bihar by July. However* by the 
end of March, 197b* only 18 blocks were declared to have 
formed Janata sarkar. i n roany of the v i l l ages of these blocks 
CSS and JSS had not been formed. The members of the block 
l eve l Janata sarkar were not e lected by anyone* They were 
mostly from the dominant sections of society, in chandi Block* 
for instance* the landed c lass had farmed in January* 1974 a 
Klsan sangh to protect the Interests of Klsans. The governing 
Board of the sangh converted I t s e l f into Jana sangharsh samiti 
which was la ter converted into Janata sarkar. 4 of 18 Janata 
Sarkars had become Inactive within two months of their 
111 
formation. 
Elections 
jp ana the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi met on 
November 1* 1974 but they could not reach an agreement on 
the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly. Mrs. Gandhi said that 
jp should wait t i l l the next e lect ions to know the wil l of 
the people, JP announced in h is November meeting at Gandhi 
109. o.p* Deepak, "is Janata sarkar some sort of parallel 
Government", Everyman's, February 2* 1975, p. 2. 
ll
°* Indian Nation* May 6 and 7. 1975. 
111. Ghanshyam shah, op. c i t . , p. 119. 
467 
Maiden that, "he,has accepted the challenge of the Prime 
Minister to show a t the next general e lect ions what the 
112 
Bihar people want" • He said, "Election wi l l be part of the 
struggle* so the context wi l l be only between two parties -
one of those who support the struggle and the other of those 
who oppose i t " , do appealed the people to ensure the victory 
of ' their candidates' against congress candidates* He said, 
"Whoever may be the candidate adopted or supported by the 
committee 
i t wi l l be for you to act" . Thus* by the end of 1974, the 
emphasis shifted from the dissolution of the Assembly to 
the defeat of the congress a t the polls* 
Constructive programmes 
Many tasks had been outlined for students, youth and 
others who had joined the movement* some of the programmes 
were:-
1* checking corruption and bribery in Government off ices 
in cooperation with o f f i c i a l s i f possible* volunteers 
wi l l not v io late any law* Their teams wi l l take turns 
to watch t i n t the people are not harrassed and not 
forced to pay bribes; 
112. Indian Nation, November 21* 1974* 
1 1 3 #
 Everyman's* November 23, 1975, p* 10* 
l l 4 ,
 ££££"' August 17, 1974, p* 11* 
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2. picketing of liquor shops; 
3. Checking blackmarketiag and hoarding of essential goods. 
Popular support should bo mobilised in this task to 
soe that proper action is taken officially la cases 
detected by the volunteers? 
4* checking irregularities of ration shops and getting 
ration cards issued to the homeless; 
5, correction of electoral rolls and voters' education; 
6*(a) securing homestead rights for Harijans and others in 
villages? 
(b) Assuring their legal rights to sharecroppers. Detecting 
fa l se and benami land mutations in the vi l lages* 
(c) volunteers from Agricultural co l leges and also others 
with a l i t t l e training should teach farmsrs to make 
compost manure and also manufacturing cowduag-gas 
requiring l i t t l e investment; 
7. studying the problems of Harijans, landless workers 
and other workers both in towns and v i l lages ; 
8. vaccination to be done by medical col lege students* 
They wi l l l a t er have to undertake innoculation against 
cholera* They snould also teach the people simple rules 
about hygiene, sanitation, clearning, water to make i t 
for drinking and nuitr l t lon; 
9 . women can generally participate in a l l the programmes, 
but they should also engage in some tasks specially 
suited to them, namely picketing l iquor shops, v i s i t ing 
hospitals and also v i s i t i n g women prisoners arrested 
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In connection with the movement, Th«y can also help 
la checking irregular i t ies in ration aheps; 
10. Distribution of l i terature and running study and 
discussion centres* Adult education net of the tradi-
tional type but la a way suited to inutan conditions* 
I t may be noted that JP cal led upon the peopfee to 
launch a war against three aine - profiteering, hoarding 
and blackmarketing. However* t h i s f ight was confined to 
unearthing ghost ration cards and negotiating with traders 
and Government o f f i c i a l s to f i x prices* in the beginning, 
the students unearthed hoarded goods ana fixed prices of 
essential commodities at Muzaffarpur, Patna and In some 
other towns. Flying squads were also set up for th i s purpose* 
After sometime this was abandoned. The Indian Nation reported* 
"unscrupulous wholesalers and re ta i l dealers are trying to 
defeat the commendable scheme to end hoarding and profiteering, 
They are openly flouting the assurance they gave to the 
Dis tr ic t Magistrates to so i l things at the mutually agreed 
rates . Essential commodities have either gone underground 
IIS 
or one being sold at blackroarket rates". The agitators tried 
to implement the agreed rates of essential commodities, in 
such cases , businessmen, their hired goondas and police beat 
up the boys. But the boys had no programme and organisation 
to back their struggle, further, sons and re lat ives of 
115* Indian Nation, Nay 29, 1974. 
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trader* had Inf i l trated the movement and sidetracked It* 
T h o
 Tlasa of India reported that"there i» seme talk that 
hoarders and profiteers have been financing the students* 
Signif icant ly , the go tip wn a owned by profiteering wholesalers 
or shops belonging to re ta i l ers who raised prices without 
117 
any reason have not been picketed by students". 
Another Important constructive programme, namely* 
speedier Implementation of land ce l l ing and Bataldarl laws 
and distribution of legal documents for homo stead land to 
HartJans remained unImplemented. s imilarly, the item regarding 
the problems of workers in towns and v i l lages remained 
untouched* 
in response to JP's c a l l , some students from different 
parts of the s ta te v i s i t ed v i l l ages in July and August, 1974. 
But after some weeks they returned home and resumed their 
studios complaining that they did not have any concrete 
programme for sustained work, in 1975 students participated 
in flood re l i e f work and vaccination programme against 
118 
cholera* 
To attack the caste system, jp asked the high caste 
boys to give up the practice of wearing the sacred thread* 
Xl6* Ghanshyam shah, op* cit., p. 121. 
117* Times of India, May 7, 1974. 
118. Qhanshyam shah, op* clt., p. 122. 
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some boy a followed It and threw their thread la public 
meeting3 but It caused some resentment among the orthodox 
Hindus* \c cording to shlvanaad Tlwarl, an Important leader 
of the steering committee of the DCSS, JP was prevented 
from speaking against this practice* The political parties 
also pleadea against It on the plea that It would Jeopardise 
1X9 
their chances In the elections. Finally, JP had to yield. 
A no tiler programmes of social reform also failed to evoke 
favourable response. Though JP pleaded that taking and giving 
of dowry led to corruption, he failed to persuade many among 
his own youthful followers to turn their back on it. 
Most; of the programmes laid stress on the political 
demands, viz. dissolution of the Assembly and resignation 
of the Ministry. Duly political programme found enough 
response* constructive programmes remained in the background 
after some sporadic attempts, students and youths - the 
vanguard of the movement - were mainly interested la 
mobilising programmes. This was accepted by no less a person 
tnan jp himself. He said that the revolutionary ardour was 
noticeable among the youth when they were required to be 
demonstrative but in the constructive aspects of the 
programme there were not many persona willing to go through 
120 
the drugery of sustained drive, sachchiuananda, the Director 
119. plnman, February 5-11, 78, p. 26. 
120. Inalan Express and Hindustan Times, December 26, 1974. 
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»f tie 4.N. slnha ins t i tu te of social studies , Patna* also 
gave the ©pinion that the energy of the movement was exhausted 
more la demonstrative a c t i v i t i e s and l e s s in constructive 
121 
works. He dent was made on the rampant corruption of the 
Government* Even the struggle programmes l i k e Janata sarkar 
did not go deep into the v i l l ages , because the members of 
the Janata sarkar belonged to the landed and u pper castes 
and they were not ready to sacri f ice their interests* This 
fac t i s also aomitted by shlvanand Tiwarl, an important 
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leader of the steering committee of the BCSS. JP's cal l to 
•total revolution* struck a responsive chord in the hearts 
of many who f e l t genuine concern for the country's future* 
But the mechanics he had in mind and the strategy he had 
adopted l e f t even some of h i s admirers cold* This fact was 
l a t e r conceded by Baburara chandavar, a c lose associate and 
an important sarvodaya worker* He f e l t that by accepting 
the challenge of elections* jp moved away from his total 
revolution, because fighting elect ion and becoming l e g i s l a -
123 
tors became an Important objective of the movement* 
Participants 
Students and youth were the main force behind the 
1 2 i
* DlnrcaP* January 29 - February 4, 1978, p. 26* 
122* l b i o . , February 5-11, 1978, p. 27. 
123* i b i d . , January 29 - February I, 1978, p* 25* 
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Bihar movement* As a matter of fact , i t were they who started 
the agitation* JP and hia sarvodaya workers joined i t after 
sometime, t^  hough the sarvodaya workers gave very v i ta l 
support to the movement. Then came the po l i t i ca l parties,whe 
In the opinion of Baburam chandavar came ou the scene after 
sensing the direction of the wind* The turban middle class 
a lso gave their support to the movement* According to Jaganaath 
Mlshra, a former congress chief Minister* unemployed youth, 
middle c las s , so-cal led in te l l ec tua l s and urban people were 
124 
the supporters of the movement. Ram Lakhan singh Yadav, 
Krishna Kant singh, Bhola Prasad singh, Kapildeo Singh and 
Karpoori Thakur a l l concede that students, youth and opposi-
t ion parties were main participants in the movement* According 
to Bhola Prasad singh and Kapildeo singh also the middle 
125 
c l a s s , middle caste and urban people supported the movement* 
I t may be noted, however, that po l i t i ca l parties became the 
forefront organization of the movement* According to shlvanand 
Tiwari, with the demand of dissolution of the Assembly, 
po l i t i ca l leaders came on equal footing with the youth leaders* 
After t h i s , the l a t t e r lagged behind the former. The reason 
for this was that student and youth leaders were not mature, 
their outlook was not clear ana they were not expert in 
po l i t i ca l manouvrlngs* Pol i t ica l leaders,on the contrary, were 
part-masters in pol i t ica l machinations though the ir outlook 
124. Ibid*. January 22-23, 1978, p. 33, 
125. supra. Footnotes 11, p. 424. 
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was also not c lear . They knew the art of attracting people 
by promising them fa l se paradise. Besides, the students also 
were more divided on party l i n e s or s p l i t into Left and 
Right groups* 
There had been no serious attempts to involve adlvasis* 
Harijana anc Muslims on a large scale . Poor peasants*landless 
labourers and industrial workers* by and large* remained 
indifferent to the movement. Not only Jagannath Mishra but 
Baburam chandavar and Kaplldeo say that there was negligible 
Involvement of the poor in the movement* Similarly* the 
movement did not penetrate deep into the rural areas* This 
is accepted both by Mishra and chandavar* During the early 
period* however* the urban poor people were sympathetic to 
the movement because they f e l t that the students were 
fighting for their cause* But la ter as the issues l ike 
corruption and dissolution of the Assembly came to the fore 
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they grew cold* Thus* the movement of 1974*75 was the 
movement of students* middle c lass and urban people. This 
i s conceded by no l e s s a person than Baburam chandavar who 
128 
vac deeply Involved in the movement. 
I t i s also important to note that woman participation 
12a* plnman* February 5-11* 1978* p. 27* 
127. ohanshyam shah* op. c i t . , p. 128. 
128* plnman* January 29 - February 4* 1978* p. 25. 
*m 
in the JP movement was I I N nogligiblo* According to smt.xamle 
Basawan singh, an important s o c i a l i s t leader* who actively 
took part in tho movement, urban women took the ir participa-
t ion in dharna, fast and similar programmes merely as tho 
fashion of tho time. They did not have real consciousness 
129 
• f tho movement, chandavar also acre i t s t h i s fact* 
p o l i t i c a l Parties 
Po l i t i ca l parties which joined tho movement in a big 
way with their students and youth organizations were the 
S o c i a l i s t Party* s*myukta s o c i a l i s t Party, congress (o) and 
the Jan sangh* The swatantr* Party* with a few pockets of 
influence* also joined the movement* I t had only one member 
in the Assembly. The All-India Forward Bloc had also extended 
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i t s * f u l l e s t support* to the Bihar movement* However, i t s 
following in the s tate was also negligible* of theme parties, 
the Jan sangh was the most organised party working in the 
movement* The J S S was strong in areas where the sangh was 
strong* The party co-ordinated i t s work with i t s two s i s t e r 
organizations* the ABVP and RSS* The AnVP dominated the CSS 
a t many places and at sons places RSS workers were either 
131 
off ice-bearers of the CSS or guided the members of the CSS* 
•19* Zbid.« p« 26* 
l 3
° * Statesman (Delhi), October 7, 1974* 
131. Ghanshyam shah* op* c i t .» p* 131. 
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The s o c i a l i s t parties* being sentimentally attached to J P , 
because he was once their leader* tried to mobilise as much 
support tor the movement as they could. Their youth organisa-
t ion SYS was act ively Involved in the agitation from i t s 
very beginning. But owing to the s p l i t , which occurred only 
a year ago, the organization of both these parties was not 
in good shape* 
The CPI(M) alee supported the movement but did not 
participate in i t . The party extended i t s support to the 
Bihar's people's movement for the dismissal of the congress 
Ministry with i t s a l l iance with the landlords* speculators 
and hoarders seeking with corruption and for dissolution 
of the Bihar Assembly and for a new and fa ir elections* i t 
ca l led upon the people te protest against the brutal repress-
ion in Bihar ana express their fu l l sol idarity with the 
fighting people of Bihar* However, the party had serious 
reservation about the movement* The party f e l t that the 
movement was not radicalised to re f lec t the socio-economic 
problems of the workers* peasants and weaker sections* The 
movement did not ra l ly a l l the l e f t and democratic forces 
to conduct the programme; i t fa i l ed to involve workers, 
peasants and other to i l ing sections of the mass and strength 
the ir struggle* The party was also apprehensive of the 
participation of the "reactionary parties l ike the jan sangh, 
BLD (Bharitfya Lok i>al) and the congress to)* 
• • • m ii • ii i . • • -wi i iM J I I . . . . i 10 i . _ _ ir • in •. .1 . _n 1  i m . n-i • mi 1 MJIIBI mn*--~m - mn n ± 11 — _ 1. • i______ 
132* Hindustan Times* September 21* 1974; Janata, vol*29, 
No* 28, Augus t 15* 1974; People's Democracy*January 12, 
1975, pp. ft-7, March 9, 1975* p* U, Warch l l , 1975. 
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The cPXiMarxist-Leninist) known as Natalit ies* supported 
the movement because i t s main target was Mrs* Gandhi whs was 
buthorltarlaji but did net participate In i t oa two grounds» 
f i r s t , the congress (o) and the jaa sangh were the major 
partners'and, secondly* JP did not give radical economic 
programmes* 
I t I s important to mention here that the pol i t ica l 
part ies act ive ly Involved In the movement were more inspired 
by the same lus t of power that characterized the ruling party, 
than by the real objectives of the movement* The astute* 
calculating leaders of these parties and groups, found la JP 
a messiah* a leader with a charismatic personality* a veritable 
banyan tree under which they could conveniently take shelter* 
Most of them began supporting him out of sheer frustration 
or helplessness but they soon found that he could trigger off 
an agitation from which they could benefit and gain strength* 
They found in jp a tremendous force which* l i k e India*, wave* 
may culminate into a jp wave winning the next elections for 
them* They showed rare unanimity* worked out a united front 
under aim and spoke with one voice on most of the Issues 
because the ir eyes were set on e lect ions whenever i t may take 
133* Ghanshyam shah* op, c i t * , p* 130* 
134* Jag Mohan, "Democracy la xndla: The Trauma and the 
Travail"* Gandhi Marg* vol* 19* No* 1* 1975* p* 45* 
135* J.D. Sethi* Ibid*, p. 82* 
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place. Their aim was to overthrow the Cong re as in the stato 
and a t the centre and to got power for themselves, in fact* 
the mi l i tant students and sarvodaya workers* who gave the 
movement i t s i n i t i a l impetus, had already receded into the 
background and i t s leadership had been taken over, toy cadres 
belonging to the Jan sangh, s o c i a l i s t s and the congress(o) 
and some other groups which had nothing in common except a 
desire to take advantage of the waning fortune of the congress 
to feather their own nests* JP himself admitted that the 
Opposition parties tried to take advantage of the movement 
in order to enlarge their influence and reduce that of the 
136 
Congress* He was apprehensive about the s incerity of the 
po l i t i ca l part ies , would they pursue the other objectives 
of the movement embodied in the total revolution when they 
come to power* He said* "At the moment several pol i t ical 
part ies are supporting the struggle and their members are 
making sacr i f i ce s , i f the Assembly i s dissolved and elect ions 
are held within a few months these parties wi l l contest them* 
X do not know how far they wi l l go In the struggle for 
achieving the broader objectives of the movement* The Jan 
sangh may not go very far* For I remember when I advised 
the svp Government in 1967 to implement some laws, the Jan 
sangh Ministers threatened that rivers of blood wi l l f i o w 
136* Jaya Prakash Narayan, "The Meaning of Bihar Movement*, 
Indian Express, May 21, 1974* 
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i f the issue was taken up". The sarvodaya leaser further 
said that "for Jan sangh the revolution would be total i f 
L.K. Advani or Atal Behari Bajpayee become the Prime Minister 
and so would be the case with the BXD i f Charan Singh cone 
138 
to power" • Though JP la t er said that he had jockingly remarked 
139 
about the Jan aangh and 3KD, but ironical ly i t proved true 
a f ter the Janata Party came to power at the centre and in 
most of the states* 
JP had believed that the s o c i a l i s t s , the sarvodaya 
workers* students and people's struggle committees might 
carry further the struggle against blackmarketing* hoarding 
140 
and other socio-economic laws. But th i s was also belied as 
a l l of tham* perhaps, with the exception of sarvodaya workers* 
indulged in power pol i t i cs* what i s more, some of the socia-
l i s t leaders had doubts about j p ' s concept of total revolution* 
Students* youth and sarvodaya workers* the main force 
in early stage of the agitat ion, were pushed behind by 
pragmatic* hardbolled, buslnessmlnded po l i t i c ians for whom 
i 3 7
* Everyman's, August 3* 1974* p. 1* 
138* Indian Express* Hindustan Times and Tines of India, 
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the movement was a pure and simple power struggle. Many of 
them vara sceptical of jp 'a concept* and philosophy,especially 
h i s "Total Revolution*• Even those who did bel ieve In revolu-
t ion were doubtful If I t could be brought about through the 
142 
present movement, students and youth on whom jp placed so 
much reliance took active interest only in mobilising progra-
mmes of the movement* Their ways proved no different from 
the 'adult po l i t i ca l culture' and they engaged as shamelessly 
in 'operation grab1 as the elders* when twenty-six of them 
becacae ML As and soma of them were mad* Ministers and Parlla-
143 
mentary secretaries* 
The movement fa i l ed to achieve i t s basic objectives* 
i . e . , soc ia l , economic and po l i t i ca l reforms, z t fai led to 
check, price r i s e , hoarding* blackmarketing and profiteering. 
Zt also fa i led to keep corruption In check, i t did not succeed 
in breaking the nexus between pol i t ic ians in power and vested 
interes t s and thus rel ieve the people from the ir tyranny* 
Of course, one result of the movement might be said to be 
the dethrowing what was called 'authoritarian* regime at the 
Centre and whole of North India. This view i s admitted by 
Karpoori Thakur, Kapildeo Singh, shola Prasad Singh,Krishna 
142. Ghanshyam shah, op, c i t . , p« 133* 
143* The term 'adult p o l i t i c a l culture' and 'operation garb* 
have been borrowed from s»c. Dubey, "Democracy in 
Indiai The irauraa and TraivailM, Gandhi Marg,Vol. 19, 
iio* 1, 1ST5, p* 21. 
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Kant slngh* Ren Lakhan Singh Yadav, Daroga Prasad Rai* Ram 
Raj Prasad Singh and many others. But that was not the avowed 
aim of the movement* 
I t i s to be noted that a t the time of agitation and 
also of e lect ion the common people was assured by Jp aad 
ether leaders of the movement that i f the leaders of the 
movement were voted to power* they would se t the i l l s of the 
society right and would establ ish the control of 'Lokshakti* 
(people's power; over the 'Rajshaktt' ( s ta te powers .But th is 
was simply bel led and the electorate of India* particularly 
of Bihar* was cheated once more. The congress was dethrown 
aad the leaders of the movement came to power f i r s t at the 
Centre and then in states* But there did take place no quali-
ta t ive change in the socia l , economic, po l i t i ca l and adminis-
tra t ive se t up of the s ta t e . Everything went on the same 
Congress pattern which the new rulers had cr i t i c i s ed day in 
and day out* corruption continued to grew, hoarders* black-
marketeers and profiteers continued to flourish* The sane out 
of date educational system was allowed to continue* There 
came no positives changes in the l i f e of the poor* suppressed 
and exploited* This view was shared by Akhtar Hussain and 
Raghupatl* both important leaders of the BCSS* Kitten pataalk 
well known s o c i a l i s t leader and shivanand riwari* All of 
them agreed that the Janata Party and Government were d i s -
appointing, youth and students because the 'Janata sarkar' 
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was following in the foot-steps of the congress Government* 
144* pinman* January 12-28,1978,pp.31 and 36,February 5-11, 
I5T8, p. 27* 
*4S2 
jp himself admitted that the Janata Government was behaving 
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la the Congress Government *way* Thus* it may be said that 
the basic causes that gave rise to the protest movement led 
by JP in Bihar remained vary much there in all their ugliness• 
However, JP movement was a great movement of pretest 
against the failures of the congress to manage the economy, 
bring down prices and remove corruption* It served a useful 
purpose by exposing the weakness of the political system that 
has .just not been able to solve the basic problems of the 
people &y highlighting the issue of corruption and pointing 
to the rot that had got into the system as a result of the 
declining morality of electoral politics* it exposed its 
basic weaknesses and that of both ruling and opposition parties-
their lack of real popular base and their increasing reliance 
on politics of manipulation from above and on politics of 
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blackmoney. I'he positive aspect of the movement was that it 
sought to apply in practice the fundamental principle ©f 
"eternal vigilance is the price of liberty", but mass dis-
content could also be used by vested interests for selfish 
ends* Every agitation does not lead co a purposeful revolution* 
Hor was there a dearth of those who liked fee fish in troubled 
waters* Thus was it that although the protest movement did 
145* ibid., June 26 - July 2, 1978, p* 19* 
146* Rajni Kothari, T h e Future of a System,politics as a 
Private Enterprise", Times of India, April 10, 1975* 
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contribute towards a change of Government In 1977, i t 
did not succeed in helping to bring s t a b i l i t y to state 
po l i t i c s* 
CHAPTER VZXX 
COHCLUSIOMS 
The year 1967 could b« the watershed la the shabby 
polltlcB of Bihar. But what was hailed as a new direction 
changed Into a drift* The establishment of the f i r s t 
government by the opposition parties failed* Ironically, 
to rea l i se the dream of an e f fec t ive alternative government. 
upt l l 1967, Bihar was ruled by one dominant party and had 
seen only four Chief Ministers, one of them only a caretaker 
Chief Minister* The composition of the Councils of Ministers 
had also been negatively uniform, the core remaining 
unchanged* But the new government, which succeeded the 
Congress government, could not prove equal to the task of 
uniting the people of the s tate under a purposeful, honest 
and strong government* The period of ins tab i l i ty , which 
in the 1970s turned into turmoil, began* During t h i s period, 
Bihar had the doubtful privi lege of having 12 governments, 
one of them being a stop-gap arrangement* There were 12 
Chief Ministers, among whom Bhola Faswan Shastrl became 
the Chief Minister of three different governments* This 
s ta te of a f fa irs was* naturally, reflected la the composition, 
nature and duration of the various Councils of Ministers 
formed from time to time* 
As i s clear from the preceding pages, three dis t inct 
phases are discernible from the point of view of of nature 
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of the coal i t ion partners* The period fro* March, 1967 -
June, 1968, the f i r s t phase, saw four government* of the 
non-congress parties* one of these government • remained in 
power for three days only* The congress, though i t supported 
a government, was completely kept out of off ice* 
The second phase, the phase of mixed Coalitions, began 
in February, 1969 and las ted upto December, 1971* The Congress 
came back into the government as a partner of theee Coalitions. 
But i t was not the sane dominant and monolithic Congress* i t 
started sp l i t t ing up* I t remained, however, the major partner* 
The various non-Congress parties , namely the S&P, PSP, Jan 
sangh, CP2 and other spl inter groups also played the ir role 
in the 'market pol i ty 1 in different ways* At the end of t h i s 
phase, Bhola Paswan shastri formed the government as an 
Independent with the support of the Congress (R), PSP and the 
CPI* 
One party governments reappeared in 1972 with the 
Congress, as the Congress (R> was re-designated by the 
Election Commission of India, staging a def inite comeback 
on the po l i t i ca l scene* This constituted the third phase* 
The congress continued to enjoy overwhelming majority in 
the Assembly from March, 1972 to April, 1977, i . e . t i l l the 
dissolut ion of the Assembly by the Janata Government at the 
Centre* 
This analysis of the governments indicates the party-
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wise composition of the various Councils of Ministers 
formed during the different phases under etaady* The represen-
tat ion of the various po l i t i ca l parties in the Councils of 
Ministers i s shown in Xfi&LtJL* a n d t h e t o t a l »*•*»•* o f 
Ministers belonging to different po l i t i ca l parties during 
coa l i t ion period i s shown in Table ZI* 
Zt i s evident from the above Tables that during the 
phase of non-coagressism* the major parties , namely the SSP, 
PSP, CPZ and the Jan sangh* did not have a f inal say as far 
as the composition of the Councils of Ministers was concerned. 
They also got l e s s seats in the ministries in comparison 
with the spl inter groups. While these a l l -India parties 
secured only about 32,53* of the to ta l ministerial posts of 
83, the shoshlt £>al managed to get about 43.37* of the 
ministerial berths* Though i t had only 38 members in the 
legis lature* 
However, in the mixed Coalitions* th i s position was 
s l i g h t l y changed mainly owing to the participation of the 
Cong ress -parties in the governments* Znsplte of the non-
parti cipatioi of the CPZ* the share of the major parties 
was about 54.97% of the total strength of 171 ministerial 
berths* However* the smaller* spl inter and regional groups 
a lso played a v i ta l part in the making and breaking of each 
of the f ive ministries* The Janata parties* i*oktantrik 
Congress* Jharkhand groups* Shoshlt Dal* BKD and the rebel 
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Showing representation of the various 
political parties in the Ministries 
during 1967 - 1971 
partias 
SSP 
PSP 
CPZ 
j a n sangh 
Period 
Cong re 
( F i r s t 
• M l i I I I 
Congress (Undivided) 
Congress ( R ) 
Congress (0 ) 
JKD 
Jharkhand 
Hul Jharkhand 
8PZ 
Svatantre 
sjhoshit Dal 
Loktantrik 
Janata 
BKD 
ISP 
Forward s l o e 
Independents 
Others 
9 
6 
6 
6 
-
-
-
4 
1 
«* 
1 
-
36 
5 
2 
-
«* 
-
2 
5 
of Non-
ssism 
Percentagi 
10*87 
7 .18 
7*18 
7 .18 
•» 
-
«• 
4*82 
1.24 
-
1*24 
-
43-37 
6 .24 
2.49 
-
«• 
-
2.49 
**24 
9 Mixed Coa l i t i ons 
) (second Phase) 
1EE2331 
IS 
2 
-
8 
19 
43 
9 
-
13 
4 
-
1 
11 
7 
9 
8 
3 
1 
14 
6 
** • * e> **^s»eSJ e^ssflsjesr 
7 .62 
1.62 
-
4.67 
11 .11 
24.41 
5.26 
-
7.62 
2.33 
-
0 .58 
6 .43 
4 .94 
5.26 
4 .67 
1.75 
0.S8 
7 .62 
3 .58 
Total 83 171 
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J O S S L M E B 
Snowing total number of Ministers belonging to 
different polit ical parties during coalition 
period* 
Parties 
Congress lundivi 
Congress (R) 
Congress (0) 
SSP 
PSP 
CPI 
Jan Sangh 
Swatantra 
JKO 
Jharkhand 
Hul Jharkhand 
API 
Shoshl t Dal 
boktantrlk 
Janata 
SK.L 
Forward Bloc 
ISP 
Independents 
Others 
OCa 
r 
.ded> 
bine* iMinistersH Deputy 
nistersftof s tate 1 Ministers 
1 ft 
19 
24 
3 
IS 
s 
4 
8 
1 
3 
8 
4 
-
as 
n 
s 
6 
-
2 
S 
3 
*» 
17 
6 
7 
3 
2 
6 
-
1 
4 
-
1 
19 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
10 
6 
-
2 
-
-
-
-
-
-
«* 
-
-
-
3 
-
-
mm 
-
e» 
1 
2 
1 Total i 
19 
43 
9 
22 
8 
4 
14 
1 
4 
34 
4 
1 
47 
12 
11 
8 
1 
3 
14 
11 
Total 1S1 9S 8 294 
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PSP named ISP, along with the independents, had obtained 
highly disproportionate shares in the Council* of Ministers. 
They had among then 43.4854 of the total strength of Ministers* 
whereas their strength in the Assembly was only 21.37%. 
One important feature of this phase was the bigger share 
and more influence of the Independents la the composition 
of the Ministries than they had la the preceding phase, 
Their share of the Ministerial posts la the f irs t phase was 
only 2.49* while i t rose to 7.424 in the second. 
From the point of view of parties, we do not find any 
changes ia the third phase, i . e . the period of on party 
governments, because the Congress continued to remain la 
power during the entire period* However, during this period 
also, political Instability and infighting were reflected 
in the reconstitution of ministries and in the changing of 
Chief Ministers. 
I t i s interesting to note that the defectors' game, 
which began in full swing during the tenure of the f irst 
United Front Government, continued to be played in the 
period of mixed Coalitions also* Out of the four Chief 
Ministers ia the f i r s t phase, three were defectors. One 
government had the distinction of being a defectors' govern-
ment hundred percent. Ails was 'appropriately* headed by a 
defector himself. Table i n shows the defector* share la 
the ministerial offices during 1967*71. 
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TABLE I I I 
Showing defectors' share in the ministerial 
of f loes during 1967 - 1971* 
ft Period of Mon-I Mlaed 
Ministers 0 Congressiam ft coa l i t ions 
ft (First Phase) ft (second Phase 
cabinet Ministers 24 9 
Ministers of s tate 19 S 
Deputy Ministers 3 2 
Total 48 14 
percentage 57.83% 9.35% 
Hext to po l i t i ca l parties* the Councils of Ministers 
can be analysed from the point of view of another important 
factor in State pol i t ics* namely, castes of Ministers* 
The d e t a i l s of the castes of Ministers are given in Table!v. 
The tota l number of Ministers belonging to different castes 
from 1947 * 1977 has been shown In Table V. 
From the above Tables* i t become• d e a r that the 
Forward castes continued to have a better share in ministerial 
o f f i c e s in comparison to the Backward Castes* However* they 
did not have the same domination in the ministries* which 
they enjoyed in pre-1967 period. The Backward Castes 
succeeded in increasing their strength during the period 
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casts* 
rorwaru c a s t i ~~" 
Rajputs 12 
Bhualhar 11 
Brahmin 5 
Kayastha 3 
Showing castas of Ministers* 1967 * 1977 
I Non-Congressisa VMlxed Coalitions 90ns Party 
9 (Firs t Phase) I (second Phase) ftGovemments 
» lata T* 1 IE IEESM-
14.45 
13.25 
6.24 
.61 Total ir 3 • M M H M M 35.73 
27 
20 
11 
5 
15.78 
11*69 
6.43 
2.92 
12 
10 
17 
2 
"4T 
12.37 
10.39 
17.52 
2.62 
63 
Yadav 
Koiri 
Kurmi 
Banla 
Total 
Backward c a s t e s 
T a l l 
Nayee 
Mallah 
Bengali Backward 
8 
4 
12 
1 
25 
1 
1 
-
-
9 . 6 3 
4 .81 
14.45 
1.24 
1.24 
1.24 
-
-
21 
13 
9 
4 
— 4 7 .. 
-
1 
2 
2 
12.22 
7 .62 
5.26 
2.33 
-
Q.58 
1.16 
1.16 
7 
3 
4 
5 
19 
1 
-
2 
-
7.21 
3.91 
4.12 
5.15 
1.39 
-
2.61 
MM 
Total 
Marwari 2 
scheduled Castes 4 
Scheduled Tribes 11 
Muslins 8 
Chr i s t i an 
2.49 
4 .81 
13.25 
9 .63 
-
1 
20 
20 
15 
-
0*58 
11.69 
11.69 
8.77 
-
a, 
13 
11 
9 
1 
„. 
13.42 
11.34 
9.27 
1.39 
Total 25 56 34 
492 
Showing total number of Mini ate re belonging 
to different casta* fro* 1967 - 1977• 
castes 
I cablnsi gHlftlatersi ^ ^ » ^ 7 
j ttlalsterstof Stata } Ministers* 
UDPOr G M t M 
Rajput 
Bhumihar 
Brahmin 
Kayastha 
33 
28 
18 
8 
X7 
12 
15 
2 
1 
1 
-
-
SI 
41 
33 
10 
Total 87 46 135 
Advance 
Yadav 
Kotri 
Kurml 
Bania 
d Backwaro castes 
21 
11 
9 
4 
IS 
9 
16 
4 
36 
20 
25 
10 
Total 45 44 91 
Backward castas 
Te l l 
Nayae 
Mallah 
Bengali Backward 
Marwari 
Scheduled Castes 
Scheduled Tribes 
Muslims 
Christian 
1 
2 
-
*» 
<m 
18 
26 
22 
1 
«a> 
1 
2 
2 
13 
IS 
9 
1 
mm 
-
2 
-
1 
6 
1 
1 
«• 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
37 
42 
32 
1 
Total 69 44 11 124 
Grand Total 201 134 IS 350 
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of mixed coal i t ions possibly because out of the four Chief 
Mini s tars , tewo belonged to these castes . Bat during the 
one party governments period in the third phase, their 
share dwindled again. 
I t i s to he noted that the Raj puts* among the Forward 
Castes* continued to be in an advantageous position through-
out the whole period though the ir percentage in the ministries 
varied from phase to phase, i n the f i r s t phase they secured 
1 4 . 4 5 A of ministerial o f f i c e s , while securing 15*78$. in the 
second phase, the highest by any caste* In the third phase* 
however* they were relegated to the second place getting 
only 12.37%, when Brahmins led them by over 5%. Znsplte of 
the highest percentage* the Rajputs were not the only 
dominant caste during the f i r s t two phases because other 
cas tes had secured about equally high percentages* 
The influence of Bhumihars* another Important caste* 
which used to be in a dominant position before 1967* began 
to wane from 13.25% in the f i r s t phase to 11*69% in the 
second phase and f inal ly 10.39% in the third phase* This 
could be explained by the absence of a strong recognised 
leader l i k e sr i Krishna siaha. on the contrary* the Brahmins* 
including the Maithil Brahmins* gained from 6.24% in the 
f i r s t phase to fc>.43- la the second phase* In the third phase 
they occupied a dominant position by securing the highest 
percentage of 17.52-/. of the berths in the Councils of Ministers. 
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Among the factors possibly accounting for th i s r i se , we 
could consider (1) two Brahmin chief Ministers la the third 
phase; ( i l ) presence of a strong Brahmin Minister from 
Bihar in Union Cabinet,and ( i l l ) the consequent defection 
of a number of Brahmin leaders from the Opposition parties 
t o the Congress* 
The Kayasthas continued to be in poor strength through-
out the whole period, being only In a s l ight ly better position 
in the f i r s t phase* Their percentage in the f i r s t phase was 
3*41%, which cams down to 2.92% in the second phase* Their 
share in the third phase was 2.61°/ only, being able to secure 
only 2 out of 97 ministerial posts* The decline of the 
numerically small Kayasthas* however* was aarginai and 
re la t ive , compared to other castes which went up the ladder 
of educational and social progress faster* 
Coming to the Backward Castes* i t i s interesting to 
know that the four castes constituting the advanced segment 
among such castes cornered above 90% of ministerial posts 
in a l l phases* 
among the advanced segment of the Backward castes , 
Yadavas succeeded In getting a higher percentage of posts in 
the second and third phases* In the f i r s t phase, however, 
they got l e s s e r percentage of posts than Kurrals, another 
important advanced Backward caste* The percentage of the 
Yadavas in the f i r s t phase was 9*43%. i t rose upto 12.22% in 
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the second phase and again came down to 7.21% in the third 
phase* The Kurrais, on the other hand* got 14.45% in the 
f i r s t phase* while in the second and third phases they got 
5.26% and 4,12% respectively* another advanced Backward 
Caste# Kolri, got 4*61% In the f i r s t ptese, 7*26% in the 
second and 3*92% in the third phase* The Ban las continued 
to increase the ir percentage frost 1*24% in the f i r s t phase 
to 2*33 % in the second, and f ina l ly to 5*15% in the third 
phase* Other Backward castes were not of reach importance 
from the point of view of the composition of the ministries. 
on the whole, the Yadavas and the JCurmis appeared to be in 
an advantageous posit ion among the Backward Castes. 
The scheduled Castes continued to improve the ir 
posit ion in the Councils of Ministers from 4*81% In the 
f i r s t phase to 11.69 in tike second and then to l3*42%>next 
only to the Brahmins in the third plmse* The scheduled Tribes* 
on the other hand, had 13.25% in the f i r s t phase* However, 
their posit ion in the second and third phases remained 
s ta t i c* They secured 11*69% in the second phase and 11*34% 
in the third phase* The variations in the representation 
of scheduled Castes and Tribes In the Councils of Ministers 
appeared to re f lec t nothing beyond the manipulations for 
o f f i c e and adjustments among the s ta te leaders* I t had l i t t l e 
to do with the promotions of the welfare of the Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes concerned* 
4*6 
The Muslims secured a higher percentage of 9*e3% of 
ministerial posts during the period of non-Congress govern-
ments* in tae second phase their share came down to 8.77%, 
but during the third phase they improved the ir position by 
securing 9.27 . The scheduled Tribes having about twice the 
population of the Muslims had a larger share of seats la 
a l l phases; the ratio being 13.25%; 9.63, , 11.69% » 8.77%, 
11.34% : 9.27°/. The Scheduled Castes numerically about equal 
to the Kuslims had a larger share of ministerial positions in 
a l l phases except in the f irst* their ratio being 4.8s 9.63; 
11.63: 3.77, 13.47i 9 .27. In the case of the Muslims also as 
in the case of the scheduled Castes and Tribes* variations 
in the ministerial posit ions represented no more than super* 
f i c l a l adjustments having nothing to do with participation 
by the Muslim masses in the po l i t i ca l processes or promotion 
of the ir interests by the governments concerned. 
Another aspect of the ministries was their region-wise 
representation. Table VI makes i t c lear that the North Plains 
continued to dominate the councils of Ministers* I t was only 
in the f i r s t phase that the region got s l ight ly l e s s e r 
percentage of berths than the South Plains. However* in the 
third phase also i t s share cams down* while that of the South 
Plains went up. The tribal be l t of Chotanagpur continued to 
be under the domination of other two regions of the State. 
No Chief Ministers during the period of 1967-1977 case from 
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t h i s region. Three of the four Chief Ministers during the 
f i r s t phase belonged to the North Plains, while the one 
to the «outh Plain*. Similarly, daring the second phase, 
out of the f ive chief Ministers* four belonged to the North 
Plains and the remaining one, again, to the South Plains* 
During the period of one party governments,all chief Ministers 
came from the North Plains* Thus, ten of the twelve chief 
Ministers came from the North Plains* Hie North Plains, 
therefore* had a larger share, Including Chief Ministership* 
in a l l the three phases under the non-Congress and Congress 
governments alike* One reason for the predominance of the 
North Plains over the south Plains could be the larger area 
and population of the former which seat more members to 
the Legis lat ive Assembly. 
As far as rural/urban bases of Ministers are concerned* 
the analysis has* unfortunately* been incomplete owing to 
the non-availabil i ty of data* NO l i s t of l eg i s la tors or for 
that Biatter of Councils of Ministers* o f f i c ia l or non-
o f f i c i a l provides t h i s information* However* an attempt 
has been made to surmise and locate Ministers on rural/urban 
bases* which* again* cannot be claimsd to be accurate* As 
i s c lear from Table v n , members e lected from rural areas 
remained in dominant positions in a l l the ministries as 
well as in a l l the three phases* Urban representation in 
the Councils of Ministers ranged between 15.52% in the 
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showing r«gion«*wiaa rsprasnntation,1967-1977 
Phase 
Non-Congressl MI 
Mixed coal i t ions 
One Party Govts* 
Total 
1 north Plains! 
29 
81 
41 
151 
\ * 5 
39.18 
50. 31 
47.12 
Couth Plains dchotanagpur 
"'Mb.' 
31 
43 
a? 
101 
1 * 
41.69 
26.78 
31.34 
_ 
* 
14 
37 
19 
70 
J * 
i 8 . i l 
22.91 
21.83 
TABLE VII 
Rural/urban bases of Ministers* 1967-1977 
0 sural f Urban 
Phaaa I Huab«r i * 0 HlukbSr I ! _J ! i 
Non-congjcassiasi 64 
Mixed Coalitions 136 
One Party Governments 76 
86.48 
84.47 
87.35 
10 
25 
11 
13.51 
15.52 
13.90 
Total 276 46 
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second phase to 13*90* la the third phase* The overwhelming 
rural prof i le of the s tate (havln g only about 9 c i t i e s ) 
where students from the v i l lages poured into towns for 
col lege education, could account for rural predominance In 
the Councils of Ministers. This i s not to say that the policy 
of the governments had a rural bias or Pzomoted the interests 
of the larger section of the rural population. 
During the ent ire period of ten years* the represen-
ta t ion of women remains d vary poor* During the phase of 
non-Coagressiam, the ir representation was 1*2C% only. Ottt 
of the four Ministries , only the f i r s t UF Government 
included a woman* i n the second phase two women were "^de 
Ministers* but the ir percentage was again 1*23% only. The 
Congress-led coal i t ion was the only government which included 
thsse two women members* However* during the phase of one 
party governments* the representation of women considerably 
Improved* Nine women were made Ministers and the ir represen-
tation want up to 9.8d%. This Increase* however* did not 
appear to have any po l i t i ca l significance as i t ssde no 
impact on the po l i c i e s or the performance of the governments* 
Coming to the role of po l i t i ca l leaders in the State* 
i t should be stated tfeat since the fai lure of the Undliided 
Congress to get an overall majority in the 1967 General 
Elections* unprincipled party bosses and power-seekers found 
an excel lent opportunity to s e l l the ir membership to the 
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highest bidder. a f ter the add-term e lec t ions also* the 
s i tuat ion did not imp to v . Defections became a cardinal 
feature. About 300 acta of defection* 200 in the fir at 
phase alone* took place during th i s period. Ho l e s s than 
100 l e g i s l a t o r s changed their sides* a t least* twice* while 
l e a s t 
a few of the* did so as many as four tines* A t / 4 3 defectors 
were rewarded with ministerial posts* 
Thus* a po l i t i ca l situation developed in Bihar l a 
which some persons came to occupy the position of 'permanent • 
Ministers, NO matter which ministry was formed* they became 
Ministers because of the pivotal posit ion they occupied in 
the balance of parties by virtue of their extra-ordinary 
a b i l i t y to defect and redefect. The names of such Ministers 
were found in every l i s t of new Ministers that appeared. 
each permanent ministers were primarily interested in getting 
hold of some particular departments to serve the ir personal 
Interests* and wanted the f u l l e s t freedom to misuse their 
power and create havoc in administration. The net result 
had been a 'virtual competition' in the misuse of powers* 
espec ia l ly in natters of transfers* postings and promotions 
of o f f i c i a l s and granting l icences and permits. Changes of 
Ministries did not really sake any difference Insofar as the 
misuse of powers by Ministers and c i v i l servants were 
concerned, in fact* Ministers were busy in trying to get rich 
quickly rather than formulating State po l ic ies and ensuring 
SOI 
the i r implementation, This was true of the Congress as 
well as non-Cong cans Ministers. 
The composition of the cabinets and ministries during 
th i s period reflected the manoeuvring* of thi top pol i t ical 
leaders for loaves and f i shes . Xt was not a real represen-
tat ion of Interests of class* castes or the people of 
Bihar as a whole* Despite superficial changes in party and 
government labels* small ol igarchic group folded factions 
and continued to rule Bihar for a decade. Further* no 
uni l inear relationship can be established between caste 
and p o l i t i c a l party in Bihar in th i s period. The sections 
of the society* which were economically and social ly well-
off seem to have dispersed* Irrespective of caste and 
dominated different po l i t i ca l part ies , competing with each 
other for the spoi ls of o f f i c e . 
While the e lect ion manifestoes and programmes of 
p o l i t i c a l parties Indicated that interest art iculation and 
in teres t aggregation were moving in the right direction* 
the performance of the governments l e f t much to be desired* 
Without going into the discussion about the merit of 
spec i f ic programmes or pr ior i t i e s given to particular items* 
i t i s c lear from the data incorporated in Chapter VI that 
the governments did not l i v e up to the ir promises. They 
preacte d but they did not practise. I f "performance la the 
t e s t of legitimacy" then on th i s score* the legitimacy of 
the governments may be questioned. 
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The lack of genuineness of the government* as true 
representatives of the people was equalled by their lack 
of s tabi l i ty* The composite Table v m confirms, among 
other things* the ins tab i l i ty of the governments in Bihar 
during the period* The l i v e s of governments could be counted 
not In years but in days and Months; sons las t ing only for 
95* 47, 10 or oven for 3 days* The mean l i f e span was l e s s 
than a year* 
Similarly* the number of ministry expansions indicates 
the instabi l i ty* misdemeanour and confusion prevailing 
during t h i s period* The f i r s t UB Ministry was expanded f ive 
times in 11 months* the shoshit Dal Ministry was expanded 
four times in 47 days* the second UF Ministry was expanded 
three times in 10 days* the SSP-led SVD Ministry was expanded 
e ight times in 161 days and the Kedar Pandey Ministry was 
expanded three times in IS months* Apart from the merits 
of the claims of the leaders* the sheer number of expansions 
Indicates that emphasis was more on distribution of spoi ls 
of o f f i ce rather than on s tab i l i t y and performance by the 
governments* 
The 1974-75 protest movement did not succeed in 
getting rid of the i l l s present in Bihar pol i t ics* The 
reform movement* notwithstanding i t s marginal salutary 
e f f e c t s as indicated in chapter Viz* was I t s e l f re-forned 
in the vast quagmire of Bihar pol i t ics* This became evident 
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when the new youth leaders of th« protest movement, winning 
the 1977 Assembly e lec t ions on the Janata Party t i cke t s , 
d is i l lus ioned their voters by following la the footsteps 
of the earl lor MLAs* 
I t I s , thus* evident that without basic change* In 
the socio-economic Infrastructure, of the society In favour 
of the depressed sect ions of the society, no superficial 
polit ical , changes were going to bring about an Improvement 
l a the ir l ives* Po l i t i ca l Inst i tut ions could be misused by 
unprincipled and unscrupulous practitioners* Hero form of 
democracy without democratic s p i r i t was no guarantee In a 
backward, e l i te-r idden society that Institutions and pol i t ical 
processes would not be subverted for sectional* group or 
personal ends* This s tate of af fa irs In Bihar may be explained 
by the traditional passivity of the people arising out of 
their Indigence, I l l i teracy* broken-down health, helplessness 
la the face of autocratic pol ice and bureaucracy and their 
apathy towards their po l i t i ca l masters. The advantages of 
economic and social changes brought Into motion since 1947 
reacted only the upper strata creating new pol i t i ca l and 
social e l i t e s . The bunches of these e l i t e s * the new rich, 
caste leaders or leaders of po l i t i ca l parties played the 
game of power* 
Opinions may di f fer as to what extent and how well 
the po l i t i ca l system performed I t s functions of Interest 
SOS 
art iculat ion and aggregation* rule making, application* 
and adjudication and of communication. The result* of the 
present study indicate* however, shortcoming* in the 
functioning of the system, producing a ser ies of fai lures 
discussed in ear l ier chapters* We can, on t h i s basis* Identify 
the functioning of the Bihar po l i t i ca l system during th is 
period as undemocratic. However* as between the pol i t ica l 
system being undemocratic or pre-democratic* we would rather 
c a l l I t pre-democratic in the l i gh t of tne constitution of 
India, the basic law of the state* the declared alms and 
object ives of po l i t i ca l parties and the aspirations and 
struggles of the people* Bihar was moving away* a lbei t slowly* 
from an autocratic* exploitative* and repressive system in 
the direction of a participatory* responsible and democratic 
system. 
There was Instability* poor performance and corruption 
leading to doubts about legitimacy* but the basic f rams work 
of periodic elections* the existence of opposition parties 
and freedom of speech did not break up, Jaya Prakash's right 
to reca l l , for instance* had to give way to the Prime Ministers 
ins is tence on waiting t i l l the next elections* The system 
swayed but missed a basic change which might have been 
premature* There was mal-functioning followed by upheavals 
but they were f inal ly contained within the perimeters of a 
pre-democratic po l i t i ca l system which gave hope for the 
future* 
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